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**CADRE WORK IN VIETNAM TODAY: SITUATION AND SOLUTIONS****Tran Thi Minh Tuyet<sup>1</sup>**

**Abstract.** Cadres are the “root” of all work, and the quality of cadre work is a decisive factor in the success of the country's development strategy - this is the lesson learned from the practice not only of Vietnam but also of other countries. During the *Doi Moi* period, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) paid great attention to renovating and rectifying its cadre work. For many reasons, in addition to the achievements, the cadre work in Vietnam still has many limitations. The trend of democratization, the goal of the country's rapid and sustainable development, and the people's demands for the quality of the public administration system have brought new demands on cadres and cadre work. In this article, based on the analysis of the current situation of cadre work in the *Doi Moi* period, the author proposes a system of solutions to improve the quality of cadre work and thereby enhance the strength of the political system in Vietnam.

**Keywords:** cadre, cadre work, Communist Party of Vietnam, *Doi Moi*

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**КАДРОВАЯ РАБОТА ВО ВЬЕТНАМЕ СЕГОДНЯ: ПРОБЛЕМЫ И РЕШЕНИЯ****Чан Тхи Минь Туэт<sup>2</sup>**

**Аннотация.** Практика не только Вьетнама, но и других стран показывает, что качество кадровой работы является решающим фактором успеха стратегии развития страны. В период политики обновления (*Дой мой*) Коммунистическая партия Вьетнама (КПВ) уделяла большое внимание обновлению своей кадровой работы. Но, в силу многих причин, помимо достижений, кадровая работа во Вьетнаме имеет еще немало недостатков. Тенденция демократизации, цель быстрого и устойчивого развития страны, ожидания народа от системы государственного управления предъявили новые требования к кадрам и кадровой работе. В данной статье на основе анализа современного состояния кадровой работы в период *Дой мой* автор предлагает систему решений по повышению её качества, от которого во многом зависит прочность политической системы во Вьетнаме.

**Ключевые слова:** кадры, кадровая работа, Коммунистическая партия Вьетнама, *Дой мой*

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## Introduction

The choice of "Cadre Work in Vietnam Today: Situation and Solutions" as a research topic comes first from *the importance* of cadre work for the development of the country and the position of the ruling party. During his lifetime, President Ho Chi Minh affirmed that "the success or failure of work is due to good or bad cadres" [Ho Chi Minh 2011: 313]. Reality also proves this: The leadership role and prestige of the political party depend on two basic factors, which are its strategies and the work of the cadres, but the strategies are also determined by the cadres. The more important the cadres are, the more important the cadre work is, because it creates a team of cadres with appropriate qualities and abilities. By evaluating cadre work, it is possible to clearly understand the achievements and limitations that need to be solved in the Doi Moi process in Vietnam today.

The urgency of the issue also comes from the CPV's *new strategy* on cadre work. To achieve the major development goals, set by the CPV's 13th National Congress in the short, medium, and long term, Vietnam must deal with many complicated internal and external issues; the first is to create lines, formulate policies and implement them in the cadres in the political system. The 13th National Congress of the CPV (in 2021) for the first time made the issue of cadres an independent content in the work of building the Party. How this strategy has been implemented is a question that needs to be seriously studied and evaluated to draw lessons.

The importance of the research topic also comes from the *contemplative results* of the current cadre work in Vietnam. In 1997, the CPV issued the Resolution: "Strategy of cadres in the period of accelerating industrialization and modernization of the country". After more than 20 years of implementation, the CPV admitted: "The renewal of cadre work has not yet made a major breakthrough" [CPV 2016: 194]; indeed, several weaknesses and limitations in cadre work are becoming increasingly apparent. This is the fundamental reason why "the cadre in our political system is large but not strong" [CPV 2018: 47] and "the capacity of cadres is not equal" [CPV 2021b: 196]. This situation raises questions: Why are the strategies, policies, and practical results not commensurate? What has hindered and is hindering the process of "cleaning up" the cadres? It is necessary to identify the causes to find solutions.

For the above reasons, understanding cadre work in Vietnam is of theoretical and practical importance.

## Literature review

The CPV is the only ruling party in Vietnam, so cadre work is the Party's work. The CPV's Eighth National Congress (1996) set the strategy: "the whole Party must take care of building a contingent of cadres" [CPV 1996: 51]. Because of the importance of cadre work in the country's development strategy, this issue has become the "focus" that attracts the attention of domestic and foreign political activists and researchers.

The content of cadre work is very broad, including the building of cadres and the process of evaluating, training, managing, rotating, appointing, employing, promoting, rewarding, and disciplining cadres from the central level to the grassroots level. As a result, researchers often analyze what they consider to be the most "prominent", and politicians often discuss the work they do directly. Some examples of this are the following studies.

With the view that bureaucracy is the most dangerous but also the most unavoidable syndrome of a ruling party, Truong Thi Thong, Le Kim Viet have published the book "Bureaucracy in cadre work in our country nowadays – Situation, causes and solutions" [2008]. The authors emphasized that bureaucracy in cadre work leads to inaccurate evaluation of cadres and cadre work, so every

“step” in cadre work is misleading. To reverse this situation, it is necessary to democratize and publicize all stages of cadre management; it is necessary to overcome the view that cadre work is a secret task that only a few responsible people have the right to know, discuss and decide.

In the organizational structure of the CPV, the Central Committee’s Organization Commission is the advisory body for cadre work and plays a very important role. From practical experience, some leaders of this agency have given their views on the work they have overseen. In 2009, Tran Dinh Hoan, former head of the Organization Commission of the Central Committee in 2001–2006, edited and published the book “Evaluation, planning, rotation of leaders and managers in the period of industrialization and modernization our country” [2009]. Although the author analyzed only three “stages” in cadre work, which are evaluation, planning and rotation of cadres, the author emphasized that the quality of these “stages” depends greatly on the person who has the authority to perform these tasks. With the same idea, in the article: “Continue to innovate strongly and synchronously in cadre work to meet the requirements of new tasks” published in the Communist Review, No. 823 (May 2011), To Huy Rua – Head of the Organizing Commission of the Central Committee for the term of the Twelfth National Congress of the CPV (2016–2021) made the following conclusion: In order to renew cadre work strongly and synchronously, many solutions must be implemented, but above all it is necessary to build a team of qualified cadres to do cadre work [To Huy Rua 2011: 11–13]. However, there is still no satisfactory answer on how to have such a team of cadres.

The lack of power control in cadre work has led to the situation of “finding ways” for position and power, which has deprived good cadres of opportunities. The Thirteenth National Congress of the CPV put forward the strategy of «strengthening the inspection and supervision of cadre work, which relates to the control of power, and preventing the “finding of ways” for position and power» [CPV 2021a: 190]. Therefore, the book “Strengthening control of power in cadre work in the current period” edited by the Minister of Home Affairs, Pham Thi Thanh Tra, has caught our attention. There are many solutions that have been raised, but it is worth noting that: “the head must first take responsibility for any violation or failure to direct the handling when there are signs of violation in the work of cadres at agencies, units, and localities under his/her direct management” [Phạm Thi Thanh Tra 2022: 25].

As one of the few countries currently maintaining a socialist regime, Vietnam's development in general and its personnel issues in particular have attracted the attention of many international researchers. They focus most of their attention on corruption among Vietnamese leaders because only officials with positions and power can be corrupt. They assert that “corruption in the party is the major threat to its legitimacy to rule Vietnam” [Onishi 2023]. Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet in the article “Public Political Criticism in Vietnam, 1990s–2018” in the book “Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Vietnam” edited by Jonathan D. London, stated: “...corruption is a significant reason for Vietnamese authorities’ passivity” [London 2023: 67]. When discussing the issue of corruption in Vietnam, the research of E.V. Kobelev and V.M. Mazyrin is most notable because they have given a comprehensive analysis of the corruption and anti-corruption situation in Vietnam, such as: definition, causes, manifestations, characteristics, harms, anti-corruption strategies and policies of the CPV and the Government of Vietnam, and several “big” cases, etc. As the authors claim, corruption in Vietnam has become a challenge for the ruling CPV, and the fight against corruption has also helped to strengthen the positions of the CPV leaders who have fought against it [Kobelev, Mazyrin 2021].

The issue of senior strategic officials, often called “the four Pillars” of Vietnam, is also an aspect that has attracted great attention from foreign researchers. In the article “Vietnam’s Communist

Party elects stability but overturns internal rules”, Philip Degenhardt wrote that, the fact that General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong was re-elected for a third term contradicts the CPV's rule that a person can only hold this position for a maximum of two terms; the nomination of Pham Minh Chinh as Prime Minister also breaks the “unwritten norm” that a Prime Minister should have previously held the position of Deputy Prime Minister. The author argues that the violation of the “two-term rule” may set a precedent for clinging to power, making it difficult for young cadres to rise through the ranks [Degenhardt 2021]. V.N. Kolotov, in an article titled: “The development strategy of Vietnam in the documents of the 13th congress of the CPV”, takes the opposite view, arguing that Nguyen Phu Trong's remaining in the position of General Secretary will ensure political stability, promote the fight against corruption, and “the purge of the cadres will open opportunities for new personnel.” Of the 200 members of the CPV's 13th Central Committee, 120 were re-elected and 80 were elected for the first time. At the same time, there is a serious rejuvenation of personnel in this “stage” [Kolotov 2021: 36–37].

The different assessment of cadre work in Vietnam makes us take a “multidimensional” view in our research.

### **Situation of cadres work in Vietnam**

The cadre work in Vietnam for nearly 40 years of Doi Moi has been mixed between achievements and limitations.

#### ***About the achievements***

The first achievement is that the CPV *has made many in-depth decisions on key issues of cadre work*. The Sixth National Congress of the CPV, which ushered in the Doi Moi period, emphasized: “Renovating leadership cadres at all levels is the most important link that our Party must firmly grasp in order to promote reforms of revolutionary significance” [CPV 1987: 132]. Considering cadre work as the “key task of key tasks”, the Political Bureau and the Secretariat issued 142 documents from 1996 to 2016 alone, including 7 thematic resolutions, 7 directives, 18 conclusions, 52 rules and regulations, 17 notices, and 41 guidelines on cadre work [Pham Minh Chinh 2018]. From the Twelfth National Congress of the CPV to the present, the Political Bureau and the Central Committee have issued many important resolutions and directives on this issue. In order to reorganize the cadres, on October 25, 2017, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee of the CPV issued Resolution 18-NQ/TW on issues related to the further renovation and reorganization of the political system to make it lean, effective and efficient. On September 23, 2019, to repel the situation of “finding ways” in cadre work, the Political Bureau issued Regulation 205-QĐ/TW on controlling power in cadre work and against “finding ways” for position, for power. With the goal of transparency in building cadres at the strategic level, on February 2, 2020, the Political Bureau issued Regulation 214-QĐ/TW on the framework of standards for titles and criteria for evaluating cadres under the leadership of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat. At the time of preparation for the Thirteenth National Congress of the CPV on March 20, 2020, the Central Committee issued Directive 03-HĐ/TW on several specific issues to implement the regulations on elections within the Party. At the CPV's Thirteenth National Congress, the Party clearly defined the goal of “focusing on building a contingent of cadres at all levels, especially at the strategic level, who are qualified, capable, reputable, and equal to their tasks, ensuring a steady and continuous transition between generations of cadres” [CPV 2021b: 242]. After the Thirteenth National Congress of the CPV, when the number of disciplined cadres continued to increase, the Political Bureau issued Notice of Conclusion 20-TB/TW on September 8, 2022, on the strategy of arranging work for cadres

under the leadership of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat after being disciplined, in the spirit of encouraging them to resign voluntarily; otherwise, the competent authorities will consider dismissing them without waiting for the end of their term. The above-mentioned resolutions, regulations and directives have laid a legal foundation for the renewal and improvement of cadre work throughout the political system.

Based on the implementation of the CPV's strategies, *the "stages" of cadre work have been continuously improved and ordered*. The classification and evaluation of cadres is carried out annually, before the planning, rotation, and appointment of cadres. The vote of confidence has gradually become routine. Cadre planning has been carried out relatively methodically at all levels, including personnel planning for the Political Bureau, the Secretariat, the Central Committee, etc. Training and retraining of cadres, especially those planned at the strategic level, is highly valued. Cadres are rotated on a regular basis. The structure of age, gender, ethnicity, field in the cadre is more reasonable. Thanks to relatively dynamic cadres, Vietnam is a country with a high growth rate, even in the context of the Covid-19 epidemic.

The CPV has focused on *promoting the role of leaders and building a contingent of strategic-level cadres*. In the CPV's structure and political system, cadres at the strategic level are the people at the highest level in the "tower" of personnel. From the Fourth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPV, the CPV noted that the contingent of cadres at strategic level "has not been built fundamentally..., leading to shortfalls, patchwork, asynchrony and inactive in the arrangement and assignment of cadres" [CPV 2012: 18–19]. The Seventh Plenum of the CPV's Twelfth Central Committee (May 2018) issued Resolution 26-NQ/TW on Focusing on building a contingent of cadres, especially those at the strategic level, who are qualified, capable and reputable, on par with their tasks, which clearly defines: "Building a contingent of cadres, especially strategic level ones, is the most important and important task of the Party, which must be carried out regularly, carefully, scientifically, rigorously and effectively" [CPV 2018: 54]. In the context of the international communist movement's decline and Vietnam's severe socio-economic crisis, the undeniable achievements of Doi Moi in Vietnam have indirectly demonstrated the leadership ability of strategic level cadres, especially the General Secretary.

One of the achievements of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong is *the work to prevent and combat corruption and negativity*. Under his direct direction, the Central Steering Committee on Anti-corruption was established in 2012. After more than 10 years, the fight against corruption has made some remarkable achievements. The anti-corruption agencies at the central, provincial, and municipal levels have been increasingly strengthened. The functions of these agencies have been expanded from anti-corruption to anti-corruption and anti-negativity. The activities of detecting and dealing with corrupt officials have achieved remarkable results. In 2022, the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, the Secretariat, and the Central Committee Inspection Commission disciplined 47 officials under the leadership of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat (an increase of 15 cases over the previous year); dismissed 5 members of the Central Committee; dismissed 2 vice premiers and 3 vice ministers. In January 2023, President Nguyen Xuan Phuc resigned because he was responsible for the corrupt behavior of his subordinates and related persons. The rate of asset recovery in corruption cases also increases year by year. The fight against corruption has been extended to the non-governmental sector. E.V. Kobelev, V.M. Mazyrin estimated: "During 2012–2020, the CPV leadership has taken significant efforts to reveal and put an end to corruption in the state sector... These efforts have brought certain positive shifts assisting to detect a set of big cases in the highest levels of government [Kobelev, Mazyrin 2021: 37].



*About limitations*

In addition to the results achieved, the cadre work in Vietnam in general still has many limitations, some of which are quite worrisome.

*First*, there are still shortcomings in all “stages” of cadre work.

*The evaluation of cadres* has been the weakest “stage” for a long time, but so far the evaluation criteria are still general, difficult to quantify and do not provide a reliable basis for purifying, deploying and appointing cadres, except for the state of fear of criticism and flattery of superiors.

*Cadre planning* still lacks comprehensiveness and connectivity, and it is not dynamic and open. Somewhere there is still a state of “hanging planning”, which means that cadres are owed standards because of personal bias. The training of cadres has not yet connected theory with reality, and the status of “fake studies, real degrees” is quite common. The rotation of cadres often does not take individual ability into account; the rotation period is often so short that it is only used to “stamp” cadres who have passed the rotation to qualify for appointment to higher positions. The recruitment and promotion of cadres has also led to several negative developments. The policy of attracting talents, especially those who are not members of the CPV, has been established, but it has not been concretized and actualized by appropriate mechanisms and policies.

*The CPV's inspection, supervision, and discipline* were lax in many places. The cadre system and policies are slowly being updated to meet the requirements of reality. Weaknesses in cadre work are slowly being studied to learn lessons for practical guidance.

*Second*: there are many “diseases” in cadre work.

The most prominent “disease” is the “*finding the ways*” for position, for power in many forms: “finding the ways” to position before being elected; “finding the ways” to power before being assigned the task; “finding the ways” to profit before being assigned to the budget; “finding the ways” to position before being appointed; “finding the ways” to get relief before being investigated or tried, and so on. Even not stopping at “finding the ways for titles”, but sometimes “bidding for titles”, meaning whoever bids the highest will win. This is really an act of corruption of power. Because promotion is through “finding the ways”, after being elected, they must recover their “capital” through corruption. The money for “finding the ways” comes from corruption and trying to get money from corruption.

The “disease” of *nepotism, localism, factionalism*, etc. is also of great concern. In Vietnam, hiring family members into the unit is not prohibited by law and is sometimes enforced as an “internal priority” policy to motivate incumbents. As a result, many high-ranking cadres have used their positions to place their relatives or family members in good positions in the public system. This situation has reduced the opportunities for honest people to strive, weakened the cadre contingent, and caused internal dissension.

The “disease” of people with *meritorious service looking down on young people* still exists in cadre work. Generational transfer is a normative issue, but the CPV’s Thirteenth National Congress admitted: “The proportion of young leaders and members of the Central Committee of CPV has not yet reached the set target” [CPV 2021b: 196].

A new “disease” that has been talked about a lot recently is “*term thinking*”, that is, using the working term for personal gain. The most obvious manifestation of this “disease” is that leaders at the end of their tenure or before changing positions often sign decisions on the recruitment and appointment of many cadres without following the rules. On the other hand, leaders who are eligible for re-election in the new term often avoid complicated tasks for fear of “losing votes”.

*Third*: there are several paradoxes in cadre work.

That is the paradox *between the policy of streamlining the organizational apparatus and the political system and the fact that they are still quite cumbersome with overlapping functions*. To implement the policy of downsizing the cadres, many units have been merged, but most of them have been merged mechanically; the number of units has been reduced, but the number of affiliated organizations within them has been increased. The goal of reducing the number of cadres in many localities and agencies has not been achieved. In some units, people who are not relatives or family members are excluded even though they are capable.

It's the paradox *of the right process and the wrong people*. The CPV has specific and very strict regulations on the 5-step process for selecting personnel or appointing cadres. Formally, all the steps are reasonable and systematic, and the procedures and order are complete. However, after being appointed, many cadres soon revealed their mistakes. This shows that the appointment process is still formal, and the right person has not been selected.

The appointment of cadres in big cities (the economic and political centers of Vietnam), has been given great attention and consideration, but the results are still not very accurate. The leaders of large cities such as Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and Da Nang have been carefully selected, but some of them have been disciplined and even prosecuted. This is a serious shortcoming in Vietnam's cadre work.

*Fourth:* the fight against corruption and negativity has not been as effective as expected.

When “corruption penetrated into minds and working style of state officials, and of the high rank CPV members” [Kobelev, Mazyrin 2021: 29], the fight against corruption is not only long, but also extremely arduous. For a long time, the exposure of corruption cases was largely reported by the press and ordinary people, not by internal struggles. Institutions aimed at preventing and combating corruption and negativity are not tight and deterrent enough. The rate of asset recovery in corruption cases is very low compared to the amount to be recovered. Some persons under investigation have even fled abroad. When the anti-corruption work is promoted, many cadres, due to “fear of wrong”, “fear of responsibility” or the realization that they can no longer have personal benefits, worked without effort, did not want to take personal responsibility.

### ***Solutions to improve the efficiency of today's cadre work***

To improve the efficiency of cadre work to meet the requirements and tasks of the new period, it is necessary to carry out synchronous solutions, which are:

*First*, improve the responsibilities of CPV leaders at all levels in terms of cadre work. According to the General Statistics Office, Vietnam's population will reach 100 million by April 2023 (GSO 2023). If there are still no talents among Vietnam's 100 million people, it is the responsibility of the leader; they must have good quality and ability to utilize and gather a contingent of qualified cadres.

*Second*, continue to institutionalize, concretize, and standardize the CPV's strategies and policies on cadre work. One of the reasons for the difficulties in cadre work is the inadequacy of institutions and sanctions. There is a need to create a synchronized legal framework, especially specific regulations on evaluation, recruitment, management of cadres, declaration of assets, etc., to fight corruption. Decentralization must go hand in hand with a mechanism to bind responsibility and improve accountability. It is necessary to further improve the cadre election system in the direction of expanding the right to nominate and stand for election. Questioning and voting of confidence in the CPV should be conducted openly, as in the National Assembly, so that everyone can monitor it.

*Third*, it is necessary to continue to innovate vigorously and synchronously in all “stages” of cadre work.

The evaluation of cadres is the first “stage” in cadre work, but it is the weakest “stage” at present, so it must be renewed quickly. In addition to improving the quality of the evaluators, the evaluation must be based on the standards of the title, the specific quality of the work and especially the confidence of the person being evaluated. It is also necessary to bind the responsibility of the evaluator to avoid subjective and emotional evaluations.

To improve the quality of cadre planning, those involved in planning must be challenged in many positions and closely monitored so that the organization can make the right choice.

To train and retrain cadres, the selection of trainees must meet the right goals and standards, the quality of the team of trainers must be improved. It is necessary to link the training and retraining of cadres with the use and effectiveness of use. It is necessary to improve the national program of training and retraining of cadres and promote international cooperation in training to develop high-quality human resources.

The rotation of cadres must overcome the “disease” of “finding ways” for rotation, that is, influencing others to move to a position with favorable working conditions, the position that can be the basis for reaching a higher rank.

Regarding the arrangement, appointment, and use of cadres, this is the “destination” of “finding the ways” for position and power, so it is necessary to increase transparency and publicity in the recruitment and appointment of cadres through various forms of examination, reviewing the work project and collecting opinions, especially from the people where the cadres work. It is also necessary to develop a national strategy on talents in the direction of not discriminating against CPV members as long as they bring benefits to the common work.

As for the cadre policy, it is necessary to reduce the number of cadres and reform wages in the following direction: Salary must be related to the results of work and the job title; salary should be the main income that can ensure a sufficient living standard for workers and their families; further narrow the wage gap between the public and private sectors.

In short, each “stage” of cadre work must continue to innovate and improve.

*Fourth*, a mechanism for controlling power must be established to prevent and overcome the limitations of cadre work. Uncontrolled power will lead to autocracy or abuse of power. Therefore, it is necessary to build a multidimensional power control mechanism. That is: It must be controlled both institutionally and morally; it must be controlled internally by the inspection and supervision of the CPV and the state, and externally by the supervision of all and the press; it must be controlled from the top down and from the bottom up, and it must combine organizational control with individual self-control. In the current period, it is necessary to strengthen the supervision over the implementation of the principle of democratic centralism in cadre work, and strictly deal with manifestations of “corruption of power”.

*Fifth*, it is necessary to improve the quality of cadres in cadre work. Those who directly participate in cadre work and advise on it must be aware of this: The work they do affects the destiny of the people, the organization and, in a broader sense, the country. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the CPV to select the right people for cadre work. Once selected, they must be trained and retrained to improve their professional skills and treated appropriately so as not to be selfish in the performance of their official duties.



### **Conclusion**

During nearly 40 years of Doi Moi, the CPV has paid great attention to cadre work, but the results are still a mixed bag of achievements and limitations. In some respects, the limitations are even more obvious. We believe that the decline in the ideology and revolutionary morality of some cadres and the weakness of the power control mechanism in the CPV are the main reasons for this situation. It can be said that the development of a market economy without paying enough attention to the cultivation of culture and morality has led to the emergence of a mentality of materialism, the desire to get rich at any cost and the change of “moral standards” in several cadres. The results correspond with the assessment of E.V. Kobelev, V.M. Mazyrin: many objects of the state property fell into the hands of high-ranking cadres and “red capitalists” are formed [Kobelev, Mazyrin 2021: 31]. Technically, these cadres are still communists, they still have the membership card of the CPV, but the political ideology and revolutionary morality have deteriorated within them. Because of personal and group interests, all processes in cadre work can be “distorted”, leading to deviation. The discipline and persecution of several cadres under the leadership of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee also showed that the recession has spread to the cadres at the strategic level. It can be said that of the four risks of the Vietnamese revolution identified by the CPV since 1994, the risks of corruption and deviation from socialism both exist in cadre work and complement each other.

Cadre work is the work of the CPV. Article 4 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam not only affirms the leadership of the CPV over the State and society, but also defines the responsibility of the CPV to the Vietnamese people for its decisions. Therefore, the CPV must take responsibility for the limitations of the cadres' work under its leadership. The CPV must dare to face the truth, speak the truth, and not avoid the negativity that exists in the cadre work. It is necessary to speed up the process of improving the power control mechanism in cadre work so that no one in a position of power can violate the rules. The people's evaluation of and trust in cadres is the most accurate measure of the quality and ability of cadres. Therefore, the law on people's supervision must be promulgated soon, so that the people can play their supervisory role and, on this basis, filter out unsuitable cadres. Changing the “quality” of cadres, preventing, and overcoming limitations in cadre work is an urgent requirement for Vietnam today.

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