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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM: EMPOWERING NATIONAL PROGRESS

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The authors of the monograph are Russian and Vietnamese researchers.

The book discusses various aspects of the CPV activities.

The monograph consists of three parts. The first part analyzes the Communist Party's domestic policy in the process of Renovation and development (1986—2021). The second part shows the Party's guidance of socio-economic and cultural reform of Vietnamese society. The third one describes the foreign policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the foreign relations of Vietnam. The digest discusses the CPV strategy and the results of its internal and external management, as well as achievement of socio-economic progress under the guidance of the CPV.

The monograph is addressed to research-workers, teachers and students studying Vietnam, as well as to practical experts specifically involved in the development of relations with Vietnam, and to a wide range of readers. The assessments and conclusions in the monograph are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Center for Vietnam and ASEAN Studies.

Keywords: Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), domestic and external policy, ideology, socio-economic and demographic trends, national-patriotic education, youth, cultural construction.

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Introduction Chapter

CONTENT AND METHODS OF THE CPV LEADERSHIP: SOME THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES

The content and method of ruling of the Communist Party of Vietnam is an issue of special significance in the overall development of Vietnam. The article contributes to clarifying the concept of the ruling Party, the ruling method; and points out the position and role of the Party's ruling method in the mechanism of realizing the Party's leadership goals. The article clarifies the actual situation of the content and the method of ruling of the Communist Party of Vietnam over organizations in the political system and in a number of key fields.

Keywords: content and method, leadership, Communist Party of Vietnam.

Introduction

In the world, the issue of the ruling Party has been studied for a long time. In the condition that a single Party leads the State and society, there are still many debates about the ruling Party in terms of theory. This issue is even more complicated in practice, from the ruling position, the legitimacy of the ruling Party, governing content, or method of governance to the relationships and interactions among elements of the ruling Party's structure.

The content and method of ruling by the Communist Party of Vietnam is not a new issue, but due to the new requirements and tasks of *Doi moi*, the situation in the country and the world changes rapidly and unpredictably, which requires us to have a new perception, a new scientific and more practical approach to enhance the ruling role of the Party, to build the Party and a clean and strong State. The article will clarify some theoretical and practical issues about the content and method of ruling of the Commu-

nist Party of Vietnam; propose solutions to strengthen the Party's leadership and ruling capacity to meet the development requirements of the new period.

The concept of the ruling Party and the ruling method

During his lifetime, President Ho Chi Minh did not clearly State the concept of the ruling Party, but through his articles and speeches, it showed that the Party's rule was a concept associated with power. According to him, to rule also means to hold power, which means to have power in reality. In Vietnam, the Party holding power also means the people holding the power, because the Party is only a representative force, representing the entire people. Cadres and Party members in the State apparatus have power, but that power belongs to the people. The people elect representatives to act on their behalf. This is a feature of the ruling Party in Vietnam today. This is not possible for the ruling parties in many countries around the world, where the ruling Party represents only one force in many different forces of classes and strata of people in society.

The ruling Party is the Party that has state power, holds State power and implements its program and goals through state activities. That is true for all ruling parties, which includes the ruling Communist Party. Specifically:

- 1) The Party must hold legislative power, through which it turns the contents of the Party's policies and programs into state policies and laws.
- 2) The Party must hold executive power. When the views and goals of the ruling Party have been institutionalized into state policies and laws, the implementation in social life must be done through the executive apparatus. In order to implement policies and laws effectively, the ruling Party must hold the top position of the executive branch such as the President, the Prime Minister and important government ministries.
- 3) The Party must have influence over the judiciary. Unlike the legislative and executive branch which the Party needs to dominate and directly lead, the judiciary branch is independent; it only obeys the law through state activities. However, the Party has a certain influence to help the judiciary branch ensure justice, the supremacy of the law and the legal basis for the Party's rule. In addition, the Party also needs to influence the mass media, socio-political and socio-professional organizations of the people in the field of civil society to ensure the socio-political base for the ruling.

Thus, in essence, the Party's rule is by the State and through which the State in order to control and rule violence power, economic power and in-

tellectual-cultural power to exercise political power. A progressive Party must aim to rule by intellectual and cultural power, which is the trend of political civilization and is also the fundamental strength of the ruling Party.

The ruling method is a combination of methods, means and measures to legitimize political power in public power which is present in the form of state power; the transformation of class ideology into legal institutions and state power organization models; mechanism to effectively use legislative, executive and judicial powers to realize the Party's goals and ideals. The ruling method is regulated by the ruling philosophy, the overall model of the political system, and the goals of governance. The Party's ruling methods include:

- 1) designing the centralized state organization model in accordance with the one-Party political structure model in order to optimize the legitimization of political power in public power;
- 2) selection of personnel as representatives in elections to the state apparatus is done in association with determining the percentage of Party members and personnel structure in each state agency that the Party have to control and dominate. This is done so as not to create a threat for the ruling position of the Party;
- 3) establishing a mechanism to use legislative, executive and judicial powers to realize the will of the Party, focusing on public policy and public resource allocation, in order not to let “interest groups” manipulate or take advantage of;
- 4) institutionalizing the Party's Platform and guidelines fully, comprehensively, and consistently into laws and policies, and exercising power by law;
- 5) implementing effective control of state power;
- 6) strictly managing Party members in the state apparatus, exercising power by the Party's discipline regime;
- 7) institutionalizing class ideology into the ruling moral code as a basis for binding responsibility and loyalty of Party members to the Party, to the Fatherland, and using virtue to govern.

The position and role of the Party's ruling method in the mechanism of realizing the Party's leadership goals

The Party's ruling method plays a very important role in ensuring the effectiveness of the Party's leadership for the State and society, specifically:

First, a reasonable ruling method ensures the optimization of the Party's leadership capacity for the State and society, effectively using state power to realize the Party's goals and ideals. In the condition that there is a government and leadership through the State is the most basic content, the ruling method directly affects the effectiveness of leadership. A reasonable ruling method allows the achievement of goals on time. It also makes sure that the legislative, executive and judicial powers are used in harmony between the will of the Party and the people, and public resources of the State are allocated and used properly.

Second, the ruling method ensures the legitimacy of the Party's leadership over the State, legitimizes the Party's political decisions and forces the whole society to obey. The Party's power is political power, has the value of compulsion within the Party. In order for the whole society to obey, it is necessary to legitimize political power in public power, which is expressed in the form of State power. Only by being represented in State power does the Party have the legal and legitimate power to exercise its leadership role over all sectors of society. Through the State, the Party institutionalizes the program and guidelines into laws and policies, forcing the entire society to obey.

Third, a reasonable ruling method ensures the unity between the political domination function and the social function of the State. To perform the function of political domination, the will of the Party must be embodied in all aspects of the organizations and operation of the State; to perform social functions, all state policies must meet the needs and aspirations of the entire society. It is essential to create an institutional environment and space for non-members to participate in state management through appropriate forms.

Fourth, a reasonable ruling method also makes the political system simple, effective and efficient. A ruling method is considered reasonable when it allows the maximization of political power to be represented in public power, simplifies unnecessary structures, and minimizes the middle layers in leadership and governance.

Fifth, with a reasonable ruling method, state power is effectively controlled, Party members participating in the state apparatus do not fall into the trap of "group interests", a pragmatic lifestyle, and break away from the Party's guidelines. An unreasonable ruling method will lead to a divide and conflicts among legislative, executive and judicial powers, insufficient concentration to institutionalize the Party's Platform and guidelines, and inability to control interest groups that manipulate public policies and the allocation of public resources.

Current status of the content and method of ruling of the Communist Party of Vietnam today

The current situation of the content and method of the Party's ruling over the State

In order to successfully lead the *Doi moi* process, the Communist Party of Vietnam has gradually innovated the contents and methods of ruling. The Communist Party of Vietnam leads the State and society with political-legal contents that express in depth the position and ruling role of the Party. With that mission, the Communist Party of Vietnam has oriented to build the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as a socialist rule of law state of the People, by the People, for the People¹. In the guidelines and resolutions of the Party, the state apparatus is constantly being renewed and perfected in the context of building a socialist-oriented market economy and international integration.

The socialist rule of law state of Vietnam is a state in which state power is unified, with assignment, coordination and control among state agencies in the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial powers², and is led by a single Party — the Communist Party of Vietnam. The outstanding feature is that the awareness of democracy, rule of law, publicity, transparency, and respect for the law in the content and methods of leadership and governance of the Party over the State has been gradually improved.

The current situation of the content and method of the Party's ruling over the National Assembly

Regarding the content of the Party's ruling over the National Assembly: The Party directly decides the orientation of organization and operation of the National Assembly; the Party decides the direction and program of law-making, decides on important issues for the National Assembly to discuss and approve in accordance with the statutory order, ensuring the scientific, objective, and precise expression of the will, aspirations and interests of all classes of people; the Party decides on major guidelines and solutions for the National Assembly to conduct supervision over state agencies, local authorities, and titles elected by the National Assembly.

The method of the Party's ruling over the National Assembly has been gradually renewed. In constitutional and legislative activities, the Party's le-

¹ Quốc hội (2013). *Hiến pháp nước Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam*. Khoản 1, điều 2.

² Ibid.

adership and governance focuses on the task of leading the National Assembly to timely and properly institutionalize the guidelines, policies, viewpoints and development orientations of the country in all areas of the nation into legal provisions, ordinances and resolutions; the Party respects and listens to the opinions of National Assembly deputies. In deciding important issues of the country, the Party's leadership and power over the National Assembly is carried out according to the Party's policy-making method — the National Assembly discusses and decides according to its authority.

Although the content and methods of governance have been renewed, the National Assembly's operation reform still has many shortcomings considering the requirements of integration.

The current situation of the content and method of the Party's ruling over the Government

Regarding the content of the Party's ruling over the Government: The Party leads to ensure that the Government performs well the roles, functions, tasks and powers of the Government; leads the consolidation of the Government's organization; leads the personnel work of the Government, ministries and ministerial-level agencies; and leads the state administrative reform work of the Government, ministries and ministerial-level agencies.

Regarding the Party's method of ruling over the Government: The Politburo and the Secretariat directly leads and directs, and at the same time, through the Government Party Personnel Committee, the Party Personnel Committees of ministries and ministerial-level agencies, thoroughly communicates and institutionalizes the guidelines and strategies of the Party, policies, laws and resolutions of the National Assembly into legal documents and organizes the implementation of state management in all fields.

However, the inspection and supervision role of the Party still has to directly replace the self-control mechanism of the Government and the state administrative system; the roles and responsibilities between the collective and individual leaders have not been clearly defined.

The current situation of the content and method of the Party's ruling over the People's Councils at all levels

Regarding the ruling content of the Party over the People's Councils at all levels: The governing content is defined more clearly and more specifically in terms of the organization and operation of the People's Councils at all levels to ensure stability and development, especially the communicati-

on, concretization and good implementation of the guidelines of the Party, policies and laws of the State.

Regarding the Party's method of ruling over the People's Councils at all levels: Local Party committees at all levels have thoroughly grasped the principles of centralization, democracy, compliance with the law, ensuring scientific method and rigor in their leadership and direction for the People's Council to ensure appropriate decisions. This has promoted economic, cultural and social development, and strengthened the government.

However, the guidelines, resolutions, laws and regulations in consolidating and improving the quality of the organizational apparatus, and in doing human resources work in the agencies of the People's Councils at all levels are still lacking specificity.

The current situation of the content and method of the Party's ruling over the People's Committees at all levels

Regarding the contents of the Party's governing method over the People's Committees at all levels: The Party Committees and Standing Committees of the Party Committees shall lead the People's Committees of the same level to perform the functions and tasks of the People's Committees well, especially in building resolutions, policies and working plans in order to well implement the Party's viewpoints and guidelines, the state's policies and laws, resolutions of the Party congresses and of the committees, standing committees of their respective levels.

The method of the Party's ruling over the People's Committees at all levels is to closely follow the requirements and tasks in the guidelines of the Party and policies and laws of the State to direct the People's Committees to implement. Party committees at all levels orient and decide on major policies in accordance with the legal process, which is becoming more democratic and less restrictive. Party committees at all levels have directly and comprehensively led personnel work, and the management team has increasingly improved their quality.

Although in recent years, there have been many changes in the leadership and direction of the Party committees and organizations at all levels using guidelines and resolutions for the activities of the People's Committees at all levels, the effectiveness and efficiency is not high. In the operation, management and administration of the People's Committees at all levels, some places have not strictly observed the guidelines, resolutions and the leadership and administration of the Party committees.

*The current situation of the content and method of the Party's ruling
ver the People's Court and the People's Procuracy*

About the contents of the Party's ruling over the People's Courts and People's Procuracies: The Party sets out guidelines, orientations and directions for policies and major undertakings on judicial work and judicial reform. The Party leads and directs competent agencies and organizations to implement, communicate, mobilize and persuade officials and people to implement guidelines in the field of justice.

Regarding the Party's method of ruling over the People's Courts and People's Procuracies: During the ruling process, by resolutions, directives and conclusions, the Party has closely led judicial activities on politics, organization and personnel, step by step limiting the situation where the Party committees loosen their leadership or interfere improperly in judicial activities.

However, the role of leadership and direction of all levels of Party committees and organizations in the process of implementing judicial reform tasks in some judicial agencies and localities is still limited. In some places, the role is still loose and the implementation has not been regularly inspected.

*The current situation of the content and method of the Party's ruling
in the economy*

Regarding the content of the Party's ruling in the economic field, the main focus has been on formulating major policies and orientations for reforming and improving the socialist-oriented market economy. The Party leads in building and perfecting the socialist rule of law state in economic management and development and leads the innovation of personnel work to serve the cause of economic development.

The Party's ruling method in the economic field: The Party governs by issuing resolutions and directives, on that basis, the state institutionalizes them into mechanisms, policies and laws to manage the economy.

In fact, theoretical research and innovation of the Party's thinking and awareness, and the process of concretizing it into guidelines, policies and their implementation still have many shortcomings. The work of building and perfecting the rule of law state with economic institutional reform has not been synchronized.

*The current situation of the content and method of the Party's ruling
in the fields of national defense, security and foreign affairs*

1) In the field of national defense and security: The Party's perception of its absolute and direct leadership role in all aspects and the state's mana-

gement of the armed forces; national defense, security and defense tasks is constantly developing and being perfected to suit the actual situation in the country and the world. 2) In the field of foreign affairs, the Party has renewed its strategic awareness of the current times, of the world and of the region, the awareness is becoming clearer and more comprehensive. The goals and tasks of foreign affairs are more in depth, and national interests and development goals are top priorities.

The current situation of methods and contents of the Party's ruling over the army, police and foreign affairs: 1) For the army and police: The ruling role of the Party is strengthened through organizational and personnel work. It is the unification of Party and government organizations in the army and police, ensuring absolute and direct leadership in all aspects of Party organizations; 2) For the field of foreign affairs: First of all, the ruling Party conducts foreign affairs tasks through directives and resolutions on foreign affairs and international integration, defines foreign affairs objectives and tasks for the benefit of the nation; development goals are top priorities. Motto and major orientations are determined for foreign affairs, from which the state institutionalizes and concretizes into strategies, programs, plans, projects for foreign affairs and international integration and organizes implementation for all levels and sectors.

In fact, the organization and coordination of the implementation of the two strategic tasks of national construction and defense by Party organizations and state administrations has been ineffective in some aspects. Foreign affairs and international economic integration have not been active and effective, and have not taken advantage of opportunities to overcome challenges in the integration process.

*The current situation of the content and method of the Party's ruling
in the field of ideology and culture*

The content of the Party's ruling in the field of ideology and culture is the tasks carried out in order to build ruling theories and guidelines, and to improve the ruling capacity in terms of ideology, theory, and culture. In fact, the process of *Doi moi* has attained great achievements. However, the work of political and ideological education has not been very effective and has been superficial in some places. Certain tasks have not been seriously implemented; the quality and effectiveness are still low. Theoretical work and theoretical education are still limited and inadequate; the quality of theoretical research is still limited; there are still many unresolved, unsatisfactory solutions. This work has not yet created the basis and motivation to construct and implement a correct and effective line of governance.

The Party's ruling method in the field of ideology and culture: The Party brings into play its forces and means and uses many different methods to communicate, educate and train cadres, Party members and people on revolutionary ideals and theories, on the guidelines and revolutionary methods of the Party. It also develops mechanisms and policies to foster, attract and promote the talents of scientists, theorists, cultural researchers and the press to improve the capacity and ruling power of the Party and State.

However, besides the achieved results, the Party's method of ruling in the field of ideology and culture is still limited. Methods and means of doing ideological work are still backwards in some aspects. Ideological work has not been sharp, persuasive or appealing enough to cadres and the people. The ideological work is heavy on one-way propaganda and has not brought into play the effective use of the dialogue method.

In the coming time, in order to effectively renovate the ruling method of the Communist Party of Vietnam in the new situation, it is necessary to focus on the following key points: Unifying the perception of the structural model of “only one ruling Party and people outside the Party can participate in politics”; designing a model of state power organization compatible with the Party's model, ensuring that the ruling position of the Party is not challenged in the process of expanding socialist democracy. In addition, the selection of personnel should be renewed according to the principle of election campaign to discover talents to be introduced into the state apparatus; the structure, number and proportion of Party members at each level should be suitable for each State agency and parallel to the model of state power organization, ensuring the unified leadership of the Party. The mechanism of using legislative, executive and judicial powers should be paid attention in order to realize the Party's goals and ideals, focusing on policy making and public resource allocation. Finally, power should be effectively controlled; power should be exercised according to the law and strict Party discipline; the ruling should be done according to objective principles and done effectively.

Conclusion

The ruling Party focuses on solving the relationship between the Party and the State, which is associated with the condition of legitimizing political power in public power expressed in the form of state power. The nature of the ruling Party is that the Party is represented by the State, uses state power to realize its goals and ideals, and ensures that the state's dominant political

and social functions are always united organically. The Party's ruling method is a combination of means, measures and techniques to legitimize political power in public power; to use state power to realize the goals and ideals of the Party. Renovation of the Party's ruling method is a constituent part of the whole work of building and reforming the political system, as well as building and rectifying the Party.

In the new situation, although there are many innovations to ensure the ruling role of the Party, the content and method of the Party's ruling over the State and society still have certain shortcomings. The sustainable development of the country depends greatly on the leadership and ruling capacity of the Party. Therefore, the Communist Party of Vietnam must mobilize all resources of intelligence, bravery and responsibility to promote the capacity to govern in order to stimulate the desire to develop a prosperous and happy country and to firmly protect the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the spirit of the Resolution of the 13th National Congress of Deputies of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

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PART 1
**THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE STATE
OF VIETNAM IN THE PROCESS
OF RENOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(1986—2021)**

Chapter 1

**IS THERE A CONFLICT BETWEEN HO CHI MINH'S
POINT: “WHOEVER EXPLOITS CANNOT
BE A PARTY MEMBER” AND THE POLICY
OF THE CPV WHEN ALLOWING PARTY MEMBERS
TO DO BUSINESS AND ADMITTING PRIVATE
BUSINESS OWNERS TO THE PARTY?**

In 1953, in the work “Political common sense”, Ho Chi Minh affirmed the standard of Party membership: “Whoever exploits cannot be a Party member”. More than half a century later, the Communist Party of Vietnam has had bold policies: Let Party members do private businesses and agree to admit private business owners to the Party. This means that “Communist Party members” and “participants in exploitation” are no longer as fiercely mutually exclusive as before. Has the Party changed its nature or has it degenerated? Using the materialist dialectics of Marxism-Leninism, the article focuses on analyzing the theoretical and practical basis of the establishment of Party membership standards in 1953 as well as the Party's policy more than 50 years later. In terms of formal logic, it seems that the Party is going against Ho Chi Minh's ideology on the standards of Party members. However, dialectically, this is the creative ap-

plication and development of Ho Chi Minh's thought towards the goal of wealthy people, strong country, democracy, justice and civilization.

Keywords: exploitation, private business owners, Communist Party of Vietnam, party members, bourgeois.

Introduction

In 1953, in the work “Political common sense”, discussing the Party membership standards of the Vietnam Labor Party, Ho Chi Minh pointed out: “Naturally, anyone who exploits people cannot become a Party member”. Not exploiting people was the top standard of Communist Party members at that time. “Party membership standards are related to maintaining the nature of the Party, to the goal of striving for national independence and advancing to socialism, to building the Party according to Ho Chi Minh's thought”¹. In 2006, the Central Committee issued Regulation No. 15/QĐ-TW on Party members working in the private economy. Then, in 2013, the Communist Party of Vietnam had a pilot policy of admitting qualified private business owners to the Party. Owners of private businesses according to the theory of Marxism-Leninism are those who “participate in exploitation”. So has the Communist Party changed its nature or has it “degenerated”? From the methodology of Marxism-Leninism, the article contributes to answering the question: What is the contradiction between Ho Chi Minh's view on “who exploits cannot be a Party member” and the Communist Party's policy? Vietnam has agreed to allow Party members to do private businesses and admit private business owners to the Party.

Historical specificity in Ho Chi Minh's point “Whoever exploits cannot be a Party member”

The work “Political common sense” was written by Ho Chi Minh in 1953 in order to “provide basic and necessary knowledge about Marxism-Leninism and the party's policy orientations in order to build ideals and beliefs so that cadres and the people overcame hardships and sacrificed themselves to bring the resistance war to complete victory”.²

In the context of the people's democratic national revolution going on, when the peasants were badly exploited by the landlords, the slogan “the plowman has the field” is a political slogan that has great influence on millions of farmers.

¹ Góp ý Dự thảo báo cáo chính trị Đại hội X của Đảng về tiêu chuẩn đảng viên làm kinh tế tư nhân không hạn chế quy mô *Sài Gòn Giải phóng Online*, March 30, 2006.

² Hồ Chí Minh (2011). *Toàn tập*, t. 8. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 582.

“Our land area is very large, our farmers are very diligent, but most of the land is concentrated in the hands of colonialists and feudal landlords”.³ Therefore, “under the feudal system, much of the wealth produced by agriculture fell into the hands of the landlord class. Landlords do not work but still enjoy their wealth”.⁴ Meanwhile, in the countryside “the poor are the largest and poorest class of people. Their hands and feet are covered with mud all year round, but they are still hungry all their lives, because they are badly exploited by feudal landlords”.⁵ The situation of people living lavishly without working and living on the sweat, tears, blood and bones of poor farmers has existed for thousands of years in the history of Vietnam and continued to exist in the 1950s. “Farmers are already poor, and taxed heavily. Landlords took too much land rent, cut their throats with loans, causing farmers to sometimes have to sell their wives and children. If there is a drought, storm, or flood, they will die of hunger on the road”.⁶ The landlord-peasant conflict has become a long-lasting conflict.

Therefore, in 1930, when the Communist Party appeared, with the role of leading the people to liberate the nation, liberate the working class, and liberate the people, the slogan “the plowman has the field” was really moving for the hearts of poor farmers in Vietnam. And of course, born with the mission of abolishing the regime of national oppression, class oppression and human oppression, in that particular historical situation, the Party could not admit into its ranks the “oppressors”. Those people were, first of all, members of the feudal landlord class.

Participating in exploitation, the landlords were followed by the commercial bourgeoisie, who “would rather have their country's economy depend on the empire than to liberate the peasants, and do not want our country's technology to be developed.”⁷ Farmers are drained and exploited badly by the landlords. What about Vietnamese workers? “Compared to workers from other countries, Vietnamese workers are very miserable, especially workers in temporarily occupied areas. They work long hours with little pay. Moreover, the regime of having to pay bribes to the rulers is a feudal exploitative regime. Unemployment often occurs”.⁸

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., tr. 251.

⁵ Ibid., tr. 257.

⁶ Ibid., tr. 253.

⁷ Ibid., tr. 252—253.

⁸ Ibid., tr. 253.

In such a concrete historical situation, the feudal landlord class and the exploiting bourgeoisie could not become members of an organization that led the masses to fight against exploitation and to abolish the system of humans exploiting other humans. That organization is the Communist Party.

When the “exploitation” had become widespread, manifested clearly and offensively, it created the indignation of the masses and led to the impoverishment and even the death of many innocent people; When the domestic exploiting forces still colluded with the external invading forces to exploit the workers, making their situation miserable, they can no longer live like humans, then it was inevitable that the Party, as the organization leading the masses to start a revolution, could not admit such exploiting people to its organization.

In the context when the resistance war against the French colonialists was in the final stage, the demand for all aspects of the battlefield was enormous; that need is largely met through the support of the masses, most of which were farmers. The reaffirmation of the standard of “whoever exploits cannot be a Party member” is of great significance in strengthening the people's trust and attracting the people's support for the revolution. On the other hand, “under the condition that Party members have to leave their families to depend on the people, under the condition that the private economy is the object of re-education, it is natural to comply with the standard of “non-exploiting” Party members”.⁹

Ho Chi Minh analyzed and pointed out that exploitation is the main cause of Vietnamese people's misery. From the workers, peasants, petite bourgeoisie to the national bourgeoisie all suffered because they were exploited by imperialism, feudalism, and industrial bourgeoisie. Therefore, in order to liberate, the people must unite to overthrow these three subjects. And of course, those exploiters cannot stand in the ranks of the communist Party's leaders.

In fact, under the circumstances of the resistance war, how “exploitation” is fully defined in theory is also of little concern. One sees “exploitation” through the impoverishment of working-class people. They lived in poverty, lack of food, lack of clothing, lack of essential survival conditions, and their basic needs were not fully met. At the same time, another part of the population lived in luxury on the sweat and tears of those in poverty. We can imagine “exploitation” here mainly through things that are very intuitively obvious: some could not eat it all, while others could not have enough

⁹ Góp ý Dự thảo... *Sài Gòn Giải phóng Online*, March 30, 2006.

to eat. But how does the mechanism of exploitation take place? What is the theoretical basis of that so-called “exploitation”, in the historical context of the 50s of the twentieth century when the Vietnamese people’s intellectual level was still quite low and when there was still too much work to be done in practice; we really did not have the time to study this issue deeply.

In the context that “exploitation” was such a sensitive word, when the masses of the people were miserable and impoverished because of exploitation, harsh rule, and policies that made their lives increasingly difficult, it was inevitable that “It is a rule that anyone who exploits other people cannot become a Party member”. Because Party members are the leading force of the people to fight against the reality of people exploiting people — bourgeois exploiting workers and landlords exploiting peasants.

Therefore, stemming from the specific historical circumstances of the people’s national democratic revolution in Vietnam in the 50s, Ho Chi Minh affirmed the truth about the criteria of Party membership: “whoever exploits cannot be a Party member.”

The “dialectics of development” in applying Ho Chi Minh’s thought on the conditions of Party members when the Party agrees to allow Party members to do private business and admit private business owners to the Party

Some methodological principles when applying Ho Chi Minh’s thought on Party membership standards

Ho Chi Minh has left the Vietnamese people, the Communist Party of Vietnam and the Vietnamese people an invaluable system of theory on the Vietnamese revolutionary path. However, one of the methodological problems when we apply his thought is:

- adhering to specific historicity. The application must be flexible, paying attention to the historical circumstances when Ho Chi Minh expressed his view and the specific situations when applying the views. We should not mechanically assume that Ho Chi Minh said so, so now we must do the same. Every era is different. Using Ho Chi Minh’s thought without taking into account specific historical circumstances, we are “damaging” his thought. Therefore, studying and applying Ho Chi Minh’s thought should pay special attention to learning about methods, learning the “soul” of the opinions, not the literal “cover” of the views expressed in each word or phrase;
- applying the development perspective. A method of dialectic explanation is that development has to go through a process. During that process,

there are times when things are in the opposite State of their original self. This is like: If we want peace, sometimes we have to accept war. In order to eliminate exploitation, we must first accept exploitation to a certain extent. To be a teacher, you must first be a disciple. Understanding this principle, we will see things as they actually are.

Theoretical issues for the Party to consider before deciding to allow Party members to do private businesses or agreeing to admit private business owners to the Party

This permission and consent means acknowledging that Party members can “participate in exploitation” and that people who “participate in exploitation” can still become members of the communist Party.

Can Communist Party members participate in private businesses, and can private business owners become Communist Party members? This question has attracted the attention of Vietnamese researchers for a long time because: In the days of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the founders of Marxism-Leninism, the working class and the bourgeoisie were considered as antagonistic classes with no common ground. The working class has struggled against the oppression of the bourgeoisie for a long period of history, so these two social forces exist in a mutually exclusive fashion. So when it comes to communist Party members joining the private economy or private business owners becoming communist Party members, we are touching on a theoretical issue: the working class and the bourgeoisie, can these two social forces become two in one? The communist Party members are the advanced part of the working class while private business owners represent the bourgeoisie. More than a century ago, these two social forces existed in antagonism, one class struggled against the other, why is it now possible to include both a worker and a bourgeois in the same person? What's the contradiction here?

Those who deny the 2-in-1 view argue that: Communist Party members lead the masses to build a society without human exploitation — a socialist and communist society — so they cannot participate in exploitation (they cannot do private business and cannot be a private business owner). The force that leads the people to eliminate unjust exploitation cannot participate in exploitation!

Meanwhile, supporters of the 2-in-1 view put forward an argument that: Communist Party members lead the masses to build a society with rich people, strong country, democracy, justice and civilization, so if they don't know how to get rich, who can they lead, who will follow them? Therefore, before leading the people to build such a future society, Party members themselves must know how to get rich and to be rich to set an example for

the masses. There is a saying in Vietnam that: “No commercial activities means no wealth”. In order to be rich, Party members must participate in the private economy and become the owner of a private business.

It seems that every point of view has its own reason. The struggle between these two opposing opinions has been inconclusive for many years, making it difficult for the Party to decide in favor of one point of view and denying the other.

The first breakthrough: The Party advocates that Party members can do private businesses

The debate between these two viewpoints took place quite fiercely until 2006, when the *Doi moi* policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam had been implemented for 20 years, enough for the people to see the undeniable achievements of the Communist Party of Vietnam's innovation and the contribution of the private economy to the development of the economy in particular and the country in general. The third meeting of the Party Central Committee, term X, issued Regulation No. 15/QD-TW on “*Party members doing private business*”.

This regulation is really a breakthrough in the Party's thinking, demonstrating the dialectic of development: To eliminate exploitation, first of all, it is necessary to accept exploitation to a certain extent. Party members must be rich to have a leader's appeal and reliability to lead the masses to eradicate poverty and become wealthy legally. Historically, this provision was actually “paved the way” centuries ago during the campaign to establish the Communist Party of Vietnam by Nguyen Ai Quoc and his comrades. The Communist Party of Vietnam is not only the product of the combination of Marxism-Leninism with the workers' movement but also the patriotic movement.

In peacetime, when economic development is a central task in the country's development strategy, a part of the country's leadership team, i. e. communist Party members, participates in the private economy, which is an unprecedented experience in history. This will have great theoretical and practical significance. If in the past, Party members actively participated in the cause of fighting to protect the independence and freedom of the Fatherland, now, when the times change, Party members participating in the private economy is something we can understand and accept both theoretically and practically.

There is a saying that: “Party members go first, the villagers follow”. When Party members do successful private businesses, they will become role models, spreading positive energy, sharing experiences, and can appeal to the masses to do private business in order to become rich and prosperous,

which contributes to the common goal of the Party to advance towards a rich people and a strong country.

During the transitional period to socialism, when the Party advocated the development of a multi-sector economy, a period in which there was still a private capitalist economy, it was perfectly reasonable for Party members to participate in the private economy. In particular, the 12th National Congress affirmed that the private economy plays an important role and is “an important driving force of the economy”; the participation of Party members in an economic sector plays the role of “an important driving force”. This is to really promote the whole economy to develop, which is meaningful in both theory and practice.

However, it should be added that, when a Party member is a private business owner, in addition to meeting the requirements of a private business in accordance with the Constitution and regulations, he/she must also comply with more specific and stricter regulations in treating the relations with workers in enterprises, the State, society, Party organizations, and mass organizations in enterprises. Especially, Party members “must directly participate in labor”. These regulations clearly show the difference between private business owners — Party members and private business owners who are not Party members. Carrying two responsibilities at the same time, the owner of a private business — a Party member has to have both the qualities of a Party member and the qualities of a business owner.

With this regulation, Party members have stepped out of their familiar and default positions and scopes as just Party members to enter a completely new field. Party members represent a new role that Party members have not been allowed to perform before: “establishing, organizing, managing and operating limited liability companies, joint stock companies, partnerships and private enterprises”.¹⁰

When Party members participate in the private sector, practical experience as business owners will accumulate knowledge and experience for them to lead the masses more effectively and help them contribute directly to the creation of material value for society. This policy, on the other hand, also makes social life transparent, reducing the situation of Party members “doing underground economy”, which could lead to many losses and consequences for society.

This is a new creation and development of Ho Chi Minh's thinking in the development of the Party that he himself, by his actions in the early

¹⁰ Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng (2006). Quy định 15 QĐ-TW ngày 28/8/2006 về đảng viên làm kinh tế tư nhân.

years of the twentieth century, clearly demonstrated: the Communist Party of Vietnam not only has the nature of the working class, but is also deeply nationalistic. At present, any social class in Vietnam that contributes to the common development towards a rich people, strong country, democracy, justice and civilization has in it the nature of a communist. In addition, peacetime communists must be prosperous and wealthy communists to set an example for the masses towards prosperity and wealth.

The second breakthrough: The Communist Party of Vietnam advocates for private business owners to become Party members

Seven years after the regulation on Party members being allowed to work in the private economy was issued, on January 30, 2013, the Central Organization Committee issued further guidance No. 17-HD/BTCTW to admit qualified private business owners to the Party. This is a significant step forward in the Party's theoretical awareness. According to regulation 15, Communist Party members have the opportunity to experience a new position, a new job, a new presence besides being a Party member, which is “doing private business” or becoming business owner. Then, when guidance No. 17 was issued, the Party had the opportunity to include a new force of Party members who pioneer in the field of doing business and create material wealth for society — they are the business owners.

What the genius leader Nguyen Ai Quoc did more than a century ago helped the later Vietnamese communists have the ability to develop their forces creatively. Members of the Communist Party of Vietnam come not only from workers, but also from many different social classes; they are enlightened with Marxism-Leninism and voluntarily strive to build a Vietnam in which the people are rich, the country is strong, democratic, fair and civilized. It is this creativity in developing the Party that has helped to gather many elite and pioneering social forces in the Party, contributing to the realization of the political goals set by the Party.

Nearly a century ago, it was the patriotic movement of intellectuals that was an effective bridge for Marxism-Leninism to penetrate into the Vietnamese workers' movement, creating the premise for the birth of the Party. At present, Vietnamese businessmen can have a second role as a communist Party member, so they will bring a new vitality to the Vietnamese communist Party.

From regulation No. 15 in 2006 to guideline No. 17 in 2013 is really a breakthrough and cautious development in the perception and action of the party. First, party members “poke their feet” to experience an unprecedented second place in theory and practice — the position of a bourgeois by allowing party members to do private business. Then, the Party admitted

party private business owners, i.e. the bourgeois as members to increase the vitality of the party organization.

The recognition and affirmation of the role of the private business owner is associated with the affirmation of the role of the private economic sector in the development of the country. At the X Congress (2006), the party affirmed that the private economy is an area that “plays an important role and is one of the driving forces of the economy”. Therefore, these “somewhat risky” experiments have created a practical basis for the 12th National Party Congress (2016) to clearly affirm in the document: the private sector is “an important driving force of the economy”.

Thus, by seeing very clearly the fundamental and main conflicts of each historical period, the Communist Party of Vietnam has brilliantly applied and developed the standard of party membership that Ho Chi Minh set forth in a creative manner. This creates a new vitality of the Party and is an important factor in creating the Party's capacity and strength in the new era.

Conclusion

In theory, the two categories “Communist Party members” and “participating in exploitation” seem to be mutually exclusive. If one was a party member, one could not participate in exploitation, or “Whoever exploits cannot become a Party member”. That was one of the most important standards of communists more than half a century ago. Currently, however, Communist Party members are allowed to work in private businesses and qualified private business owners can join the Party. That means that party members can “participate in exploitation” and those who “participate in exploitation” can still be Party members.

In terms of formal logic, these two positions are completely contradictory to each other. However, if we look at the specific history of each historical period in association with the dialectic of development, development has to go through periods of its opposite. To eliminate exploitation, we must first accept exploitation to a certain extent. If we want peace, sometimes we have to accept war. It can be seen that the standards of party members in the 50s of the twentieth century and the current policy of the party on allowing party members to own private businesses and admitting private business owners to the party are not contradictory.

The current policy of the Party is the creative, flexible and courageous application of the materialist dialectic of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's thought on the basis of maintaining the goal towards a socialist society with a rich people, strong country, democracy, justice and civilization.

In terms of morality, the current policy of the communist party is not at odds with Ho Chi Minh's thought and the classical theorists of Marxism-Leninism on party membership standards. As Lenin said of communist morality: “Our morality comes from the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat”, and “The basis of communist morality is the struggle to consolidate and complete the construction of communism”.¹¹ The participation of party members in the private capitalist economy or the admission of private business owners to the party are just steps taken to complete the construction of the socialism in Vietnam. It is a creative application and development of party membership standards according to Ho Chi Minh's thought in the new situation, in order to reach the consistent goal of class liberation, human liberation, and successful construction of socialism in Vietnam.

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¹¹ Lênin, V.I. (2006). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 41, tr. 367—372.

Chapter 2

CPV'S CREATIVE ADOPTION OF MARXISM-LENINISM IN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING SOCIALISM IN VIETNAM (SINCE 1986 TO THE PRESENT DAY)

During the process of construction and development in Vietnam, the Communist Party of Vietnam has always been steadfast in its path to socialism, taking Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh ideology as the ideological foundation and always creatively apply Marxism — Leninism to the reality of national development, creating outstanding developments in all aspects of social life. The creative application of the Communist Party of Vietnam is reflected in the investment in developing the productive force through improving the quality of human resources and industrialization and modernization to create a material basis for the owner. social meaning; adjust production relations through changing economic model, shifting from centrally planned economic model to socialist-oriented market economy model; accept the multi-ownership multi-form economy, combining the dialectic between the development of the private economy and the state economy; attaching importance to the role of the State in regulating the economy according to the principle of *small government, large market*, etc, thereby, creating a Vietnam with “structure, potential, position and international prestige like nowadays”.

Keywords: Communist Party of Vietnam, Marxism-Leninism, the application of Marxism-Leninism by the Communist Party of Vietnam.

Introduction

In Vietnam, since independence, the Communist Party of Vietnam has determined that the development path of Vietnamese society is to move up to socialism, taking Marxism-Leninism as the ideological foundation. The

process of building and developing the country is a arduous, difficult and complicated process, with the opposition and hostility of many opposing forces and inadequacies in the practice of building socialism in the world. world, but, with flexibility and creativity, the Communist Party of Vietnam has always steadfastly followed the socialist path, creatively applying Marxism-Leninism to the practical development of the country. proud achievements, especially in the economic and political fields.

Creative application of the Communist Party of Vietnam in the development of production forces and adjustment of production relations

The Marxist-Leninist classics have always been consistent in their economic determinism when they say that material or economic forces are the determining factors for social development in all aspects. Therefore, in order to build a social system qualitatively different from capitalism, the first goal that the classics aim to criticize is the limitations of the economic model of capitalism: *market economy*. The discovery of surplus value and the exploitation of surplus value in a capitalist society is the highlight, signaling the end of the capitalist mode of production from economic causes. That is also the reason that for a long time, many theoretical studies identify the market economy with capitalism, so when building socialism, people look for an economic model that lies outside of the market economy. The crisis of the centrally planned economic model, marked by the systemic crisis of the socialist countries, requires a return to the study of the market economy in its primacy. It has helped capitalism stand and develop for many centuries, with the question that needs to be answered: is the development of the market economy to follow the capitalist path?

On the basis of a correct and increasingly complete awareness of socialism and the path to socialism in Vietnam, lessons learned from the weaknesses and inadequacies of the centrally planned economic model after the dissolution of the old socialist system, the Party and State of Vietnam set out a path to comprehensively renew the country since the 6th Party Congress in 1986, in order to effectively carry out the socialist construction, in which important and fundamental are economic innovations. The process of renewing our Party's economic theoretical thinking has made great breakthroughs when realizing the objective development trend of the world economy, which is the development based on the modern market economy, open to integration and development. The Communist Party of Vietnam has determined that only developing a market economy can realize socialism from an

economic perspective. Since the 6th National Congress, perceptions about the market economic model in the construction of socialism have gradually been clearly shaped. In order to overcome the shortcomings of the centrally planned economic model, which is seriously inhibiting economic and social development, along with the ripe changes in perception, the model of *socialist-oriented market economy* was established by our Party and State. Implementation policy: “The socialist-oriented market economy in our country is a multi-sector commodity economy operating according to the market mechanism under the management of the State under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam. This is a form of market economy that follows the laws of the market economy, both based on and guided by the principles and nature of socialism”¹ has been implemented in practice, creating qualitative changes in economic models and outstanding growth in the economy and all aspects of social life. The problem is how to prevent the development of the market economy and the socialist orientation from becoming barriers to each other, it is necessary to determine the focus of this development towards the ultimate goal: in order to make the best use of the market's advantages, and at the same time overcome and minimize its defects to serve the interests of all people, towards the goals of socialism”.²

If we consider the development of the market economy as the adjustment of the economic model in the ownership relationship to the level of development of the productive forces in Vietnam in the current period according to the content of the law on the *In accordance with the production relations with the development level of the productive forces* in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the investment in the development of the productive forces in Vietnam is also the expression of creative application of this law in development practice in Vietnam. Because Vietnam is a country that has not undergone the process of capitalist industrialization, the process of industrialization and modernization is determined to be indispensable to establish the material and technical basis for socialism. Our Party considers industrialization as the central task of the transition period. However, this is no longer the classical model of industrialization with modern mechanical industry and heavy industry development as the main basis, which must be prioritized for development as in the process of building socialism in Soviet Russia:

¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2011). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 204–205.

² Phùng Hữu Phú, Lê Hữu Nghĩa, Vũ Văn Hiền, Nguyễn Việt Thông (đồng chủ biên) (2016). *Một số vấn đề lý luận- thực tiễn về chủ nghĩa xã hội và con đường đi lên chủ nghĩa xã hội ở Việt Nam qua 30 năm đổi mới*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 270.

Heavy industry is the main basis of socialism. To suit Vietnam's characteristics and the context of international integration, the Communist Party of Vietnam advocates that industrialization must be carried out in association with modernization, associated with the progressive development of science and technology. The goal of industrialization and modernization is to turn our country into an industrial country with modern material and technical foundations and a reasonable economic structure. By the 13th Party Congress, January 2021, with the rapid development of science, technology and the digital economy, the process of industrialization and modernization continued to be emphasized by our Party in the context of in the context of economic growth model renewal, not only associated with the knowledge economy but also in the process of national digital transformation: “Drastic renewal of growth models, economic restructuring, industrialization, modernize the country, focus on innovation, promote national digital transformation, develop the digital economy and digital society”.³ Creating a leap in production forces through the process of industrialization and modernization is also creating a shortened development step on the road to socialism in Vietnam. This is also the creative application of theory by the Communist Party of Vietnam based on the fundamental views of Marxism — Leninism on the historical-natural nature of socio-economic forms in the past. development process: “The general law of development in the history of the whole world has not excluded but on the contrary also included a number of stages of development with characteristics either in form or in the sequence of development. that development”.⁴

From the characteristics of Vietnamese social reality, recognizing the opportunities and opportunities for breakthrough development in “taking a shortcut” to the development of science, technology, technology and economy of Vietnam. In the developed capitalist countries, after many times adjusting the concept of the *shortened development* understanding by *ignoring the capitalist regime*, our Party has clearly defined the content of the development path in Vietnam as: “Our country's way to the ascent is the transition to socialism, bypassing the capitalist regime, that is, the establishment of a dominant position of production relations and superstructure of capitalism, but absorbing and inheriting the achievements that mankind has achieved under the capitalist regime, especially in science and technology, in order to rapidly develop the productive forces, build a foundational

³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 1, tr. 37.

⁴ Lênin V. I. (1978). *Toàn tập*. Matxcova: Nxb. Tiến bộ, t. 45, tr. 431.

modern economy”.⁵ The creativity in applying the theory of our Party has contributed to creating leaps and bounds in the development of the productive forces, thereby creating outstanding achievements in economic development: “Growth speed The average GDP in the period 2016—2020 still reaches about 6 %/year (in 2020 alone, GDP growth will still reach 2.91 %, which is the highest growth rate in the world). The size of the economy and per capita income increase (in 2020, GDP will reach USD 271.2 billion and per capita income will reach USD 2,779). The quality of growth has been improved, labor productivity has increased from 4.3 %/year in the period 2011—2015 to about 6 %/year in the period 2016—2020”.⁶ In particular, our Party attaches great importance to investing in the development of the labor force (the most important part of the productive force) in terms of physical, mental and spiritual strength through radical and drastic changes, comprehensive education in order to create high-quality human resources, arouse the desire to develop a prosperous and happy country.

Creative application of the Communist Party of Vietnam in the concept of ownership and the role of the State in economic development

On the basis of applying the Law on *the conformity of production relations with the development level of the productive forces*, the Party's policy not only focuses on investing in the development of the productive forces but also on a timely basis, adjust production relations to suit the development level of the productive forces in each specific period. One of the adjustments and creative application of our Party is the matter of ownership and applying it in building and developing a market economy in Vietnam. The strong development of science and technology has expanded the object of ownership. The omnipresence of the economy, by itself, will regulate and regulate the forms of product distribution in the market. With the development of modern market economy, the regulation of distribution and income through the operation of market factors such as production, labor, capital, land, technology, knowledge etc, by itself more equalizes the degree of ownership of the product of labor. It seems that labor is no longer seen as the sole factor of value creation, but along with labor the owners of resources also receive income in different forms at the market price. Thus, the distribution by

⁵ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2001). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ IX*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 84.

⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op.cit*, tr. 60—61.

labor is not the only distributional principle in the modern market economy. This leads to many changes in perception in the process of building and developing a market economy in Vietnam.⁷

In Vietnam, in the historical period before *Đổi mới*, due to the incorrect perception of the role of ownership relations, it was believed that building and developing advanced property relations (public ownership) could pave the way for the developed productive forces, at the same time we also consider this as an economic way to build socialism. So, for a long time, we applied public ownership to the whole economy. The economy now accepts only two forms of ownership, namely state ownership and collective ownership, and does not accept the existence of private ownership forms, leading to many inadequacies, limitations and constraints. economic development. Realizing this mistake, since implementing the *Đổi mới* policy (1986) until now, our Party and State have changed their perception, considering ownership as the central issue of economic reform, development policy economy with many forms of ownership, many economic sectors, rich in forms of business organization and distribution. The private economy, from being considered a “non-socialist” economic sector, has been recognized as an important economic component of the economy, creating remarkable developments for the economy: “The private economy increased rapidly in quantity, gradually improved business efficiency, created jobs, and contributed increasingly to GDP. The private sector currently contributes about 50 % of GDP, 90 % of jobs and 39 % of total social investment”.⁸ Accepting a multi-sector economic model, making the most of the development of the private economy for the economic development of the whole society, and at the same time, establishing a compatible infrastructure, with an important understanding The dominant production system was expanded in a very flexible manner, dialectic has promoted the development of production, circulation, consumption, capital circulation, etc. That economic development has created the premise. important and necessary in terms of economy and society for the process of building socialism such as liberating the labor force and creative capacity of individuals, improving the people’s material and spiritual life, ensuring democracy, social progress and justice in society, sustainable development, etc.

⁷ Nguyễn Thị Thuý Vân (2019). *Phương pháp luận biện chứng duy vật và sự vận dụng nó trong phát triển nền kinh tế thị trường ở Việt Nam hiện nay*. Nxb. Đại học Quốc gia Hà Nội, tr. 96–97.

⁸ Đinh Thế Huynh, Phùng Hữu Phú, Lê Hữu Nghĩa, Nguyễn Văn Hiến, Nguyễn Việt Thông (đồng chủ biên) (2015). *30 năm đổi mới và phát triển ở Việt Nam*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia Sự thật, tr. 107.

Thus, in the spirit of Marxism — Leninism, we do not underestimate the role of *public property*, but in the context of level of production forces, a flexible and dialectical combination of both public and private ownership is an appropriate solution to create a driving force for economic development.

One of the more creative applications of the Communist Party of Vietnam from the Marxist — Leninist theory of socialism is the role of the State in economic development. Vietnam has determined that the market economic model that we build is an economic model with a regulatory role of the State. That has its objective causes. The reality of market economy development in countries around the world in general and in Vietnam in particular shows that there are areas where the state's intervention and regulation cannot be ignored, especially at the macro level. For example, building the necessary legal corridors for the market to operate effectively, creating a healthy competitive environment; The renewal of economic policies and laws of the State, paving the way for economic development, etc. In the construction and development of a market economy in Vietnam, the state's role is even more important when, on the one hand, it has to ensure the objective movement of the elements of the market economy, on the other hand, is the subject of development, ensuring the elements of fair distribution, social security and harmony. interests for the sake of socialism.

The modern market economic development model in the world shows that, in the market economy, the private sector plays a leading role. There, the right to private property is respected and protected, thereby creating an impetus for economic development when individuals, in pursuit of their own self-interest, unconsciously create social benefits: “and sometimes in doing so, they respond to the social good even better when they intend to do so before”.⁹ However, as warned by the Marxist-Leninist classics, the expansion of the free market and the massive, insatiable and scattered development of production of business individuals have made the area of labor turned into a battlefield, making the anarchy in production more and more intense. For the sake of personal gain, entrepreneurs will never conduct a business that is not profitable. It shows that the laws of the market themselves have limitations, and in many cases, it proves to be powerless against the utilitarian motives of business entities, leading to unbalanced accumulations and concentration, is the source of inequality and disorganization in economic activities.¹⁰ That is why it is necessary to have the role of the State to re-

⁹ Mai Ngọc Cường, Trần Việt Tiến, Mai Ngọc Anh (2016). *Lịch sử các học thuyết kinh tế*. Hà Nội: Nhà. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 85.

¹⁰ Nguyễn Thị Thúy Vân (2019). *Op. cit.*, tr. 101, 102.

gulate the development of the modern market economy. The remaining question is how will the relationship between the State and the market play out? The amount of state intervention in the market is just enough to regulate the economy without affecting the free development according to the law of the market with the principle of “*small government, big market*” of the modern market economy, that is, no matter how large the state's intervention and regulation in the market economy is, the market mechanism must still be the determining factor in the operation of the market.

Conclusion

The guiding ideology of the Communist Party of Vietnam throughout the process of leading the Vietnamese revolution is to be steadfast and to apply and creatively develop Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh ideology for the sake of the goal of national independence and socialism. This is the issue: “principle, vital”¹¹ for the Vietnamese people, thanks to that, Vietnam has “the opportunity, potential, position and international prestige as it is today”.¹² That shows the vitality and scientific value of Marxism — Leninism in the current context, it is also a living proof of the role and scientific creativity of the Communist Party of Vietnam in leading the process of national construction and development.

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¹¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, tr. 33.

¹² *Ibid.*, tr. 25.

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Chapter 3

IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE IN THE IDEOLOGICAL ACTIVITY OF THE CPV TODAY

Democratizing the political life of the Communist Party of Vietnam, contributing to improving political foundation and leadership capacity of CPV is an important content in the ideological work of the Party. In all activities of the Party, and first of all, in ideological work, democratization is required both in theory and practice. Thus, cadres doing Party building work in terms of political ideology need to pay regular attention to democracy in order to help the Party update new information, form views and policies to organize and lead the construction of a socialist democracy.

In fact, ideological work is always associated with summary of reality and theoretical research, which create a scientific basis for protecting the ideological foundation of the Party, and promoting the role of ideology — theory in the formation of guidelines and policies of the Party and State. This will also spread the innovated ideology, program, guidelines and policies in order to foster in the people a revolutionary worldview and outlook, good morality and personality and encourage all classes of people to realize the goal of industrialization and modernization of the country. However, in the current ideological work, besides important results, in each content area, each form of ideological work, there are still some shortcomings in democracy and democratic practice.

Keywords: democratic practice, ideological work, Communist Party of Vietnam.

The view of the Communist Party of Vietnam on democratic practice in the ideological activity

Ideological work is a highly specific field of activity because its object is people with complex perceptions, thoughts and emotions. The Communist

Party of Vietnam's view on democratic practice is consistently and profoundly expressed in its leadership and in directing the practice of ideological work.

In theoretical research and summary of reality, creating favourable conditions for the development of all creative capacities is a very important requirement. The Party requires each Party member to be responsible for strictly observing their discipline in speech. In scientific conferences and other forums, one can debate freely, but personal views that are contrary to the Party's policy are not allowed to be communicated. The Party respects the truth and demands that "it is necessary to create favorable social conditions for the process of renewing thinking: a democratic atmosphere in society, especially in the Party's activities and in scientific research; a spirit of respect for truth; an accurate information system; and self-criticism and criticism needs to be conducted on a regular and serious basis"¹. The vivid manifestations of democracy are: spiritual liberation and freedom of thought, respect for each other's personality in debate and dialogue.

In the new situation, the Party emphasized, the proper attitude of each Party member is to contribute to overcoming difficulties. Each member should carefully study issues to propose ideas to the Party instead of arbitrarily giving opinions or being indifferent and irresponsible. All cadres and party members must listen and respect each other's opinions, truly for the sake of truth and reason. That is the demonstration of democratic culture in dialogue and debate that the Party requires.

The Party always upholds the spirit of willingness to learn and overcome shortcomings in research. In addition to mastering the revolutionary and scientific nature of Marxism-Leninism and inheriting the valuable legacy of President Ho Chi Minh's revolutionary ideology and theory, the Party requires adoption of new theoretical achievements, new experiences, and updated scientific knowledge in order to make correct conclusions, overcome misconceptions or outdated ideas. The Party affirmed: "Renovating thinking does not mean denying theoretical achievements, the universal laws of the cause of socialist construction and the correct guideline that has been determined; on the contrary, it is to complement and develop those achievements"². The Party pointed out the need to associate practical research in Vietnam with selective adoption of mankind's scientific achievements.

¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1987). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ VI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 126.

² *Ibid.*, tr. 125.

In fact, the Communist Party of Vietnam always upholds the close relationship between theory and practice in theoretical research and summarizing reality. The Party clearly states that the factors that make up the vitality and feasibility of all undertakings and policies are the results of summarizing the creative experiences of the masses. The Party attentively listens to the opinions of scientists and theorists, is prudent in its assessment, evaluation and use of research results of scientists and theorists. The Party appreciates new discoveries and innovations in theoretical research but also distinguishes between accidentally and intentionally taking advantage of scientific research to deviate from the Party's direction.

The Marxist-Leninist education has given Vietnamese cadres, party members and people a scientific worldview and a revolutionary outlook, a systematic understanding of new achievements in theoretical work of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Some demonstration of the practice of democracy is the renovation of the content of political theory education in the direction of being closely related to reality and suitable for each learner. This education also has effectiveness for application, and answering the posed problems in reality. The renovation is also reflected in the curriculum, content, and methods of teaching and learning theory in the direction of attaching importance to quality and ensuring effectiveness.

In mass communication, the Party paid attention to the contents suitable to the revolutionary task of each period, in accordance with the objective principles and trends of the times.

In fact, the vitality and effectiveness of ideological work lies in the revolutionary spirit and scientific nature of ideological work. The Party pointed out that only by conducting this work on a scientific, objective and impartial basis and overcoming superficiality in implementation can we fight effectively against all false and opposing ideas.

The Party required people to avoid superficiality in communication about the resolution: "The explanation of the guideline does not stop at the general views. It must be proved by scientific arguments and by reality, helping people to understand clearly and deeply the Party's guidelines; attaching thorough clarification of the Party's guidelines with the explanation of specific policies of the State"³. Doing well this requirement helps the guidelines to be thoroughly grasped, and improves self-discipline in compliance.

In addition, the Communist Party of Vietnam has always attached great importance to the development of mass media and improving the quality of

³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1985). *Một số văn kiện của Đảng về công tác tư tưởng*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Sách giáo khoa Mác — Lênin, tr. 33.

information. The Party affirmed: “The press is the voice of the Party, and at the same time it also reflects the voice of the masses”⁴. The Party criticizes the manifestations of anarchy, commercialization, and departure from the principles, purposes and political goals of the press. The above points of view and guiding principles are detailed carefully in the system of documents guiding press activities.

Practicing democracy in mass communication work has also been paid great attention by the Party and creatively implemented in different historical moments. The Party noted the need to further expand democracy and openness in party activities, mass organizations, elected bodies, state agencies, and the whole society. The practice of democracy in those activities is reflected in a number of aspects such as: the way a conference is run must ensure democratic discussion, frankness, and clear conclusions; Right to participate and contribute opinions, right to vote, right to information are respected.

In improving the effectiveness of democratic practice in ideological work, the relationship among the Party committee — ideological officials — the people is an important factor: “Orient towards the grassroots level, know well the local situation, strengthen the forces at the localities, and create a solid political position in each locality”⁵. This purpose can only be achieved when the above relationship is well established.

A better implementation of democracy depends on the mechanism of receiving and processing feedback. This is a necessary condition. The Party requires leaders at all levels to pay full attention and be sensitive to public opinion and aspirations of the masses to adjust and supplement policies, especially in matters related to the close interests of the each class. Party committees at all levels and state agencies need to have a full sense of responsibility to deal with the people's legitimate requests in the direction of relying on the masses, listening to honest people's opinions, and informing the public about what the public needs to know. By doing this, we can discuss and solve problems that arises in the localities together at the grassroot level rationally, orderly and legally. With the aim of promoting wisdom in the cause of reform, the Party requires that cadres, party members and people, when presenting their thoughts, to show a high sense of responsibility and a constructive attitude, not only to be critical but also to actively contribute ideas and experiences in solving real-life problems.

⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1987). *Op. cit.*, tr. 129.

⁵ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2002). *Văn kiện Hội nghị lần thứ năm Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Khóa IX*. Hanoi: Nxb. Chính trị quốc gia, tr. 137.

An important requirement in the democratic practice in ideological work is an attitude of respect for the people's creativity: "While promoting initiatives, there may be mistakes. A positive attitude is to help subordinates clearly see the shortcomings or unsuitable parts to build and cultivate the new ideas, even if they very small and just start to grow"⁶. In leading cultural and artistic activities, the Party requires Party committees at all levels to apply measures that are truly democratic, persuasive, and encouraging of to creativity, and not to order and impose opinions on cultural and scientific activities. The Party requires strict criticism of restrictive, conservative, sketchy, and formulaic ideas in cultural and artistic activities. Ideological work must be able to encourage all new discoveries and innovation, making Vietnam's culture richer, more diverse, advanced and modern, making a worthy contribution to the world's cultural treasures. Practicing democracy in the leadership of cultural and artistic activities is "both to ensure the development of culture, literature, art, and the press in accordance with the Party's political and ideological orientations, and at the same time to ensure the exercise of human rights, freedom and individual democracy in the creation of culture, literature, arts, science and technology on the basis of promoting high self-discipline with the right purpose"⁷. On the basis of being aware of the important position of the struggle to protect democratic viewpoints and principles in ideological work, the Party has paid great attention to leading this work and issued many official documents specifying the system the Party's point of view. The Party directs the fight against any scheme to take advantage of democracy and openness to sabotage the cause of the Party and the people. The Party directs the struggle to protect the ideological foundation, program and guidelines of the Party; to combat false claims and correct party members in oral and written discipline; to raise the sense of discipline in Party members' speech and criticize some party cadres for taking advantage of their participation in contributing ideas to the Party and having opposing actions to the democratic spirit of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

Improving the effectiveness of democratic practice in the Party's ideological activity

In the leadership activities of the Communist Party of Vietnam, ideological work is an important part. In the current context, in order to achieve

⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1985). *Op. cit.*, tr. 65.

⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1998). *Văn kiện Hội nghị lần thứ năm Ban Chấp hành Trung ương khóa VIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị quốc gia, tr. 80.

high efficiency, the ideological work itself must be completely renovated to meet the requirements of political reform in the new revolutionary period. In the coming time, the ideological work needs to be carried out on the basis of the following main issues:

First, it is necessary to pay more attention to the issue of leading and directing the practice of socialist democracy in the ideological work of the Party.

The Party should supplement and perfect its official regulations on democracy and the practice of socialist democracy in the Party and society, declarations and commitments on democracy; develop a roadmap for democratization, and prioritize democratic practice in the ideological work of the Party.

The practice of democracy in the Party is closely linked with Party's principles and disciplines. In the current system of guiding documents of the Party, there are many documents related to democracy and democratic practice in ideological work such as: Platform, Charter, Resolution, Directive, Notice Report, Conclusion, Rule, and Regulation. These are the bases for raising awareness about socialist democracy and practicing democracy in ideological work. In order to have practical results of democracy and meet the requirements of the country's political tasks and the Party building and rectification work in the new situation, the Party needs to review, supplement, and gradually build up and improve the system of official documents on socialist democracy. It needs to also have programs and plans for implementation, and have sufficient conditions to realize them.

It is necessary to build a legal framework for democracy and practicing socialist democracy in different fields of social life, first of all, in the field of ideological work.

In addition, it is necessary to establish a specialized agency to research, advise and assist the Party in directing and managing the field of democracy and practicing socialist democracy in the Party's ideological work. More attention should be paid to researching, summarizing and advising on the formulation of views, guidelines and policies on socialist democracy and democratic practice in general and in the ideological work of the Party in particular.

It is recommended that an intensive research department on democratic practice should be created in academies, universities, and research institutes on political theory, social sciences and humanities, contributing to perfecting viewpoints, guidelines and policies of the Party and State. There should be scientific criticism of political decisions and criticism to fight against the wrong views of political opportunists and hostile forces.

Regulations should be perfected on socialist democracy in all aspects of the Party's and state's activities, especially those of the Party's Executive Committee, the Party's Committee for Inspection and Supervision, the Party Personnel Committee, the Youth Union, the Advisory Boards of the Party Committee, and the Party's mouthpiece.

Second, it is necessary to supplement and improve the quality of socialist democracy content and democratic practice methods in the Party's ideological work.

It is essential to firmly grasp the principles of Marxism-Leninism when conducting theoretical research on socialist democracy, and to closely follow the country's reality and encourage the spirit of independent thinking, frank debate, affirmation of the right things, criticism of the wrong things. This is not only to contribute to the construction of the Party's guidelines and policies, but also to promptly find out new ideas to support, encourage and to correct shortcomings.

Party committees at all levels must attach importance to the promotion of practical summaries to affirm the new and the right; criticize the old and the wrong in the democratization of ideological work; promptly praise new democratic factors and strictly deal with violations of democratic rights. When drafting reviews, Party committees at all levels need to coordinate and agree with organizations in the political system, agencies and mobilize human resources to do ideological work. They should focus on summarizing the improvement of the quality of democratic practice by ideological agencies and specialized ideological work teams.

It is necessary to pay attention to expanding foreign relations and international exchanges through domestic and international scientific conferences on democracy and democratic practice, and to have a new awareness of democracy and its implementation in different historical contexts. It is also important to update modern knowledge, timely make adjustments suitable to the country's situation, and enrich Vietnam's democratic practice experience. In several political parties in the world, there are valuable lessons learned from mistakes in practicing democracy in ideological work as well as successful lessons in reform, which have well resolved the relationship between democracy expansion and maintaining socio-political stability. Those are practical lessons that need to be studied and adopted by Vietnam.

The process of formulating, mastering and implementing resolutions and directives of the Party and policies of the state needs to be reformed according to the requirements and criteria of socialist democracy. We should attach importance to ensuring the democratic rights of party members. Therefore, it is important to develop and complete the regime of notifying local

situations and of reporting current status, the method of grasping the situation of ideological work and ideological orientation; as well as the system of polls for party members and the people.

The content and the method of mass communication and education of political ideology for cadres, party members and people need to be renovated to meet the requirements of democratic practice in ideological work.

It is necessary to renovate political theory education in the direction of expanding the political theory education system, diversifying types of training, meeting the needs of political theory learning of cadres, party members and people to learn about new contents on democratic theory and practice, as well as the ability to apply democratic theory in practice to solve specific situations of ideological work.

A renovated mindset on morality and lifestyle education and improving revolutionary qualities for cadres and party members is very important for practicing democracy in ideological work. This requires that it is necessary to renew mindset on morality and lifestyle education for cadres and party members both in terms of value, common standards, formats, methods, objects and conditions of guarantee.

Third, skills and capacity to practice democracy in the Party's ideological work need to be further improved

Democracy should be practiced in the election of leading organs of the Party and state management at all levels, as well as in dialogue.

In order for the democratic dialogue to be effective, the interlocutor needs to grasp the Party's views on the issues and fields of the dialogue's content, thereby preparing appropriate and effective new content and methods to ensure the requirements of a democratic dialogue. When having democratic dialogue, it is necessary to create an atmosphere of openness, equality and friendliness. If this atmosphere cannot be created, it is impossible to receive honest and frank opinions from the party members and the public.

One of the goals of democratic dialogue is to raise ideological awareness among party members and the masses. Therefore, when considering dialogue issues, we should base on objective and scientific grounds and avoid subjective and emotional bias. The arguments and supporting details raised must clearly demonstrate that there is a scientific basis and a practical basis. The organization and the person who directly join the dialogue must be in the right position, perform the right function and task, has good reputation in the organization and has good personal qualities.

Democracy should be practiced in referendums of party members and people, and basic regulations need to be issued to ensure substantive democracy in the ideological work of the Party.

It is necessary to improve the capacity and qualifications of cadres in charge of ideological work of the Party. The forces of cadres doing ideological work need to be improved according to additional standards of socialist democracy and democratic practice capacity. The working process of ideological cadres needs to be renewed from the stage of discovery, planning, training, appointment, rotation, promotion, and re-appointment in the direction of radical democratization.

The application of the theory of democracy into the practice of the ideological work of the Communist Party of Vietnam is posing many problems to be solved. The issue of democratization in Vietnam today and the practice of democracy in ideological work are not only theoretical issues but also practical problems about democracy; it is to find new and suitable mechanisms and formats to increase the quality of democratic practice in ideological work and in social life. In order to practice democracy in the current ideological work, it is necessary to build a synchronous implementation mechanism to promote and improve the effectiveness of democratic practice in the Party's ideological work, to meet the requirements of building a rule of law state of the people, by the people and for the people.

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Chapter 4

PROMOTING PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH'S IDEAS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS TODAY

President Ho Chi Minh spent his whole life fighting to turn the Vietnamese people from a slave nation to a free nation, bringing the people from the status of a country lost to the colonizers to the status of an independent country belonging to the citizens. Applying Ho Chi Minh's point of view on practicing democracy and realizing that the people are the masters, the Communist Party of Vietnam has brought about great results. Therefore, clarifying these contents is important in current democratic practice.

Keywords: Ho Chi Minh, view, State, democracy.

The whole life of President Ho Chi Minh's revolutionary activities was a process of selfless struggle to affirm a principle in reality that he soon realized: The people are the masters of society. This awareness was the driving force for him to embark on the path of revolution, to Marxism-Leninism, to follow the path of the proletarian revolution and to become the person who led the whole nation to ideal and noble goals. These goals are national independence and affirming the position of the people as the owners of society and the country: "Our country is a democratic country, the highest position belongs to the people, because the people are the masters".¹ Promoting democracy in the Party and in the whole society is the way to realize the goals that the Party and President Ho Chi Minh desire.

¹ Hồ Chí Minh (2011). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 7, tr. 434.

Affirming the view that the People are masters and the People rule in reality

To say “the people are the masters” is to affirm the social status of the people. Historically, all states have stated the slogan of the people as the master, but it is necessary to distinguish between the status of “people as masters” and that of “people as leaders” in reality. In thinking and in practical activities, Ho Chi Minh paid special attention to the difference and the gap between the status of “people as master” and the state of “people as leaders”. This is because, historically, there have been many evidences to prove this qualitative difference, that is, mastery in practice and mastery by title. From “people are masters” to “people are leaders” is a difficult leap: “how to make people know how to enjoy democratic rights, know how to use their democratic rights, and dare to speak and to take action”.²

Here, Ho Chi Minh had a request: How to let the people know how to enjoy democratic rights. This is a matter of the nature of the State and the essence of the new social system: “if in an independent country, the people do not enjoy freedom and happiness, independence has no meaning”.³

When it comes to “independent country” for “the people to enjoy freedom and happiness”, “enjoy” here does not mean as a “gift” given, but because the people deserve to “enjoy” the results of the struggle through a lot of hardship, losses, and sacrifices. During his life of struggle for the people's happiness, Ho Chi Minh constantly enlightened people about the idea of self-reliance, “we have to take care of ourselves...”, “our workers and farmers save ourselves”, “use our strength to set us free...”. This is the key point for each citizen to strive towards the goal of “people are masters” and “people are leaders” in reality.

Having won the government, the people regain their right to be the master of society and the right to lead the society, but from the status of being an “owner” to “the right to lead” in reality, there must be certain conditions attached. According to Ho Chi Minh, the revolution to seize power, lead the governing, and build up a society is the cause of the people themselves, nobody can do that for them. But in order to participate in the struggle and in the process of that struggle, the people must be enlightened, gathered, and united into strength: “With the people's forces, no matter how big or difficult the job is, it can be done. If not, nothing will be done. People

² Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 15, tr. 293.

³ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 4, tr. 64.

know how to solve many problems in a simple, quick and complete way, which talented people and large organizations can't think of.”⁴

In order to exercise the right of mastery, the people must not only have rights, but it is also important to have the capacity to lead. This is the top concern of President Ho Chi Minh: “If you want to be a good owner, you must have the ability to master. We study to have the capacity to master, to be able to organize a new life — first of all to organize a new production system.”⁵

As can be seen, Ho Chi Minh always kept in mind the necessity of fostering the people's strength, exercising the right to mastery with a national policy deployed on a large scale — the work of raising people's knowledge, fostering the people's spirit, training talents, which are the leading factors forming the people's “mastery capacity”. The special thing is that the guidelines and policies that Ho Chi Minh initiated, launched, encouraged and implemented are complete, synchronous, systematic and strategic. He saw the profound and fundamental meaning of social reforms in fostering the people's strength and building democracy. “We must work hard to carry out social reforms, to improve people's lives, to realize true democracy.”⁶

In Ho Chi Minh's thought, the people are masters so that “the people know how to enjoy their democratic rights, know how to use their democratic rights, dare to speak and take action”, showing a proactive, positive, constructive and creative attitude from the people. The use of the word “knowing” next to “enjoying democratic rights” and “using democratic rights” shows a high requirement for the capacity of “mastery”, which is the people's “intellectual level”. Only through the implementation of real democracy will people understand their “democratic rights” and then they will “dare to speak and take action”.

The people take the lead through electing the State of the people, by the people and for the people

Through the election of the National Assembly and people's councils at all levels, the people exercise their power in the form of direct and indirect democracy, building a lawful state according to the will of the whole people.

A state that is considered constitutional and legitimate is a state in which the people themselves elect their representatives democratically and

⁴ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 5, tr. 335.

⁵ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 12, tr. 527.

⁶ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 9, tr. 3.

openly, and not through extreme outside intervention such as Viet Quoc, Viet Cach in Vietnam in the years 1945—1946 or the military coup in Myanmar today with the sacrifice and bloodshed of the people due to protests against the military government.

Ho Chi Minh emphasized: “The National Assembly is the highest authority of the State. The People’s Council is the local authority organ of the State.”⁷

From the point of view: Our country is a democratic country, Ho Chi Minh affirmed the people’s mastery of the State by way of general election through universal suffrage, direct and secret ballot. Ho Chi Minh perceived general election as a political right that the people won through revolutionary struggle, a form of democracy, demonstrating the people’s ability to practice democracy.

“The general election is an opportunity for the entire nation to freely choose talented and virtuous people to take responsibility of the country’s work. In the General Election, anyone who wants to take care of the country’s affairs has the right to stand for election; every citizen has the right to vote. Regardless of gender, economic status, religion, race, class, party, every citizen of Vietnam has those two rights. Therefore, the General Election means freedom and equality; i. e. democracy, solidarity. Thanks to the General Election, the whole people elect the National Assembly. The National Assembly will appoint the Government. That government is truly the Government of the whole people”.⁸

According to Ho Chi Minh: “Our electoral system implements democracy and at the same time realizes the unity of the whole people. All citizens 18 years of age and older have the right to vote, and 21 years of age and older have the right to stand for election. Elections shall be conducted according to the principles of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage. The people have the right to dismiss deputies to the National Assembly and the People’s Councils if they prove to be unworthy of the people’s trust. That principle ensures the people’s right to monitor their representatives.”⁹

Through democratic elections, the elected representatives of the people can join the state apparatus with the spirit of serving the people, abandoning bureaucracy, bossiness, contempt or disrespect for the masses, carelessness or neglect of the needs of the people from the government agencies and employees. Delegates are elected for the people, close to the people, respect

⁷ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 12, tr. 375.

⁸ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 4, tr. 153.

⁹ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 12, tr. 375.

the people, but it is important to understand: "The people are not the same. Among the people, there are different classes, different intellectual levels, and different opinions. There are advanced classes, intermediate classes, and backward classes".¹⁰

In promoting the right to direct democracy and mobilizing the people's participation in state management, people's trust in the government and that of the government in the people is vital. However, in reality, this problem is not at all simple, apart from misperception as a reason, there is also a situation as pointed out by Ho Chi Minh: "The cadres with defects are often afraid of what people say. But if you are honest with the people, know you have made a mistake, and apologize to the people, the people will also be very happy and will forgive you".¹¹ In fact, there are many cadres who not only do not dare to admit their mistakes and apologize, but also find ways to circumvent and cover their shortcomings, even punish and bully those who give their honest opinions. This situation leads to very ominous consequences: "For the leadership agency, for the leaders, party members and cadres, even if they have opinions, they do not dare to say it, even if they want to criticize, they are afraid and do not dare to criticize. Therefore, there is a difference between superiors and subordinates. The masses and the Party are separated from each other. The superiors think everything is fine. The subordinates do not dare to say anything. They don't speak, not because they don't have an opinion, but because they think that their superiors won't listen, don't consider it, and sometimes they might get "judged" for being different. They do not dare to say it, they keep it inside, and then they get frustrated and disappointed. Then, there is the rise of habit of "not speaking in front of people, only talking behind their back", "silent within the Party, talkative outside the Party", and this gives birth to the habit of "hesitation and evasion" and other bad habits".¹²

A democratic State is a State that implements the principle of openness and listens to the opinions of the people

Implementing the principle of transparency and listening to the people's opinions in the organization and operation of the new state apparatus is one of the basic contents aimed at democratizing the organization and ope-

¹⁰ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 5, tr. 336.

¹¹ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 15, tr. 375.

¹² Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 5, tr. 283.

ration of the State, ensuring that the State is truly of the people, by the people, for the people. Good implementation of this principle requires the operation of the state apparatus to be open to the public for the people to know according to the provisions of the law. At the same time, in the process of organizing the implementation of guidelines, policies, laws, plans and decisions of state agencies, the authorities must listen to, absorb and deal with opinions, aspirations, other perceptions, assessment and evaluation of the general public.

Publicizing the organization and operation of state agencies is to ensure that the working people have the chance to understand, perceive and analyze the activities of the state apparatus. Citizens can express their opinions, discuss and evaluate such activities, promote their ownership in state construction and participate in state management. In contrast, state agencies, officials and employees must be close to the people, respect the people, and listen to the people's opinions in order to check and re-evaluate their undertakings, policies and activities. Only then can we promptly amend, supplement and shape those policies and activities accordingly.

“Any cadres who do not dare to openly admit their shortcomings, fear the criticism of their colleagues and the people, and do not have the courage to correct their shortcomings, are not worthy to be cadres.”¹³

The value of this principle has been recognized in Article 30 of the 1946 Constitution drafted by President Ho Chi Minh as the head of the committee, which is a provision that regulates the format for publicizing the sessions of the National Assembly: “The National Assembly's meetings are open to the public and the public is allowed to listen. The press is allowed to report the discussions and resolutions of National Assembly. In special cases, the National Assembly may decide to convene in secret”.¹⁴

Publicizing all activities of the state apparatus does not mean publicizing all matters belonging to national secrets. Ho Chi Minh emphasized: “Everything must be discussed publicly, it is forbidden to form clans and have chitter chatter”.¹⁵

In addition to publicizing guidelines, policies, laws, and plans, it is also necessary to promptly publicize the limitations and shortcomings of the cadres, civil servants and the state apparatus. We should not fear losing credibility and keep things internally, or conceal weaknesses and shortcomings.

¹³ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 6, tr. 53.

¹⁴ Hiến pháp 1946. URL: <https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Hien-phap-1946-Viet-Nam-Dan-Chu-Cong-Hoa-36134.aspx>

¹⁵ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 6, tr. 369.

On the contrary, the more frankly, clearly, strictly and promptly we handle the limitations and shortcomings of cadres and civil servants in the state apparatus, the more we can make the state apparatus clean, strong, and enhance the trust of the people for the State.

Promoting Ho Chi Minh's view that “the people are masters” in today's reality

Inheriting President Ho Chi Minh's thought on democracy, implementing the rule that “the people are masters”, the Resolution of the XIII Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam expand the motto “People know, people discuss, people take action, people inspect” into six contents: “People know, people discuss, people take action, people inspect, people supervise, people benefit”. The resolution also affirms that the Party's purpose is not only to promote democracy but also to consider “improving the quality of life and the happiness index of Vietnamese people” as a goal to strive for. To practice and promote democracy according to President Ho Chi Minh's point of view, it is necessary to do well the followings:

Firstly, better mass communication should be done to unify the awareness of and responsibility for the practice of democracy according to Ho Chi Minh's thought. This is a regular task and must be done in a serious, methodical and scientific manner. Communication on the implementation of democratic rights to the people can help each citizen understand that democracy is both a right and an obligation of each citizen.

Ho Chi Minh affirmed: “Communication means bringing something to the people to understand, remember, follow and take action. If that goal is not achieved, communication has failed”.¹⁶

Communication can unify awareness and responsibility for democracy so that people understand the relationship between democracy and discipline. The Communist Party of Vietnam always demands to expand democracy and promote democracy, but it is necessary to unify the perception between centralization and democracy; avoid a one-sided understanding of democracy, especially the practice of democracy within the Party. In fact, some cadres and party members are not fully aware of the principle of democratic centralism, which has led to abuse of power, authoritarianism and machieavellism, which reduces people's trust in democratic practice. However, it is necessary to understand that democracy needs to be practiced within a framework, it is not an excessive democracy, anarchy, or extreme democracy to

¹⁶ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 5, tr. 191.

the point of denying centralization, disrespecting and violating the principle of democratic centralism. In order to effectively communicate about the implementation of democracy, it is necessary to promote the positivity and initiative of different actors, in which the role of the mass media is very important. Good communication about democracy and promoting democracy will contribute to the success of the reform of the country, bringing the revolutionary cause and the country to higher development.

Secondly, the lessons learned by the Communist Party of Vietnam in the reform process should continue to be promoted: “in all the work of the Party and State, we must always deeply grasp the concept of “people are the roots”; truly believe, respect and promote the people's right to mastery, persistently implement the motto “people know, people discuss, people take action, people inspect, people supervise, people benefit”. The people are the center and the subject of the renovation, construction and defense of the Fatherland; every policy must really come from the people's life, aspirations, rights and legitimate interests, taking the people's happiness and well-being as a goal to strive for”.¹⁷

Each cadre and party member must be worthy of being a “public servant” of the people. Elected deputies must be worthy representatives of the voters who elected them. They are the ones entrusted by the voters to represent the will and aspirations of the people. That means that representatives represent the people to participate in deciding important national issues. Delegates must base themselves on the will and aspirations of the people to decide on all issues at work.

Delegates must be honorable, honest with themselves and put the interests of the people first. Their actions must match their words. This must be verified through the candidate's work, words and behavior.

Delegates should know how to listen and have the capacity to listen to people's opinions with both affection and responsibility to understand the thoughts, aspirations and wills of the people.

Delegates must know how to speak and dare to speak out the voice of the voters — those who have elected them. The problem is to say what and how to say it? Delegates must present their opinions in the most comprehensive and convincing way. Especially during discussion sessions, delegates must know how to ask concisely, make straightforward questions and speak straight to the point with good content, ideas and the ability to convince listeners in the shortest time.

¹⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 1, tr. 96—97.

Delegates must base themselves on the will and aspirations of the people to decide on all issues at work. In case the opinions and interests of individuals or interest groups, including themselves, are contrary to the interests of the nation or the will of the people, the delegate must express the will and aspirations of the people, not his or her personal opinion.

Thirdly, as regards the government, it should “Continue to perfect, concretize and well implement the mechanism of “The Party leads, the state manages, the people master” and the motto “People know, people discuss, people take action, people inspect, people supervise, people benefit”. It should effectively organize the people’s participation in monitoring and evaluating the performance of organizations in the political system as well as the quality and capacity of the cadres and party members. Work results, people’s satisfaction and trust should be important criteria to evaluate the quality of the organization’s apparatus and the quality of cadres and party members.”¹⁸

Along with that, it is necessary to have a mechanism to protect honest and brave people who dare to fight for the common cause because many people are still afraid to fight corruption or wrongdoing. In other words, it is necessary to institutionalize and concretize the viewpoint of protecting cadres with “six dares” in the Resolution of the 13th Party Congress: “When forming the cadres, first of all, they should be leaders with strong political foundation, good morality, and outstanding ability. They dare to think, dare to speak, dare to do, dare to take responsibility, dare to innovate, dare to face difficulties and challenges, dare to act for common interests. They have a high reputation and are truly pioneering, exemplary, and are the nucleus of solidarity”.¹⁹

In using human resources, it is necessary to implement the word “skilfulness” of Ho Chi Minh: “Using cadres not according to their talents is also a cause for failure. For example, it is not good for people who write well but speak poorly to do work related to giving speeches. It is not good for people who speak well but write poorly to do writing work. Therefore, both of them have no achievements”.²⁰

It is necessary to continue to foster and improve the capacity of the cadres and civil servants so that they are truly “people’s servants”, when performing official duties, they must also serve the interests of the people, contributing to building the people’s trust in the Party and State. Through

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, tr. 192.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, tr. 187.

²⁰ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 5, tr. 283.

performing their duties, the cadres and civil servants must truly “respect the people, be close to the people, believe in the people, understand the people, learn from the people, rely on the people and be responsible to the people”.²¹

Fourthly, President Ho Chi Minh's view on democracy should be implemented by promoting the concept of “the people are masters” in reality, not only in the fact that the people elect their representatives to the National Assembly and the People's Councils at all levels, but the people should also have the right to veto, monitor and supervise the activities of elected representatives.

This democratic dismissal mechanism aims to ensure the National Assembly's transparency, maintain its quality and operational capacity. Ho Chi Minh clearly stated that: “The people have the right to dismiss deputies to the National Assembly and People's Councils if they prove to be unworthy of the people's trust. That principle ensures the people's right to supervise their representatives”.²²

According to Ho Chi Minh's point of view, in order to show that the people are masters of the state, the elected representatives must have regular contact with the people through various “channels”. If they neglect this relationship, The State easily falls into bureaucracy and stagnation; it will stand above the people, which is contrary to the true democratic nature inherent in the modern State. Through general elections, electing and possibly dismissing elected representatives, the basic political rights of the people are guaranteed, the people exercise the role of master of the state; they organize and build their own modern State.

As the masters of the state, the people have the right to vote through elections to exercise their rights, but at the same time, the people have the obligation to build and protect the State, making the State more and more perfect and stronger. Ho Chi Minh said: “Our regime is a democracy. The people are masters. The government is the servant of the people. The people have the right to urge and criticize the Government. The government, whether big or small, is aimed at serving the interests of the people. Therefore, the people have the duty to help the Government, in accordance with the Government's discipline and in accordance with the Government's policies, so that the Government can fulfill the tasks that the people have entrusted to them”.²³

²¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam. *Op. cit.*, t. 2, tr. 248.

²² Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 12, tr. 375.

²³ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 9, tr. 90.

Thorough understanding of Ho Chi Minh's thought on the people as the masters and practicing democracy in reality are the premise for Vietnam to develop further. This will realize the wish to build a dignified, bigger and more beautiful state that can stand shoulder to shoulder with the powers of the five continents as President Ho Chi Minh wished.

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Chapter 5

POWER CONTROL MECHANISM IN VIETNAM'S ONE-PARTY SYSTEM TODAY

Over the past 90 years, since its birth in February 1930 until now, the Communist Party of Vietnam has always affirmed its leadership role on behalf of the people and the nation. After the victory of the General Uprising in August 1945, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was born, and the Party became the ruling Party. In the new conditions, the important and urgent issue for the Party is to build a power control mechanism to ensure that all power belongs to the people — through the Party's leadership role, it is important to realize the goal of independence for the nation, freedom and happiness for the people, for a prosperous and happy socialist Vietnam.

Keywords: Communist party, mechanism, power control, Vietnam.

Among the organizations of the Vietnamese political system (which includes: Communist Party of Vietnam; State of Vietnam; Vietnam Fatherland Front; and socio-political organizations such as Vietnam General Confederation of Labor, Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, Vietnam Women's Union, Vietnam Farmers' Union, Vietnam Veterans Association), the Party is a member of the political system, but this member plays a leading role. Platform for building the country during the transitional period to socialism (Supplement and Development in 2011) defines: “The Communist Party of Vietnam is the ruling Party, leading the State and society. (...) The Party leads the political system and is at the same time a part of that system”.¹ This is also clearly stated in Article 4 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2011). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 88—89.

That power belongs to the people is the hallmark of a democracy. The power of the Party and the state apparatus is not the power in itself but is authorized by the people. Therefore, the people have a legitimate claim and of course desire to control the power they have assigned so that it is not deformed, not corrupted, not abused, ensuring that power only has one ultimate purpose: serving the Fatherland, serving the people. In addition, power is exercised within the framework of the Constitution and laws.

Control of power includes institutions, measures and methods towards the goal of ensuring that power is properly and effectively exercised; examining, detecting, and preventing abuse or corruption of power, so that power does not exceed the limit entrusted by the people. The control of power in the political system of a single Party is to control the scope and limit the activities of the Party and the State, to ensure that all activities comply with the scope and limits authorized by the people. It also ensures that these institutions act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the law, avoid abuse of power or corruption by agencies, organizations, cadres and civil servants, which contributes to ensuring stability and sustainable development of the political system.

To prevent power corruption, it is necessary to have a strict monitoring and control mechanism for power, ensuring that “all power belongs to the people”. In particular, the Communist Party of Vietnam has focused on leading and directing on the following main contents:

Promoting democracy in the organization and operation of the Party, building a democratic practice mechanism to ensure all power belongs to the people

Power control and ensuring that state power belongs to the people have always been the focus of all democratic political system with the existence of class and a state. This is closely related to democracy and the mechanism for practising democracy in socio-political life. Because democracy is an effective weapon to prevent abuse of power and corruption of power. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau has reminded: “The natural logic of power always follows the trend of abuse of power without exception, even though the original motive of power may be purely for the people. Unchecked, unsanctioned power is always dangerous. So far, there has been no truly safe case where absolute power has fallen into the hands of one person or a group of people. This requires all power to be controlled by a legal mechanism, with

transparent sanctions (...) If there are defects, democracy will be corrected by a higher level of democracy”.² In his work *The Social Contract*, Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote: “Those who are entrusted with the executive power are not the masters of the people, but only the executors; the people can bring them up and remove them as they please; for them, there is no contract but compliance, and that when they assume responsibility assigned to them by the state, they do nothing but fulfill their civic duty without questioning anything about the conditions to which they must abide”.³

Therefore, all activities of the ruling Party and the State in a democratic political system with the rule of law must meet the legitimate will and aspirations of the people. Marx wrote: “Under democracy, men do not exist for the sake of the law, but the law exists for man; here human existence is law, whereas in other forms of the state system, people are an existence regulated by law. Such is the hallmark of democracy”.⁴

Discussing the powerful subjects and forces of the revolutionary cause, President Ho Chi Minh — Founder of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the person who gave birth to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (now the Socialist Republic of Vietnam) once emphasized: “Renovation and construction work is the responsibility of the people”; “the cause of resistance war and national construction is the work of the people”; “The revolutionary work is the common work of the people, not the work of one or two people”. For the revolutionary cause, the people play a decisive role in success or failure, “having the people means having everything”.

That spirit is clearly reflected in the Party’s revolutionary programs (From the Platform in 1930, the Program at the Second Party Congress, the Platform for National Construction in the Transition to Socialism in 1991, the Platform with supplements and develops in 2011) and institutionalized in the provisions of the Vietnamese Constitution (1945, 1959, 1980, 1992 and 2013).

The purpose of promoting democracy is to ensure that the Party, State and socio-political organizations have the ability to mobilize the spirit of taking initiative, creativity, intelligence, revolutionary enthusiasm, and a sense of true mastery of society and the country of the working class, the working people and the whole nation. All of these creative activities should be directed towards the successful implementation of the Platform, guideli-

² Hồ Sĩ Quý (2014). *Một số vấn đề về dân chủ và độc tài*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Lý luận Chính trị, tr. 47.

³ Rousseau J.-J. (2004). *Bàn về khế ước xã hội*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Lý luận Chính trị, tr. 138.

nes and policies of the Party and State. Deeply aware of that problem, in the years of *Doi moi*, the practice of democracy in the Party and in society has developed in both theory and practice.

In principle of organization and operation, the Communist Party of Vietnam operates on the principle of “democratic centralism”. The democratic centralism regime creates the necessary conditions for the implementation of collective leadership and responsible individuals, and that regime is also the highest leadership principle of the Party (President Ho Chi Minh once emphasized this is the Party's leadership regime). The principle of democratic centralism is implemented in state agencies, in socio-political organizations, and at the same time with the implementation of the principles: self-criticism and criticism; maintaining solidarity and unity on the basis of the Party's Platform and Charter; The Party is closely associated with the people; The Party operates within the framework of the Constitution and laws. The Party Charter approved by the 11th National Congress (2011) defines: “The Party is a firm organization, united in wills and actions, taking democratic centralism as the basic organizing principle; implementing collective leadership, personal responsibility, love for comrades, strict discipline, and at the same time implement the principles of self-criticism and criticism, solidarity on the basis of the the Party's Political Platform and Charter; having close attachment with the people; and the Party operates within the framework of the Constitution and the law”.⁵ From those principles of organization and activities, the Party is interested in building and practicing democracy within the Party. In fact, the Party has encouraged freedom of thought in Party activities, respecting different views and individual opinions in a constructive spirit. It has also encouraged creativity, discussion and democratic debate in order to bring into play the wisdom of the whole Party and each member. The process of obtaining votes of confidence for candidates and nominations is included in the Party's regulations, ensuring the principle of democratic centralism. During the recent congresses, the practice of democracy in the Party continued to be supplemented by stricter rules and regulations, such as the Politburo's regulation on reporting work and activities between the two meetings of the Central Executive Committee; and Party committees at all levels are responsible for reporting on leadership and direction between the two meetings. Regulations are

⁴ Mác C. và Ănghen Ph. (2002). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 1, tr. 350.

⁵ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2011). *Điều lệ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 5.

made on time for self-criticism and criticism, taking confidence votes of cadres and party members; the people participate in contributing to building the Party. Regulations on information and provision of information are also made.⁶ The rights of party members are ensured according to the provisions of the Party's Charter, including the right to be informed and discuss issues on the Political Platform, the Party's Charter, the Party's guidelines and policies; the right to vote on the work of the Party; to stand for election, nominate and elect leadership agencies at all levels of the Party according to the regulations of the Central Committee; criticize and question activities of party organizations and party members at all levels within the organization; report and make recommendations to responsible agencies and request answers; present opinions when the party organization makes comments, makes work decisions or enforces discipline on Party members; make an appeal about the disciplinary decision against them. The democratic rights of party members are promoted in the promulgation of resolutions of party organizations. Party members are allowed to discuss and give opinions before voting on the Party's affairs, contributing to ensuring that the Party's organization and operating regime are more and more democratic and substantive; at the same time, helping Party members timely grasp the Party's guidelines, the state's policies, laws and the political tasks of localities, agencies and units.

Along with promoting the practice of democracy in the Party organization system, the practice of democracy in state agencies is emphasized. The awareness of the rule of law state continues to be clarified in many aspects such as: the relationship between the State and citizens as an equal reciprocal one in terms of legal rights and obligations; democracy and human rights in addition to constitutionality and rule of law; step by step clarification of power and power supervision in the state's activities. Continuing to build and perfect the socialist rule-of-law State of the people, by the people and for the people, the 2013 Constitution was promulgated with many new amendments and supplements, especially the ideology of the state serving the people, facilitating development, closely working with the people, fully exercising the people's democratic rights, respecting and listening to the people's opinions and being subject to the people's supervision; enjoying benefits but also maintaining discipline and responsibility. Also, power is limited and controlled; there are control mechanisms and measures to

⁶ Hội đồng Lý luận Trung ương (2020). *30 năm thực hiện Cương lĩnh xây dựng đất nước trong thời kỳ quá độ lên chủ nghĩa xã hội*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia Sự Thật, tr. 223—224.

prevent bureaucracy and corruption. The system of legal documents related to the organization and operation of state power agencies is concretized and institutionalized. Activities of the National Assembly continue to be innovated in a professional manner; the supreme supervision function of the National Assembly and the supervision of the People's Councils are strengthened at all levels; questioning activities and transparency should be paid more attention.

Government activities are renewed in the direction of building e-Government, Government of action, integrity, facilitating development. Public agencies should promote reform of administrative procedures towards the satisfaction of the people and re-arrange the activities to streamline the organization of the apparatus at all levels and enhance transparency and accountability. The role of citizens to participate in monitoring the activities of public agencies is strengthened. Work on making contact with the people and handling of complaints and denunciations has had positive changes. The role of the press and media is enhanced in all activities of social life.

The Party's leadership promotes judicial reform according to Resolution No. 49-NQ/TW, dated June 2, 2005 of the Politburo on the Judicial Reform Strategy to 2020, setting the goal of building a transparent, strong, democratic, strict judicial system that upholds justice and modernize step by step to serve the people and the Fatherland. Judicial agencies continue to be strengthened in the direction of respecting the rule of law, building a rule of law state, having openness and transparency, and sharply reducing unjust judgements. Supervision mechanisms is strengthened to ensure the participation and supervision of the people of judicial activities.

Building and perfecting the power control institutions in the organizations of the political system

In a political system under the condition that a single Communist Party is in power, perfecting the institution of controlling power includes defining the political-legal principles, the Constitution's norms, regulations in the legal documents; the Party's charter and documents of organizations in the socio-political system. These regulations stipulate the functions, tasks, powers, contents, forms, processes and procedures for controlling power in order to ensure uniformity, consistency, transparency, clarity and feasibility. Simultaneously, the building and perfecting of the institution to control

power needs to be suitable with and meets the requirements of Vietnam's extensive international integration today.

During the past 35 years of reform, the Communist Party of Vietnam has led and directed the building of a power control mechanism with many practical results. Many related documents were directed to be developed, promulgated and effectively implemented in social life. The Central Executive Committee and the Politburo have issued many thematic resolutions on Party building and rectification. Specifically, Resolutions of the 4th Central Committee term XI and Term XII detail the work of Party building, preventing and repelling the degradation in political ideology, morality, lifestyle, internal manifestations of “self-corruption” and “self-degradation”. Regulation No. 102-QD/TW (2017) *On disciplining violations* prescribe sanctions for more than 380 negative actions that violate Party's regulations by cadres and party members. Regulation No. 205-QD/TW (2019) *On control of power in personnel work and against bribing to run for office and to get power* stipulates 3 groups of prohibited acts in personnel work for members of Party committees, party organizations, collective leaders of agencies, units, localities, advisory staff, officers who proposes promotion and do personnel work; 5 groups of acts of bribing or manipulation while running for office and 8 groups of acts of covering up or aiding violations while running for office and measures of sanctioning and handling. Regulation No. 55-QD/TW (2016) is about *a number of things to be done immediately to strengthen the role of setting example of cadres and party members*. Regulation No. 08-QDi/TW dated (2018) *On the responsibility of setting an example of cadres and party members, first of all Politburo members, members of the Secretariat, members of the Central Committee* clearly details 8 contents showing that Politburo members, members of the Secretariat, members of the Central Committee must lead by example and 8 contents on being strict with themselves and resolutely fighting corruption. Directive No. 05-CT/TW (2016) of the Politburo gives details on promoting studying and following Ho Chi Minh's thought, morality and style.

The Politburo issued Regulations No. 55-QD/TW (1999), Regulations No. 19-QD/TW (2002) and Regulation No. 47 (2011) *On things that Party members should not do*, to train and handle Party members who violate Party discipline; Regulation No. 85-QD/TW (2017) *On inspection and supervision of asset declaration of officials under the management of the Politburo and the Secretariat*; Regulation No. 86-QD/TW (2017) *On supervision within the Party*, etc. These regulations are the basis and standards for cadres and party members to strive towards, train themselves, raise their sense of responsibility, be exemplary to abide by the Party's guidelines and viewpoints, the

Charter and state laws. They should perform the duties of Party members, prevent the deterioration of political ideology, morality and lifestyle, and avoid bureaucracy, corruption and other negative issues. At the same time, those regulations are also the basis for people and organizations in the political system to monitor Party members; for Party committees, Party organizations, inspection committees and branches to inspect and supervise party members when performing and handling violations.

The National Assembly amended and promulgated the 2013 Constitution and many laws and codes with new contents and provisions related to power control: the 2015 Penal Code (amended and supplemented in 2017); Criminal Procedure Code 2015; Law on cadres and civil servants; Law on Officials; Law on Denunciations and documents detailing the Law on Denunciations; Law on Civil Judgment Execution (amended and supplemented in 2014). Some specialized laws such as: Law on Enterprises; Law on management and use of state capital in production and business in enterprises; Law on Bidding; or Law on Auditing also have provisions to prevent cadres and civil servants from taking advantage of their assigned positions and duties for power abuse, corruption and self interests.

The Government has issued many decrees: Decree No. 112/2020/ND-CP, dated September 18, 2020 *On disciplining cadres, civil servants and public employees*; Decree No. 71/2016/ND-CP stipulating the time limit and procedures for administrative judgment enforcement and handling of liability for those who fail to execute court judgments and decisions; Decree No. 59/2019/ND-CP, dated July 1, 2019 detailing guidelines for the implementation of the 2018 Law on Anti-corruption; Decree No. 19/2020/ND-CP, dated 12/02/2020 *On inspection and disciplinary action in law enforcement on handling of administrative violations*. The Prime Minister has issued Directive 10/CT-TTg, April 22, 2019 *On strengthening handling and preventing effectively the situation of bureaucracy and trouble for people and businesses in administrative work*.

Being well aware of the role and strength of the people, the Party has paid attention to building and perfecting the mechanism for controlling power through promoting the role and activities of the Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations, and it has been renewed and enhanced step by step. Along with promoting the implementation of the Regulation on democracy at grassroots level and the Ordinance on implementation of democracy in communes, wards and townships, the democratic atmosphere in the Party and in society has been more open, especially regarding the role of supervision and social criticism of the Fatherland Front and mass organizations. The Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam has promulgated

Regulation on supervision and social criticism of the Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations, as well as Regulation on the participation of the Fatherland Front, socio-political organizations and the people in contributing to building the Party, building the government.

These are really important politico-legal foundations for Party committees and organizations at all levels to carry out the supervision and control of power, and to prevent and combat corruption and degradation in a part of cadres, Party organization officers and civil servants. This is also a big step forward in awareness and theoretical thinking of the Communist Party of Vietnam in the issue of controlling power.

Building and perfecting the power control institutions and the content, scope and form of power control of the authorized subject

The Platform for building the country during the transitional period to socialism (Supplement and Development in 2011) states: “Our State is a socialist rule of law state of the people, by the people, for the people. All state power belongs to the people, whose foundation is the alliance between the working class and the peasantry and the intelligentsia, led by the Communist Party of Vietnam. State power is unified, with assignment, coordination and control among important agencies in the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial powers”.⁷

From that main orientation, the Party's leadership further concretizes the operation and control mechanism among the legislative, executive and judicial branches in the condition of a unifying power. It is crucial to strictly observe the principles of democracy, the rule of law, especially the role of the legal system as a tool for the people to control power, exercise their mastery and participate in the activities of the state apparatus.

To ensure that agencies and organizations in the political system are both the enforcer and the subject of control and supervision of power (the Communist Party of Vietnam; the National Assembly and People's Councils at all levels; the Government, People's Committees at all levels; People's Procuracy, People's Courts; Fatherland Front and its members; People, media agencies) are clearly defined in terms of scope, content of their tasks, powers. Processes and procedures for controlling power are compatible with their position and role in the political system. In addition to the general ins-

⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2011). *Op. cit.*, tr. 85.

tutions mentioned above, in building the power control mechanism, the Party has directed towards perfecting the institution specialized in controlling power, such as the Internal Affairs Committee, the Inspection Committee; Auditing and Inspecting bodies; the People's Procuracy; the Courts; The Steering Committee for Anti-corruption and so on. Those organizations are granted strong functions, tasks and powers to become the "special forces" and "sacred swords" of the Party in the implementation of power control in a detailed, transparent and effective manner.

In fact, the term of the 12th Party Congress showed that: Agencies and units with anti-corruption function have been strengthened in organization, their quality, operational efficiency and coordination relations have been improved, especially for specialized units under the Government Inspectorate, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Supreme People's Procuracy. This has promoted their key role in detecting, fighting and handling corruption cases and incidents. Elected bodies, the Fatherland Front, and socio-political organizations have strengthened their supervision of law enforcement, conducting many thematic supervisions, focusing on areas prone to corruption, wastefulness, negativity, as well as issues related to corruption, wastefulness and negativity that the people are most concerned about. All of this effort has brought positive effects in practice.

Strengthening inspection and supervision in association with resolute handling of cadres, party members and civil servants who have degenerated and become corrupted

During many terms of the Party Congress in the *Doi moi* period, especially the XI and XII congresses, the issue of building a power control mechanism was promoted in association with strengthening inspection, supervision, discipline, ensuring the rigor of the Party's discipline, warning, deterring and preventing violations of Party organizations and members.

The Party has resolutely fought against bureaucracy, corruption, waste, individualism. It has also developed and accelerated the implementation of regulations on promoting exemplary role in training moral qualities, manners, lifestyles and work ethics of officials and party members, especially leaders and managers at all levels, heads of agencies and units, as well as performed self-criticism and critical reviews. At the same time, there is a focus on leading, directing, strengthening inspection, focusing on suggesting discipline measures for collectives and individuals showing signs of violati-

on. The mechanism of inspection, supervision and social criticism is strictly implemented by the Fatherland Front, socio-political organizations and the people concerning the quality, morality and lifestyle of cadres and Party members.

It can easily be seen that there is corruption and abuse of power, in which a part of cadres, Party members and civil servants, including officials become corrupted or abuse their power. This is a major obstacle to the country's socio-economic development, causing loss of resources and reducing investment efficiency, distorting policies, affecting the cause of constructing and defending the nation; causing great damage to property of the State, society, collectives and citizens; infringing upon and upsetting the moral standards and cultural traditions of the nation, adversely affecting the reputation of agencies and organizations, and eroding people's trust in the Party and the regime. Faced with that situation, the Communist Party of Vietnam has had great political determination, drastic and synchronous solutions in the fight against authoritarianism, autocracy, corruption, wastefulness, negativity, "group interests". Along with building a control mechanism for important leadership positions, the Party clearly stated the view that for all positions — rights — responsibilities or interests, State control must be carried out simultaneously. Party committees and inspection committees at all levels identify inspection for signs of violations as a key task in order to detect, prevent timely and limit the consequences caused by violations of the Party organization and members. Through various information channels, inspection conclusions, investigation by competent authorities and regular monitoring results, inspection committees at all levels have detected and identified signs of violations of Party members and conducted inspection when there are signs of violation. Only in the term of the 12th Congress (2016—2021), Party committees and organizations at all levels have examined 264091 party organizations and 1,124,146 party members; inspection committees at all levels have inspected 15,920 party organizations and 47,701 Party members when there were signs of violations. Through inspection, Party committees at all levels have disciplined 1,329 organizations and 69,600 members; The Inspection Committee at all levels has disciplined 17,610 Party members in different forms. Particularly, the Central Inspection Committee has disciplined 169 party members. Inspection Committees at all levels have supervised 124,469 party organizations and 185,731 party members.⁸

⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 2, tr. 197—200.

The strengthening of inspection, supervision, discipline and strict handling of organizations and party members who violate allows no forbidden zones, no exceptions. It has been associated with reform in personnel work and prevention of bribery when running for office. It has made an important contribution to consolidating and strengthening people's trust in the Party, the State and regime, creating a solid foundation for rapid and sustainable development of the country in the years to come.⁹

In short, using power properly, having an effective mechanism to control power and prevent power corruption are the ruling strategy of the Communist Party of Vietnam; these also show the political culture of the ruling Party.

The fight regarding control of power in a single-party political system is always extremely difficult, complex and sensitive. It requires the building and gradually perfecting of mechanisms, policies, and regulations of the Party, laws of the State and institutions that are strong, synchronous and complete. There must be courage, great political determination and decisive actions in the exercise of power control of the whole political system, of the people and of each cadre and member of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

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⁹ According to Report No. 18-BCĐT/DLXH, dated February 3, 2020 on the results of a public opinion poll on a number of issues of the country by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam: Construction, rectification The Party, preventing and repelling the deterioration of political ideology, morality, and lifestyle, displaying “self-corruption” and “self-degradation” were evaluated by cadres and party members with encouraging results; the figure increased from 39 % in 2018 to 59 % in 2019. Anti-corruption, wastefulness and “group interests” were evaluated by cadres and party members with encouraging results, increasing from 29 % in 2018 to 48 % in 2019. Source: Báo cáo tổng kết công tác xây dựng Đảng và thi hành Điều lệ Đảng nhiệm kỳ Đại hội XII, in: Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 2.

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Chapter 6

THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE POWER STRUCTURE IN VIETNAM: THE CPV IN A MARKET ECONOMY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

The article is based on the analysis of constitutions of the SRV and newest party documents of the SRV, as well as materials of party press and opinions of leading experts. The analysis of key features of the power system in Vietnam is of great scientific and practical interest, because without an adequate understanding of this issue it is impossible to make a correct analysis of both internal and external political situation. As a result of the study, the author concluded that the Vietnamese model of a one-party political system in a market economy and regional integration has shown its high efficiency. It has both strengths and weaknesses. If its critical vulnerabilities are neutralized (corruption, degeneration of part of the Party leadership, loss of trust), this system can ensure the country's dynamic development with the CPV in power. Its features, such as simultaneous loyalty to traditions, flexibility and reliance on modernization of the economy with the stability of the political system allow to maintain the stability of the political regime and to introduce innovations in the management of the party and the country in the new complicating geopolitical conditions.

Keywords: Ho Chi Minh thought, power system, CPV, one-party system.

Introduction

The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) plays a leading role in the power system of modern Vietnam. During the struggle for the country's independence, not just a new political regime was created, but a new identity that united the nation through years of struggle and has now become dominant in a united Vietnam.

Reforming ideology and the course of modernization

At present, there is a one-party system in the SRV headed by the CPV, which is at the center of the system of power and management of all spheres of politics, economy and social life. In its activities, the CPV is guided by the Ho Chi Minh thought, which actively uses the most effective elements adapted to the conditions of Vietnam borrowed from other political systems.

The 1986 *Đổi mới* reform brought tangible results and proved to be very effective, leading to the development of ambitious plans for the country's further development until 2030 (the centenary of the CPV) and 2045 (the centenary of the August Revolution).

The Central Committee and Politburo of the CPV Central Committee are the main centers of strategic decision-making, which are implemented by the government. The report of the CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to the 13th CPV Congress in January 2021 outlined priority development objectives in the following areas: renewed thinking and modernization models; managing social development and ensuring social justice; developing international activities and ensuring construction of modern armed forces; and party building and improving management efficiency.¹

Ideology in contemporary Vietnam plays a very important role and permeates all pores of the state and society. This is an extremely important feature of the power system in the SRV. In Chapter 1, “Political System”, Article 4 of the current Constitution of Vietnam in 2013 states, “The Communist Party of Vietnam, the vanguard of the Vietnamese working class, simultaneously the vanguard of the toiling people and of the Vietnamese nation, the faithful representative of the interests of the working class, the toiling people, and the whole nation, acting upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh's thought, is the leading force of the State and society”.² The Vietnamese partners did not come to this formulation immediately.

At the height of Soviet-Vietnamese relations, the 1980 Constitution of Vietnam contained the following wording in Article 4: “The Communist Party of Vietnam, the vanguard and the staff of the working class, which is armed with Marxism-Leninism and constitutes the only force leading the State, the society and the factor decisive to all victories of the Vietnamese

¹ Nguyễn Phú Trọng. *Toàn văn phát biểu của Tổng bí thư, Chủ tịch nước Nguyễn Phú Trọng*. Retrieved on June 11, 2021.

² Hiến pháp nước Cộng hòa Xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam năm 2013. Retrieved on June 11, 2021.

revolution. The Party exists and strives for the interests of the working class and people of Vietnam. The Party's organizations operate under the Constitution".³ As can be seen from the text of Article 4, only "Marxism-Leninism" is listed as the ideological basis of the regime.

Shortly after the disintegration of the USSR, a new Constitution was adopted in 1992, with significant changes in the wording of Article 4. "The Communist Party of Vietnam, the vanguard of the Vietnamese working class, the faithful representative of the rights and interests of the working class, the toiling people, and the whole nation, acting upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh's thought, is the force leading the State and society".⁴ Since then, Ho Chi Minh's thought has been given an official status enshrined in the Constitution, and this ideology has been applied creatively without excessive fanaticism or pharisaism. This practice has worked well in Vietnam, for both ideological extremes are fraught with dangerous excesses. One-sided bias breeds hypocrisy from the top, which leads to its discredit in the eyes of the people, while conservative bias leads to dogmatism, which manifests itself in a drop in management efficiency and disengagement from power. At present, the CPV is not spinning like a weather vane, trying to adjust to the rapidly changing external and internal conditions, but it is also not persisting in defending the general course of a century ago, clearly outdated under present conditions, with the dictatorship of the proletariat, the class struggle, and other orthodoxies.

Vietnam has learned from the collapse of the USSR and is pragmatically balancing theory and practice, ideology and economics, knowing full well that abrupt changes in these areas can bring down the political system and the entire state.⁵

One cannot live without ideology in today's world. Ho Chi Minh himself once wrote: "If the party wants to be stable, it must make theory the basis, everyone in the party must understand it, everyone must follow this theory. A party which has no theory is like a man without reason, a ship without a compass".⁶ It is thanks to such a nationally oriented ideological compass that the leadership of the SRV was able to find the best way out of a seemingly hopeless situation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The CPV and

³ Hiến pháp nước Cộng hoà Xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam năm 1980. Retrieved on June 11, 2021.

⁴ Hiến pháp nước Cộng hoà Xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam năm 1992. Retrieved on June 11, 2021.

⁵ Dư luận quốc tế về bài viết của Tổng Bí thư Nguyễn Phú Trọng (2021). Bài viết của Tổng Bí thư góp phần phát triển tư tưởng Hồ Chí Minh. Retrieved on June 11.

⁶ Hồ Chí Minh (2011). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị quốc gia, t. 2, tr. 289.

Ho Chi Minh's thought are systemic elements of the political and state system of the SRV.

Nguyen Phu Trong, General Secretary of the CPV Central Committee, describes the ideological approach of the CPC as follows: “We must selectively adopt and supplement in a critical and creative spirit the latest achievements in ideology and science so that doctrine, our teachings are always modern, constantly adopting new forces, not slipping into stagnation, backwardness in relation to life”.⁷

The main directions of Vietnam's development are discussed in a policy article by Nguyen Phu Trong, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV),⁸ which was published in mid-May 2021. There he noted, “Success or defeat depends above all on the right course, political courage, managerial capacity, and fighting strength of the Party”.⁹

In our opinion, in modern Vietnam a dialectical approach is realized, which allows on the one hand to follow its course, and on the other hand to maneuver according to the circumstances in a changing environment. This makes it possible to develop without collapsing the political system, while gradually modernizing the system of power, adapting successful practices that have worked well in other systems to its needs.

The Minister of Public Security, General To Lam, drew attention to three threats to the regime at the 13th Congress of the CPV: 1) corruption, profligacy, and degradation in political ideology and morality and way of life, which are occurring among some cadres, party members, 2) “peaceful transformation”, and 3) “hostile forces”,¹⁰ which obviously have both internal and external dimensions. The experience of the collapse of the USSR shows that the weakest link was the reborn party elite. This is the issue of the first two threats noted by the Vietnamese security leadership.

Thus, the CPV, while remaining faithful to the ideological elements beneficial to the country, ensures modernization and economic development, which stabilizes the political system.

Presently:

1) Order and governability are ensured in the country, and high rates of economic growth ensure the stability of the regime.

⁷ Tổng Bí thư Nguyễn Phú Trọng. *Một số vấn đề lý luận và thực tiễn về chủ nghĩa xã hội và con đường đi lên chủ nghĩa xã hội ở Việt Nam*. Retrieved on June 11, 2021.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Tô Lâm (2021). *Tham luận của Đoàn đại biểu Đảng bộ Công an Trung ương*. Retrieved on June 11, 2021.

2) The “intertwining and competition”¹¹ of elements of different socio-economic systems occurs, in the words of Nguyen Phu Trong, creating a dynamic impulse that leads to the country's development.

3) A “closed door” policy will lead to stagnation and backwardness.

Here's what CPV Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong writes about it: “These entanglements and competition are even more complex and radical in a market and open-door, international integration environment. Next to the successes, the positives, there will always be the negatives, the trials, which should be treated soberly and dealt with in a timely, effective manner. This is a very tough struggle, a hard one, which requires a new vision, new courage, and new creativity”.¹²

In his article, Nguyen Phu Trong drew attention to the six benchmarks for social development that the CPV seeks in its work:

1) We need a society in which development is truly human-centered, not profit-driven through exploitation and the trampling of human dignity.

2) We need economic development that goes hand in hand with progress and social justice, not an increasing gap between the rich and the poor and a lack of equality in society.

3) We need a humane, cohesive society where people support each other, oriented toward progressive humanitarian values rather than unfair “big fish swallowing small fish” competition for the sake of narrow personal or group interests.

4) We need sustainable development, in harmony with nature, to provide a comfortable living environment for present and future generations, rather than exploitation and appropriation of natural resources, limitless material consumption, and destruction of the environment.

5) And we need a political system in which power really belongs to the people, comes from the people and serves the interests of the people, not the rich minority.

6) It is all these beautiful aspirations that are the true values of socialism and at the same time its goals, the path that President Ho Chi Minh, our Party and our people have chosen and insistently pursued.¹³

Nguyen Phu Trong noted the eight key elements of socialism with Vietnamese characteristics currently under construction:

1) the socialist society that the people of Vietnam seek to build is a society with rich people, a strong state, a democratic, just, civilized society;

¹¹ Tổng Bí thư Nguyễn Phú Trọng. *Op. cit.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

- 2) where the people are the master;
- 3) with a highly developed economy, based on modern productive forces and appropriate advanced production relations;
- 4) with an advanced culture filled with national identity;
- 5) with people who live well, are free, happy, and have the conditions for all-round development;
- 6) all peoples living in Vietnam are equal, solidary, respectful, and help each other in their joint development;
- 7) with a legal socialist people's state, created by the people for the people under the leadership of the Communist Party;
- 8) with relations of friendship and cooperation with all countries of the world.¹⁴

According to G.M. Lokshin, an authoritative Russian Vietnam Studies scholar, “there is very little “ism,” that is, doctrinaire, in this interpretation of socialism, but much more common sense”.¹⁵

Vietnam is closely watching the balance of power on the world stage and the “rules of the game” between superpowers and contenders for regional dominance. Under these conditions, Hanoi is fighting not so much for survival as for raising its status in the international geopolitical “food chain”. And this in itself is no small achievement.

Currently, Vietnam's dynamic economy is progressively moving along the path of the so-called Little Dragons (小龍), trying to become a fifth generation “dragon”. In order to realize this course, Vietnam-based TNCs that sell most of their products on the world market must emerge in the country, and the dynamic Vietnamese and international businesses in general support this line.

G.M. Lokshin, analyzing the relationship between the government and business, believes that “in time the role of the oligarchy in market economy has become still more notable through the owners of big private companies.”¹⁶ There are indeed dollar billionaires in the country, but in our opinion, it is not enough to talk about “oligarchs” in relation to contemporary Vietnam, who by definition do not even so much interfere in political decision-making by the authorities, as they manage the power. We are not aware of any evidence to support such assumptions. On the other hand, there are well known facts of persecution of corrupt and even runaway “effective ma-

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Lokshin, G.M. (2021). Ideological Problems of the CPV in the Focus of the 13th Party Congress. *Russian Journal of Vietnamese Studies*, ser. 2, no. 2, p. 28.


¹⁶ Ibid.

nagers” abroad, who have been returned to their homeland under uncertain circumstances and have been brought to trial.

The renowned British scholar Bill Hayton also asks whether Vietnam is “destined to become the next oligarchy in Southeast Asia”¹⁷ and immediately answers that “this is a very remote possibility, but not necessarily a reality”.¹⁸

The party system and ideology play a systemic role in Vietnam, both for the political regime and for statehood as a whole.

The political system of contemporary Vietnam is not a copy of either the Soviet or Chinese system. It is a national system that combines both its own Vietnamese and locally adapted the most effective elements of foreign political systems.



Ho Chi Minh's thought permeates and connects all levels of the system of power. Abrupt changes in any part of this system threaten the collapse of the political regime as a whole.

Managing threats for sustainable development

At present, the political system is being adjusted to implement the decisions of the 13th Congress of the CPV, which are to ensure the country's sustainable development under any scenario of changes in the external environment. The main task is to protect national interests. However, there are both internal and external threats along the way. The most important threats

¹⁷ Hayton B. (2010). *Vietnam Rising Dragon*. Yale University Press, p. 228.

¹⁸ Ibid.

are internal. Among the internal threats, the loss of trust in the party among the people has been declared the most important. With the rules of the game tightening in the international arena, it is necessary to bring order to the country. Consequently, the system of government must conform to the following main tasks:

- 1) cleansing the party ranks of compromised members;
- 2) ensuring manageability of political, economic, social processes without managerial inversion, when the power is controlled by these processes;
- 3) ensuring high rates of economic growth for the sustainable development of the country and increasing its international level.

The long overdue party purge in the Vietnamese context looks quite traditional. Even feudal managerial practice held the priority of the worthy as the norm. Confucius said, “Raise up the crooked and set them above the straight and the people will not obey”.¹⁹ Vietnam has paid a high price for the transition from a situation in which processes control power to a model in which power controls processes. On this difficult path were such outstanding achievements as the August Revolution, the victory in the Indochina Wars, the unification of the national territory, the development of an economic reform program, the exit from the sanctions regime and the U.S. economic embargo without surrendering the priority of national interests. All this speaks to the high efficiency of Ho Chi Minh's system of government and the ability of this system to self-reproduce and modernize.

At present, the CPV is continuing its course of overcoming the consequences of the war and uniting the nation regardless of the country of residence. One such event in the spring of 2021 was the global commemoration of the founding day of the Vietnamese state of the Hong Bang dynasty and the organization of a corresponding official ceremony at the Hung kings Temple in Vinh Phuc province, in which Vietnamese communities around the world participated.

As a result of this study, the author concluded that the Vietnamese model of one-party political system in a market economy and regional integration has shown its high efficiency. It has both strengths and weaknesses.

Strengths: ensuring stability and order in the country; achieving and maintaining high rates of economic growth and improving living standards over three decades; strengthening the country's international standing.

¹⁹ Конфуцианское “Четверокнижие” (“Si shu”) (2004). М.: Vost. Lit., s. 163.

Weaknesses: corruption among the party elite; the degeneration of some high-ranking officials; the threat of loss of credibility among the people.

To summarize, we should note the following features of the power system in Vietnam in a market economy and regional integration. First of all, it is the preservation of the one-party system while developing a socialist-oriented market economy. It turned out that the preservation of the political system is quite compatible with the development of a market economy, while maintaining the threat of power passing into the hands of oligarchic circles, which is pointed out by authoritative experts. The most important feature of the evolution of Vietnam's political system was the continuation of the policy of renewal not only in the field of economic reforms, but also in the field of ideology. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union (December 26, 1991), a new constitution of the SRV was adopted in 1992. At the same time, there was an important modernization in the field of state ideology, namely the transition in 1992 from “Marxism-Leninism” (“*học thuyết Mác — Lênin*”)²⁰ to “Marxism-Leninism theory and Ho Chi Minh thought” (“*chủ nghĩa Mác — Lênin và tư tưởng Hồ Chí Minh*”).²¹ It was at this time that the term “Ho Chi Minh thought” officially appears.

This political and ideological maneuver demonstrated simultaneously fidelity to traditions, a rapid response to changes in the external and internal environment, flexibility and reliance on modernization of ideology and economy with a stable political system, which at that time allowed to maintain the stability of the political regime and introduce innovations in the management of the party and the country in the new complicating geopolitical and economic conditions.

At present, there are both experienced old-school politicians and young proven nominees in the system of power, who will have the opportunity to gain experience under the guidance of older comrades. Such a line makes it possible to maintain stability and predictability, to carry out a dosed rejuvenation of the executive personnel, and to avoid dashing from one extreme to another. In this context, the trend of increasing the role and representation of security services in the executive branch in Vietnam is a logical phenomenon amid the intensified fight against corruption and the degeneration of senior personnel. The results of this approach were not long in coming. As early as July, Vietnam revised its policy of mandatory Western publications

²⁰ *Hiến pháp nước cộng hoà xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam năm 1980. Op. cit.*

²¹ *Hiến pháp nước cộng hoà xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam năm 1992. Op. cit.*

for academics, as the first steps in this direction showed that the negative consequences outweighed the positive ones.²² Intelligence officials saw with the naked eye the abolished system as a recruitment drive and a greater opportunity for “hostile forces” to place their people in the chain of command.

Another important feature of the Vietnamese power system is nationalism. The Vietnamese party leadership is primarily interested in the development of their own country and people, rather than the implementation of abstract ideological dogmas to the detriment of national interests. In doing so, they actively study the positive and negative experience of such typologically similar parties as the CPSU and the CPC. And after a comprehensive analysis, they decide on reforms in their country.

The Vietnamese approach to ideology in this context is much closer to the Chinese than to the Soviet approach. It has more Vietnamese nationalism of its own. All goals and objectives are closely related to the development of Vietnam, not abstract ideological dogmas at the expense of Vietnam. In this context, the criticism of the Vietnamese leadership's ideological policy regarding the alleged departure from certain provisions of orthodox Marxism is quite revealing. In particular, G.M. Lokshin believes: “The theoretical and ideological dilemma of today's socialism stems from a complete departure both in theory and in practice from the main slogan of the Communist Manifesto: “Proletarians of all countries, unite!” The CPV no longer calls the working class the guiding force of society, and the new environment demands new theoretical, ideological and political formulas. So far, no ideology has succeeded in capturing the masses. In this environment, the CPV is no exception”²³.

It seems that it is the transition to Ho Chi Minh thought that allows us to use effective Marxist and Soviet achievements for the benefit of our country and to leave behind compromised practices. This maneuver completely dismisses critical claims against the CPV leadership about a “departure from principles”. The CPV's focus on solving Vietnam's problems is the best explanation for its effectiveness. From the ideological legacy of Marxism, only what can effectively solve its own problems has been taken on board, and it is this Vietnamese version of Marxism with the addition of traditional and modern practices that allows it to develop effectively in the modern world, avoiding not only dogmatism and rigidity, but also “shifting

²² Vũ Minh Giang. *Quy chế đào tạo tiến sĩ sẽ xóa bỏ nạn thuê viết bài báo quốc tế*. Retrieved on July 10, 2021.

²³ Lokshin, G.M. *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

to suit the current conjuncture”. As can be seen from the above quotations from several constitutions of the SRV, as well as the latest management decisions, there is no crisis in the field of ideology in contemporary Vietnam, which does not mean that there are no changes in this area. As life changes, so does ideology. And that is why the Vietnamese experience deserves careful study, which is especially relevant against the background of the collapse of the Soviet and Eastern European socialist systems.

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Chapter 7

ACHIEVEMENTS AND EXPERIENCE OF THE PARTY BUILDING IN VIETNAM IN 2011—2021

The construction of the Communist Party of Vietnam in the 2011—2021 period has achieved many important achievements, reflected in the following aspects: Party building in politics and ethics has been given special attention; ideological Party building continued to be strengthened; the renewal and consolidation of the organizational apparatus, the streamlining of the focal points, and the downsizing of the staff of the political system have been drastically implemented at all levels; cadre work and staff building have many innovations; the fight against corruption and waste is led and directed drastically and comprehensively; Mass mobilization work has been focused and renewed, the close relationship between the Party and the people has been consolidated and strengthened etc. Although there are still some shortcomings and limitations, the achievements of Party building work are very large, comprehensive and has left many valuable lessons for the Party building work in the next stages.

Keywords: Communist Party of Vietnam, Party building, resolutions, lessons.

During the process of existence and development, the Communist Party of Vietnam has always paid great attention to Party building, considering this a key task with vital meaning for the Party and the socialist regime. Especially, from 2011 to now, the Communist Party of Vietnam has carried out regular and continuous Party building work with many campaigns with many fundamental and important measures, contributing to improving leadership capacity. and the fighting power of the Party. In addition, Party building work is also considered a “key” task, meaning “survival” for the Party and the socialist regime, with specific manifestations being the Resolution of the 4th Central Committee (Term 4). XI): Some urgent issues of current Party building and the Resolution of the 4th Central Committee (term XII)

on *strengthening Party building and rectification; prevent and reverse the deterioration of political ideology, morality, lifestyle, and internal “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” manifestations*. The results of Party building work have promoted the socio-economic development of the country; strengthening defense-security potential; improve Vietnam's position and prestige in the international arena, creating a solid foundation and foundation for the country to develop quickly and sustainably in the next stages.

Some major achievements in Party building for the period 2011—2021

In the process of leading the State and society, the Communist Party of Vietnam has always paid attention to Party building and rectification. The 11th National Congress of the Party (January 12, 2011 — January 19, 2011) clearly stated: “Keeping the nature and strengthening the leadership role of the Party, building a truly clean Party, being strong both politically, ideologically and organizationally, improving the Party's leadership capacity and fighting strength is a key task of vital significance to the Party and the revolutionary cause of our people today”.¹

Implementing the Resolution of the 11th Party Congress on Party building work, at the 4th Conference, the Party Central Committee discussed and highly agreed on the promulgation of the Resolution “A number of urgent issues on building the current Party”, focusing on three urgent issues: *first*, fight to prevent and reverse the deterioration of political ideology and morals and lifestyle among cadres and party members; *second*, build a team of leaders and managers at all levels, especially at the central level, to meet the requirements and tasks of the period of industrialization, modernization and international integration; *third*, clearly define the authority and responsibility of the heads of the Party committees and authorities in relation to the collective leadership of the Party committees and the collective leaders of agencies and units, and continue to innovate the Party's leadership method.

After 4 years of implementing the Resolution, the 12th National Congress of the Party (2016) summed up: “The process of implementing Resolution 4 of the Central Committee has had an impact on promoting the country to overcome difficulties, maintaining political stability, socio-economic development, and strengthening confidence in the Party and

¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2011). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 56.

the people”.² On the basis of summarizing 4 years of implementation of the Resolution of the 4th Party Central Committee, term XI, the 12th National Congress of the Party clearly indicated the direction and tasks of Party building and rectification work as: “In the coming years, the heavy requirements and tasks of the new development period require further strengthening of Party building work, focusing on resolutely and persistently continuing to implement the Resolution of the 4th Party Central Committee, term XI. Party committees at all levels, party organizations, collective leaders of agencies, units and individuals, leaders and managers at all levels from central to grassroots levels must be serious, self-conscious and have appropriate plans and measures. to overcome and correct weaknesses and shortcomings”.³

To perform the key tasks set forth by the 12th National Congress, the Central Committee has concretized in 4 Central Conferences (4, 6, 7, 8), in which *the first key task* is “assigned by the Central Committee” concretized at the 4th and 7th plenums and promulgated Resolution No. 04-NQ/TW dated October 30, 2016 on “Strengthening Party building and rectification; prevent and reverse the deterioration of political ideology, morality, lifestyle, and internal “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” manifestations”. This is both a continuation of the implementation of the Resolution of the 4th Party Central Committee, term XI, especially the things that the Resolution proposed but have not yet implemented and implemented poorly, and at the same time have new content compared to the Resolution of the 4th Party Central Committee term XI is *to struggle to prevent and repel the manifestations of “self-evolution”, “self-transformation” internally, in association with the implementation of Directive 05-CT/TW, dated May 15, 2016 of the Politburo on promoting study and follow Ho Chi Minh ideology, morality and style, and promote the role of the people in Party building and rectification.*

Implementing the proposed guidelines and guidelines, the Party building work has achieved many important results, reflected in a number of main aspects:

First, special attention is paid to the Party building in terms of politics and morality; Party building on ideology continues to be strengthened.

Practice shows that the work of building the Party in politics is of special importance. In any circumstances, the Communist Party of Vietnam is always firm and steadfast in Marxism — Leninism and Ho Chi Minh ideology and constantly applies and develops creatively in accordance with Vi-

² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2016). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 43.

³ Ibid, tr. 45.

etnamese realities; steadfast in the goal of national independence and socialism; firmly adhere to the renovation policy and principles of Party building. The results of Party building in politics have made the Party's political level, capacity level, intelligence, leadership capacity, and combat strength increasingly raised, always firm in the face of all difficulties and challenges, and able to overcome all difficulties and challenges. appropriate decisions to direct the timely and effective handling of practical problems.

Along with Party building in politics, the work of building the Party on ethics has been given special attention, promoted by the Central Committee and all levels of Party committees and organizations, and the awareness and actions of cadres and party members, especially Party members holding leadership and management positions have made positive changes. The work of building the Party on morality has contributed to the fight against effectively preventing deterioration in politics, morality, lifestyle, and manifestations of “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” among the cadres. ministries, party members, especially leaders, managers and heads of organizations, agencies and units; building a team with strong political will, pure moral qualities, responsibility and right motives, pioneering, exemplary, completing all assigned tasks well. Meanwhile, the ideological construction of the Party has continued to be strengthened, contributing to raising awareness, consolidating solidarity and unity within the Party and social consensus. Political and ideological education has been promoted, with diverse and rich contents and forms. The protection of the Party's ideological foundation, and the struggle and rejection of wrong and hostile views were focused on leading and directing, and achieved remarkable results.

Summing up the term of the 12th National Congress and looking back at 35 years of renewal, the 13th National Congress of the Party (2021) affirmed: “The work of building and rectifying the Party and the political system has been given special attention, importance, conducted comprehensively, synchronously and effectively in all aspects of politics, ideology, morality, organization and cadres”.⁴

Second, the renovation and consolidation of the organizational apparatus, the streamlining of the focal points, and the downsizing of the staff of the political system have been drastically implemented at all levels with high political determination, great efforts and actions. act decisively, with focus and focus.

At the 6th Conference (Term XII), the Central Executive Committee issued two Resolutions 18 and 19 on “Continuing innovating, consolidating

⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 1, tr. 21.

and reorganizing the organizational apparatus of the lean political system, effective and efficient operation”. This is a difficult, complex and sensitive issue, which has been implemented many years ago but the results are still limited and have not met the set requirements, not really groundbreaking. Just over two years of implementing Resolutions No. 18, 19-NQ/TW, the whole country has reduced 4 focal points directly under the Central Government; 7 General Departments; 83 departments, departments and equivalents; 119 departments and branches; 5,180 groups, teams and 5,145 public service units etc. The provinces and cities have reduced more than 100 focal points under the province, nearly 5000 focal points under the district level; reduce 6 administrative units at district level, 545 administrative units at commune level and more than 15,354 villages and residential groups; reduced by nearly 7,000 people working part-time at commune level and more than 222,000 people working part-time in villages and residential groups.⁵ Thereby, organize the apparatus of the political system has reduced the number of focal points, the level of intermediaries, the number of leading cadres, the level of “functions”, the reduction of administrative procedures, the reduction of staffing, the reduction of recurrent expenditures, and the increase of investment spending. develop.

Third, the cadre work and cadre building have many innovations, which the Party focuses on leading and directing to implement comprehensively.

One of the three urgent issues proposed by the Central Resolution 4 (Term XI) is to build a contingent of leaders and managers at all levels, especially at the central level, to meet the requirements of the industrialization, modernization cause of the country and international integration. This is the first time the Central Government has set this task. Like anything, doing it for the first time is always difficult in both theory and practice. But it can be said that the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat are very interested and direct. Resolution 4 of the Central Committee set forth and in just one year, the Central Organization Committee had completed the construction of the project. The 6th Plenum of the Central Committee (Term XI) discussed and approved the “Strategic-level cadre planning scheme”. This is the first time the Central Committee has discussed democratically and in detail on the issue of strategic-level cadres planning, unifying the objectives, requirements, objects, standards and age of strategic-level cadres. After that, the Central Committee introduced the cadre plan at the Central level for the 12th term and subsequent courses.

⁵ Nguyễn Đức Hà (2020). Công tác xây dựng, chỉnh đốn Đảng nhiệm kỳ Đại hội XII: Triển khai toàn diện, đồng bộ về chính trị, tư tưởng, đạo đức, tổ chức và cán bộ. *Tạp chí Tuyên giáo*, số 9, tr. 18.

In addition, the mobilization and rotation of leaders and managers at all levels, especially at the central level, was promoted and carried out according to a strict and democratic process, creating a high degree of unity among the various departments, relevant agencies at the central and local levels; between the place where the cadre is sent and the place where the cadre is received. Through the mobilization and rotation of cadres, they have timely supplemented cadres for difficult places and contributed to training, fostering, training and challenging cadres in practice, helping them to develop quickly, more comprehensive, to overcome one step the shortage of staff status.

Fourth, the fight against corruption and waste is led and directed drastically and comprehensively in the spirit of no “no-no” zone, no exceptions.

In order to lead the good implementation of anti-corruption work, the Politburo decided to establish a Central Steering Committee on anti-corruption with a more suitable composition and chose a breakthrough step: speeding up progress, to strictly handle serious and complicated corruption cases and cases that are of particular interest to the public; Issue the Directive on strengthening the leadership of the Party in detecting and handling corruption cases and cases; Regulations on inspection and supervision of cadres belonging to the Politburo, the Secretariat management etc. At the same time, the Central Executive Committee decided to re-establish the Central Internal Affairs Committee and the Internal Affairs Committees of the provincial Party Committee and the city Party Committee to advise the Party committees at all levels on internal affairs and it is also the standing body of the Central Steering Committee on anti-corruption.

Over the years, the Central Steering Committee for Anti-corruption has strengthened its direction of inspection, supervision, inspection and audit; for the policy of transferring many serious and complicated corruption cases to competent authorities for investigation, prosecution and public trial in accordance with the law. Many serious and complicated corruption cases and cases, which have attracted the attention of the public, have been investigated, prosecuted, prosecuted and handled publicly, alerted, in accordance with the law, and have a powerful deterrent effect towards cadres and party members and affirm the determination of the Party and State in the fight against corruption, wastefulness and negativity. The recovery of corrupt assets has had positive results. Only during the 12th Congress, Party committees at all levels examined 264,091 party organizations and 1,124,146 party members; The Inspection Committee at all levels inspected 15,920 party organizations and 47,701 party members when there were signs of violations. Through inspection, Party committees at all levels have dis-

ciplined 1,329 party organizations and 69,600 party members etc. Particularly, the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat have disciplined 10 party organizations and 60 party members; The Central Inspection Committee has disciplined 169 party members (including 53 comrades who are officials from the Politburo and the Secretariat).⁶

Fifth, the mass mobilization work is focused and continues to innovate.

In recent years, the concept of “taking the people as the root”, which is the subject of the renovation work, has been realized and implemented more and more deeply and fully; The close relationship between the Party and the people has been consolidated and strengthened. Awareness and responsibility of all levels of party committees, party organizations and political system are enhanced; attach importance to listening, grasping the situation and solving the legitimate and legitimate aspirations and recommendations, pressing issues of the people; contributing to strengthening the close relationship between the Party and the people and promoting the role of the people in Party building. In particular, the civil mobilization work of the ruling system, especially the government's mass mobilization, has been promoted and implemented synchronously at all levels and sectors, creating changes in the economy awareness and enhancement of the responsibilities of serving the people of the cadres and civil servants. The Government has built and operated a system to receive and respond to complaints and suggestions from people and businesses; Many localities have publicized hotlines to receive and handle people's petitions. The emulation movement “Skillful People's Movement” was expanded in scope and audience, becoming a regular and effective activity.

Some lessons learned from the Party building work for the period 2011—2021

Besides the achieved results, the Party building work in the past time still has some limitations, not keeping up with the requirements of the new situation. The struggle to detect, prevent and deal with the deterioration of political ideology, morality, lifestyle, and internal “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” manifestations has not really met. stated requirements; the ability to self-detect and handle violations of some party committees and organizations is still a weak and slow stage to be overcome. The state of deterioration of political thought, morality, lifestyle, of a large

⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 2, tr. 200.

number of cadres and party members; bureaucracy, corruption, wastefulness; selfish individualism, opportunism, pragmatism, pursuit of fame, fortune, positionalism, partiality, corruption, wastefulness, arbitrariness, and unprincipledness are still serious. The manifestations of ideal fading away, away from the goal of socialism, “self-evolution”, “self-transformation” are still complicated. The hostile forces are still looking for ways to sabotage the revolutionary cause of the Vietnamese people; they make every effort to distort and slander the Party and State of Vietnam, fiercely and directly attack the Party's ideology, platform, and political lines, incite and divide within the Party, divide the Party, State with the people. The limitations and shortcomings were emphasized by the 13th National Congress of the Party: “The ideological work that is still present is still limited, not timely, not very convincing etc. A part of cadres and party members. members who have not been pioneers and exemplary; degradation in political ideology, morality, lifestyle, and the expression of "self-evolution" and "self-transformation" internally is still complicated. Self-criticism and criticism in many places are formal. Exercising the responsibility of setting an example, especially that of the head, has not yet spread widely etc. The leadership capacity and combat strength of some grassroots party organizations are still low and have not been consolidated in time etc”.⁷

From the reality of Party building work over the past ten years, we can draw some key lessons from the following:

First, we must be steadfast and creatively apply Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh ideology in the current new situation.

Throughout the process of Party building and rectification over the years, the Party's steadfastness and creative application of Marxism — Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's thought have been put into practice. The 13th National Congress of the Party (2021) concluded: “The work of building and rectifying the Party must be etc steadfast, applying and creatively developing Marxism — Leninism and Ho Chi Minh ideology”.⁸ Thanks to being consistent with the ideological foundation, the Party has a theoretical basis to pave the way, set out the Platform, strategy and right path; have grounds to consolidate ideological unity in the Party and in society; firmly believe in the chosen ideal and goal, not bewildered or wavered by changes in domestic and international situations, resolutely oppose political pluralism and opposing multi-party parties; have a scientific basis to criticize deviant views and fight against false and hostile views. Besides, in the new situation, it is

⁷ Ibid., tr. 222—223.

⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 26.

necessary to continue to study Marxism — Leninism in a systematic and methodical manner, and more importantly, it is necessary to supplement and develop Marxism — Leninism in accordance with this condition. new historical event. That is to be consistent and creative in perceiving, applying and developing Marxism-Leninism; must innovate and improve the quality in studying Marxism — Leninism, Ho Chi Minh' ideology and morality; at the same time, continue to well implement Resolution No. 35-NQ/TW, dated October 22, 2018 of the Politburo “On strengthening the protection of the Party's fundamental foundation, fighting against wrong views, hostile in the new situation”. Only in this way can we create a unity of political thought within the Party, and have a full scientific basis to fight against political ideological degradation, “self-evolution”, “self-transformation” in the Party. internally, fight against wrong and hostile views to firmly protect the ideological foundation of the Party.

Second, focus on building the Party in terms of politics, ideology, organization and morality.

This lesson has a very important meaning, as pointed out by the 13th National Congress of Deputies: Party building in politics is paid special attention. The work of building the Party on ideology continued to be strengthened. Party building in terms of organization is carried out with high political determination, focusing on consolidation and innovation, reorganizing the apparatus of the political system, there was a real change.⁹ In particular, the issue of Party building on morality becomes even more urgent when a large number of cadres and party members degrade in political ideology, morality, lifestyle, “self-evolution”, “self-transformation” as the Resolution of the 4th Plenum of the 11th Party Central Committee (January 2012) and the Resolution of the 4th Plenum of the 12th Central Committee (October 2016). The 12th National Congress of the Party places the task of building the Party in moral terms with the building of the Party in politics, ideology and organization. The 13th National Congress of the Party emphasized: “The work of building the Party on morality is highly emphasized, contributing to the training of revolutionary moral qualities, fighting individualism, opportunism, and pragmatism, “group interests”, manifestations of deterioration in political ideology, morality, lifestyle, “self-evolution”, “self-transformation” internally”.¹⁰ In addition, the Party promotes revolutionary moral education in association with studying and following Ho Chi Minh ideology, morality and style. Experience shows that moral building of the

⁹ Ibid., tr. 73—75.

¹⁰ Ibid., tr. 74.

Party must be closely combined with strengthening the Party's education; strictly maintain discipline and discipline with the effort of self-cultivation and training of cadres and party members, upholding the responsibility to set an example, including setting an example of morality and lifestyle. This lesson learned is still valid today.

Third, rely on the people to build and correct the Party.

In fact, the Party's close attachment to the people is the guiding point of view throughout the revolutionary periods, one of the Party's operating principles, and a source of strength for the Party to fulfill its roles and responsibilities well. before the people and the nation. The people are not only the implementer of the Party's line, but can also contribute ideas to the Party to improve the guidelines and policies as well as supervise the activities of party organizations and party officials and members. directly participate in the construction and rectification of the Party. Therefore, it is concluded from experience that it is necessary to further tighten the close relationship between the Party and the people, relying on the people to build the Party. It is necessary to build a contingent of cadres who truly "respect the people, be close to the people, believe in the people, understand the people, study the people, rely on the people and be responsible to the people". Continue to concretize and well implement the motto: People know, people discuss, people do, people inspect, people monitor, people benefit. To organize well the reception of the people of the heads of the Party committees and authorities according to the prescribed period. Focus on mass mobilization work for ethnic minorities, religious compatriots and overseas Vietnamese. Promoting the role of the people to participate in building the Party, building a clean and strong government and political system.

Fourth, carry out Party building and rectification regularly, but with focus.

In the past time, the Communist Party of Vietnam has been regularly built and adjusted to meet the requirements and tasks with new contents, so as not to let the Party lag behind the movement and development of reality. in the country, the world and the general intellectual level of society. When necessary, the Party can launch and organize a number of campaigns, but that does not replace regular and continuous Party building and rectification activities. On the one hand, the fight against negativity in the Party must be carried out patiently, without rest, without being satisfied with the achieved results until the basic manifestations of negativity are prevented and repelled. extreme in any form. On the other hand, in each certain period, based on the requirements of the task of renewing the country and the internal situation, the Party needs to focus on building and correcting a number of contents. For example, the Resolution of the 4th Plenum of the Party

Central Committee, term XI and term XII, focused on the task of fighting to prevent and reverse the deterioration of political ideology, morality, and lifestyle; internal “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” manifestations. When seeing signs of “group interests”, running for office, running for power seriously harms the unity and unity in the Party, violates the principle of democratic centralism, and causes frustration among cadres, party members and employees. On September 23, 2019, the 12th Politburo issued Regulation No. 205-QD/TW “On controlling power in cadre work and against running for office and power”. Therefore, the lesson on conducting Party building and rectification regularly, but with focus, always has profound theoretical and practical value.

Fifth, Party building must be closely linked with the leadership of socio-economic development, ensuring national defense and security, and actively and actively integrating into the world.

This is a valuable lesson learned in the Party building work in the new period. Due to the focus on Party building, closely linked with leaders in socio-economic development, ensuring national defense and security, and proactively and actively integrating into the world, up to now, the country's appearance has become more dignified, bigger and more beautiful; People's lives have been significantly improved in terms of material, cultural, spiritual, on living standards and quality of life, especially in terms of food, accommodation, transportation, education, medical treatment and services. The political system was built, strengthened, and ensured the political stability of the country. National defense and security will be strengthened, firmly protecting the country's independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, sea and islands. Foreign affairs and international integration are constantly expanding, combining internal and external forces, enhancing Vietnam's position, creating an environment of peace, cooperation and development.

Conclusion

With the point of view of looking directly at the truth, properly and objectively assessing the situation in all aspects, with the right policy and direction, the Party building work in Vietnam has now achieved many achievements. The Communist Party of Vietnam was built in terms of politics, ideology, organization and morality, the Party's leadership capacity and combat power, and the Party's ruling capacity was enhanced. Although there are still some shortcomings and limitations, in general, the achievements of Party building work are great, comprehensive and leave many va-

luable lessons. These are profound theoretical and practical issues that need to be distilled and applied in the Party building work in the new period, contributing to the successful implementation of the Resolution of the 13th National Party Congress. contribute to building a rich people, strong country, democracy, justice and civilization.

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Chapter 8

THE REFORM PROCESS OF THE CPV FROM THE 6th NATIONAL CONGRESS UP TO NOW

The development of each country and nation is marked by revolutions and national reform. The cause of reform, initiated by the 6th National Congress of Deputies (1986) of the Communist Party of Vietnam, is to continue the cause of building socialism in Vietnam, to meet the requirements of the country, in accordance with the current trends as well as great changes in the world. In the following congresses, with the right strategies and policies, the Party has gradually perfected the renovation policy, led the renovation cause and achieved many important achievements in the construction and development of the country, maintained national independence and national sovereignty, raised Vietnam's position in the international arena, and created a new status and driving force for the Vietnamese revolution.

Keywords: process, reform, Communist Party of Vietnam.

The 6th National Congress of Deputies initiated the comprehensive reform of the country

The 6th National Congress of Deputies (December 1986) marked a very fundamental and decisive turning point in the Communist Party's renewal process, on the transitional path to the socialism in Vietnam. The 6th Congress has set out a comprehensive reform of the country — from renewing thinking (first of all, in economic thinking) to renovating the organization, renovating the cadres, renewing the style of leadership and public

service; from economic innovation to political system innovation and other areas of social life. The 6th Congress affirmed: “For our country, reform is an urgent requirement of the revolutionary cause, a matter of vital significance”.¹

The Congress set the motto of looking directly at the truth, properly assessing the truth, stating the truth; thereby not only affirming the achievements but also frankly pointing out mistakes in the arrangement of the economic structure, in the distribution and circulation, in the socialist reform and also in the economic management mechanism. The Congress concluded that: “the above-mentioned mistakes are serious and long-lasting mistakes in terms of major undertakings and policies, mistakes in strategic direction and organization of implementation”.² The 6th Congress also affirmed that Vietnam is in the first stage of the transition to socialism, so it is necessary to continue to build the necessary preconditions to promote industrialization; resolutely abolish centralization, bureaucracy, and subsidy system, and build a new management mechanism.

The 6th Congress determined that the goal of innovation is to change for the sake of a rich people, a strong country, and a civilized society. Rich people are associated with strong countries, strong countries are associated with a civilized society, a society in which people treat each other with love, and that is, the phenomenon of people exploiting other people no longer exists. People are allowed to realize their potentials, creativity and energy to get rich righteously, to create material wealth for society.

The Congress also raised four great lessons: In all its activities, the Party must thoroughly grasp the ideology of taking the people as the root, building and promoting the people's right to mastery; The Party must always come from reality, respect and act according to objective laws; must know how to combine the strength of the nation with the strength of the times in new conditions; to build the Party on par with the political tasks of a ruling party leading the people to conduct the socialist revolution.

It can be seen that the reform policy set forth by the 6th Party Congress is the result of practical summaries and innovative thinking, especially in theoretical thinking. It was a remarkable development with revolutionary significance in the Party's awareness and actions with breakthrough policies and guidelines. The guidelines and directions set forth by the Party have met

¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1986). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ VI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 98.

² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 47, tr. 548.

historical requirements, demonstrating wisdom, bravery, and the creative thinking of the Communist Party of Vietnam, which opened a new era for the cause of constructing and developing the country.

The process of developing and perfecting the Party's *Doi moi* policy from the 7th Congress to the present

- The 7th Party Congress (June 1991) continued to carry out the task of leading the country on the path of comprehensive, synchronous, principled renovation with firm steps. The Congress approved the Platform for building the country during the transition to socialism. The 1991 Platform affirmed that the Party must be strong politically, ideologically and organizationally; regularly self-regulate, strive to improve the intellectual level and leadership capacity of the Party. The 1991 Platform represented the Party's new awareness of socialism, the steadfastness of the path to socialism in Vietnam in the context that the socialist regime in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was in serious crisis and in danger of collapse. This had profound strategic significance, helping the Party stand firm in the face of “raging storms”.

The mid-term national congress of deputies of the 7th term determined that the market mechanism must be built synchronously under the management of the state according to the socialist orientation; building a Vietnamese rule of law state of the people, by the people, for the people. The conference also raised four risks: the risk of falling further behind economically; the risk of deviating from socialism; the risk of corruption and bureaucracy; the risk of “dien bien hoa binh” (i. e. security risks in peacetime). Those are profound warnings and vision of the Party.

The 7th Congress added an important goal of the *Doi moi* system, which is “fairness”: “Rich people, strong country, fair and civilized society”. Clearly, the goal of “fairness” is particularly important. It is a social value that helps create motivation to promote social development, just as President Ho Chi Minh famously said at the Government Council meeting at the end of 1966: “(we are) not afraid of lacking in anything, (we are) just afraid of injustice”.³

- The 8th Party Congress (June 1996) marked a new development step in the Party's renovation work. The congress affirmed: “The *Doi moi* in the

³ Hồ Chí Minh (2011). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 15, tr. 224.

past 10 years has got great achievements of great significance... Our country has come out of the socio-economic crisis... The mission set out for the beginning of the transition period is to prepare the premise for industrialization, which has been basically completed, allowing the transition to a new period of promoting industrialization and modernization of the country”.⁴ The Congress pointed out the basic contents of industrialization and modernization and a number of important points to continue perfecting the guidelines, which affirmed: “commodity production is not opposed to socialism...; socialist-oriented market is a unified whole with many forces participating in production and circulation, in which the state economy plays a leading role...; continue to renovate the economic management mechanism with the goal of abolishing the centralized bureaucracy and subsidy mechanism, forming a relatively synchronous market mechanism under the management of the state in the direction of socialism”.⁵ The congress also drew the lessons of: “closely combining economic reform with political innovation from the very beginning, with economic innovation as the focus, and at the same time, step by step implementing political reform”.⁶ This is considered a valuable lesson, creating a premise for economic development along with political stability in Vietnam.

- The 9th Party Congress (April 2001) proposed a general model of the transition period to socialism in Vietnam, which is the development of a multi-sector commodity economy, operating according to the market mechanism under management of the state, following the socialist orientation. For the first time, the Congress mentioned the concept of “market economy”, and affirmed that the development of a socialist-oriented market economy is the general economic model of the transition period. The Congress deeply, fully and comprehensively assessed the position, role and content of Ho Chi Minh's thought. The Congress also emphasized that building socialism is to create qualitative changes in society in all fields. It is a difficult and complicated undertaking, so it is inevitable that a long transition period must be experienced with many stages and many forms of socio-economic organization have a transitional nature.

A new step in the Party's reform policy at the 9th Congress is the addition and development of the foreign policy: “Consistently implement the foreign policy of independence, self-reliance; expansion, multilateralisation

⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2013). *Văn kiện Đại hội Đảng thời kỳ đổi mới và hội nhập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 329.

⁵ Ibid., tr. 348.

⁶ Ibid., tr. 331.

and diversifying international relations. Vietnam is willing to be a friend and a reliable partner of countries in the international community, striving for peace, independence and development”.⁷ The 9th Congress also directly pointed out a number of shortcomings and limitations in the Party that need to be overcome, especially corruption, wastefulness, and deterioration in political ideology, morality, and lifestyle of a portion of cadres and party members. If this is not remedied, it will greatly affect the prestige of the Party and the people's trust in the Party.

The 9th Congress also made an important decision to add the goal of “democracy” to the targets of *Doi moi* right after the goal of “fairness”. This addition is considered an important development in the Party's theoretical awareness of socialism. Democracy is both the goal and the driving force of innovation, development, and socialism.

- The 10th Party Congress (April 2006) affirmed the important task of improving the Party's leadership capacity and combative strength, bringing into play the strength of the whole nation, comprehensively promoting the reform work to bring the country out of underdevelopment. The Congress clarified and deepened the socialist orientation in the market economy, which affirmed: “Achieve the goal of “rich people, strong country, fair, democratic and civilized society”; powerfully liberate and continuously develop production capacity, improve people's living standards, achieve hunger eradication and poverty alleviation, encourage people to strive towards prosperity, then help others to escape poverty and gradually become better off”.⁸ The Resolution of the 6th Central Committee of the 10th term on continuing to improve the institution of the socialist-oriented market economy has clarified a number of theoretical and practical issues about the model, nature and characteristics of the market economy with a socialist orientation. The 10th Congress issued Regulation No. 15-QD/TW allowing Party members to do private business without limitation in size, but they must abide by the Party Charter, the laws, state policies and specific regulations by the Central Executive Committee. This regulation is a step forward in the Party's thinking, creating favorable conditions for Party members to become rich legitimately for themselves and their families, making positive contributions to the country's socio-economic development.

- The 11th Party Congress (January 2011) marked a new stage in the development of theoretical awareness and practice of the reform process in Vietnam. The congress has the duty to look directly at the truth, speak the

⁷ Ibid., tr. 479.

⁸ Ibid., tr. 626.

truth, uphold the spirit of serious self-criticism, to review, objectively and comprehensively evaluate achievements, as well as weaknesses and shortcomings. During this congress, the Party approved the Platform for building the country during the transition to socialism (supplemented and developed in 2011). The 2011 supplemented and further developed platform has achieved an important step forward in the Party's reform guidelines, in theoretical awareness of socialism and the road to socialism, which identifies eight basic characteristics of a socialist society, eight basic directions and eight major relationships that need special attention. The 11th Congress also took a new step in renovating development thinking, development methods, transforming the growth model from broad development to reasonable development between width and depth, in which three strategic breakthroughs were identified: "1) Perfect the socialist-oriented market economy institutions...; 2) Rapidly develop human resources, especially high-quality human resources...; 3) Build a synchronous infrastructure system..."⁹

Regarding the objectives of *Doi moi*, the 11th Congress still considers reform a general feature of socialist society in Vietnam. However, the Party has adjusted the order of the goals, namely putting democracy before justice and civilization. "The socialist society that our people built is a society of: rich people, strong country, democracy, justice and civilization"

- The 12th Party Congress (January 2016) set the task of accelerating the reform work; Party building in terms of morality is equal to Party building in politics, ideology and organization, striving to soon turn our country basically into a modern industrialized country. The 12th Congress emphasized: "Strengthen the training of qualities, revolutionary ethics; fight against individualism, opportunism, and pragmatism", "Resolutely fight against bureaucracy, corruption, wastefulness, individualism, opportunistic lifestyle, forming of clans, "group interests", and the situation of "speech does not go hand in hand with action".¹⁰

The 12th Congress also set requirements to improve the efficiency of foreign affairs, to proactively integrate into the world with the motto and orientation of "Diversification and multilateralization in foreign relations; proactively and actively integrate into the world; to become a friend, a reliable partner and a responsible member of the international community".¹¹

⁹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2011). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 106.

¹⁰ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2016). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 202.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, tr. 35.

It can be seen that this orientation has taken a step forward compared to the 9th National Congress, affirming that Vietnam is “a friend, a reliable partner and a responsible member of the international community”, not just showing a “willingness to be friends and reliable partners of other countries in the international community”.

The 12th National Congress also determined: “The state economy, the collective economy together with the private economy are the cores to develop an independent and self-reliant economy”,¹² and affirmed to continue to set out tasks of economic restructuring associated with innovating the growth model: “promote the implementation of a synchronous and comprehensive restructuring of the economy, of sectors and fields, combined with reforming the growth model, focusing on important areas”.¹³

- The 13th Congress of the Party (January 2021) sets the orientation on building and perfecting the institution, which affirms: “Continue to strongly renew thinking; build and perfect the development institution synchronously to achieve sustainable development in economy, politics, culture, society, environment..., promptly remove difficulties and obstacles; promote all potentials and resources, create new impetus for the rapid and sustainable development of the country; comprehensively and synchronously perfect the institutions for the development of a socialist-oriented market economy, create a favorable environment for mobilizing, allocating and effectively using resources, promote investment and business production”.¹⁴

The 13th Congress also paid special attention to human resources work, especially for cadres at the strategic level: “The human resources work must be the “most strategic of all”, focus on building the workforce at all levels, especially strategic level cadres and heads who are qualified, capable and reputable on par with their duties; (we should) promote the responsibility of setting an example of cadres and party members according to the motto — the higher the position, the more exemplary one has to be, especially for members of the Politburo, members of the Secretariat, members of the Central Committee”.¹⁵ This is a correct policy of the Party because in any organization, human resources work plays a particularly important role, as President Ho Chi Minh once said: “cadres are the root of all work”.

¹² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2017). *Tài liệu nghiên cứu các Văn kiện Hội nghị lần thứ năm Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khóa XII*.

¹³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2016). *Op. cit.*, tr. 88—89.

¹⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 2, tr. 328—329.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, t. 1, tr. 26—27.

One of the important contents of the XIII Congress is to emphasize that a new growth model needs to make good use of the opportunities of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, based on scientific — technological progress and innovation: “Continue to accelerate the reform of the economic growth model, strongly shift the economy to a growth model based on increased productivity, scientific and technological progress, innovation, high-quality human resources; effectively and economically utilize resources to improve the quality, efficiency and competitiveness of the economy”.¹⁶ This is a right policy, creating a breakthrough for Vietnam to effectively apply the advances of science and technology, successfully implement national digital transformation, making an important contribution to achieving the goals mentioned.

The reform process of the Communist Party has gone through 35 years and has achieved many important achievements. It has really changed the face of Vietnam in all areas of socio-political life. The Resolution of the 13th Party Congress affirmed: “The country has got great achievements of historical significance, strong and comprehensive development compared to the years before reform. The scale and level of the economy have been raised. People's lives have been significantly improved, both materially and spiritually. Our country has never had the opportunity, potential, position and international prestige as it does today”.¹⁷

Some outstanding achievements and significance of *Doi moi* in Vietnam

Some outstanding achievements

After 35 years of carrying out comprehensive renovation of the country under the initiative and leadership of the Communist Party, Vietnam has got many achievements in the cause of national construction and development, including a number of outstanding achievements as follows:

- Socio-political stability: This is Vietnam's greatest achievement with the leadership role of the Party. In the context of the rapidly evolving and complicated world situation, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries had a great influence on the world situation in general, especially the remaining socialist countries. Besides, there is globalization, fierce competition between countries, the explosion of information technology and the Internet, followed by the flow of foreign ideas and cultures im-

¹⁶ Ibid., tr. 120.

¹⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 2, tr. 322.

ported into Vietnam. In that situation, Vietnam has maintained socio-political stability, integrated successfully, step by step perfected the socialist rule-of-law state and the country has developed in all fields. That is a great result, because only when the political situation is stable will it be possible to solve all other problems of social life.

- Economic management mechanism has been renewed, the economy has grown rapidly: In the *Doi moi* process, Vietnam has obtained remarkable achievements in the renewal of economic management mechanism, reflected in the fact that Vietnam has abolished the centralized and subsidized bureaucratic mechanism — a mechanism that has inhibited production and created many negative phenomena in social life, in order to switch to a socialist-oriented market mechanism. From the place where there were only two components, the state economy and the collective economy, the economy has changed to a multi-sector one, in which the state economy plays the leading role and the private economy is the driving force of economic development, and at the same time, economic sectors are the core for development as the Resolution of the 12th National Congress has determined: “The state economy, the collective economy together with the private economy are the core for the development of an independent and self-reliant economy”.¹⁸

Thanks to the reform of the economic management mechanism, the material and spiritual life of the people of all classes has been significantly improved. From a poor country with old, outdated and low-level material and socio-economic infrastructure, up to now, Vietnam has risen to become a developing country with middle income and developed infrastructure and technology. It can be seen that the pace of development and change from rural to urban, from mountainous to plain areas has never been so rapid and strong as it is today. It can be seen that in 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic spread on a global scale; Vietnam was also strongly affected and suffered great socio-economic losses. However, Vietnam still achieved special results and achievements, as the Political Report of the 13th Party Congress affirmed: “While the world was in recession, with negative growth of nearly 4 %, our country’s economy still achieved a growth rate of 2.91 %, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the world”.¹⁹

- Socialist democracy is gradually promoted: Socialist democracy through the government of the working people under the leadership of the Party plays a great role in the cause of constructing socialism. However, the com-

¹⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2017). *Op. cit.*

¹⁹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 23.

mon disadvantage of former socialist countries is that they have not strongly promoted the people's right to mastery. The political system also reveals many weaknesses. Being well aware of this problem, the Party pointed out: "The whole organization and operation of our country's political system in the new period is aimed at building and gradually perfecting a socialist democracy, preserving power that belongs to the people".²⁰

In the past years, Vietnam has implemented socialist democracy in all areas of social life. In Party activities, activities of state agencies and mass organizations, there is a lively, open and frank discussion atmosphere, which has gradually overcome the phenomenon of superficial democracy. In renewing and consolidating the political system, the focus is on clearly defining functions and effectively resolving the relationship between the Party and the State and mass organizations.

Thus, the achievements in 35 years of reform of the Communist Party of Vietnam are great. The *Doi moi* process has really changed the face of Vietnam in all fields of socio-political life. The Resolution of the 13th Party Congress affirmed: "The country has got great achievements of historical significance, strong and comprehensive development compared to the years prior to *Doi moi*. The size and level of the economy has been raised. People's lives have been significantly improved, both materially and spiritually. Our country has never had the opportunity, potential, position and international prestige as it does today".²¹ Those achievements are the result of tireless efforts of the entire Party, people and army through different congresses, under the correct, effective and timely direction of the Central Executive Committee, the Politburo, Secretariat and Party Committees at all levels. This is considered an important premise, an internal strength, and a strong belief for Vietnam to steadily move up.

Meaning

The achievements of *Doi moi* during the past 35 years have changed the face of Vietnam and are especially important for Vietnam to continue firmly on the path to socialism, specifically as follows:

Firstly, the achievements of *Doi moi* have added new vitality, increased motivation, and given Vietnam a new position and force to rise above and achieve outstanding results in economic development and all aspects of socio-economic life. Those achievements are considered as acceleration, cre-

²⁰ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1991). *Cương lĩnh xây dựng đất nước trong thời kỳ quá độ lên chủ nghĩa xã hội*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Sự thật, tr. 16.

²¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 2, tr. 322.

ating momentum for the next development stages of the country, with new capabilities and strength to continue promoting the cause of development and innovation and firmly stepping on the path that has been established.

Secondly, Doi moi has helped to liberate production capacity, consolidate and strengthen new production relations, to bring the country out of the status of a country with low per-capita income, to help achieve socio-political stability and to improve the people's material and spiritual life. *Doi moi* has changed the face of the country, socialist democracy has been promoted and expanded, and national unity has been consolidated and strengthened.

Thirdly, Doi moi also helps improve national strength, strengthen national defense and security, maintain independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and socialist regime; expand and deepen foreign relations and international cooperation, and further enhance Vietnam's position and prestige in the international arena.

Fourthly, the results of *Doi moi* have confirmed that the path to socialism is consistent with the reality of Vietnam and the development trend of history. The Party has perceived, applied and creatively developed Marxism — Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's thought; inherited and promoted the national tradition and the good achievements in the past. The guidelines and orientation outlined by the Party are correct and creative in line with the people's interests and aspirations, and are unanimously supported by the people and international friends.

Fifthly, the achievements of *Doi moi* show that the Party has effectively applied international experiences that are suitable for Vietnam. It has been flexible and creative to promptly issue guidelines and policies suitable with the situation in the country and in the world, while maintaining political bravery, steadfast goals, ideals, and national independence associated with socialism.

Conclusion

Vietnam is facing a turbulent world; the old order has changed, the new order has not yet formed, the world situation is complicated, containing many uncertain factors and unpredictable changes. Science and technology have made great strides. The world is facing many global problems. The advantages of capital, science and technology, and the market are in the hands of capitalism. The independent countries increasingly struggle to choose their own way to develop in the future. The *Doi moi* process in Vietnam has got certain achievements. However, there is still much work to be done in

the future, especially on new reform work that can make the country move forward quickly, strongly and firmly to socialism and realize the goal of “Rich people, strong country, democracy, justice, civilization”.

Currently, the integration process of Vietnam into the world economy is deepening. No one can predict what the future will hold, but with the Party's wise and correct leadership, Vietnam is stepping up its self-reform work to better adopt new advantages and opportunities, and at the same time, avoid and overcome the negative impacts in the process. To do that well, it is required that Vietnam actively seize opportunities, make the most of advantages to constantly create a new position and new forces for the country.

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Chapter 9

MASTERING AND HANDLING WELL THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION

The relationship between national construction and defense is the relationship between two strategic tasks reflecting the law of existence and development of the Vietnam; it is an objective, inevitable, unified and close relationship, creating premise and conditions for each other, working together towards a common goal of independence, freedom and happiness. The construction and defense of the Fatherland in Vietnam is currently taking place in the context of the country's proactive international integration, therefore it is necessary to master and perform well the following main tasks: Continuing to be aware of and properly handling the relationship between partners and subjects, between cooperation and combating; closely combining economic, cultural and social development with strengthening national defense and security; closely combining national defense, security and foreign affairs; timely institutionalizing the Party's views on the relationship between national construction and defense to suit the new context of international integration.

Keywords: construction, defense, fatherland, international integration.

The 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam affirmed: In understanding and dealing with major relationships that reflect dialectical laws and core theoretical issues in the Party's reform guidelines, it is necessary to continue to master and handle major relationships well, including the relationship between building and defending the socialist Vietnamese Fatherland.¹

¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 1.

The relationship between the construction and defense of the Socialist Vietnamese Fatherland is the most fundamental, largest and most all-encompassing relationship throughout the entire cause of national reform and development. This is the relationship between the two strategic tasks of the Vietnamese revolution, reflecting the law of existence and development of the Vietnam: nation building must go hand in hand with national defense.²

Building socialism means the comprehensive and strong creation and development of all the elements constituting the socialist socio-economic form in terms of economy, politics, culture and society so that Vietnam becomes a prosperous socialist country with a free and happy life for the people, a society of rich people, strong country, democracy, justice and civilization.³ Defending the Socialist Fatherland means using a combination of forces and measures against encroachment and damage in any form to firmly protect independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Fatherland; protect the Party, State, people and socialist regime; protect the culture and national interests — the nation; to maintain a peaceful and politically stable environment; to maintain national security and human security; to build an orderly, disciplined, safe and healthy society to develop the country according to socialist orientation.⁴ The defense of the Fatherland is now comprehensively defined as the protection of both the natural — historical and the political — social aspects, which is to ensure both survival security and developmental security of the country in an integrated entity.

The relationship between building and defending the Socialist Fatherland is objective, inevitable, unified, and closely linked. It creates premise and conditions for each other, works together towards a common goal of independence, freedom, and happiness. Construction and protection are two elements or two sides of a development process. The general rule is: wherever and in any field where there is construction activity, there is protection activity and vice versa, wherever and in any field where there is protection activity, there is construction activity.

Independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity must be protected in order to have a country to build on. If a peaceful and stable environment can be maintained, conditions for building and developing the country's economy, culture and society are possible. Protecting the Party, the State, the socialist regime, the people, national interests, and the new nation-

² Hồ Chí Minh (2011). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 9.

³ Nguyễn Phú Trọng (2021). *Tâm nhìn chiến lược và ý chí vươn lên của dân tộc*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia.

⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*

nal culture will create a premise and conditions to build and develop the country according to socialist path. On the contrary, there must be the construction and development of the economy, culture and society; the improvement of the synergy, position and strength of the country; and the improvement of the material and spiritual life of the people. Then, there will be resources to invest in consolidating and enhancing the national defense and security capacities; to strengthen the national unity bloc, the all-people defense arrangement and a firm foundation for people's security; and this will garner the support and help of international friends. After all, construction is the fundamental factor with the most decisive role and meaning for the defense of the socialist nation.

Construction is an effective method to protect the country. It is important to promote the role of national construction to protect the country and to uphold the responsibility of all forces in this construction process to protect the country. Overcoming economic backwardness is one of the most important means of protecting the socialist regime. In addition, to step up the fight against the manifestations of “self-corruption” and “self-defection” internally and the deterioration of political ideology, morality, lifestyle is to prevent, repel, and eliminate the “self-destructive factors” right in the heart of the regime; this is one of the methods to protect the nation most effectively and to upkeep the nature of the socialist regime. Building elements of socialism, making those elements develop firmly, clearly showing the superiority and progress of socialism and not letting the country deviate from the socialist orientation is an important goal of defending the Socialist Fatherland.

The construction and defense of the Fatherland in Vietnam is currently taking place in the context of international integration. First and foremost, international integration means international economic integration, and at the same time integration in all other fields of social life. International integration is a highly developed form of international cooperation to achieve common goals and interests. This is the process of linking and uniting countries and territories together through the participation of organizations, institutions, mechanisms and international cooperation activities for the development goal of each country and territory and to form a common power to solve problems of common concern among nations and social forces.

International economic integration in Vietnam has been developing deeply and widely on many levels and in many forms through the signing of many new-generation bilateral and multilateral trade agreements; export/import activities and foreign investment capital has increased sharply, which make positive contributions to the economic growth and development of

the country. In international integration, economic integration is the focus, while integration of other fields creates favorable conditions for economic integration and actively contributes to developing the society and economy, preserving and promoting the country's cultural identity, strengthening national defense and ensuring national security.

Active international integration will consolidate a peaceful environment; make the most of favorable international conditions for rapid and sustainable development of the country; improve people's living standards; maintain independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and firmly defend the socialist Vietnamese Fatherland; preserve and promote national identity; strengthen the national synergy; raise the country's international position and reputation; actively contribute to the cause of peace, national independence, democracy and social progress in the world.

After 35 years of implementing the comprehensive reform of the country, the Communist Party of Vietnam's theoretical thinking, awareness and practical guidance on the relationship between building and defending the socialist Fatherland has developed more comprehensively and deeply and gained great achievements of historical significance. Under the leadership of the Party, by overcoming difficulties and challenges, we have ensured socio-economic development, improved people's living standards, maintained independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, maintained the Party's leadership and ruling role, protected the socialist regime, maintained a peaceful and stable environment, created a solid foundation for successfully implementing the comprehensive reform of the country, strengthened internal resources and synergy, while constantly improved the position and prestige of the country in the international arena.⁵

However, the perception and handling of the relationship between the construction and defense of the Fatherland in Vietnam in recent years still has many shortcomings and limitations. A part of the people, cadres and party members, especially at the grassroots level, are still not fully aware of the dialectical relationship between building and defending the socialist Fatherland and often focus only on economic construction while disregarding the task of defending the Fatherland. There has not been a good awareness of linking construction with national defense or combining economic development with national defense. Many economic units are only interested in pure economic benefits without attaching importance to fulfilling their obligations and responsibilities to strengthen national security and

⁵ Nguyễn Phú Trọng (Chủ biên) (2011). *Về các mối quan hệ lớn cần được giải quyết tốt trong quá trình đổi mới để lên chủ nghĩa xã hội ở nước ta*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia.

defend the Fatherland. The formulation and implementation of a number of socio-economic development policies on some occasions and in some places have affected the requirements of ensuring national defense and security. Even in the planning and implementation of the plan, some localities did not do it correctly and disrupted the relationship between socio-economic development and strengthening national defense and security, especially near the border and on islands. In some places, the coordination between forces in performing the task of national construction and defense, between economic development and strengthening of national defense and security is sometimes inconsistent and lacking rigor. The promotion of the role of the political system and social organizations in performing the task of building the all-people national defense and people's security has not been so effective, especially in rural areas. Resolving the relationship between defense and security and foreign affairs is sometimes still not synchronous and effective. The legal system and law enforcement related to the relationship between national construction and defense are still incomplete and ineffective.

Doi moi in Vietnam is entering a stage of development in both breadth and depth that is stronger, more comprehensive, more thorough, and more deeply integrated; it is at a landmark height in order to promote the country to develop rapidly and sustainably. The goals for the year 2025 are turning Vietnam into a developing country with modern industry and surpassing the low-middle income level; by 2030, the goal is to be a developing country with modern industry and high middle income; and by 2045, it will be a developed, high-income country, and “towards the middle of the twenty-first century, it strives to become a developed and socialist-oriented country”.⁶

In the context of international integration, in addition to some basic advantages, the cause of national construction and defense in Vietnam has got new requirements and faced many difficulties and challenges in terms of economy, culture, society, national defense and security, and foreign affairs.

In order to continue to be aware of and handle well the relationship between national construction and defense in the current international integration context, it is necessary to master and perform well the following key tasks:

First, continue to perceive and properly handle the relationship between partners and subjects, between cooperation and combating in the context of international integration.

⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*

The Communist Party of Vietnam has renewed its thinking, replacing the old concept of “us versus the enemy” with a new concept of partners-subjects. Those who advocate respect for independence, sovereignty, establishment and expansion of friendly relations, equal and mutually beneficial cooperation with Vietnam are all considered to be partners. Any force that conspires and acts against the cause of building and defending the socialist Vietnamese Fatherland is subject to being combated. In each partner there may be conflicting interests that need to be combated; in each object, there may still be points of agreement with us that needs cooperation. Under certain conditions, the partner and the “subject” can alternate each other.

When the country is integrating deeply into the world, the relationship between partners-subjects becomes more diverse, complex and has new forms of expression in all areas of social life. It is necessary to have a dialectical view of the partner—subject to determine the appropriate forms of cooperation or combat. It is necessary not to be ignorant or let our guard down to the point that the country is startled, or encounter strategic unpredictable situations. At the same time, we should not be too rigid in perception and handling of situations to lose opportunities for socio-economic development. It is important to stay alarmed about harmful compromises to the cause of defending the Fatherland, especially in the condition that major countries adjust their strategies and put their national interests first. The country must not “get caught between two bullets” and become a “battlefield” for big countries to implement strategies and resolve conflicts.

International integration is a process of both cooperation and combat; therefore it is important to stay steadfast about national interests; to proactively forecast and flexibly handle all situations; not to fall into a passive position of facing economic and military confrontation or political and diplomatic isolation. It is important to implement peaceful defense and self-defense according to the principle of “four nos”: Not joining military alliances; not affiliated with one country to fight the other; not allowing foreign countries to set up military bases or use Vietnamese territory against other countries. Depending on the specific situation and conditions, it is necessary to consider developing necessary defense and military relations at an appropriate level.⁷

Second, economic, cultural and social development should be closely combined with strengthening national defense and security.

⁷ Bộ Quốc phòng (2019). *Sách trắng Quốc phòng Việt Nam 2019*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia.

It is important to combine the development of economy, culture and society with national defense and security in each development strategy or master plan of the whole country and in each locality, focusing on remote areas, borderland and islands. Economics should be closely combined with national defense in planning and developing economic zones and industries, ensuring economic efficiency associated with the requirements of ensuring national defense and security as the basis for specific policies. It is necessary to overcome loopholes and shortcomings that have occurred in the combination of socio-economic development and defense and security strengthening in some areas, especially in strategic and important areas in terms of defense and security.

The implementation of reforming the growth model is associated with economic restructuring, and this should be considered as both a premise and a consequence of international economic integration, a decisive solution to improve internal resources in order to take advantage of opportunities and overcome challenges of the new period of international economic integration. The relationship between independence, self-reliance and international economic integration should be properly handled to build an economy with high independence and is able to cope with international economic fluctuations. Lastly, macroeconomic stability, economic security should be maintained to upkeep the socialist orientation.

Third, national defense, security and foreign affairs should be combined closely.

It is important to continue to realize the new thinking of the Party on the relationship between defense, security and foreign affairs in the context of globalization and international integration. The direction and tasks of foreign activities in the new situation should be implemented well. On the basis of both cooperation and combat, foreign affairs activities serve the goal of maintaining a peaceful and stable environment, making the most of external resources to develop the country, improving the living standards of the people; resolutely and persistently fighting to firmly defend independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Fatherland; protecting the Party, State, people and the socialist regime. The international commitments that Vietnam participates in should be complied and this goes hand in hand with actively participating in the construction and effective use of international laws and regulations and participating in the activities of regional and international structures. Initiatives and cooperation mechanisms should be proposed on the principle of mutual benefit; the nation's role in the regional and international community should be consolidated and en-

hanced to actively contribute to the struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress in the world.

Fourth, the Party's views on the relationship between national construction and defense should be promptly institutionalized to suit the new context of international integration.

In order to realize the Party's view on the relationship between building and defending the socialist Fatherland in the context of international integration, one of the problems is to institutionalize the Party's view on this relationship through an appropriate system of laws, policies and sanctions to properly resolve it. Appropriate mechanisms should be formulated so that all branches, levels, organizations and forces effectively implement the close combination of economic development with national defense, security and defense, and security with economic development.

It is also essential to continue to grasp thoroughly and organize well the implementation of the national defense strategy, military strategy, security strategy and other specialized strategies to protect and defend the country early, from afar, starting from when the country is not in danger. This should be done by the combined strength of the whole nation and the strength of the times. Strategic trust with other countries should be built and consolidated, especially with neighboring countries, big countries, and traditional friends in order to create new positions and forces for the cause of national defense. A number of military and defense situations should be clearly determined, and at the same time possible situations should be anticipated in line with reality in order to serve as a basis for a determined and active prevention, rather than being passive or startled in terms of strategies; and to ready to deal with all situations victoriously.⁸

It is recommended to continue to review, supplement and perfect the system of laws and sub-law documents related to the settlement of the relationship between national construction and defense in the context of international integration. Attention should be paid to reviewing the system of legal documents related to the organization and coordination of actions between economic forces and the forces that protect the Fatherland. Regulations on coordination of activities between forces should be completed, such as among the main army, local army, police, coast guard, border guard and self-defense force in strategic locations. Finally, the legal system related to the combination of socio-economic development with national defense and security should be reviewed and perfected, and this will serve as a basis

⁸ Ngô Xuân Lịch (2018). Chiến lược quốc phòng, chiến lược quân sự Việt Nam — Sự kết tinh truyền thống dân tộc với ý Đảng, lòng dân. *Báo Quân đội nhân dân*, ngày 18/4.

for the good implementation of the combination between national construction and defense in the new period.

The construction and defense of the Fatherland is the relationship between two basic strategic tasks throughout the process of the Vietnamese revolution. It is a matter related to the nature of the existence and development of the country. In the current context of deep international integration, mastering and handling this great relationship well is meant to guide the handling of other relationships, in order to transform the country with sustainable development into a developed country with socialist orientation.

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Chapter 10

THE COMBINATIONS OF NATIONAL AND EPOCHAL FACTORS TO BUILD A MARXIST CONSTITUTIONAL STATE

In the construction of the rule-of-law state, there is not and cannot be an invariable “formula” of the rule-of-law state for all nations; only specific and defined models of the rule of law state for each country, in which there is a dialectical unity between the universal characteristics (the era) and the inherent characteristics of that country (the nation). The Communist Party of Vietnam has led the construction of the state under the rule of law in Vietnam in the spirit of combining the good traditional values of the nation with the values of the times (democracy, humanity, science) that many models of the rule of law of the world have been implementing applying creatively and selectively (inheriting, filtering, adapting) reasonable and appropriate experiences on how to build and organize the state’s legislation.

Keywords: the rule of law, the socialist rule of law state in Vietnam, national factors, factors of the times, the Communist Party of Vietnam leads in state construction.

National and epochal factors in the perception and construction of the rule of law in Vietnam

When conducting research on the ideology of the rule of law and the basis for the formation of state institutions of the rule of law, Marx and Engels stated: “...each a certain stage of economic development of a nation or an epoch that creates a base from which one develops state institutions,

the rule of law”.¹ This means, it is necessary to start from the objective reality in which people exist and produce in order to study the corresponding political and spiritual institutions, and not vice versa; from infrastructure to superstructure research; from material-economic relations to learn about the State and the rule of law. The basic contents of the state problem in Marx's philosophy have been the inheritance and development of universal human values of the theory of the rule of law. However, due to the specific historical conditions and circumstances of their time, they did not have a complete theory of the rule of law state in socialism (or the socialist rule of law state). The socialist rule of law state as a basic concept in the theory of the state of Marxist philosophy had not yet been elucidated. Therefore, the addition and completion of Marxist theoretical views on the rule of law to suit new historical conditions and circumstances is an objective requirement in theory and practice.

Historically, the rule of law state was born and developed in association with the formation and development of bourgeois democracy. Meanwhile, the theory of the State of Marx and Engels is primarily aimed at illuminating the revolutionary practice of destroying the State of the bourgeoisie. Reality and the revolutionary situation at that time did not allow them, and even Lenin later, to answer many theoretical questions about the new State replacing the destroyed State, including the legal State permission. The theory of the state and law in the socialist society before the *Doi moi* period (Reform 1986) in Vietnam has just stopped at the socialist legal principle in the organization and operation of the state apparatus. The concept of the rule of law is mentioned in the literature as a part of new political thinking, because in previous periods, the theory of the rule of law was developed mainly in capitalist countries. However, in socialist countries, due to the incorrect perception that the rule of law state belongs to the bourgeois state, it has not been established and studied to build a rule of law state even if it is a rule of law socialist state. Commenting on the disastrous consequences of such views, Kudriavsev asserted: “The greatest mistake of Soviet jurisprudence was to turn away from the idea of the rule of law just because it was involved with the capitalist revolution, which does not consider it a human value”.² When it comes to reform, that issue has only been mentioned, but when the research results on theory and their implementation are still very limited, then

¹ Mác C. và Ăng-ghen Ph. (1995). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 16, tr. 500.

² Viện nhà nước và pháp luật (1992). *Tìm hiểu về nhà nước pháp quyền*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Pháp lý, tr.9.

the socialist regime in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was in serious crises and collapsed as a system.

Before the August Revolution of 1945, Vietnam was a half-feudal, half-colonial country. The nature of the state is a combination of the nature of a minion feudal state with the nature of an invading colonial state, so there is no such rule of law state, much less the rule of law state in the spirit of the people, by the people, for the people. Due to specific historical conditions and circumstances, the majority of Vietnamese people have not been exposed and familiarized much with the democratic practices (even if it is a bourgeois democracy like in Western countries), which were formed and developed for a long time in the capitalist democracy. This caused many difficulties. The political and social life of Vietnam has not yet undergone capitalist democracy; The customs and lifestyles of “the king’s rule bows to the village’s rules” plus the “hatred” to the state, colonial and feudal laws are still heavy. Lenin said that the aversion to anything belonging to the state and the law among workers in the old society was understandable, and that created a disregard for the law in the characteristics of the people’s psychology and nationality. This can be said to be a major obstacle to the construction of the rule of law in Vietnam.

In such a contextual and practical situation, President Ho Chi Minh was the first to apply the Western ideology of the rule of law along with the ideas of the state of Western political leaders and the socialist state of the Marxist classics into the organization of building the new Vietnamese State. As early as 1919, when making the 8-point claim (*Claim of the people of Annam*) demanding freedom and democracy rights for the Vietnamese people, leader Nguyen Ai Quoc at that time demanded that the French colonialists reform the legal system in Indochina, in which they must abolish the rule by decree and replace decrees with laws. Since then, he emphasized: “Everything must be done under the law”.³ In fact, Ho Chi Minh’s thoughts about the state and the rule of law was at first just comments and thoughts about the role of law in implementing democracy for the Vietnamese people when the country was still a part of the French union, in which people do not have the least democratic and equal rights as the French. Along with the reality of the process of building an independent Vietnamese state, the perception of the rule of law in Vietnam has gradually formed and shaped on the basis of the arguments and theories about the rule of law that mankind has ever experienced in the history.

³ Hồ Chí Minh (2011). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 1, tr. 473.

The reform process was initiated by the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, in which there was an important content on renewing the ideology and practice of building a socialist state in Vietnam. The innovative practice together with the results of practical summarization and theoretical generalization have provided increasingly accurate and persuasive grounds for the Communist Party of Vietnam's view on the rule of law, socialist state of Vietnam. Those views have been increasingly supplemented and developed, which are clearly reflected in the Documents of the Communist Party of Vietnam and in the supplement and amendment of a number of articles of the 1992 Constitution (amended and supplemented in 2001), Constitution 2013. The concept of the rule of law in Vietnam has been gradually clarified:

First of all, the rule of law state is understood not as a type of state but as a way of organizing the state apparatus, a way of operating that apparatus on the basis of laws promulgated by the state itself. In modern society, the rule of law is a progressive form of organization, creating conditions to better counter bureaucracy, authoritarianism, and autocracy, and can bring society into an orderly and disciplined operation. Therefore, the socialist state of Vietnam should necessarily be organized in the form of a rule of law state.

Secondly, building a state ruled by law is a process that must have appropriate forms and steps determined by historical conditions (level of socio-economic development, education level, traditional characteristics, etc.). political system and national culture).

Third, the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was formed through the basic legal institutions enshrined in the Constitution. In terms of politics, the Constitution stipulates that our State is a democratic republic (Article 1, Constitution 1946 and Article 2, Constitution 1959); is a socialist republic (Article 2, Constitution 1992); is a socialist rule of law state of the People, by the People, for the People (Article 2, Constitution 2013).

Fourth, from a political-legal perspective, the current Vietnamese State is organized according to the principle of democracy — the rule of law. In essence, the rule of law represents the most important feature of the democratic state. The rule of law is not identical with the law, because there can be a state and law, but it does not necessarily become a rule of law state (like feudalism state for example). Law is only the premise, or means for constructing a rule of law state.

The view of the Communist Party of Vietnam on building the rule of law is the basic political orientation reflected in the Constitution and legal system of Vietnam. The successful construction of the rule of law in

Vietnam must be associated with a process of social reality awareness in the spirit of innovation and science, with an approach from both the Vietnamese revolutionary reality (the nation), also from the (epochal) human values of the rule of law (as a form of state — a progressive way of organizing the exercise of political power and a common value of mankind), but appropriate and compatible with the historical-specific conditions and circumstances of Vietnam. Among them is the urgent requirement of perfecting the democratic institution. The requirement to practice and promote democracy in the renovation process clearly shows the need to exploit the values of the theory of the rule of law that mankind has had in history. According to the point of view of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the 2013 Constitution, in Vietnam, state power is unified **without division but with assignments**, coordination and control (new point from the XI Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam. — *Author emphasizes*) among state agencies in the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial powers.

The Communist Party leads the building of a socialist rule of law state in Vietnam

In the process of renewing the Party's theoretical thinking, the term (concept) of the rule of law state has gradually been clarified. At the National Conference of Delegates of the 7th term of the Communist Party of Vietnam (January 19, 1994), for the first time, this term was clearly stated in the document: *“Continue to build and gradually improve the rule of law state in Vietnam. It is a state of the people, by the people, for the people, managing all aspects of social life by law, leading the country to develop socialist-oriented pathway”*.

The 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (April 1996) said that in order to build and strengthen the entire state apparatus, it is necessary to focus on solving basic tasks: renewing and improving the quality of legislative work and supreme supervision of the National Assembly over all state activities; reform of state administration, reform of judicial organization and activities; strengthen anti-bureaucracy, anti-corruption and anti-wastefulness campaigns.

Resolution of the Ninth National Congress affirms: The State of Vietnam is the main tool to exercise the people's right to mastery, a rule of law state of the people, by the people, for the people; know how to consult and selectively apply the theory of building the rule of law of mankind to the specific conditions of Vietnam so that it is suitable for the nation, the time and the actual situation of the country.

The 10th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam continued to affirm its views on the socialist rule of law state in Vietnam more specifically: “Building the operating mechanism of the socialist rule of law state, ensuring the principle that all state power belongs to the people; state power is unified... Perfecting the legal system, increasing the specificity and feasibility of regulations in legal documents. Building and perfecting a mechanism to check and monitor the constitutionality and legitimacy in activities and decisions of public agencies.”⁴

The 11th Congress made important breakthroughs in political thinking, organization and operation of the state apparatus when determining: “State power is unified, with assignment, coordination and inter-agency control in the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial powers. To step up the construction of a socialist rule-of-law state, focusing on three major contents: Continuing to renovate the organization and operation of the state apparatus...; building a team of cadres and civil servants who are clean and capable to meet the requirements of the new situation...; actively prevent and resolutely fight against corruption and waste, practice thrift...”⁵

The 12th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam continued to be consistent and supplemented and further developed these views in line with the new realities of the country, the region and the world: “Continuing to build a socialist rule of law state under the lead of the Communist Party is the central task of the political system reform”.⁶

At the 13th Congress, the Communist Party of Vietnam clearly and specifically defined the direction and task of building the current Vietnamese rule of law State: “Improve the capacity, effectiveness and efficiency of the State’s operations. To better define the roles, positions, functions, tasks and powers of State agencies in the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial powers on the basis of the rule of law principles and assurance of power. The state is unified, has a clear division, closely coordinates and strengthens control over state power.”⁷

It can be said that perceiving and building and perfecting the rule of law in Vietnam is a long and complicated process, that led by the Communist

⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ X*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 126.

⁵ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2011). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 52, 54—55.

⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2016). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 175.

⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 1, tr. 174—175.

Party of Vietnam. The role of the Party in the organization, construction and operation of the State has both expressed its popularity as well as its own characteristics of political relations in the Vietnamese State. It reflects the popularity (epoch) because every democratic state is associated with the dominant role of the political party in most activities and organizations of the state. It reflects the political conditions in the country because the Communist Party of Vietnam has a long history of attachment to the people and the nation through struggles for democracy, reform and renovation processes of the state, the leadership role of the Party is respected by the whole nation. Stemming from the reality of the process of building the House of Vietnam in the past time, from the theoretical and practical bases, the Communist Party of Vietnam on the basis of a harmonious and reasonable combination of national and historical factors, has identified requirements for the purpose of continuing to build and perfect the current Vietnamese rule of law State:

First, to build a real state of the people, by the people, for the people. The organizational structure and operation mechanism of the state must absolutely ensure and implement in practice at the highest level the principle of the people's right to master the state and society.

Second, building a state with a lean apparatus, minimizing unnecessary costs, but must be organized in a regular manner, working scientifically with the highest criteria of good national governance and serve the people well (the assisting government).

Third, the organization and operation of the state must be on the basis of law, manage society by and according to the law; ensure that all citizens and State agencies are equal before the law, and at the same time make the sense of the supremacy of the law universal in the widest range of society. The thought throughout recent documents of the Communist Party of Vietnam is: "Our State is the main tool for exercising the people's right to mastery, a rule of law state of the people, by the people, for the people, ...". The State manages the society by law. All agencies, organizations, cadres, civil servants, and all citizens have the obligation to abide by the Constitution and the law"; "Promoting democracy goes hand in hand with maintaining discipline, strengthening the rule of law, managing society by law, propagating and educating the whole people to raise the awareness of law observance".

Fourth, the rule of law is always associated with the construction and training of revolutionary morality, whose core is need, thrift, integrity, justice, and impartiality. From the 8th National Congress, the Communist Party of Vietnam affirmed: "Strengthen the socialist legality, build the rule of law in Vietnam. Managing society by law, at the same time attaching im-

portance to education and moral improvement. Upholding the strictness of the law is inseparable from morality, love and tolerance as well as the fine and progressive traditional values of the Vietnamese nation. This point of view of the Communist Party of Vietnam shows a smooth and harmonious combination of national and epochal factors in that morality is also considered an important component in building and perfecting the state, but not as radicalized like the concept of 'rule of morality', while the element of law is not absolutely transformed into 'rule of law'. Strict laws must be placed on the solid and durable foundation of revolutionary ethics: taking service to the people and national governance as the goals.

Fifth, to build a team of cadres and civil servants who are really uncorrupted, whole-hearted in serving the people, with political bravery and high sense of responsibility, management capacity, and professional expertise.

Conclusion

After 35 years of reform, the construction of a socialist rule of law State in Vietnam led by the Communist Party has made important strides. The task of building a clean and strong state is really the pillar of the political system of immense and vital significance, a necessary and urgent requirement of the process of renewal towards democracy and rule of law in Vietnam today. The Communist Party of Vietnam combines inheritance, acculturation, creativity, history — specifically the national factor (specific historical conditions and circumstances of the country) and the era factor (so-called Marxist views on the state and socialist state; theories and methods of building and organizing the operation of progressive and appropriate models of the rule of law state in the world, compatible with conditions, specific situation in Vietnam) for state-building a decisive role.

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Chapter 11

THE ACHIEVEMENTS IN BUILDING THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AT COMMUNE LEVEL OF VIETNAM IN THE *DOI MOI* PERIOD

After 35 years of *Doi moi*, the Communist Party of Vietnam has always affirmed that Party building is a key task. Party building work throughout the *Doi moi* period has achieved certain achievements in both theoretical and practical awareness, and at the same time, the organization and operation of the local government at the commune level has been increasingly improved. The Vietnam Fatherland Front and the commune-level socio-political organizations are active, making many contributions to the implementation of political tasks in the locality. Building a political system at the commune level has brought many lessons, especially in the work of building and rectifying the Party and building and renovating the organization and operation of the local government at the commune level.

Keywords: achievements, political system building, commune-level political system, *Doi moi*.

Building the Party and political system means to improve the Party's leadership and ruling capacity, enhance the effectiveness and operational efficiency of the political system, promote socialist democracy, and ensure uniformity, suitability between economic and political renovation. To achieve that goal, it is necessary to build a comprehensive and synchronous commune-level political system. Building the political system at commune level (commune, ward, and township) entails the entire leadership activities of the Party committees, management bodies of the government in: consolidating and transforming the organizational apparatus of the political system at commune level; renewing contents and modes of operation; building and

training cadres and civil servants; handling well different relations in the commune-level political system in order to promote the role of the commune-level political system and the people's right to master , as well as to achieve local political objectives.

Achievements in building the commune-level political system

After 35 years of *Doi moi* (1986—2021), along with outstanding achievements in economy, society and culture, as well as political reform, the work of building the Party and political system have also achieved many important achievements, which can be clearly demonstrated by the fact that the political system at the commune level is constantly in contact with the daily activities of the People.

Achievements in building the Party at the commune level

On the basis of persisting in the principles of organization and operation of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the construction of the commune-level Party has been carried out in terms of politics, ideology, organization and morality, and has undergone many powerful changes, specifically:

First, in terms of politics, building a commune-level Party helps to maintain revolutionary goals, ideals and fundamental principles steadfastly; to strengthen political determination; and to improve the quality of resolutions of the commune-level party committees. Party building and rectification work is valued and strengthened. The Communist Party of Vietnam has issued a number of important resolutions which have been widely implemented at all levels of party committees, party organizations and members, especially the sixth Central Resolution (second time) (Term VIII) “On some basic and urgent issues in the current Party building work”, Resolution of the Fourth Party Central Committee (Term XI) “Some urgent issues on Party building today”.

Second, in terms of ideology, the work of building commune-level party organizations has been enhanced, creating unity in the smaller units and party committees, contributing to the unity of the whole Party and social consensus on the general issues of the locality and the country. The commune level is the place to detect and defeat the “new developments in peacetime” plot of hostile forces at the grassroots level.

Third, the party organization at the commune level has had many important innovations, from organizational structure and operating mechanism to improving effectiveness and efficiency. The functions, tasks and organizational structure of the commune-level Party are increasingly improved, ensuring that the Party does not encroach on or replace the work of the government. The commune level is the place that plays a key role in the success of Party membership development, contributing to increasing the number of party members of the Communist Party of Vietnam to 5.2 million by the end of 2019.¹ The Party introduces capable and qualified Party members to key positions of the commune-level local government, Vietnam Fatherland Front Committee and commune-level socio-political organizations. Party organizations and members of the Communist Party of Vietnam operate within the framework of the Constitution and laws.²

Fourth, in terms of morality, the work of Party building is given special importance, which plays an important role in the fight to prevent and reverse the deterioration of political ideology, morality, lifestyle, and promote the exemplary role of Party members. Party members are closely attached to the People, serve the People, submit to the People's supervision, and be accountable to the People for their decisions; respect and promote the People's right to mastery, rely on the People to build the Party.

Achievements in building local government

First, the work on building and perfecting the law on organization and operation of local government has been done. The Law on Organization and Operation of Local Governments at all levels was promulgated quite early. Up to now, there are 7 laws with different names, namely: Law on Organization of Local Government in 1958, Law on Organization of People's Councils and Administrative Committees at all levels in 1962, Law on Organization of People's Councils and People's Committees in 1983, Law on

¹ According to the Press Release of the National Conference on Party building and organization, in 2019, Party organizations across the country admitted 143,000 new members, bringing the total number of Party members of the Communist Party of Vietnam to 5.2 million.

² In Article 4 of the 1980 Constitution, for the first time, the position of the Communist Party of Vietnam was recognized in the most valuable legal document, but by then, the Party's organizations operated within the framework of the Constitution. In the 1992 Constitution, additional regulations on operating within the legal framework were added, and this provision was inherited and perfected by the 2013 Constitution. Clause 3, Article 4 of the 2013 Constitution stated: "The organizations of the Party and its members operate within the framework of the Constitution and the law".

Organization of People's Councils and People's Committees in 1989, Law on Organization of People's Councils and People's Committee in 1994, Law on Organization of People's Councils and People's Committees in 2003 and Law on Organization of Local Government in 2015. During the *Doi moi* period, Vietnam promulgated 4 laws on organization of local government; the promulgation of the new law has shown new updates that meet the objective requirements in line with the reality of management at the commune level. At the same time, it is the main legal corridor for the local government to be organized and operate in accordance with the law, and to effectively manage all areas of local social life.

Second, the activities of the commune-level government have achieved many positive results.

Compared with the previous organizational laws, the 2015 Law on Organization of Local Government specifies that the local government consists of the People's Council and the People's Committee. "The People's Council is the local state power agency, representing the will, aspirations and mastery of the people, elected by the local people, responsible to the local people and government state agencies at higher levels".³ Based on the tasks and powers stipulated in the 2013 Constitution and the 2015 Law on Organization of Local Governments, the People's Councils of communes in localities throughout the country have performed according to their assigned competence, decided on many important issues that have a strong impact on the socio-economic development of the locality. During the term, the People's Council held meetings and passed resolutions; resolutions issued by the People's Councils of communes promptly created a legal basis for the People's Committees of communes to implement the Party's guidelines and policies, the laws of the state, and resolutions of Party Committee at higher level and the Commune Party Committee. These guidelines are applied in all management activities in accordance with the characteristics of the commune, ward and township, and meet requirements posed by reality. In addition, the commune-level People's Council has also focused on unifying and concretizing the process of promulgating resolutions to help improve the quality of resolutions. The well-organized process of promulgating resolutions of the commune-level People's Councils has made them more active in solving socio-economic problems of the locality. The process of formulating resolutions complies with the provisions of law; the documents have been carefully examined and received criticism and comments from delegates and socio-political organizations.

³ Quốc hội (2015). *Luật tổ chức chính quyền địa phương 2015*, khoản 1, điều 6.

The commune-level People's Council has paid attention to the performance of the supervision function and achieved certain results. Many commune-level People's Councils have actively studied, researched and applied forms and measures of supervision and inspection suitable to the actual situation. Careful listening, reviewing of reports, receiving questions, answering questions, organizing monitoring and inspection missions down to the villages at the grassroots level to collect voters' opinions have helped the Council at commune level grasp the situation and give timely opinions on many pressing issues that need to be resolved. The supervision activities of the People's Councils of communes have made positive contributions to the settlement of many negative cases and incidents, and limited law violations that occur in the locality. Many monitoring teams have discovered violations in law observance at the grassroots to propose competent authorities to handle them promptly; detected violations in areas such as site clearance, capital construction investment, budget revenue and expenditure, policies for education, poverty alleviation.

Many commune-level People's Councils have well promoted the monitoring activities of delegates by meeting with people. In this way, they solve queries, complaints and denunciations of individuals and organizations in the locality, ensuring the good implementation of grassroots democracy, preventing and limiting negative incidents in the local government apparatus, contributing to ensuring security, order and political and social stability.

“The People's Committee is elected by the People's Council at the same level, is the executive body of the People's Council, the local state administrative agency, and is responsible to the local People and the People's Council of the same level and state administrative agencies at higher levels”.⁴ As a local state administrative agency, the commune-level People's Committee must perform the State administrative management role in all aspects and fields of socio-economic life in the locality. At the same time, it is also the agency that manages the observance and implementation of decisions and directives of the commune's People's Council of the commune and the district's People's Committee in association with the guidelines of the Party, policies and laws of the State. This is shown in socio-economic, cultural, security, defense and environmental activities in the locality. Meetings of the People's Committee are held in accordance with regulations and focus on solving specific problems. The quality of the cadres, civil servants and part-time workers has been significantly improved. Up to now, most of

⁴ Ibid., điều 8.

the communes have roads leading to the central area; facilities for the cause of education — training, health care, culture are invested in; the standards of universal primary and secondary education basis have been met; the people's health care is maintained to prevent major epidemics from occurring; the rate of poor households decreases every year; cultural identity is maintained and promoted; the material and spiritual life of the people has been significantly improved; national defense and security are consolidated and maintained; judicial activities are carried out quite well; administrative reform has made remarkable changes. Many communes have developed working mechanism and maintained their operation according to regulations.

Third, local government is organized and operated in accordance with administrative units. One of the achievements in the construction of local government at all levels in general and at the commune level in particular is that local government is organized in administrative units suitable to the characteristics of rural, urban and island areas or special administrative-economic unit. Before the Law on Organization of Local Government 2015 was promulgated and took effect, commune-level governments were organized and operated with the same functions, duties and powers, even though the objective conditions in each locality were different. This led to similar treatment towards all localities and could not promote the advantages of each locality. On the basis of the basic difference between urban and rural areas, the Law on Organization of Local Government 2015 organized models of urban government and rural government with different duties and powers.⁵ The implementation of the urban government model will promote the proactive, responsible and creative role in serving the people, promoting the socio-economic development of the locality.

Achievements in building the Vietnam Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations at commune level

The Vietnam Fatherland Front at commune level and socio-political organizations at commune level include: Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, Vietnam Trade Union, Vietnam Women's Union, Vietnam Veterans

⁵ According to Resolution No. 97/2019/QH14 dated November 27, 2019 of the National Assembly, from July 1, 2021, the local government in wards in Hanoi City is the People's Committee of the ward, this is the administrative agency. It performs tasks and exercises powers according to regulations and according to decentralization and authorization of the People's Committee, Chairman of City People's Committee, People's Committee, President of People's Committee in the district or town.

Association, Vietnam Farmers' Association (applicable to communes, wards and townships engaged in agricultural, forestry, fishery and salt production activities and organized by the Vietnam Farmers' Association). Currently, the Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations at commune-level localities are organized⁶ and operate in accordance with the law and their organization's charter.

The Vietnam Fatherland Front at commune level and its member socio-political organizations have well carried out the work of communicating with and mobilizing local people to well observe the guidelines of the Party, policies and laws of the State; promoting the patriotic emulation movement associated with studying and following Ho Chi Minh's thought, morality and style. The commune-level Fatherland Front has well coordinated with branches and mass organizations to effectively carry out campaigns such as: "All people unite to build cultural life in residential areas", "All people unite to build a new countryside and a civilized city" and promoted social activities such as showing gratitude to the elderly or a day for the poor. Socio-political organizations are interested in helping union members borrow money to do business⁷, find good jobs, and head towards sustainable poverty reduction. In addition, these organizations perform well the function of supervision, social criticism, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of union members. Most of the commune-level socio-political organizations develop annual monitoring plans, the contents of which are supervised by the Vietnam Fatherland Front at the commune level. Member socio-political organizations and the People's Inspection Committee coordinate with the committees of the People's Council at the same level to comply with regulations; focus on supervising the construction of infrastructure, public facilities and other investment projects in the area; practice democracy and implement regimes and policies for people with meritorious services.

⁶ When Decree 121/2003/ND-CP dated October 21, 2003 of the Government on regimes and policies for cadres and civil servants in communes, wards and townships took effect, the head of socio-political organizations at commune level is clearly defined as a full-time cadre to distinguish from commune-level civil servants. In addition, the number of persons holding the position of deputy heads in socio-political organizations are part-timers, whose quantity are decided by the provincial-level People's Council.

⁷ According to the provisions of the Civil Code, grassroots socio-political organizations can provide secured loans for poor individuals and households to borrow a sum of money from credit institutions for production, business and consumption purposes in accordance with the law. The maximum loan amount for poor households is VND 100 million/household without loan security, effective from March 1, 2019.

The coordination between elements in the commune political system and between the commune political system and the political system at higher levels

Firstly, as regards the coordination between elements in the political system at the commune level

First, about the relationship between the Party organizations and the commune-level government: during the implementation process, there was unity and consensus between the party organization and the commune-level government in building the commune's political system, thereby achieving the tasks set out by the Commune Party Committee such as building a new countryside, public facilities, electricity works, roads, schools, stations and so on. Comprehensive leadership of the commune-level Party organization guarantees that the People's Council and the People's Committees are effective and efficient, but they do not act in place of the People's Councils and Commune-level People's Committees. Instead, these organizations assign, coordinate and control according to the principle of democratic centralism.

Second, about the relationship between Party organizations and the Fatherland Front and the commune-level socio-political organizations: In performing tasks, there is always support to motivate each other to complete tasks, for example in coordination, reconciliation, settlement of complaints and denunciations. This has created favorable conditions for the Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations to participate in supervision and social criticism, and to contribute ideas for Party building, for a strong and transparent government according to Decisions 217 and 218 of the Politburo.

Third, about the relationship between the commune-level government and the Fatherland Front and commune-level socio-political organizations: every year, the commune-level Fatherland Front develops a program to coordinate with the commune-level government on building public annual coordination program. There is also a joint plan between the Fatherland Front and the People's Council and the People's Committee of the commune on organizing meetings with voters before and after the meeting of the People's Council, on the organization of the People's Deputies Conference in residential areas, communes and townships as well as the Great National Unity Conference.

Secondly, as regards the coordination between the commune-level political system, the higher-level political system, and the village

First, the higher-level political system leads the commune-level political system; the higher-level political system closely directs the commune-level political system. A number of district-level cadres attend the activities of a number of hamlets belonging to commune-level party organizations. Through those working sessions, they have timely pointed out shortcomings, solved problems, had appropriate solutions for economic development, and maintained socio-political stability in the locality.

Second, the commune-level political system implements the guidelines of the higher-level political system; for each resolution assigned by the higher level, organizations in the commune-level political system discuss to agree on the most effective method, then actively encourage and mobilize villages and hamlets to carry out political tasks and plans.

Third, through Party divisions' secretaries and village heads, the commune-level political system along with villages and hamlets has effectively implemented and organized activities; mobilized resources of the residential community; properly performed their duties and responsibilities without encroaching on each other's work.

Besides the above achievements, the construction of the commune-level political system in Vietnam in the period 1986—2021 still has some limitations. *First*, a large number of party members show signs of deterioration; there is still abuse of power, violations of discipline and regulation at the commune level. In addition, a part of cadres and civil servants have a bossy attitude, making it difficult when dealing with requests of organizations and individuals. *Next*, local democracy regulations and the practice of democracy in administrative agencies are not regular and continuous, so there is effective implementation at first but later people loosen up. In fact, many communes consider practicing democracy as a job of the government and disregard the role of party committees and mass organizations; on the contrary, there are communes that delegated all the work to the Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations to implement.

Lessons learned

The 6th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (December 1986) decided on the comprehensive reform of the country in terms of economy, politics, culture, society, national defense and security, and foreign affairs. Over the past 35 years of *Doi moi*, Vietnam has got great achievements, and the construction of the political system in general and the construction of the commune-level political system are also among those

achievements. Looking back on 35 years of *Doi moi*, the construction of the commune-level political system has drawn the following lessons:

First, the Party building and rectification work must be implemented drastically, comprehensively, synchronously, regularly and effectively in terms of politics, ideology, morality, organization and staff.⁸ It is important to apply consistently and develop creatively Marxism — Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's thought; improve the Party's leadership, ruling and fighting capacity; regularly consolidate and strengthen solidarity within the Party and political system; strictly implement the principles of Party building and regularly renew the Party's leadership method.

Second, it is important to be resolute about the Party's principles of organization and operation, promote democracy, maintain internal unity, regularly renew thinking, content and working methods, and closely coordinate with advisory agencies of the Party, the State, the Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations to effectively implement the organization and construction of the party.

Third, building the Party and political system must always match reality, come from reality, respect reality, and attach importance to summarizing real situations and understanding situations to do consulting work well. Guidelines and resolutions of the Party, Party committees and organizations at all levels should be effectively implemented; the focus should be on building a clean and strong Party in politics, ideology, morality, organization and personnel.

Fourth, along with maintaining and strengthening the leadership role of the Party, it is necessary to respect and bring into full play the activeness of the commune-level local government and socio-political organizations. Maintaining and strengthening the Party's leadership role is a matter of principle, a decisive factor to ensure the success of Party building work. The Party is the core of leadership of member organizations of the political system, but must not make excuses or substitute them. Rather, it must attach importance to promoting activeness in the management of all areas of social life of the local government and in the supervision and social criticism of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations.

Fifth, it is necessary to strictly implement the Party's policy on decentralization among local government levels in the direction: "Whichever level of government that can manage and settle a task better and more closely to reality, the task and authority should be assigned to that level". This will

⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII. Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia. Tập I.

remove the imprint of the old mechanism in which subordinates sought direction or approval from superiors. We should also continue to review and clearly define the duties and authority of the commune-level government in the direction of: “one-level”: jobs that can be solved according to people’s needs and that can be decided by the commune level are delegated to the commune-level authorities to perform and take responsibility by law. Similarly, if work to be done according to the needs of the people has to go through both the commune and district government, then the work should be assigned to the district level for implementation.

Sixth, public service attitudes and administrative procedures are measures and criteria for assessing people’s satisfaction with the government. Administrative procedure reform should be accelerated at the commune-level People’s Committee, in which the focus is on reviewing procedures to simplify them, to reduce the number of documents and to standardize the content of administrative documents. The one-stop mechanism should be implemented in handling administrative procedures; the application of information technology should be promoted in handling administrative procedures. Popular public services should be provided online at level 3 or higher in order to reduce costs and time for individuals and organizations when handling administrative procedures at the commune level. Many places have met with these standards and are helping to increase people’s satisfaction and trust in the Party and State.

Conclusion

The stability and sustainable development of the political system depends on many different factors such as economy, politics, culture, society, national defense, security and foreign affairs. In order to achieve a State of stability and development, the political system must first build a clean and strong Party and other elements of the political system. After 35 years of *Doi moi*, the construction of the commune-level political system has achieved many achievements, changing the face of the commune-level political system, which is clearly reflected in the following aspects. Firstly, positions, functions, tasks and powers are clearly delineated and there is a coordination mechanism among elements in the political system. Secondly, in addition to the administrative management function, the commune-level government has become an organization providing public services, serving the legitimate rights and interests of the people. Thirdly, achievements in building the political system at the commune level contribute to maintaining stability and improving the living standards of local people.

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PART 2

**THE POLICY OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
AND CULTURAL REFORMING
OF VIETNAMESE SOCIETY**

Chapter 12

**THE CPV'S ECONOMIC STRATEGY
UP TO 2045:
CRUCIAL TASKS AND DEVELOPMENT RISKS**

The article discusses the SRV crucial social and economic tasks up to 2045 and analyses the opportunities and their realization risks. Vietnam's economy long-term prospects have been observed on the base of development strategy up to 2030, vision to 2045, determined by the 13th CPV Congress. The realization of such goals as industrialization and modernization, the growth model renovation, the disparities removal and the economic restructuring, the promotion of maritime sectors and deepening of international economic integration has been verified.

There has been explored contradictions and potential threats of the adopted strategy, which had not been duly estimated. In particular, there have been noted the over-estimation of the given economic growth rates, underestimation of disbalances at the macro-level and the urgency of transition from extensive methods to intensive ones, from the industrial stage of development to that of innovations. The more realistic assessment of the adopted targets allows to acknowledge that strategic miscalculations may cause long-term consequences.

Keywords: the SRV, development prospects, extensive growth, transition to innovative economy, maritime strategy, international integration, sovereignty.

Main targets, growth rates and the ways to progress

In just over fifty years after the war, Vietnam escaped from the poverty and became one of the emerging markets — most rapidly growing economies in the Indo-Pacific. Current socio-economic situation in the country is stable. Due to its achievements in economic growth and transformation Vietnam has got the name of a new “Asian tiger”. As a whole, it proved the efficiency of the Renovation policy (Doi Moi), developed and pursued by the Communist Party for 35 years with the goal to set Vietnam on the path of market transformation and social progress¹.

Currently the Strategy of socio-economic development for the period of 2021—2030 has been implementing (the prior one was completed in 2020) with the vision to transform the SRV into a developed industrial state by 2045. The actively ongoing processes of industrialization and servicization include the support of traditional economic spheres, such as agriculture, forestry and fishery, contribute to the products processing enlargement and to export expansion. The development of traditional branches guarantees social protection of the country’s population and food security in general. In future, Vietnam’s next target is to unite these branches with industry, while the latter contributes to modernization of agriculture and fishery and forms the supply-chains of processed agricultural and aquatic products.

During preparations for the 13th Congress of the Communist Party and after it the outlines of economic development strategy were formed both for the current decade and for a longer-term perspective. It is noteworthy that the CPV leadership having optimistic expectations for the future, for the first time in its contemporary history, introduced really long-term directives and targets, looking a quarter-century ahead. The crucial deadline is the 100th anniversary of the independent state of Vietnam (2045), but there have been planned indicators of numerous important dimensions up to 2050. State sectoral programs have been developed to be realized up to 2030. The National Energy Development Program, complex plans of railway and air transportation, the Complex plan of gas industry development, the Complex plan of agriculture development are among the most significant ones.

There have been determined the following five priority realms of innovation development: information and communication technologies, biotechnologies, new materials (also, with the help of nano-technologies), automatization and robotics. All these goals meet the requirements for the cons-

¹ Nguyen Xuan Phuc (2019). Report on Socio-Economic Situation in 2019 and Socio-Economic Development Plan for 2020. *Vietnam Economic Review*, 11: 4.

truction of a new, fifth, technological mode and point to the beginning of Vietnam's transition towards a higher, innovative, stage of development.

For 2021—2025 average annual GDP growth rate was planned at 6—6.5 %², but at the end of 2022 the forecast was raised to 7—7.5 %.³ In my opinion, these are excessive expectations; 5 %-growth seems to be more realistic for the entire period till 2030. The results of 2021 and nine months of 2022 are evidence in favor of sober assessment. IFO optimistically evaluates the possibilities of Vietnam's economy due to its rapid rehabilitation after the pandemic. Also, they expect the launching of “the Chinese driver”, stability in the EU zone and the US, but positive indicators in 2021 have been changed with signs of deceleration in the PRC and obvious recession in the West. There emerged a threat to food and energy security in the world. This has a negative effect for a number of sectors, such as the chain of main producers of raw materials, metals, fertilizers, as well as of agricultural products. Such fluctuations (growth followed with fall) started the mechanism of the global protracted finance-economic crisis, which Vietnam's economy cannot avoid.

At the same time, it is impossible to cancel a logical trend of gradual weakening of dynamics of Asian emerging economies as they mature. It is reflected by the indicators of Vietnam's GDP growth during the period of market reforms. The fall is insignificant, but since the early 21st century the growth rates have been steadily declining: 7.3 % in 2001—2005, 6.3 % in 2006—2010, 5.9 % in 2011—2015, 5.8 % in 2016—2020.⁴ The further “cooling” of economy will repeat the history of other “Asian tigers”, which serves us a basis to make a forecast for the future other than that by Vietnamese experts.

Expecting the maintenance of high economic dynamics, the CPV leadership has put forward ambitious targets of raising the population's incomes and the level of development of their country. By the end of the current Five-Year plan (2025) it is expected that in the UN world's classification it will join the middle group of the countries with average incomes per capita, the top group in 2030, and by 2045 it will have highly developed economy and high incomes⁵. Given that in 2021 the income per capita, in CPV assessment, was USD3125, to reach the level of the middle group (USD4000) by

² Nghị quyết Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII của Đảng, 25.02.2021.

³ IMF về kinh tế Việt Nam: “Đây là điều chúng tôi không quan sát được ở các nền kinh tế khác”. *Sputnik*, 04.10.2022.

⁴ Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2013, p. 147; 2020, p. 183. Hanoi, 2014, 2021.

⁵ Triển vọng kinh tế Việt Nam dưới sự điều hành của ban lãnh đạo mới. *Vietnamplus*, 15.05.2021; Nghị quyết Đại hội XIII của Đảng, 25.02.2021.

2025 is not so complicated.⁶ However, the rise to USD8000 in 2030 (the threshold of the top group) is dubious, when the growth rates are decelerating, not to mention the world crisis. The achievement of USD11000 in 2045 (the low level of high developed countries) seems to be hypothetical. The idea of the target is clear — to join the world elite by the 100th anniversary of Vietnam's independence and to prove the success of the CPV mission.

In my opinion, this approach is short of realism in the assessment of both the reference level and the perspective; it is not easy to predict the probability of events for the nearest future. At the same time, this scenario ignores the so-called middle-income trap; the measures to overcome it are clear, but they are slowly realized in practice. Taking into account GDP per capita at nominal exchange rate the SRV leaves behind (in ASEAN) but Cambodia and Myanmar, and ranks the 128th in the world. But as far as the growth rates of incomes per capita are concerned, it is superior to such ASEAN developed countries like Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.

Perhaps, the excessive euphoria is due to rosy world forecasts (the World Bank statistics), according which in 2020 Vietnam ranked the forty-second among 196 countries by nominal GDP while in 2036 (previously in 2050) is predicted to become 20th.⁷ The process of approaching the world leading economies is changing Vietnam's geopolitical potential. The attractiveness and general influence of the Vietnamese economy are rapidly growing, also, raising political stakes. It is well known that the SRV aspires to be acknowledged a medium power by 2030, and this also imposes obligations on the economic achievements.⁸

It is of great importance to determine the reliability of these calculations base. The SRV statistics had been essentially corrected by the 13th CPV Congress: the GSO stated that in 2020 GDP achieved USD343.6 billion, not USD271.2 billion, as previously reported, due to the revision of calculation method⁹. In the end it ranked the fourth on the volume among the

⁶ Chiến lược phát triển kinh tế xã hội 2021—2030, in: *Văn kiện Đại hội XIII (2 tập)*, tập 1, tr. 218.

⁷ World Economic Outlook Database, April 2021; Đã rõ thời điểm Việt Nam sẽ lọt top 20 nền kinh tế lớn nhất thế giới?, 02.10.2022.

⁸ Le Dinh Tinh (2019.). Vietnam as an Emerging Middle Power towards 2030 and beyond. *Russian Journal of Vietnamese Studies*, 3: 7—17.

⁹ Chiến lược phát triển... *Op. cit.*, tập 1, tr. 218; Báo cáo kết quả phát triển kinh tế xã hội 5 năm (2016—2021) và phương hướng, nhiệm vụ phát triển kinh tế 2021—2025 năm, in: *Văn kiện Đại hội XIII (2 tập)*, tập 2, tr. 9. It was announced that in 2022 this figure should reach USD400 billion: Quy mô GDP Việt Nam tiến lên mốc 400 tỷ USD, có cần “bê lái” chính sách FDI? *Sputnik*, 17.09.2022.

ASEAN member-countries, leaving behind Malaysia and Singapore (Table 1)¹⁰. But such a 26 %-jump in less than a year cannot be explained.

Table 1. The comparison of economic size and incomes per capita in some ASEAN countries in 2018—2021

ASEAN member-country	2018	2021	2018	2021	2018	2021
	GDP, billion dollars		Dollars per capita		Income per capita, USD at PPP	
Singapore	377,0	396,9	66 859	72 794	100 686	116 486
Vietnam	308,7	362,6	3230	3694	9776	11 553
Malaysia	358,7	372,7	11 380	11 371	28 236	29 617
Thailand	506,7	505,9	7298	7233	18 534	19 209
The Philippines	346,8	394,1	3252	3548	8719	9119
Indonesia	1040	1190	3893	4291	11 643	12 904

The source: URL: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=VN-PH-SG-TH-MY-ID>

Notes: *World Bank GDP per capita (current US\$); GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$)*

As GDP size can be accurately compared while measuring PPP, let us take the relevant data. The IMF evaluates this SRV's indicator as USD1.15 trillion in 2021 (USD0.932 trillion in 2018), more than Malaysia and the Philippines. According to the WB data, *the PPP* alignment of the indicator per capita differs too. Malaysia is, so far, ahead, followed by Thailand and Indonesia; the SRV follows them leaving behind the Philippines. If Vietnam manages to maintain the growth rates of 6—7 %, it will leave Indonesia behind soon, as the latter's economy grows slower (5 % annually), but its population increases faster.¹¹ In terms of *current US\$* purchasing power parity, the SRV GDP per capita achieved USD9776 in 2018 and USD11553 in 2021, having increased by 1.18 times. But it is a long way ahead to achieve the level of newly industrialized states (NIS) (fig.1).

¹⁰ Kinh tế Việt nam 2020: một năm tăng trưởng đầy bản lĩnh. GSO; Chuyên gia quốc tế lạc quan về kinh tế Việt Nam trong nhiệm kỳ mới. *VietnamPlus*, 25.05.2021.

¹¹ Dapice, D. Kinh tế Việt Nam: COVID-19 cũng có thể là cơ hội. *Tuổi trẻ Cuối tuần*, 9.05.2021.




Fig. 1. Vietnam's transition to a modern economy in comparison with some NIS.

Source: Eckardt, S., Vu Viet Ngoan. *How can Vietnam avoid the middle-income trap?* 16.05.2019; Note: T = Year when reforms began

The strategy of development and the restructuring of economy

The industry development strategy up to 2025, vision to 2035 r. determines the priorities in the transformation of industrial production; it presents such processing industries as chemical industry, agricultural products processing, forestry and fishery, textile and footwear industries. The priorities choice is clear: the course towards industrialization being realized not so fast as it had been expected. The 13th Congress acknowledged that it has not been succeeded to transform Vietnam into an industrialized country by 2020 as predicted.

This conclusion follows from the change of the sectoral structure of the economy. The contribution of industry and construction into GDP has fallen (instead of the planned growth) and the contribution of processing industry, including engineering, has shown a modest growth (Table 2)¹², the

¹² Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2020. *Op. cit.*, p. 200; Mazyrin V. M. *Op. cit.*, p. 260; Báo cáo kết quả ... *Op. cit.*, tr. 21.

cause being a slow technological modernization of the industry, depending on the development of the processing one. Also, the servicization tendency of economy (see Adam Ford's chapter) is an objective cause for the decrease of the industrial input. In the SRV the contribution of the services sector into GDP lags behind the advanced ASEAN countries. Therefore, modernization of the economy as a whole is inhibited.

The strategy assumes that by 2035 the share of industry and construction in the economic structure will amount to 40–41 %, the High-Tech production share being 45 % by 2025, later will amount to 50 %. Given that the service sector will amount to 50 % modern economy must input about 90 % of GDP. A special attention is paid to chemical industry, engineering, fishery and agriculture, pharmaceuticals and tourism. New regulations amplify and sometimes tighten requirements to quality and security of goods' producing and turnover.

The 13th Congress determined the services areas which are to be the driving forces of the process. It has been resolved to make for the development of the most advantageous sectors, possessing science intensity and based on high technologies, i.e., telecommunication, oil and gas sector, shipping and air transport, tourism. This list lacks currently leading sectors, accounting for two-thirds of the value of the services provided such as the retail trade, property transactions, the finance sphere¹³. At the same time, it was proposed to modernize and disseminate services accounting for a high rate of return, namely, finance, bank, exchange, logistic and auxiliary ones.

The CPV leadership put forward another set of tasks, caused with new challenges; there was adopted the SRV Marine Economic Development Strategy up to 2030, vision to 2045. Its potential is large indeed and only beginning to be exploited. The development and promotion of the strategy show that the party considers the maritime sphere to be an important component of the national strategic space. It desires to make Vietnam “a strong and rich country because of the sea; to make maritime economy development sustainable...”.¹⁴ Also, fortifying of this economic sector is due to the necessity to defend the sovereignty of the maritime space and islands. The given target meets the stake on the development of the oil and gas industry, deep-sea fishing and other segments linked with the sea, such as port servi-

¹³ Vietnam, in: *The economy of Southeast Asian countries*. Textbook. M.: Nauka, 2020, p. 149–150.

¹⁴ The Party's Resolution on the maritime strategy up to 2030 was adopted on October 22, 2018.

ces, ship building and repair, sea transport, tourism on the coast and islands. According to the strategy, maritime sectors must bring about 10 % of national GDP, while 28 coastal areas must create about 65–70 % of the country's GDP.¹⁵ Curiously, the target was suddenly put down; in 2007 the original conception evaluated the contribution of marine economy into GDP worth 45 % by 2020, but these expectations seem to have been too high.

As this sector is an important reserve of the country's growth and defense, it is noteworthy that the development of the marine economy does not contradict to the innovation dominant. The strategy has planned the maximum usage of progressive science-technological achievements. In a number of the maritime science-technology sectors Vietnam must reach the level of developed countries. The task to solve the mentioned targets and to create the necessary structure requires large funds which are hard to find within the country and to get from without. Therefore, the realization of the strategy appears to be a complicated one, but as it is closely connected with Vietnam's political goals in the South China Sea, there are reasons for optimism.

The economic strategy up to the mid-21st century clearly shows the ecological orientation of national development. It takes into consideration, first, the imperatives of Western partners and obligations in the scope of the free trade agreements; secondly, the danger of global warming and rising sea level. At the same time, the 13th Congress does not directly concentrate on mega-threats of the process either in the strategy or in resolutions, despite the forecasts of a number of leading researchers. According to the latest assessments of the World Bank, the climate change, if there are no preventive measures against it, by 2050 will cause about 12–15 % GDP losses annually and by 2030 about a million persons will be pushed into a state of poverty¹⁶ Earlier forecasts indicated in the mid-century a possible inundation of a large part of the Red River delta and that of the Mekong, the centers of the national economy. In spite of probable catastrophic consequences, the plans for the near decade and future do not provide for the move of population to the highlands, which will require the construction of new urban and industrial centers, and migration abroad control. A very preliminary assessment is that during 2022–2040 possible costs on ecology can amount to USD254 billion, including the compensation of the private property losses and the reconstruction of social infrastructure (USD219 billion) and on

¹⁵ Le Dinh Tinh (2021). Vietnam marine economy strategy to 2030, with a vision to 2045: an analysis. *Russian Journal of Vietnamese Studies*, 1: 8–27.

¹⁶ Hai lộ trình giúp Việt Nam đạt mục tiêu kép về tăng trưởng và khí hậu. *The Leader*, 25.07.2022.

social assistance programs (USD35 billion). Carbon neutrality requires USD114 billion, including the transition to “the green energy” (USD64 billion), and to other industrial sectors, transport and agriculture (USD17 billion)¹⁷. In total, these costs are equal to GDP volume in 2021. It means that during nearly twenty years ahead there will be spent no less than 5 % GDP per year.

Generally, it is provided to intensify measures for adaptation to climate changes, for the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters. The 13th Congress called to rationally use natural resources, make the protection of the environment and of human health the primary goal, close dirty productions, improve the quality of the environment, preserve biodiversity and ecosystem of the country, build “the green economy”, the close-cycle economy, loyal to the environment. Also, the Maritime strategy puts forward the targets of prevention, control and significant reduction of the aquatic environment pollution, including the reduction of plastic wastes in the ocean¹⁸.

The sustainability of the SRV economic development is still more dependent on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Since the beginning of the 21st century, Vietnam has shown the highest in the world increase of carbon emissions per capita, about 5 % annually¹⁹. To solve the problem, the Strategy of “green” growth, vision to 2050 has been launched with the target of the “green” production, first of all in the energy, the mode of life change and sustainable consumption. Due to this, not only the citizens’ attitude to the problem has improved, but also harmful emissions have been reduced. The consumption of energy per unit of production declined, the business became increasingly aware of the current target (49 % of businessmen took the trend towards the release of ecologically safe products in 2020, in comparison with 28 % in 2011).²⁰ The implementation of the strategy contributed to the reduction of the environmental degradation, having shown the necessity of its prolongation in the next decade (2021—2030). There are provided stricter obligations to transform the SRV into the country with the neutral carbon footprint by 2050. These obligations of the leadership look especially high when compared with neighboring China ex-

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Le Dinh Tinh. *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

¹⁹ Ngân hàng Thế giới tại Việt Nam. Tổng Quan về Việt Nam. Retrieved on 20.06.2021.

²⁰ Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) (2021). The national strategy on green growth for 2021—2030. Retrieved on May 5. In 2018 the volume of loans for financing “green” projects amounted to USD10.36 billion and was 2.35 times higher against 2015.

pecting but 60 % of the task. It is to believe, if the matters stand so in the PRC, the neighboring state (incomparably smaller) cannot, by definition, reduce its harmful emission to naught.

The transition to the “green” energy (the core of this bold plan) is obviously a challenging and risky task. According to the World Bank, its realization costs USD12–14 billion annually (about 3 % of GDP)²¹, but the SRV state budget can hardly allocate the funds without the direct assistance of the EU-countries promoting this program. Currently, in conditions of its own deepening energy and consequent general economic crisis, the European Union will scarcely take on the costs, but the CPV leadership is silent about it. Also, it will be difficult to double existing energy capacities by 2030 in conditions of the sharp reduction of coal output and thermal power plant generating capacities (in the period before 2040 it is planned to be closed), and, de-facto withdrawing the plans of hydropower electricity generation, let alone the cancellation of nuclear power plants. Vietnam is the acknowledged leader in the development of the wind and solar energy in Southeastern Asia, and achieved great successes in this sphere, but numerous problems, both existing and expected ones, have not been properly evaluated. The significance of the “green” transition for the achievement of ecological effect and carbon neutrality depends on the fact that the energy sector emits 65 % of carbon dioxide in the country, and currently three quarters of the energy is generated through traditional sources²². As a matter of fact, this program, being hastily realized, under the pressure of the West, without proper support and disregarding the beginning global upheaval, may have the opposite effect and to inhibit the SRV general development.

So far, there is a slow transition from the *growth model*, based, as a rule, on the extensive development factors, to the intensive one. The 13th Congress proposed to intensively master the innovation model, to assure the sustainability of Vietnam’s economic development by the increase of labor productivity (now it is in order of magnitude lower than that of most countries of Southeastern Asia), to improve infrastructure, increase the contribution of processing and assembly production. The creation of the economy of knowledge is not conceptually thought over and is reduced to the task of digitalization and informatization (Table 2)²³. There are premises: according world agencies estimations, Vietnam belongs to the leaders of developing

²¹ World Bank bày cách chuyển dịch năng lượng bền vững tại Việt Nam. *The Leader*, 25.01.2022.

²² Ibid.

²³ Đoàn Văn Bình. Việt Nam ở đâu thời 'du mục k? thuật số'. *The Leader*, 31.10.2022.

information technologies and innovations²⁴. But while extensive factors dominate, economic growth has no sufficient support of knowledges, science and technologies, professional skills (certified workers make up about 25 % of the total employment)²⁵.

As a sequence still there is a danger of increasing lagging behind even from the neighboring countries of the region. Therefore, the term of the transition to a new model by 2045, having put forward by the 13th Congress of the CPV seems to be too long. In my opinion, so far, there is no proper assessment of the exhaustion of the extensive development resources (but they may be exhausted during 2021—2025, the period of the ongoing Five-Year Plan) and no determination of mechanisms of truly innovative growth. The reserves to follow the old ways still exists, but they are very small.

The 13th Congress confirmed the task of accelerated and sustainable economic development by increase of growth quality, competitiveness and efficiency, namely, through the implementation of the achievements of science and technology, increase of labor productivity, and products' quality. During the previous Five-Year plan labor productivity increased, the contribution of the total factor productivity grew, the capital intensity GDP index (ICOR) reduced; this improved the ratio of GDP forming factors. The increase of labor resources quality and of human capital as a whole is obvious. According to the Human Development Index calculated by UNDP, Vietnam ranks countries with high index.²⁶ But these shifts are not sufficient for accelerated modernization.

Structural imbalances and social problems mitigation

In order to modernize economy and to increase the sustainability of its restructuring, the 12th CPV Congress took a course for overcoming serious structural imbalances, and being acknowledged correct, it was continued by the 13th Congress.

To reduce the shortfall in infrastructure development from the material production is one of the urgent tasks; a great attention was paid to its soluti-

²⁴ In the rating on the global innovation index in 2020 the SRV ranked the forty-second among 131 countries, and the third among ASEAN countries; see: Báo cáo kết quả phát triển kinh tế xã hội 5 năm (2016—2021). *Op. cit.*, tr. 37.

²⁵ Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2020. *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

²⁶ Báo cáo tình hình kinh tế — xã hội quý IV và năm 2020; Tình hình kinh tế — xã hội quý IV và năm 2019. In 2021, this index reached 0.726: Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2020, p. 16.

on. By the share of investments into infrastructure in GDP the SRV belongs to the lower group of ASEAN countries and ranks 89th of 137 in the world.²⁷ The cause, in particular, is the limited progress in creating auxiliary links and mediators in the production chain.

In overcoming structural imbalances and overheat of Vietnam's economy, the optimization of public investments is of great importance. Their contribution to GDP has stabilized at 33 % level, though in the early 2010s it exceeded 40 %. It is important to stabilize other finance macro-indicators (also, inflation rates). In 2021 it grew 1.84 % in CPI the lowest level beginning from 2015.²⁸ The variation of the index for consumer prices in previous 5 years was much higher (an average growth of 3.15 %, but lower the indicator 7,65 % annually in 2011–2015), proving the success in the inflation control²⁹. However, with the Ukrainian crisis and Western sanctions against Russia, the price increase both in the world and in Vietnam accelerated, especially energy prices. Thus, in April and May 2022 gasoline prices increased 34 % at once. Currently, the SRV government and the State Bank aim to keep annual core inflation at the rate of 4 %.

Also, there has been set the task of further reduction of the state budget deficit and the domestic debt, the increase of the foreign trade surplus³⁰ and gold reserves.³¹ It is an urgent need to improve the balance of payments, especially current accounts. It is not easy to cope with these tasks in conditions of the global decline of foreign trade and investments due to the above-mentioned crisis and military operation.

The rational urbanization is of the increasing socio-economic relevancy, while at this level the SRV lags behind the developed countries. The beginning of the 21st century saw the acceleration of this process (from 2010 to 2020 the share of urban population increased from 30 % to 37 %); the consequences of the urbanization are to be evaluated, but it is clear that cities

²⁷ Ngân hàng Thế giới tại Việt Nam. Tổng Quan về Việt Nam; Nguyen Xuan Phuc. *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

²⁸ Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2020. *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁹ Báo cáo tình hình kinh tế — xã hội quý IV và năm 2020; Báo cáo kết quả phát triển kinh tế xã hội 5 năm (2016–2021), tr. 12.

³⁰ In 2020 it was 3.5 % of the trade turnover (export USD281.5 billion, import USD262.4 billion), while on the results of 2015 the deficit was 11.4 % (turnover of USD328 billion). *Ibid.*; Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2018, p. 610.

³¹ In the period of 2015–2020 the reserves grew from USD28 milliard to USD100 milliard. Nguyen Phu Trong (2021). Some theoretical and practical issues on socialism and the path towards socialism in Vietnam. *Tạp chí Cộng sản*, November 10; Báo cáo kết quả phát triển kinh tế xã hội 5 năm (2016–2021), tr.10.

cannot cope with the influx of internal migrants. The indicators are as follows: unemployment in town (4.3 % in 2021³²), higher than in the country (2.5 %), increasing pollution of the environment, traffic jams, and migrants' limited access to the social security system. In the future the population will concentrate in cities at a slower pace. It requires to develop the policy of urban agglomerations development in the entire country, to avoid the sprawl of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

Another demographic aspect requires a special attention. According to the UN latest forecasts, by 2045, the SRV population will amount to about 110 million, the quantity of older people (above 65 years old) will start to outnumber children's groups (under 15 years old) and the population of the employment age (the latter will reach its maximum of 70 million).³³ These are beneficial conditions for a leap forward; the dominance of "the golden age", bringing the demographic dividend, will precede the stage of ageing. This is experts' vision of the development strategy:

- In the near future (the 2020s) to ensure full employment excluding the search of job abroad (now about 500 thousand people are guest workers), due to the combination of all three sectors of economy;
- In a more distant future, when the industrialization is completed, the economic developments rates slow down and the technical progress reduces labor requirements per unit of output, to carry out the automation, which will replace the physical labor. This will require the promotion of new services, the disclosure of the potential of human capital to ensure employment and growth of innovative economy.

The obvious consequence of the market economy building is the deepening of social stratification. The CPV leadership acknowledges this process to be unavoidable and intends (as a counterbalance) to maintain the rates of poverty reduction according multidimensional index; now the proportion of the population living below the poverty line in PPP (USD3.2 daily) is minimum (4,4 %).³⁴ In town and in the country the poverty rates are respectively 1 % and 6.5 %, so far reflecting a significant gap in living standards between the cities and the countryside.

³² Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2020. *Op. cit.*, p.16. The Congress desired to keep the urban unemployment at the rate of 4 % by 2025: Nghị quyết Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII của Đảng. *Op. cit.* 25.02.2021.

³³ World Population Prospects: The 2020 Revision (2021). UN, Geneva.

³⁴ Ngân hàng Thế giới tại Việt Nam. Tổng Quan về Việt Nam; Nghị quyết Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII của Đảng, 25.02.2021; Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2020. *Op. cit.*, p.17.

Also, the CPV encourages the strengthening of the middle class. According to the strategy, its proportion will grow from 13 % to 26 % by 2026.³⁵ It is difficult to find examples of so crucial shifts in the social structure during a short period, but social inequality will be insignificantly reduced thus. Obviously, no less than a half of the population should be brought to the moderately prosperous level, like the CPC proposed for China. Another measure of support of socially vulnerable layers is the unemployment reduction but due to the effects of the pandemic and the recession, the solution to this problem has slowed down. In 2021 its rate amounted to 3.2 %, and the same proportion of able-bodied citizens are not fully employed.³⁶ Compared with other countries of Southeastern Asia this is a low rate, and in the future, it will not be easy to maintain it.

The course for deepening the world integration

Since the start of reforms policy Vietnam's entering the international market and establishment of beneficial relations with capitalist countries assist to overcome the former international isolation and restrictions for economic development. It has been naturally and efficiently, in the scope of its position, integrated into global value chains.

However, the increase of trade turnover is accompanied with the growing disbalance of the contributions by foreign residents and local companies. This negative phenomenon is typical for the development of both exportation and importation. Last decade trade turnover of the former was 422 % higher, while the growth of the latter was but 137 % (fig. 2). The broadening of the gap between the contribution of local capital and foreign one is a great threat to Vietnam's economy. It is still more dependent on investments and export of foreign companies at the background of low competitiveness of domestic business. Foreign companies will grow on providing new jobs and production volumes, but to some extent. With the improvement of living standards higher labor costs within Vietnam it will be less attractive for external players-donors, and they will transfer the production to new places, like now they are transferred here from China. Therefore, the SRV has to promote its own domestic services sector and capital-intensive production, to prepare high-qualified workforce.³⁷

³⁵ Nghị quyết Đại hội; Triển vọng kinh tế ... It is expected that the upper layer of the middle class will grow especially rapidly — by 17 % annually in the period up to 2045: Đã rõ thời điểm Việt Nam sẽ lọt top 20 nền kinh tế lớn nhất thế giới? *Op. cit.*, 02.10.2022.

³⁶ Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2020. *Op. cit.*, p.16.

³⁷ The economy that COVID-19 could not stop. *The Economist*, 04.09.2021.




Fig. 2. Vietnam merchandise exports growth by the kind of property in 1995—2020, \$bn

Import dynamics is nearly parallel with export and characterized by annual growth, because there is a high demand for foreign goods and services on the domestic consumer market, and the production is mostly based on imported raw materials. This trend will maintain as, according to forecasts, in the near future the domestic consumption will increase by an average of 20 % annually.³⁸

The SRV strategy up to 2045 does not consider objective difficulties and negative consequences of the process. The world economy stagnated also prior to 2022, and with the beginning of a new crisis in Europe it has fallen into a stupor. Vietnam, having given up the reduction of the growth rates, so far avoids significant costs due to diversification of trade links and foreign trade liberalization. However, it will be still more difficult to maintain the increase of the trade turnover and direct investments into the economy in conditions of intensifying competition for natural resources with the key partners (given the natural exhaustion of oil, gas and coal reserves), a spike of world prices of energy, grain and fertilizers. The current threat of the increase in the deficit of food and energy, which definitely will catch up Vietnam, along with the high qualified workforce shortage and other factors, will detain transition to the innovative economy.

³⁸ Ibid.

The natural consequence of the complete integration into the global, pro-Western system is the increasing dependence of Vietnam's economy on the developed countries and TNC. Not only has Vietnam adopted the rules dictated by the systemic partners, but also it has changed a number of strategic development guidelines, such as the cancellation of nuclear energy and the stake on the renewable energy sources, despite their higher prices and inefficiency. In agriculture GMO are widely practiced, while there is a great potential of cultivating eco-friendly products. In the industrial sphere the SRV is a kind of assembly workshop, it retains a number of dirty productions, remaining in the low segment creating value-added chains. The legal regulation of joint projects acknowledges the rule of international law, i.e., TNC's primacy over the national ones, claims for democratization of legislation, challenging the protection of own interests, which can be observed in trade-unions organization and protection of intellectual property. In the finance sphere economy obeys the IMF standards linking it to the US dollar and loans in western banks, fulfilling limiting obligations. In general, Vietnam adopts the Western "rules-based order", which essentially supports the US hegemony worldwide. This order is contrary to Hanoi's adherence to the multipolar world order, sovereign development and independence, which will objectively inhibit the realization of the program of nation-building in the 21st century.

Conclusion

Vietnam is one of the most dynamically and steadily growing world's economies. Neither COVID-19 pandemics, nor the first strikes of the global crisis of 2022 cannot undermine it. This is the evidence of a solid safe margin and the authorities' skillful reaction to new challenges. The important groundwork for the future is "Strategy 2030" vision to 2050, having for the first time defined the ways of development for such a distant perspective. Virtually all the long-term forecasts predict that Vietnam will develop faster than many other countries.

Showing obvious successes under the CPV leadership, Vietnam's economy faces a number of significant difficulties and problems. The global crisis of 2008—2009 and the following sanction war of the Western alliance against Russia and China have revealed the vulnerability of the model, based on technological and finance borrowing. Now it is clear that the conditions of Vietnam's integration into the global market were not equitable nor safeguard the national interests.

The 13th CPV Congress objectively analyzed the new situation and tried to maintain optimism in the country, given the increase of the worldwide

instability. However, some of the planned targets were obviously overestimated. The formulation of threats and response methods to the global risks and challenges, directly addressing the SRV, does not create confidence in the possibility to overcome them, does not properly estimate the contradictions of the current economic system and the way to overcome them.

The analysis of the 13th CPV resolutions, having grounded the continuation of the policy for industrialization and modernization, the growth of the maritime economy reveals possible detains in the renovation of the growth model and restructuring of economy, still lagging behind more developed countries of Southeastern Asia. Thus, the tasks of the transition to the innovative model, of adequate substance and relevance, have too distant deadlines for their realization. The strategy of socio-economic development is ecologically grounded, with “green” guide-lines, but does not properly consider the dangerous for Vietnam consequences of the global climate change up to the mid-century, the difficulties of the transition to the renewable energy sources, and loses sight of the first tectonic shifts of geopolitical nature.

The setting of mutually exclusive dual task of international integration and the creation of independent, self-sufficient economy is contradictory. The greater participation in global sales and production networks, and proper implementation of the recommendations of international finance centers firmly tie Vietnam's economy to TNC and Western partners, weakening its economic sovereignty. Meanwhile, the most important condition of sustainable development, meeting national interests, is the fundamental reduction of the dependence on the foreign capital, non-monopolization by them of the entire sectors and branches of national economy, the avoidance of external control.

In my opinion, the CPV would become stronger, if it concentrated on national interests and active realization of the internal economic potential, at the same time weakening the stake on international factors in conditions of the world leaders' hybrid war in a severe form and on a still wider scale.

Table 2. Relevant and planned indicators of Vietnam's socio-economic development in 2011–2030

Indicator	2011–2015 result	2016–2020 plan	2016–2020 result*	2021–2025 plan	2030 plan
Economic growth, % per year	5,9	6,5–7,0	5,8	6,5–7,0	7,0
GDP average per capita, USD, end of the period	2097 (2015)	3200–3500	2779	4700–5000	7500

Indicator	2011—2015 result	2016—2020 plan	2016—2020 result*	2021—2025 plan	2030 plan
Industrial contribution to GDP, %, total	39 (2015)	~40	37	>40	>40
— processing industry and engineering, %, as a part	16 (2015)	25	20	>25	30
— added value per person in this sector, USD	—	—	>900	—	>2000
Industry and construction growth, % per year	6,9 (2015)	8,0—8,5	7,45	—	—
Contribution of digital economy to GDP, %	—	—	—	20	30
Services contribution to GDP, %	43,5	~45	46	48—50	>50
Services annual growth, average, %	6,3	6,6—7,1	6,2	—	—
Agriculture annual growth, %	3,0	2,5—3,0	2,5	—	—
Export growth, %, annual average	17,5	10	12	—	—
Investment contribution to GDP, % per year	31,7 (2015)	32—34	33,7	32—34	33—35
Contribution of private sector to GDP, %	44	50	45	55	60—65
State budget deficit to GDP, %, end of the period	5,4 (2015)	≤4	3,5 (2019) 4 (2020)	3,7	—
Domestic debt, % GDP	65	62	56	60	50
Foreign debt, % GDP	59	50	47	—	45
Contribution of the TFP** to GDP growth, %	33 (2015)	30—35	36	45	50
Labor productivity growth, % per year	4,3	5	5,9	6,5	6,5
GDP energy intensity, decrease, % per year	0	1—1,5	1,8	—	1—1,5
Urbanization rate, %	32 (2015)	38—40	37	45	>50
Employment in agriculture, % ***	44 (2015)	<40	33	25	<20

Indicator	2011—2015 result	2016—2020 plan	2016—2020 result*	2021—2025 plan	2030 plan
Skilled workforce, %	51,6 (2015)	65—70	64,5	70	—
— with working rank, certificate etc.	20	25	24,5	28—30	35—40
Human development index (UNDP rating)	0,693	0,7	0,704 (2019)	>0,7	>0,7
Urban unemployment, %	3,6 (2015)	≤4	3,9	<4	—
Reduction of greenhouse emissions, % ****	—	—	13	—	9
Access to clean water / 2030 — wastewater utilization, %	82—86 (2015)	90	90	95—100	65—70
Recycling waste materials, %	75 (2015)	85	85	90	98

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2014. *Op. cit.*, p.126, 134, 690, 695; Chiến lược phát triển kinh tế xã hội 2021—2030, in: *Văn kiện Đại hội XIII (2 tập)*, tập 1, tr. 218—261; Báo cáo kết quả phát triển kinh tế xã hội 5 năm (2016—2021) in: *Văn kiện Đại hội XIII*, tập 2, tr. 157—162.

Notes: * Bold is used to highlight the unrealized targets of the Five-Year Plan.

** TFP = total factor productivity.

*** The share in the total numbers of the workforce.

**** Compared with the volume, which could have existed, with no appropriate measures undertaken.

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Chapter 13

DYNAMIC FLEXIBILITY (“LINH HOẠT”) AND THE CPV

The paper explores the hypothesis that dynamic flexibility (‘linh hoạt’) is a characteristic of Communist Party of Vietnam practice. It considers some historical examples, and then discusses how it can be explained by reference to: 1. Vietnamese cultural and linguistic scepticism about the authority of single stated truths; 2. Possible legacies of the past relationships with the CPSU; 3. Objective pressures from historical experiences that encouraged it, and, through relative success, reinforced belief in it. The paper then analyses use of the term in official documents relating to economic policy, an analysis that supports the hypothesis and enriches it. It suggests that issues relating to dynamic flexibility can also be seen in the national experience with COVID-19 in 2020 and 2021. This tends to support the original hypothesis, adding to it that Vietnamese practice sees this as quite normal and so unremarkable, which, from others’ perspectives, it is not.

Keywords: dynamic flexibility, Communist Party of Vietnam, COVID-19.

Introduction

It is likely that for many Vietnamese officials, their tendency to deploy the term ‘linh hoạt’, which I translate here as ‘dynamic flexibility’ — DF — is commonplace, normal, and unremarkable. However, as I will try to show, this can be read to mean that policy statements refer to sets of implementation activities that are varied, and that **these variations do not necessarily imply mistakes, to be criticised**. This obviously has important implications: if not mistakes, then how are such differences to be managed, understood, and explained? It is also, from other perspectives, striking as Communist Parties are generally considered to be authoritarian, like other organisations,

and so require clear compliance with instructions, rather than expecting and so encouraging a range of ways to implement them. Given that mainstream economics deploys determinate models, implying that policy X will lead to results Y, deviation from policy instructions based on such theories should be treated as disobedience and so penalised. Therefore, a culture that as a matter of course accepts deviations and variation as policy is implemented has, perhaps implicitly, a sense of the economic that is different from the mainstream. To put this slightly melodramatically, if Australia was “born modern”¹, then perhaps independent Vietnam has been in some way “born postmodern”.

This issue was studied in Fforde 2017.² This illustrated the point by examining a routine document of the Vietnamese State, using:

... a 15-page official report of the People’s Committee of Ho Chi Minh City (HCM City PC — # 74/BC-UBND 10/7/2009), ... downloaded recently {whilst} ... checking on the history of CPV Central Committee plena 1991 to 2016 (from the VIIth to the XIIth Congresses). It is ... quite unexceptional, framed as a *so ket* (“provisional summing-up?”) of work to “rationalise” renovate (*doi moi*) state-owned enterprises (SOEs) of the city over the period 2001–2008. The document starts by stating the characteristics (*dac diem*) of the city’s SOEs before this work was done. It then discusses how the process of deployment (*trien khai*) of the work was based upon Party resolutions and legal regulations. The construction of specific tasks itself entailed “change in mentality and awareness and resolution in accelerating the reform of the city’s SOEs” (*co su chuyen bien trong tu duy nhan thuc va quyen tam trong viec day nhan tien trinh cai cach doanh nghiep nha nuoc cua Thanh pho* (1). {clearly} ... cognitive change, of which the report is part, is ‘upfront’ considered to be part of the process [48–49].³

Equally clearly, cognitive change here is understood as entailing variations over time and between people in understanding, and this is accepted and treated as, not violations of central instructions, but unremarkable and accepted. Again, this ‘tolerance’ contrasts with views of authoritarian states as requiring and enforcing compliance with directives. It also does not see policy as not so much something that is implemented but deployed. I think

¹ Brown, N. (2005). Born Modern: Antipodean variations on a theme. *The Historical Journal*, 48 (4): 1139–1154.

² Fforde, A. (2017). Vietnamese research practice: some reflections on a sometimes-key component of change. Research Note, ASIEN. *The German Journal on Contemporary Asia*, 145: 45–64.

³ Diacritics are omitted here as they were omitted in Fforde 2017.

this distinction, though not usually made in Vietnamese, can be through the contrasts between “*thực hiện*” and “*triển khai*”.

A recent article in the Home Ministry’s journal “State organisation” looked at this question. It was clear that whilst Party discipline had to be maintained “*cần phải có các hình thức, phương pháp, biện pháp, bước đi hết sức mềm dẻo, linh hoạt mới có thể đạt kết quả*” (“There is a need for forms, methods, means and steps that are supple and dynamically flexible so that results can be obtained”), so that “*người lãnh đạo, quản lý không nhất thiết chỉ duy nhất tập trung thực hiện một nội dung hoạt động nào đó đã được quyết định*” (“So that leaders and managers do not have solely to focus on pre-determined activities”).⁴ Whilst these are only two of 15 uses of DF, the first shows that results depend upon it, and the second that leadership is more than simply implementing an activity **whose content is fixed beforehand**. This is surely underpinned by an implicit acceptance of the malleability of “truth”, resonant of post-modern positions in the West.

For us, this is striking: discipline should require a certain uniformity in implementation of tasks “fixed beforehand”, yet, as we will argue, Luru & Hà argue that any such uniformity needs to be — should be — offset by variation in implementation to secure results (*đạt kết quả*). The data below shows that this tension is managed by the regular and normalised statement in policy documents that implementation should include DF — variations are acceptable, and positive. Results, this suggests, are more important than “correct process”.

This normalisation suggests that DF is indeed mundane, clothed by and hidden within much else. It also suggests that it is understood as essential to securing intent, and, crucially, means that activities need not be fixed beforehand in planning documents etc. This is interesting, given that ruling Communist Parties are generally seen as authoritarian, seeking compliance with instructions and orders from above. And, as already mentioned, the models of mainstream economics, which imply that policy X will lead to results Y, tend to view deviations as mistakes.

An issue in Western policy studies is that policy statements must in some way manage implementation problems. This issue may, though, assume that, **of their nature**, policy statements should be implementable, so that variations in implementation imply mistakes, challenging the validity of policy. Does failure to implement challenge the validity of policy? Or does it imply a failure of discipline? Different practices offer different answers to

⁴ Luru Kiếm Thanh and Hà Quang Thanh (2018). Mô hình lãnh đạo linh hoạt. *Tạp chí Tổ chức Nhà nước*, January 14.

these questions, and these possible answers through interesting light on important issues, such as how policies are replaced by new ones.

Thus, in a seminal work, two well-known American political scientists argued that it was normal, in the US, for the broad generalisations and statement of intent expressed in national policy statements to face major difficulties when, during implementation, they encountered local conditions [Pressman & Wildavsky 1973].⁵ This argues that implementation failures are inevitable; their point is that this is for many unexpected. This places Vietnamese experiences, such as with DF, as of far wider interest.

Other approaches, relevant to the issue of DF, address the issue of how different societies have managed relationships between the inherent generalisations of texts — in this case, policy documents — and realities. Three major contributions are Woodside 2006, Gillespie and Nisbett. The first remarks that:

If the European discussion of the hazards of merit-based political power sometimes reflected a fear of the mob, the political analysis of this topic in the East Asian mandarines, for many centuries, revolved around a fear of the nature of bureaucratically-produced words. The treacheries of written texts ... were repeatedly canvassed.⁶

This suggests that in the “East Asian mandarines” — which include Vietnam — there is a long history of awareness that there was no simple connection between policy and what could be observed “here and there” when it was implemented. This would perhaps be marked in English by referring to policies being deployed rather than implemented. This distinction can also be made in Vietnamese — the contrast between *triển khai* and *thực hiện* — though this seems not to happen often, perhaps as for Vietnamese their resolution of these issues, which I argue implies tolerance for variation and endorsement and support for DF, is unremarkable. Implementation is therefore understood to mean pretty much the same as deployment.

Students of such cultural differences can profitably explore, as the second and third scholars I cite here do, the possibility that much modern Western thinking, likely similarly to the Vietnamese, remains influenced by its historical roots. The core beliefs upon which policy is founded, says

⁵ Pressman, J.L. and Wildavsky, A. (1973) *Implementation: how great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland; or, Why it's amazing that Federal programs work at all, this being a saga of the Economic Development Administration as told by two sympathetic observers who seek to build morals on a foundation of ruined hopes*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

⁶ Woodside, A. (2006) *Lost Modernities; China, Vietnam, Korea and the hazards of world history*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Nisbet, are metaphorical, and so not simply linked to realities. Gillespie also stresses the long history of dominance by the puzzles posed by Western Christianity:

[T]he apparent rejection or disappearance of religion or theology in fact conceals the continuing relevance of theological issues and commitments for the modern age. ... [T]he process of secularisation or disenchantment that has come to be seen as identical with modernity was in fact something different than it seemed . . . *the gradual transference of divine attributes to human beings (an infinite human will), the natural world (universal mechanical causality), social forces (the general will, the hidden hand), and history (the idea of progress) (emphasis added)*.⁷

What actually occurs in the course of modernity is thus not simply the erasure or disappearance of God but the transference of his attributes, essential powers, and capacities to other entities or realms of being. The so-called process of disenchantment is thus also a process of reenchancement in and through which both man and nature are infused with a number of attributes or powers previously ascribed to God. To put the matter more starkly, in the face of the long drawn out death of God, science can provide a coherent account of the whole only by making man or nature or both in some sense divine [Nisbet 1969: 274] .

This contrasts strikingly with Woodside's observations of "East Asia". This suggests an interpretation of Pressman & Wildavsky's surprise at problems of policy implementation, with variations as indicating mistakes, as reflecting religious beliefs, specifically those of monotheistic Christianity, with its notion of revealed Truth (and historical tendency to use violence against heresy).

Nisbet adds to this by offering a longer historical perspective, going back to classical (pre-Christian) norms of knowledge production.

... the principal argument of this book that the metaphor ... {is} much more than adornments of thought and language. {It is} quite inseparable from some of the profoundest currents in Western thought on society and change. They were inseparable in ancient Greek thought and in the thought of the centuries which followed the Greeks; and they remain closely involved in premises and preconceptions regarding the nature of change which we find in contemporary social theory [Nisbet 1969: 8, 9).

These statements from major scholars can be interpreted as suggesting different and very deeply rooted differences between different groups of so-

⁷ Gillespie, M.A. (2008) *The Theological Origins of Modernity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

cieties, and these can be related to the issue of policy implementation. Of course, as Pressman & Wildavsky show, these tensions create responses, and mainstream policy handbooks such as Althaus et al 2017⁸ can be read as suggesting that what the Vietnamese, I argue, find unremarkable in their practice is a normalisation of what much Western scholarship has still to struggle for: policy is not best understood as mainstream economics largely still says it is (use of the best model that says what will lead to what), but as a series of processes.

Crucially, Woodside suggests that the East Asian mandarinal tradition has a legacy of scepticism about relations between policy and implementation — between text and reality. This expects implementation to vary. Somebody who disagrees is then not so easily attacked as a heretic.

In contrast, noting Pressman & Wildavsky’s surprise that they observe that such relations are often if not generally problematic, Gillespie and Nisbet can both be read as suggesting that texts — such as policies — whilst generalising, naturally express something fundamental. Therefore, variations in implementation are “heretical”. Variation in implementation challenges the authority of policy statements. Therefore, as the thrust of Pressman & Wildavsky shows, variation in implementation causes concern as it suggests that policy is incorrect or inadequate.

This paper argues that Vietnamese practice, and its use of DF in texts, confirms Woodside’s position. The CPV and its officials are far less concerned about variation in policy implementation than a Western framing of the issue would expect. Such variation is, far from being seen as a challenge to authority, as something positive, encouraged by deployment of the term *linh hoạt*. This suggests that Vietnamese practice deserves further and comparative study as it is, technically speaking, based implicitly upon a philosophical scepticism that is not surprised that the same policy is implemented differently in different contexts.

Vietnam: intent and policy

The CPV and its subjects seem to manage this issue in three ways:

First, it is useful to distinguish between **intent**, expressed in one sort of document, and **action**, expressed in another — to distinguish between “line” (*đường lối*) or “position” (*chủ trương*) or “point of view” (*quan điểm*) — and “policy” (*chính sách*). The words themselves mark the difference. The latter

⁸ Althaus, C., Bridgman, P., and David, G. (2017) (6th Edition). *The Australian Policy Handbook. A practical guide to the policy making process*. Abingdon: UK.

literally translates as a government document, making the conceptual difference clearer in Vietnamese than English. Ministerial policy departments (the *Vụ Chính sách*) do not make “policy” in the normal English sense; rather they concretise (cụ thể hóa) **intent**.

Second, variation in implementation (such as between localities) is not necessarily an indication of error, necessarily criticized. Rather, it is without conceptual difficulty to be understood as reflecting inescapable local variations, such as in understanding (*hiểu biết*) and mentality (*tu duy*), or that different localities occupy different points in a temporal process (*quá trình*).

Third, whilst such variations are therefore not necessarily errors, they should be positive, reflecting “dynamic flexibility” (*linh hoạt*) by local agents acting to suit local conditions.

This paper therefore focusses upon documents and how they illustrate these points. Whilst this shows how official practice (as expressed textually) addresses, for Vietnamese, manages the issues raised by the major scholarship just cited, this is treated as quite normal and unexceptional. Placed into the context of issues raised by these scholars, however, it is not. I will return to this in our conclusions.

The paper continues with two quick overviews, first of some historical issues, and then possible legacies of the CPV’s relationship with the CPSU. It then presents an analysis of how a sample of Vietnamese policy documents, which contain the terms for dynamic flexibility — “*linh hoạt*” — and economy — “*kinh tế*”, deploy the first term. As already stated, these documents are quite unremarkable and for Vietnamese utterly normal, and so much of what I argue is, naturally, somewhat banal (for them, if not for us). This can be taken to suggest deep culturally-related assumptions.

The 1980s transition: state business

This paper treats the 1980s transition “from plan to market” as marked by powerful “bottom-up” forces associated with commercialisation. This is a contentious position, but the paper does not engage with others that assert that policy was the dominant driver of change. It would seem obvious that cultures that assert that deviations from policy are mistakes will probably adapt slower than others, where deviations can be discussed and assessed without having to manage arguments that they are wrong **because they are deviations**. Thus, acceptance of DF or some equivalent should usually allow for faster rather than slower correction of policy, and for policy corrections that are more robust.

Other research has argued that state owned enterprises (SOEs) in north Vietnam before 1975 were already far more experienced with markets than they were meant to be, if reference is made to the standard textbooks.⁹ These processes, this research argued, then accelerated in 1978–79 with the loss of Chinese and Western aid. Before this had largely been replaced by the large Soviet bloc aid program, policy in early 1981 shifted to indicate limited acceptance of commercial activities. This was then reversed in the early 1980s and then returned to acceptance before the 1986 VIth Party Congress. Soviet technical assistance appears to have been unaware of these processes, advocating instead implementation of the norms of central-planning and so strict restrictions on SOE commercial activities (which were reminiscent of the Kosygin reforms but differed in that they were largely bottom-up rather than policy driven). Further research could then compare how the Kosygin reforms were able to draw upon existing “violations” — what Vietnamese experience could refer to as “fence-breaking” (*phá rào*) or “positive violations” (*vi phạm tích cực*), all markers, like DF, of a tolerance of deviations from strict obedience to policy.

In this context, SOEs varied greatly in their commercial activities, both in extent and their direction. This was clear both from articles published in the press, such as *Nhân Dân*, and from what was learnt from a panel of SOE managers used to research Fforde 2007. Clearly, in this context, whilst attempts were made to assert that variations from policy were mistakes, these coexisted with a far stronger tendency to interpret such variations in ways that allowed for the CPV to avoid excessive internal conflict. After all, even if, as managers argued, the early 1981 policy on SOEs “meant that we did not go to prison”, it also encouraged more conservative SOEs to explore commercialization. And the process both co-existed with the conservative (but likely unknowingly so) Soviet technical assistance and its underlying power — after all, as the discussions showed, it was economically progressive, creating higher output and real wages for SOE workers, and it led to the already-mentioned return of policy to support it before the 1986 VIth Congress. Fforde 2007 and 2021a show clearly that this process was eased by the strong tendencies, as Woodside put it, for scepticism: policies were more deployed (*triển khai*) than implemented (*thực hiện*).

Of course, SOE managements and their superior organs — whether central Ministries or local government departments — were all staffed by

⁹ Fforde, A. (2007) *Vietnamese State Industry and the Political Economy of Commercial Renaissance: Dragon's tooth or curate's egg?* Oxford: Chandos.

Fforde, A. (2021a) A public affair? Vietnam's State enterprise sector: the 'State Business Interest' and policy history. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 73 (3): 559–581.

Party members. The extent to which their activities were or were not strictly in compliance with policy varied. Policy also varied in its stance towards commercialisation. Fforde 2020 argues that the CPV was influenced by changes in the CPSU after the death of Stalin, so checks and balances were built-in by allowing variation in views. Thus, analyses such as Whitefield 1993 argued that the Kosygin reforms failed because, in contrast to Vietnam, state business interests were relatively weak. The corollary of this was that variations in policy implementation could not too strongly be asserted to reveal mistakes: if two SOEs were doing different things, this did not necessarily imply that one was in error. Further research is likely profitable here.

Evidence from official documents — 'linh hoạt' and 'kinh tế'

A sample of relevant documents

The online source Thuvienphapluat (<https://thuvienphapluat.vn/>) — TVPL — is free and contains over a quarter of a million documents. It seems to be a modern development of the old paper-based Official Gazette (*Công Báo*) published since before 1975 in Hanoi, and which now exists at central (<http://congbao.chinhphu.vn/>) and local levels (for example, for Ho Chi Minh City — <http://www.congbao.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/> and Tuyen Quang province — <http://congbao.tuyenquang.gov.vn/>). All seem to be searchable through their websites and all are free and open access. This provides massive amounts of information on how broad issues are managed through such specific documents. Arguably, this of itself, by given easy access to local variations, reflects the underlying views of the world that DF also indicates. TVPL contains documents issued by many state bodies (central and local) as well as Party organs such as the Politburo. The documents appear to be simply those used by officials, as they are signed and sealed by the relevant authority. They usually contain a list for their distribution, naming offices and organisations and where it is to be archived (*truu*).

A search (22nd September 2021) of TVPL for documents containing “*linh hoạt*” using the international convention “” to request the phrase, gave 5641 entries, and for “*kinh tế*” gave 114768. Searching for both gave 4754. This was for the entire period covered — 21st September 1941 to the search date. Narrowing the period (of promulgation — *ban hành* — to start with 1st January 1976 (as a proxy for reunification) gave 4711 and starting with 1st January 1987 (as a proxy for the *Đổi mới* period) gave 4654. The selected documents appeared not to be ordered according to date of promulgation.

A decision was taken to sample every hundredth document, giving a sample of 46, and these were downloaded in the Word document format (the ‘*tài văn bản tiếng Việt*’ option) and then examined.

The sample: some examples

Note: Only the first reference to DF is reported for each document if there is more than one. For reasons of space, and because the use of DF does not seem to vary much, I give only two examples.¹⁰

- Ủy ban nhân dân tỉnh Yên Bái (Yên Bái People’s Committee), 2021, # 492/QĐ-UBND, *Quyết định về việc phê duyệt kịch bản tăng trưởng kinh tế tỉnh yên Bái năm 2021* (Resolution on the approval of the economic growth scenario for 2021), Yên Bái, 24/3/2021 (“*Trong bối cảnh dịch Covid-19 còn diễn biến phức tạp, các cấp, các ngành, địa phương, đơn vị căn cứ nhiệm vụ được giao tổ chức triển khai thực hiện theo hướng linh hoạt; tranh thủ các điều kiện và cơ hội thuận lợi trong từng thời điểm của năm để quyết tâm hoàn thành và hoàn thành vượt mức các mục tiêu, chỉ tiêu ...*” (Whilst COVID-19 is still evolving in complicated ways, {everybody} must, based upon their allocated tasks, organise deployment and implementation in a DF direction; they must make use of conditions and useful opportunities during the year to resolutely meet and exceed goals and targets ...) [2]).

- Hội đồng Nhân dân tỉnh Quảng Ninh (Quảng Ninh People’s Committee), 2017, *Nghị quyết về kế hoạch phát triển kinh tế — xã hội 5 năm giai đoạn 2021—2025* (Resolution on the 5 year socio-economic development plan for 2021—2025), Quảng Ninh, 9/12/2020 (“*Tiếp tục quán triệt sâu sắc và vận dụng sáng tạo, linh hoạt các quan điểm của Đảng về “đối tác”, “đối tượng” tạo thế đan xen lợi ích*” — “Continue to properly grasp and use, creatively and with DF the Party’s points of view on “partners” and “subjects” to secure a situation of interlocking interests”) (20).

The sample is, like many of the documents in TVPL, “mundane”. These texts deal with the work of government at various levels, here relating to economic matters, and so shows what is “normal”, if not humdrum. This is what was hoped for. Logically, DF can be applied in three situations: in implementing intention from “above” the agency, such as a Party line; in implementing a strategy of the agency; and in implementing a task allocated by the agency. All three can be found. This mirrors closely language in different contexts: the use of DF to respond to and support stated intention: here in this threefold language — of the Party (as a national body), of the local

¹⁰ The full list is available from the author on request.

state (which is itself directly led by the local Party) and of the local agency, as expressed in a task. This does not seem to throw up much variation in how the word DF is used.

Examination of the mentions of DF shows clearly that policy statements encourage and require dynamic flexibility (*linh hoạt*) in implementation. The goal is to meet targets; results are given higher importance than process, and so variations are actively encouraged.

Conclusion

The way these documents use the term *linh hoạt* shows it deeply embedded in how the CPV and its officials work. If there is a central Party “line”, then we can see how this intent is to be managed by local agencies in way that stipulates DF. If the local state agency states intent as a strategy, then this is to be managed by the local state organs with DF. If it states intent as a task, then this is to be implemented with DF. The term is treated as mundane if not humdrum. Yet it means that variations in how a particular intention is reflected in action are quite acceptable, so long as they contribute to securing the goals of that intention.

This fits with Woodside’s views of the shared historical scepticism of countries with traditions of “East Asian mandarinates”. It also supports a sense that Pressman & Wildavsky’s surprise at implementation problems on the one hand was not unexpected, if looked at through an “East Asian” lens — and quite expected, if looked at through the concerns of Nisbet and Gillespie, with their warnings about the assumptions behind the languages through which intention was articulated.

It follows from this, that we see in these practices the view that it is the ‘spirit’ of the document, which expresses intent, not its “form”, that is important. Therefore, in judging actions the central issue is not whether the letter of the document is followed, but whether it contributes to attaining intent. The quote from Lru & Hà, 2021, above puts it clearly: results are more important than process.

This, it would appear, is also why “formalism” is criticized so readily (*hình thức thôi*). A Google search for “*chéng chủ nghĩa hình thức*” (against formalism) turns up various “cheat sheets” for Vietnamese studying for their examinations in Marxism-Leninism, which tend to be highly pragmatic. To quote from material from Nguyễn Trãi University:

... trong hoạt động nhận thức và thực tiễn cần chống khuynh hướng tách rời nội dung khỏi hình thức cũng như tách hình thức khỏi nội dung (... in activities of realisation and practice one needs to avoid separating content from

form as well as separating form from content). *Phải biết sử dụng sáng tạo nhiều hình thức khác nhau trong hoạt động thực tiễn* (one must know how to creatively use different forms in practical activities). *Bởi lẽ, cùng một nội dung có thể thể hiện dưới nhiều hình thức khác nhau* (this is because different contents can appear in different forms); *đồng thời, phải chống chủ nghĩa hình thức*. ... (at the same time, **one must be opposed to formalism**). *Vì nội dung quyết định hình thức, nhưng hình thức có ảnh hưởng quan trọng tới nội dung* (This is because whilst content determines form, at the same time form has important influences upon content) (stress added).¹¹

The apparent confusion here is interesting, but it confirms that DF can be important without those using the term recognising its significance. For us, its significance is that it reflects a philosophical scepticism, a tendency not to think that disagreement reflects error, and so tolerance. This suggests that it is likely to resist change and remain normalised. But whilst this tolerance may seem clear within the formal methods through which the Party and its officials “do things”, it clearly also coexists within other more authoritarian tendencies — perhaps why it is so often mentioned. Such tendencies within the Party are discussed clearly by authors such as Huy Đức.¹² They are also present in relations between officials and the public. Finally, it is I think important to re-examine the possibility that some of these Vietnamese practices bear some relationship to the historical interactions between Soviet citizens and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the CPV, both before and after the death of Stalin. Again, I leave this to others.

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¹¹ Nguyễn Trãi University (2021). *Chuyên đề 1: Những vấn đề cơ bản của chủ nghĩa duy vật biện chứng* (Giảng viên: TS Phạm Bá Khoa — Giảng viên cao cấp). Retrieved on 27.09.2021 from URL: <http://daihocnguyentrai.edu.vn/de-cuong-chuyen-de-1-chu-nghia-mac-lenin>

¹² Fforde, A. (2021b). A Vietnamese insider discusses the origins of the 1968 Tet Offensive — what is he trying to tell us? *Azja-Pacyfik*, 21: 179—188.

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Chapter 14

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN ENSURING HUMAN RIGHTS IN VIETNAM AS SEEN BY THE CPV

The article analyzes the relationship between social security and human rights assurance in Vietnam. This is based on data from the resolutions issued by the Communist Party of Vietnam through different congresses, the possible policies of the State in the system of building social security towards ensuring human rights. The article focuses on three main contents: The viewpoints and policies of the Party and State on social welfare towards ensuring human rights in Vietnam; the process of implementing policies and views and its results; and proposal of some solutions to contribute to better implementation of policies on social security associated with human rights in Vietnam.

Keywords: social security, human rights, Vietnam.

The view of the Communist Party of Vietnam on the role of social security

Ensuring social security is identified by the Communist Party of Vietnam as an important task and an integral part of the system of guidelines and policies that contribute to the guarantee of human rights, socio-political stability, creating a basis for socio-economic development to help the country develop fast and steadily and integrate internationally. The basic function of social security is to ensure human rights, according to the International Labor Organization (ILO): “Social security is a protection that society provides to its members through a number of measures are widely applied to help individuals cope with economic and social difficulties, shocks, loss or decrease in income sources caused by sickness, maternity,

labor injury, loss of labor ability or death. Social Security provides medical care and support to families of victims with children” (ILO-1984).¹ Recognizing the importance of the right to social security, Vietnam has built and continued to perfect the legal system on social security in the direction of approaching human rights and sustainable development. Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2013) states the people’s right to social security as follows: “Citizens have the right to social security” (article 34); “The State creates equality in opportunities so that citizens can enjoy social benefits and it develops a social security system” (Article 59). In Resolution No. 15-NQ / TW dated June 1, 2012 of the 11th Party Central Committee named “Some issues on social policy for the period 2012–2020” also sets out requirements to ensure social security as a regular and important task of the Party, the State, the whole political system and the whole society.

Some main orientations of the Communist Party of Vietnam towards social security for all citizens can be shown through the following contents:

First, policies have to create new jobs, increase income for the people and reduce poverty. The policy to solve unemployment and income problems for people is the mainstay of the social security policy. The 12th Congress clearly stated: “Create opportunities for people to work and improve their income. Ensure wages, equal income, and adequate living conditions for people to reproduce labor power. Encourage social investment to create more jobs, improve the quality of vocational education. Develop and improve system policies on wages and salaries, and mechanisms to amend previous flawed policies. Adjust vocational training policies, link training with practical application”.² These are the directions for the main risk management policies and the pillars of social security system to help all classes of people work, earn income, and have the necessary material capacity to best deal with risks in society. On the other hand, hunger eradication and poverty reduction are considered as one of the important contents in management of social security. The Party has issued many master programs and management policies for hunger eradication and poverty reduction. In the Resolution of the 12th National Congress, it is clearly stated: “Strive for sustainable poverty reduction, especially for regions with special difficulties and with specific policies to reduce poverty faster among ethnic minorities. Focus on solutions to create favourable conditions and encour-

¹ Nguyễn Hải Hữu (2012). *Giáo trình Nhập môn an sinh xã hội*. Hà Nội: Nxb Lao động, tr. 48.

² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2016). *Văn kiện Đại hội Đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XII*. Hà Nội: Nxb Chính trị quốc gia, tr. 137.

rage the poor and near-poor to strive to get out of poverty sustainably by themselves”.³

Second, implement good insurance policies for the people. Insurance policy is the mainstay of the social security system, helping people to lesson burden in old age, accidents, pain, and unemployment. Our Party has had many guidelines in insurance policy: Directive No. 38-CT/TW dated September 7, 2009 of the Secretariat on Promoting the work of medical insurance in the new situation; Resolution No. 15-NQ/TW dated June 1, 2012 of the 5th Hanoi Party Committee of the 11th Party Central Committee on “Some social policy issues for the period 2012—2020”; Resolution No. 21-NQ/TW dated November 22, 2012 of the Politburo on “Strengthening the Party’s leadership on social insurance and health insurance for the period 2012—2020”. At the 12th National Congress, the Party continued to assert: “Develop and implement well policies on social insurance, unemployment insurance, and occupational accident insurance”, “Expand the range of participants, improve the efficiency of the system, reform the financial mechanism, ensure sustainable development of the social insurance fund”⁴. These are identified as orientations for insurance policies to further promote the role of risk reduction in social security policies.

Third, expand and improve the effectiveness of social assistance work for vulnerable groups. Vietnam is a country that has experienced many wars to protect itself, and is heavily affected by natural disasters and climate change; it is also in the process of implementing industrialization and modernization, so the number of people in need of social assistance in Vietnam is very large. Social assistance has a very important role and meaning, ensuring for social members when they encounter risks that they cannot overcome by themselves. Therefore, for many years, the Communist Party of Vietnam has paid great attention to social assistance work. The 12th Party Congress clearly stated: “Continue to perfect policies, encourage community participation, and improve the effectiveness of social assistance work”.⁵ In addition, there is a request “to switch from humanitarian assistance to ensuring citizens’ social security rights”, which affirms the Party and State’s concern for human rights.

Fourth, ensure the provision of essential basic social services for the people.

³ Ibid, tr. 300.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

About the guarantee of minimum education. The Party pays great attention to the development of education and training, supporting people with minimum educational qualifications, enhancing the quality of human resources, meeting the requirements of industrialization and modernization of the country, and forming a learning society, creating opportunities and favourable conditions for all citizens to pursue lifelong learning. The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 2013 stipulates: “Citizens have the right and obligation to study” (Article 39).⁶ On that basis, the 13th Party Congress assessed: “The policy of fundamental and comprehensive reform of education and training has been actively implemented, and started to take effect. The network of education and training institutions continues to expand in size. Education and training in disadvantaged areas and ethnic minority areas are given more attention”.⁷

On the issue of minimum medical insurance. The Party leads the nation's healthcare system to ensure that everyone enjoys primary health care services, especially the disadvantaged groups, implements universal health insurance; expands access to and use of high-quality health services; make sure people can live in a safe community, develop well physically and mentally, reduce disease rates, improve physical fitness, increase life expectancy, and improve population quality. Resolution No. 20-NQ/TW dated October 25, 2017, the Sixth Conference of the 12th Party Central Committee on strengthening the protection, care and improvement of people's health in the new situation, stated: “Improve the quality of medical examination, treatment and rehabilitation at all levels. Focus on primary health care. Improve the network of medical facilities, especially in mountainous, border and island areas, increase the number of health workers for rural, mountainous, border and island areas. At the same time, continue to ensure equity, reduce new disparities in people's access to healthcare services between localities and target groups”.⁸ Focusing on investing in mountainous, remote, coastal, and island provinces will reinforce the infrastructure, medical equipment and human resources, and ensure equal access to healthcare for the people.

⁶ Hiến pháp nước Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam (2013). URL: <http://moj.gov.vn>

⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 62.

⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2017). Nghị quyết số 20-NQ/TW ngày 25/10/2017, Hội nghị lần thứ sáu Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khóa XII về tăng cường công tác bảo vệ, chăm sóc và nâng cao sức khỏe nhân dân trong tình hình mới. URL: <http://Dangcong-san.vn>

Regarding social housing assurance, social housing development is one of the important contents of socio-economic development policies; the State promulgates policies to promote the development of the housing market, and simultaneously adopt policies to support housing for social policy beneficiaries, low-income people and the poor facing housing difficulties in order to contribute to political stability and ensure social security. The National Assembly and Government of Vietnam have promulgated many mechanisms and policies to develop social housing to support housing for disadvantaged and low-income people in both urban and rural areas. These policies include the Law on Housing 2014 and Decree No. 100/2015/ND-CP dated October 20, 2015 on development and management of social housing. In particular, on January 25, 2017, the Prime Minister issued Directive No. 03/CT-TTg on promoting the development of social housing.

It can be seen that, in the process of leading the revolution, the Communist Party of Vietnam pays great attention to leading the implementation of social security to prevent, limit and overcome risks, ensure income security and a good life for members of society. The views of the Party are an important orientation for social security policies to be incorporated into people's lives.

Results of implementation of policies on social security to ensure human rights in Vietnam

Results

First, about policies to create jobs, increase incomes and reduce poverty. Policies to support job creation through the National Employment Fund, the Fund for the Poor, preferential credit policies, vocational education, vocational training, and job placement have made important contributions to ensuring a high percentage of employment (over 77 % of the population aged 15 years and over are employed) and sustainable poverty reduction. In the period 2010—2020, our country always maintained a low unemployment rate (from 2—3 %) and belonged to the group of countries with low unemployment rate in the world. The average income of employees has improved, increasing by an average of 8.7 % per year in the period 2013—2018⁹. The National Target Program on Sustainable Poverty Reduction was effectively implemented, focusing on the poorest districts and communes with special difficulties. The movement “The whole country

⁹ Tổng cục Thống kê (2018). *Báo cáo tình hình kinh tế — xã hội quý IV và năm 2018*. Ban hành ngày 27/12/2018. URL: <http://gso.gov.vn>.

joins hands for the poor — leaving no one behind” has achieved many positive results. The rate of poor households decreased rapidly from 11.76 % in 2011 (according to the poverty line standard in the period 2011—2015) to 3.75 % in 2019 (according to the poverty line standard in the period 2016—2020), an average decrease of more than 1.3 % per year. The poverty reduction efforts of the Vietnamese Government were highly appreciated by the international community.

Second, the policy of social insurance and health insurance has been supplemented and revised, which has expanded the people's opportunities to participate and benefit from, and sustainably ensured the sustainability of insurance funds. Social insurance has covered most of the labor force, according to three major policy groups: compulsory social insurance, voluntary social insurance and unemployment insurance. The proportion of people in the labor age in the labor force who participate in social insurance increased from 21.8 % in 2011 to 32 % in 2019. In particular, voluntary social insurance in the whole period 2008—2018 only attracted more than 270 thousand participants, but by the end of 2019, the number increased to 545 thousand people. “The proportion of people in the labor age in the labor force who participate in unemployment insurance increased from 17.1 % in 2011 to over 27 % in 2019. The whole country has 85.6 million people participating in health insurance, accounting for 90 % of the population in 2019, basically covering the entire population”.¹⁰ Social insurance and health insurance have become an important social safety net, supporting people to overcome the risks of illness, work accident, occupational disease, maternity, unemployment, and end of working age. Currently, the whole country has over 3.1 million people enjoying monthly pension and social insurance allowance; each year, the Social Insurance Fund pays benefits for sickness, maternity, occupational accidents and occupational diseases for 6 to 10 million people. In 2019, the Health Insurance Fund paid for 186 million turns of medical examination and treatment with health insurance at a cost of VND 100 trillion.

Third, social assistance work for vulnerable groups follows a human rights-based, human-centered approach. The scope and beneficiaries of social assistance were expanded and the social allowance money was increased, contributing to stabilizing the lives of disadvantaged people. The number of people receiving monthly social benefits via cash payment increased from nearly 1.7 million people in 2011 (accounting for 1.9 % of the po-

¹⁰ Bảo hiểm xã hội Việt Nam (2018). *Bảo hiểm y tế khẳng định những bước tiến vững chắc*. Retrieved on January 23, 2020 from URL: <http://baohiemxahoi.gov.vn>

pulation) to more than 2.9 million people in 2019 (accounting for 3 % of the population). Urgent social assistance policies could timely support people at risk due to natural disasters such as floods, storms, droughts, extreme cold, harmful cold, and other causes. In the period of 2012–2019, the Government supported more than 343 thousand tons of rice (to relieve hunger in the between-crop period and on the occasion of the Lunar New Year every year) for about 18.4 million people who lacked food; and supported more than 3,700 billion VND for localities to assist people in overcoming the consequences of natural disasters. On the other hand, public and non-public social support establishments have basically met the needs of nurturing and taking care of social protection beneficiaries. There are 425 social assistance establishments (191 public establishments and 234 non-public establishments) that nurture and care for more than 41 thousand people nationwide.¹¹

Fourth, the system of basic and essential social services is guaranteed, creating favorable conditions for people to access and enjoy.

About universal education: the goals were completed from preschool to lower secondary school; 99 % of children went to school at the right age at primary level from 2015, and the number was over 90 % at lower secondary level since 2014, contributing to an increase in the literacy rate of people aged 15 years and over, which was over 97 %. Children in difficult circumstances, children with disabilities are cared for, assisted timely, and supported to integrate into the community. In 2018, 70 % of children with learning disabilities had access to inclusive education and learning at schools. Programs and policies to support education for children of poor households, ethnic minorities and disadvantaged areas have been effectively implemented. In the 2017–2018 school year, more than 520,000 students received rice support and more than 1,800 billion VND of lunch support was given to students in extremely difficult communes and villages.¹²

The grassroots health system and preventive health care have helped to improve the opportunities for people to access and enjoy health services, especially in remote, isolated and ethnic minority areas. By the end of 2018, 98.4 % of communes had health stations; 96.0 % of villages and hamlets had village health workers, 90 % of communes had doctors, 76 % of communes met the National Criteria for Commune Healthcare in the period 2011–

¹¹ Việt Nam hướng đến xây dựng một hệ thống an sinh xã hội bền vững (2021). *Tạp chí Cộng sản*, January 6.

¹² Hội đồng Lý luận Trung ương (2020). *Chương trình giảm nghèo bền vững ở Việt Nam: Thực trạng và giải pháp*. Retrieved on September 27, 2021. n

2020, and over 95 % of communes had obstetrician-gynecologists or midwives. The network of reproductive health care services was consolidated and developed, covering 100 % of districts, 93 % of communes, and 96 % of villages. In addition, preventive healthcare plays a decisive role in preventing dangerous diseases and preventing major epidemics from occurring. The model of military-civilian combination has been promoted and brought about full effect. “The rate of children under 1 year of age who are fully immunized is high, from 96 % to 98 %; the percentage of children under 5 years old with underweight malnutrition gradually decreased from 16.2 % in 2012 to 12.7 % in 2018 and is estimated at 12 % in 2020”.¹³

Housing for disadvantaged and vulnerable groups has been implemented in accordance with the actual conditions of the country; policy to support poor households with housing difficulties was implemented, in the period 2011—2015, 531,000 poor households were supported. In the 2016—2018 period, the policy continued to support 89,378 poor households to borrow loans to build houses, and it is expected that by 2020 it will support for about 144,000 poor households to borrow loans for housing. From the mobilization and sponsorship of businesses, communities, and political and social organizations, 332,229 houses were built and repaired for the poor and people in difficult circumstances. “By the end of 2018, the whole country had completed 198 social housing projects with more than 81,700 apartments with an area of over 4,085,000 square meters for low-income people. Currently we are continuing to implement 226 projects, with about 182,200 apartments and an area of about 9,110,000 m²”.¹⁴

The achievements of social security in the past years have contributed to the realization of the concept of putting people as the center and no one being left behind in the development process. The results of the implementation of the social security policy have made an important contribution to the efforts to develop Vietnamese people in terms of economy, education, health, and happiness.

Some shortcomings and limitations in the process of implementing policies on social security

First, the coverage of the social security system is not high, and the range of beneficiaries is still narrow. The proportion of the labor force part-

¹³ Chương trình tiêm chủng mở rộng. *Thành quả tiêm chủng mở rộng*.

¹⁴ Bộ Xây dựng (2020). *Nhà ở xã hội ở Việt Nam góc nhìn từ các cơ chế chính sách*. Retrieved on August 4, 2020 from URL: <http://moc.gov.vn>

icipating in social insurance is still low because the solutions to expand the subjects are not really effective. The Social Insurance Fund is not sustainable, and social insurance debt is still common. The scale and quality of basic social service provision is not high, especially in rural, mountainous and ethnic minority areas.

Second, the subject of implementing social security is still the State, while as a developing country, Vietnam still has limited resources to implement social security policies. Moreover, the level of support is still low, not meeting the minimum living needs while some beneficiaries still rely on the support policy of the State. The participation of the community and society is not strong and diverse, and there are not enough people in the group of social security policy workers, and their quality is not good enough.

Third, the results of poverty reduction are not sustainable, the gap between the rich and the poor is increasing, leading to an increase in absolute inequality between the rich and the poor; and the development also gap between regions and population groups has not been narrowed. The poverty rate is high among ethnic minorities living in remote, isolated and extremely difficult areas.

Fourth, the state management of social security still has many shortcomings in the formulation and implementation of policies, laws and social security programs in a new direction. There is still overlapping work or the work is scattered among many ministries and branches. In addition, administrative reforms related to social security still have many barriers, causing difficulties for beneficiaries to access. Also, the national database system on social security is incomplete and slow to update.

Some solutions to contribute to the implementation of social security to ensure human rights in the coming time

First, the government should continue to communicate and raise awareness in the political system and the people about the responsibility to implement the current social security policy with specific, practical programs with diverse and substantial content. Advanced scientific and technological achievements should be applied so that people understand about the nature, content and orientation of social security, thereby making positive changes in the participation process.

Second, a national strategy on social security to respond to the new situation should be studied and drafted on the basis of summarizing and evaluating the implementation of Resolution No. 15-NQ/TW dated June 10,

2012, the 5th Conference of the Party Central Committee (XI term) on a number of social policy issues for the period 2012–2020. This is the basis for proposals, supplements and adjustments for the period 2021–2030 with new views, contents, strategic orientations and solutions on social security.

Third, the social security model should be continuously institutionalized according to a new approach, on the basis of additional adjustments to existing legal documents related to the 5 pillars of social security (Law on Employment, Law on Social Insurance, Law on the Elderly, Law on People with Disabilities). Besides, a number of new laws on social assistance and social work should be drafted to create a basis for building Law on social security.

Fourth, the social security model should be innovated in the direction of increasing support for some social groups that need special assistance through the implementation of the national target program on social security for the period of 2021–2030. Accordingly, the focus is on: “1. Supporting sustainable poverty reduction for workers and poor households; 2. Taking care of children with special circumstances; 3. Taking care of people with severe disabilities; 4. Caring for the elderly with special difficulties; 5. Supporting the development of the social work profession”.¹⁵

Fifth, obstacles in management and investment financial mechanism for social security should be removed. The functions and tasks of units related to social security should be restructured in the direction of centralization and unity in terms of state management. The Government ensures the investment budget for the implementation of social security policies and programs. On the other hand, decentralization to the locality should be the focus in order to promote the activeness and initiative in the management and implementation of social security policies and programs at the grassroots level.

Good implementation of social security contributing to ensuring human rights is a long-term process and is influenced by many objective and subjective factors. In order to effectively carry out this important task, in addition to the political determination of the Party and the State, each citizen needs to raise their awareness of their responsibility and sense of self-discipline when participating in socio-economic activities, and constantly strive towards “self-security”, which contributes to the successful implementation of the task of national construction and defense.

¹⁵ Nguyễn Hữu Dũng (2020). Tiếp tục hoàn thiện mô hình an sinh xã hội: cách tiếp cận dựa trên quyền con người gắn với phát triển bền vững. *Tạp chí Cộng sản*, số 945, tháng 7, tr. 56–61.

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Nguyễn Hải Hữu (2012). *Giáo trình Nhập môn an sinh xã hội* Nguyen Hai Huu. *Introduction to Social Security*. Hà Nội: Nxb Lao động.

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Chapter 15

THE CPV'S LEADING ROLE IN CULTURAL BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT DURING 35 YEARS OF *DOI MOI*

In the past thirty-five years of renovation (1986—2021), Vietnam has achieved “great and historically significant achievements that crystallize the creativity of the Party and our people, affirming the way our country's rise to socialism is in line with Vietnam's reality and the development trend of the times; affirms that the correct leadership of the Party is the leading factor determining the victory of the Vietnamese revolution”.¹ In cultural development, the results achieved in recent years are partly due to the correct leadership of the Party. Therefore, evaluate the Party's leadership in culture during the past 35 years of renovation as a way of looking back at the past to look to the future.

Not until *Doi moi*, but during the struggle for national independence, our Party saw the importance of leadership in the cultural field. In the cultural outline of 1943, our Party affirmed: “Only by leading the Party's cultural movement can public opinion be influenced, the Party's propaganda will be effective”.² The reason why the Party led the country to win many victories in the struggle for national independence is partly because the Party has led well in the field of culture, built the fighting spirit and sacrificed for the revolution, for the sake of the revolution. country among the masses. In the current renewal process, the Party must lead better in this field because in terms of freedom of thought, in the transition to socialism and international expansion, on the basis of Internet development, many

¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 1. tr. 104.

² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2001). *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*. Hanoi: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 7, tr. 316.

cultural products containing different ideologies including socialism, capitalism and even pre-capitalism exist, it is necessary to strengthen the leadership of the Communist Party to ensure socialist orientation in the development of Vietnamese culture.

Keywords: Communist Party, Vietnam, *Doi moi*, culture, development.

The Party leads culture through the Platform, guidelines and resolutions

To be able to effectively lead in the cultural field, the Party must develop a correct and comprehensive cultural development policy. In the context of the transition from the previous period of bureaucracy, subsidy and closure to the period of industrialization, modernization, market economy development and international integration, the Party's cultural line there must be innovation. Therefore, in the past 35 years of *Doi moi*, the Party has constantly developed theoretical thinking to build cultural guidelines. The Party has issued about 30 different resolutions and directives in the field of culture to lead the construction and development of Vietnamese culture. In which, there are two important resolutions that are considered as the Party's cultural development strategy in the *doi moi* period, which is the Resolution of the 5th Party Central Committee, term VIII (July 1998) "On building and developing the culture of Vietnam advanced, imbued with national identity" when Vietnam has just entered the market economy and international integration and the 9th Party Central Committee, term XI (Resolution 33-NQ/TW) "On building and developing develop Vietnamese culture and people to meet the requirements of sustainable development of the country" when Vietnam has developed a stronger market economy and deepened and comprehensively integrated into the world.

In order to lead the development of Vietnamese culture, our Party has given 5 guiding viewpoints in the development of Vietnamese culture, which is basically the agreement between the Resolution of the 5th Central Committee, term VIII and the Resolution of the 9th Party Central Committee, term XI. That is: Culture is the spiritual foundation of society, the goal and the driving force for sustainable development of the country. Culture must be put on an equal footing with economy, politics and society; Building an advanced Vietnamese culture imbued with national identity, unified in the diversity of the Vietnamese ethnic community, with national, humanistic, democratic and scientific characteristics; Developing culture for the perfection of human personality and building people for cul-

tural development. In building culture, the focus is on building people with good character and lifestyle, with basic characteristics: patriotism, kindness, affection, honesty, solidarity, industriousness, and brilliance, creativity; Building a synchronous cultural environment, focusing on the role of family and community. Harmonious development between economy and culture; should pay full attention to cultural and human factors in economic development; Cultural construction and development is the cause of the entire people led by the Party and State, managed by the State, the people are the creative subjects, the intellectuals play an important role. At the same time, our Party also set out 6 tasks to develop Vietnamese culture and people, which are building Vietnamese people to develop comprehensively; building a healthy cultural environment; culture building in politics and economy; Improve the quality and efficiency of cultural activities; cultural industry development goes hand in hand with building and perfecting the cultural market; actively integrate into international culture, continue to the quintessence of human culture.

The Party leadership institutionalizes guidelines into legal documents

Institutionalizing the Party's views and guidelines on culture into laws and state policies is an important way to ensure the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam over culture. Before 1986, there were very few legal documents on culture, mostly circulars, directives and guidelines.

In the past 35 years of *Doi moi*, a series of legal documents related to cultural areas have been promulgated. For example, in the field of conservation and promotion of cultural heritage, we have the Law on Heritage; In the field of performing arts, to protect performers and producers, we have the Intellectual Property Law and the Cinema Law. In addition to the legal system, the Government's circulars, decrees and regulations related to the field of art are also issued to recognize, evaluate and honor the outstanding contributions of individuals and organizations to the field of art. with the development of the nation's art scene. Typical documents can be mentioned such as: Decree No. 251-CP dated 12/6/1981 of the Government Council on Ho Chi Minh Prize and State award; Ordinance No. 16/LCT/HDNN dated June 4, 1985 of the State Council regulating the Ho Chi Minh award and the State award; Decree No. 90/2014/ND-CP dated September 29, 2014 of the Government on “Ho Chi Minh Prize”, “State Prize” on literature and art (amended and supplemented in 2018 according to Decree No. 133/2018/ND-CP dated October 1, 2018 of the Government); Decree No.

89/2014/ND-CP dated September 29, 2014 of the Government providing for the consideration and award of the title “People's Artist”, “Excellent Artist”; Decree No. 144/2020/ND-CP dated December 14, 2020 of the Government regulating performing arts activities etc.

Regarding other cultural activities such as organizing festivals, weddings and funerals, there is the Law on Belief and Religion 2016, Decree No. 110/2018/ND-CP dated August 29, 2018 of the Government regulating on festival management and organization; Directive No. 14/1998/CT-TTg dated March 28, 1998 of the Prime Minister on the implementation of a civilized lifestyle in weddings, funerals and festivals; Decision No. 308/2005/QĐ-TTg dated 25/11/2005 of the Prime Minister promulgating the Regulation on implementation of civilized lifestyle in weddings, funerals and festivals; Directive No. 05/CT-TTg dated February 9, 2018 of the Prime Minister on promoting the implementation of a civilized lifestyle in marriage, mourning etc. The timely introduction of the above policies has contributed contribute to making people's spiritual and cultural life healthier and richer.

Regarding tourism activities, including cultural tourism, the State has promulgated the Law on Tourism. In addition, the Government has also issued many important policies, creating resources for tourism development, such as: Resolution No. 92/NQ-CP dated December 8, 2014 of the Government on a number of solutions to promote tourism development. developing Vietnam's tourism in the new period; Decision No. 1861/QĐ-TTg dated November 23, 2017 of the Prime Minister approving the target program for tourism infrastructure development for the period 2016—2020, Decision No. 49/2018/QĐ-TTg dated 12/12/2018 of the Prime Minister approving the Charter of organization and operation of the tourism development support fund; Decision No. 1685/QĐ-TTg dated December 5, 2018 of the Prime Minister approving the Project on restructuring the tourism industry to meet the requirements of developing the industry into a spearhead economic sector; Decision No. 1671/QĐ-TTg dated November 30, 2018 of the Prime Minister approving the Master Plan on application of information technology in tourism in the period of 2018—2020 and orientation to 2025; Decision No. 147/QĐ-TTg dated January 22, 2020 of the Government approving the Vietnam tourism development strategy to 2030; Decree No. 45/2019/ND-CP dated May 21, 2019 on sanctioning administrative violations in the field of tourism etc.

It can be seen that over time many laws and policies on press, publishing, advertising, libraries, physical training and sports have been promulgated such as: Law on Press; Publication Law; Law on physical training and

sports; Advertisement Law; Library Law. In addition, there are policies and strategies of the Government such as: Decision No. 2198/QD-TTg dated December 3, 2010 of the Prime Minister approving the Strategy on development of physical training and sports until 2020, Decision No. Decision No. 115/QD-TTg dated January 16, 2014 of the Prime Minister approving the Planning on development of publication, printing and distribution of publications up to 2020, vision to 2030, Decision No. 581/QD-TTg, dated May 6, 2009 approved by the Government Strategy for cultural development to 2020, Decision No. 329/QD-TTg dated March 15, 2017 of the Prime Minister approving Project on cultural development improve reading culture in the community by 2020, with a vision to 2030; Decision No. 362/QD-TTg dated April 3, 2019 of the Prime Minister approving the national plan for development and management of press up to 2025; Decree No. 75/2010/ND-CP dated 12/7/2010 of the Government on regulations on sanctioning of administrative violations in cultural activities; Decree No. 158/2013/ND-CP dated November 12, 2013 of the Government providing for penalties for administrative violations in the fields of culture, sports, tourism and advertising etc.

About international integration in culture, promoting foreign culture, promoting Vietnamese culture to the world, there are legal documents such as Directive No. 10/2000/CT-TTg of the Prime Minister on strengthening management and promoting external information work. Decree No. 72/2000/ND-CP of the Government on publication and dissemination of works abroad. Law on Cultural Heritage, Decision 210/1999/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister on some policies towards overseas Vietnamese. It can be said that the State has been very interested in institutionalizing the guidelines in the Party's line on culture into a legal system as a legal basis for the management of cultural activities in practice. This helps the Party's line to be organized and implemented in practice.

The Party leadership promotes resources in building and developing Vietnamese culture

The Party's consistent stance in mobilizing resources to develop Vietnamese culture is to increase investment from the state budget and mobilize contributions from the people. Right at the 6th Congress, the Congress that opened the renovation process, the Communist Party of Vietnam affirmed that "The State together with the people build the necessary material and technical foundations for culture and art, preserve the and embellishing his-

torical and cultural relics.”³ People not only participate in the construction of material and technical foundations for culture, but also participate in cultural and artistic activities as the VIII Party Congress affirmed “Culture construction is the common task of the whole society. Having an appropriate investment policy for culture and arts. Developing cultural and artistic activities of the State, collectives and individuals according to the line of the Party and management of the State”.⁴ Socialization of cultural activities is a movement and organization aimed at attracting all domestic and foreign social forces and economic sectors to activities of creating, providing and disseminating cultural values, create conditions for strong and widespread culture development. Socialization not only attracts money but also many other resources from the people, especially the people's creativity in cultural development “Mobilizing resources and creativity in society to invest in building construction projects”. building cultural works and institutions, organizing cultural activities, encouraging organizations, individuals, households and mass organizations to participate in cultural and artistic activities, managing and protecting relics, cultural heritage”.⁵

Institutionalizing the Party's policy on promoting resources to develop this culture, our State has Resolution No. 05/2005/NQ-CP dated April 18, 2005 of the Government on promoting socialization of activities. education, health, culture and sports; Decree No. 69/2008/ND-CP dated May 30, 2008 of the Government on policies to encourage socialization of activities in the fields of education, vocational training, health, culture and sports.

It can be said that, in the past 35 years of *Doi moi*, resources for Vietnam's cultural development have constantly increased, both from the state budget as well as from the contributions of the society. In the past five years, the state budget has spent more than 15,000 billion VND on investment in the cultural sector, excluding the local budget, accounting for 1.71 % of total development investment. The average growth rate from the state budget prioritizing the allocation of culture and information for the cause of culture and information is about 10 % per year, 3 % higher than the growth rate of recurrent expenditure from the state budget.⁶ Socialization of cultu-

³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2015). *Văn hoá soi đường cho quốc dân đi (Văn kiện của Đảng về văn hoá)*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia Sự thật, tr.58.

⁴ Ibid., tr. 73.

⁵ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ X*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 214.

⁶ Chi ngân sách Nhà nước cho văn hóa chiếm 1,71 %. *Báo điện tử VTV*, 25.10.2019.

ral activities has also attracted many people's resources for cultural development. As of December 2020, the whole country has 180 museums (4 national museums, 7 specialized museums belonging to ministries and branches, 36 specialized museums belonging to units of ministries and the equivalent, 81 provincial museums and 52 non-public museums).⁷ In the field of performing arts, there are more than 200 organizations and individuals operating in the form of socialization, of which nearly 80 units are registered for regular and stable operation, the rest are active in nature. spontaneous is not effective. There are 40 private libraries have been established, with an average of 5,000 to 10,000 books on art, science, technology, history, economics, etc. serving the community, scattered in all three regions of the North, Central, and South Vietnam.⁸ On the conservation and reclamation of relics, in addition to the Project on anti-degradation and embellishment of historical and cultural relics (under the national target program on culture in the period 2011—2015), the socialization of relic conservation has mobilized many social resources equivalent to the state's investment in the protection and restoration of relics.⁹

Party leaders in building and promoting the role of cultural staff

Leading the construction and development of a team of cultural and artistic activities and creations is determined by the Communist Party of Vietnam to be a heavy and huge task and is a content that ensures the Party's leadership to culture. The Party's cultural leadership is in fact the ideological and political orientation for cultural activities and cultural products, all according to the Communist Party's goals and ideals, which is to develop the nation and make our country into a prosperous socialist country. To do so, cultural activists and creators must be imbued with the Party's ideals, upholding the sense of responsibility to the people and the country. The Party must build a contingent of writers and artists worthy of the title of “artist-soldier”, “soldier-artist”. In many of its documents, the Party always affirms that “Innovating the Party's leadership method in the direction of ensuring that culture, literature, art, and the press develop in accordance

⁷ Nguyễn Huy Phòng. *Hoàn thiện chính sách, pháp luật về văn hóa ở nước ta hiện nay*.

⁸ Đào Duy Quát (2018). Vì sao chủ trương xã hội hóa các hoạt động văn học, nghệ thuật chưa thực sự vào cuộc sống? *Báo điện tử Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam*, December 18.

⁹ Đặng Thị Bích Liên (2018). Xã hội hóa hoạt động bảo tồn di sản văn hóa ở nước ta hiện nay. *Tuyên giáo*, June 30.

with the Party's political and ideological orientations, while preserving guarantee individual democratic freedoms in creativity on the basis of promoting social responsibility and civic duty etc. ”.¹⁰ The Party always respects the creative freedom of the contingent of artists and writers, does not interfere in their activities, and allows them to be free to create — this is an important condition for promoting the artist's talent, but such creations are not contrary to the Party's political ideals and orientations, and must serve the common interests of the country. Therefore, it is necessary to build a team of activists, cultural and artistic creators who are both talented, enthusiastic and responsible for the country and the community. To build this team, the Party pays great attention to discovering and fostering talents. Many mass composition movements have been widely launched in order to discover talents from the masses for further fostering. Many awards for each field of cultural activities are organized on a regular basis as a way of honoring the talents of artists and promoting these works to the masses. The Party has led to improve the material and spiritual life of the contingent of artists and writers so that they can feel secure to stick with the profession. Because, if you are dominated by money and daily necessities, you can't focus on creating and can lead to distorted expressions in your composition, influenced by other factors leading to inability to fulfil the noble vocation of cultural and artistic works. In the new context of multi-dimensional impact, some artists have had deviant expressions, composing against the Party's line, following low tastes etc; but in general, our Party appreciates the contingent of writers and artists in Vietnam. Over the past time, the South has been a reliable, loyal, loving force for the country and people, dedicated to the profession, has created many works and works of ideological and artistic value, effective active in innovation.

Building culture within the Party — a Party leadership method for culture

The Party has always determined that building culture within the Party is a content that ensures the Party's leadership with culture. In the Resolution of the 5th Central Committee Plenum, term VIII, the Communist Party of Vietnam affirmed that “from the exemplary role in all aspects of organizations and individual cadres in the Party, State and mass organizations, it will promote the real leadership The movement of All people to build a cul-

¹⁰ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2016). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 131.

tural life. Exemplary is an important content and method in the leadership of the Party”.¹¹ At the 9th Central Committee Plenum, term XI, our Party continued to affirm this: “We must attach great importance to building culture from within the Party, within the state apparatus, whose important content is learning and following ideology, Ho Chi Minh morality and style (etc). The example of each cadre, party member is an important requirement in the leadership of the Party”.¹² Building culture within the Party will ensure the Party’s leadership with culture because the Party sets out cultural development guidelines that want to call on the people to actively participate in the implementation, cadres must comply first. If you want to call on the people to promote patriotism and dedication to the country, but cadres and party members are degenerated and only care about personal gains, how can they appeal? Therefore, the contents of the cultural development guidelines set forth by the Party must be implemented by each member of the Party first, thus building culture within the Party. Building culture within the Party is the content that ensures the Party’s leadership over culture because only then can the Party build the right cultural line, meeting the requirements of the times to lead the cultural cause. In order for the national cultural leadership to develop strongly, properly and healthily, the Party culture must truly embody, be the crystallization, and be the first cultural example. the most representative of the nation, of the people. In order for the national culture to develop, the party culture must take the lead. Party culture is not only a matter related to the life of the Party but also affects the development of national culture.

Recognizing this, in recent years, our Party has organized many campaigns to build and correct the Party. The promulgation and organization of the implementation of the Resolution of the 4th Central Committee Plenum, term XI “On some urgent issues of Party building today” and the Resolution of the 4th Central Committee Plenum, term XII “On strengthening the construction and rectification of the Party”; preventing and repelling the deterioration of political ideology, morality, lifestyle, internal “self-degeneration” and “self-transformation” expressions, which are the expression of specific determinations and actions in building culture in the Party. Construction goes hand in hand with fighting. Besides fighting against the manifestations of degradation, metamorphosis, and alienation from culture in the Party, the Party also organizes a campaign and learns to

¹¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1998). *Văn kiện Hội nghị Trung ương 5 khóa VIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr.81.

¹² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2015). *Op. cit.*, tr. 170.

follow Ho Chi Minh ideology, morality and style in order to improve the quality of life. culture in the Party. After 5 years of implementing Directive 05-CT/TW “On promoting learning and following Ho Chi Minh ideology, morality and style” on May 15, 2016, many examples of Party members have appeared, and there have been positive changes in the Party's culture.

The Party leading culture through 35 years of renovation has achieved many achievements, from changing thinking to organizing practical implementation. Therefore, after 35 years of *Doi moi*, Vietnamese culture has developed many steps, an important part of which is the leadership role of the Party. However, the limitations in cultural development that, as our Party considers, compared with the achievements in economics and politics, the inadequate cultural achievements are also partly due to the limitations in the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam with culture. Therefore, in order to develop Vietnamese culture in the coming time, first and foremost, it is necessary to continue to improve the effectiveness of the Party's leadership in culture.

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Chapter 16

BUILDING A CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT IN VIETNAM TODAY

The cultural environment contains the cultural values created by people in the process of existence and development. Building a cultural environment is one of the most important tasks of the cause of building an advanced Vietnamese culture imbued with national identity, in the new context of the country and the current times. Building a cultural environment has a close relationship with the strategy of developing the Vietnamese people, building cultural institutions, building a clean and strong political system; preventing counter-development and counter-culture, contributing to synchronous and harmonious development of both economy and culture right in each step and each development policy. This will create a sustainable foundation for development and social progress.

Keywords: culture building, cultural environment, cultural activities, environmental protection.

The importance of the cultural environment and building the cultural environment in the cause of *Doi moi* in Vietnam

Cultural environment is the environment in which people live, create and enjoy culture. Cultural environment is the environment that contains cultural values created by people, ethnic communities and humanity in the past as well as in the present and the future. The cultural environment is also the place where human cultural activities take place (creation, preservation, dissemination, enjoyment, and evaluation of cultural values and products). Humans are subjects of the cultural environment; they create the cultural environment and enjoy the values (and even counter-values) in the cultural environment. And vice versa, the cultural environment also has a multiface-

ted impact on the humanization and culturalization of people. Therefore, building a cultural environment will contribute to creating a humane biosphere, a progressive and healthy spiritual foundation; and this is a premise to develop and perfect each individual, ensure human security, contribute to socio-economic development, and improve people's quality of life.

Building a cultural environment has a close relationship with developing people; building families; building villages, agencies, units and cultural enterprises; building new rural areas, building civilized urban areas; building a green — clean — beautiful environment; building the Communist Party of Vietnam and a clean and strong political system; fighting against corruption, negativity and social evils; ensuring security, social order and safety; developing synchronously and harmonizing economy and culture right in each step and each development policy; creating and promoting the power of “cultural capital”, “soft power” for social development and progress.

Building a healthy cultural environment is one of the most important tasks in the cause of building an advanced Vietnamese culture imbued with national identity, in order to build a healthy cultural life that meets the diverse and constantly increasing cultural needs of the people.¹

The process of awareness and direction for the construction of the cultural environment in Vietnam in the period of *Doi moi*

During the renovation period, the Party and State of Vietnam has had many guidelines and policies to build a healthy, progressive and civilized cultural environment in all fields of social life. The construction of a cultural environment is associated with human development, development of education — training, science — technology, innovation, mass information systems, internet, literature and art, cultural policy, and international integration of culture. All of these aspects have had great achievements. The conservation and promotion of cultural heritage and the value system of Vietnamese people are emphasized, which contributes to socio-economic development. The movement of “All people unite to build cultural life”, building cultural families, cultural villages and agencies, cultural units has been widely responded by people from all walks of life and has promoted many human values in the community and positively affected the cultural,

¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1998). *Văn kiện Hội nghị lần thứ năm Ban chấp hành Trung ương khóa VIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 59—60.

economic, political and social life in all regions and areas across the country.

The construction of a cultural environment has been invested, managed and developed by all levels, sectors, from the central to local levels. Socialization of cultural activities is increasingly expanding. More and more organizations and individuals participate in activities and contribute resources to building a cultural environment. The institutional system and cultural institutions at all levels have been strengthened, built and completed. The state management of culture at the grassroots level has been strengthened. There is an emphasis on criticism, fighting and repelling evil, backwardness, negativity, opposing views, wrong and hostile behavior which are harmful to the cultural environment and lifestyle. In the context of the prevention of the Covid-19 pandemic, good cultural values, social ethics, traditions of family, communities and villages have emerged; there are many examples of good people, good deeds and goodwill which have been replicated and promoted.

However, the construction of a cultural environment in recent years still has many limitations and weaknesses. The system of cultural institutions and material and technical foundations for cultural activities are still lacking and weak. In some places, these factors are degraded, lacking in synchronization or have low efficiency. The gap in cultural welfare, cultural enjoyment and basic social services among regions, areas, localities and social classes remains large. Cultural life in ethnic minority groups and remote areas still has many difficulties. The cultural environment still has many aspects that are not really healthy and are contrary to the fine customs and traditions of the nation's culture and morality. Toxic cultural products and the negative side of social networks still penetrate strongly into society. Social evils, drugs, prostitution, criminal offenses, traffic accidents, school violence, social violence, domestic violence, violence against women and children, vandalism, damage of the ecological environment and so on are complicated. Many cultural service establishments are opened in places and operate arbitrarily to pursue profits but violate the provisions of the law. State management agencies have not yet taken effective measures to prevent and handle these issues. "Ethics and lifestyles in the family, school and society are worryingly degraded, causing frustration in society"²; "The cultural and social environment continues to be polluted by social evils, corruption, negativity (...) Corruption and wastefulness in some fields and areas are still serious and complicated, with increasingly sophisticated and pre-

² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 2, tr. 72.

ssing manifestations in society (...) Deterioration in political thought, morality, lifestyle, individualism, “group interests”, wastefulness, ignorance, running after achievement in a part of cadres and party members have not been repelled”.³ The above limitations and weaknesses adversely affect the cultural environment and the building and development of an advanced Vietnamese culture imbued with national identity. They also affect the process of socio-economic development, ensuring security, national defense, and protecting the ecological environment.

Vision and orientation, solutions to build a cultural environment in the current national development strategy

In order to promote the results and values achieved and to overcome the limitations and weaknesses in the construction of the cultural environment in recent years, the Document of the XIII Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam has determined: “There need to be mechanisms, policies and solutions to build a really clean and healthy cultural environment, improve people's conditions for cultural enjoyment (...) Building a comprehensive cultural environment in the families, at schools, in residential communities, in the Party, State, mass organizations and businesses so that culture is really the driving force and breakthrough in socio-economic development and international integration”.⁴ In that direction, it is necessary to pay attention to leaders and direct the implementation of a number of key tasks and solutions as follows:

First, building a prosperous, progressive, happy and civilized Vietnamese family.

The family is the cell of society, the first and important cultural environment that directly educates and forms the lifestyle, morality and personality of each person. Therefore, if we want to build a progressive and healthy cultural environment, we must first build a prosperous, progressive, happy and civilized family. The document of the 13th Party Congress defines: “Preserve and develop the Vietnamese family value system in the new period (...) Implement cultural standards for a prosperous, happy, progressive, prosperous and civilized Vietnamese family”.⁵ Building a Vietnamese family value system in the new era should be based on preserving and

³ Ibid., t. 1, tr. 84, 93, 95.

⁴ Ibid., tr. 144, 162.

⁵ Ibid., tr. 144.

promoting the good morals of a traditional Vietnamese family and selectively absorbing progressive, scientific, and appropriate values of humanity about the family. In addition to the contents and standards on building a family of “warmth, progress and happiness” mentioned in the Documents of the XI, XII Congresses, the Documents of the XIII Congresses of the Communist Party of Vietnam added the content and “value standard of civilization” as a new and important value standard for building a Vietnamese family in the context of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the process of extensive international integration.

It is necessary to emphasize the role of the family in nurturing and educating the young generation. The role of becoming role models of grandparents and parents should be emphasized. It is important to build a culture and family etiquettes in each family. A close relationships between family, school and society should be created. The construction of cultural families should be associated with the construction of cultured residential areas and cultured villages, the construction of new rural areas and civilized cities, prevention of social evils, and environmental protection. The advice of President Ho Chi Minh should be implemented: “It is right to be focused on the family and many families constitute a society. A good society makes a better family, a good family makes a good society. The nucleus of society is the family. It is because we want to build socialism that we must pay attention to the nucleus”.⁶ The leadership of the Party and State management and the role of socio-political organizations should be strengthened in communicating with and educating cadres, party members and union members to try to build cultured families.

Second, promoting cultural activities at the grassroots.

A healthy and rich cultural environment must be expressed through healthy and diverse cultural activities of each citizen and community. Therefore, cultural activities at grassroots level must be promoted such as: information sharing, communication and promotion activities; social club activities; library and reading activities; preservation, museum work, promotion of cultural heritage values and education of cultural traditions and revolutionary history; mass cultural activities; activities of building cultured families, villages and agencies; sports activities; tourism and entertainment activities; activities of “showing gratitude to predecessors”; charity, humanitarian activities. Cultural activities must be renewed in terms of organization, ma-

⁶ Bài nói chuyện của Bác Hồ tại Hội nghị cán bộ thảo luận Dự thảo Luật hôn nhân và Gia đình, tháng 10—1959, in: Hồ Chí Minh (2011). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 12, tr. 300.

nagement, operation and investment under the motto “The state and the people work together” and enjoy the benefits together.

Values, positive and humane factors in religious culture and beliefs should be promoted. Religious activities should be encouraged to be associated with the nation, towards goodness, humanity, progress. Negative manifestations, superstitions and illegal evangelism have to be criticized and prevented at grassroots level. The manifestations of “commercialization of belief and religious activities in some places”⁷ should be addressed and fixed.

Third, building cultured schools, agencies and units; building cultured villages and quarters; building new countryside, civilized urban areas.

Each school should be developed to have a clean and healthy cultural environment; it is also a cultural education environment with comprehensive training in ideals, qualities, personality, lifestyle, physicality, education of historical, cultural and revolutionary traditions for the younger generation. The school culture should be about “first studying courtesy/civility, then comes the study of literature”. Every teacher is a shining example for students to follow. The negative trend of running after achievement and commercialization of education should be prevented, there should be authentic study, fair exam, and thus there will be real talents. A cultural environment in agencies and units should be built to have a spirit of solidarity, democracy and civilization, meeting substantive cultural standards; democratic regulations at the grassroots level should be implemented well. In addition, a civilized and progressive lifestyle should be built in weddings, funerals and festivals, in the family and in public places. The movement to build cultured villages, hamlets, quarters, collective areas, communes and wards should be encouraged to improve the self-governance of the residential community. The movement of building new rural areas, advanced new rural areas, model new rural areas, civilized and modern cities should be promoted. A healthy, democratic, united and humanistic office culture environment should be created to repel bureaucracy, fragmentation, disunity, opportunism and pragmatism; we should resolutely fight against corruption, wastefulness and other negative activities.

Fourth, building, perfecting and improving the quality and performance of cultural institutions.

Cultural institutions such as libraries, museums, houses of traditions, clubs, theaters, cultural and sports centers, parks, stadiums, press and mass media offices, places with internet services, discotheques, stages, cinema

⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 2, tr. 73.

centers, cinema rooms, karaoke rooms are places where cultural activities take place in a concentrated manner and they reflect the values of the cultural life of the community and the nation. It is the physical environment, the “path”, the “fulcrum” for cultural activities and cultural values taking place in social life. It is necessary to develop and continuously improve the operation quality of cultural institutions at the grassroots level, and at the same time pay attention to invest in the construction of a number of key cultural works in the centers of regions as well as cultural works at national level. There should be favourable conditions for organizations, businesses and individuals to contribute to investment, construction, management and operation of cultural institutions. Cultural institutions must develop in the direction of autonomy; public-private cooperation should be promoted, and the harmony of interests between the State, investors (enterprises) and people should be ensured. The situation of subsidizing, “ask — give” in operations should be abolished, the market’s rules should be respected. At the same time, guidance, inspection, supervision and handling of violations should be strengthened to ensure that cultural institutions operate properly according to the political orientation of the Party and laws of the State. The not-for-profit goal of cultural institutions should be encouraged in order to improve cultural welfare for all classes of people, especially in remote, isolated and ethnic minority areas.

Fifth, paying attention to building and protecting the landscape and ecological environment.

This is a basic requirement to build a healthy cultural environment and improve people's quality of life. The State needs to build and perfect the legal system and policies on environmental protection in the context of developing a market economy and responding to climate change and global epidemics today. The document of the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam has determined: “Protecting the living environment and people's health is the top goal; resolutely eliminate projects that pollute the environment, ensure the quality of the living environment, protect biodiversity and ecosystems (...) Have a plan to fundamentally overcome the situation of destruction, depletion of natural resources, and environmental pollution of production facilities, industrial parks and urban areas. Improve the quality of the environment and the living conditions of the people”.⁸ The awareness and responsibility of each person and community should be raised in protecting the ecological environment. A culture of decent human behavior towards the natural environment should be built. There should also be edu-

⁸ Ibid., t. 1, tr. 117, 154.

cation on prevention of harmful effects of tobacco, solid waste and alcohol consumption. It is also important to protect and save energy, save water resources, ensure food hygiene and safety, prevent epidemics for people and animals. Violations of environmental laws should be resolutely handled.

In addition to preserving and protecting the ecological environment, it is necessary to focus on conserving, building and promoting the values of cultural landscapes, scenic spots, and architectural heritages. These are the cultural spaces created by people, contain the cultural values of the community and nation and contribute to the creation of a healthy cultural environment.

Sixth, linking cultural environment construction activities with socio-economic development, ensuring national defense and security.

Building a cultural environment must be closely and synchronously linked with economic and social development, ensuring national defense and security. Activities to build a cultural environment must be aimed at promoting socio-economic development, sustainable multi-dimensional poverty reduction, legitimate wealth creation, economic restructuring, crops and livestock restructuring, tourism, services, digital transformation, digital economy and digital society. At the same time, we should ensure social progress and security, social justice; improve social welfare, narrow the gap in material and spiritual life between urban areas and rural areas, between economically developed areas and remote, mountainous, border and island areas, and between classes in society.

Corporate culture, entrepreneurial culture, business culture should be created with a sense of respect for the law, keeping credibility, healthy competition, for the sustainable development of the country. Economic policies need to be formulated in terms of culture in the economy in order to attract and encourage organizations and businesses interested in investing in the development of the cultural industry and building cultural institutions and environment.

Building a cultural environment must be associated with ensuring human rights, human security, cultural security, social order, safety and building the great unity of the whole nation. Complicated incidents in security and order should be promptly detected and effectively handled, preventing the formation of “hot spots” in localities and establishments. Inspection and supervision should be strengthened to ensure strict implementation of the Party's regulations and the State's laws in each family, agency, and grass-roots unit. It is important to prevent and suppress all kinds of crimes, social evils (especially drug crimes, prostitution, criminal crimes, corruption crimes, high-tech crimes) and other acts that violate other laws to maintain social order, discipline and the peaceful life of the people.

Seventh, practicing democracy widely, promoting civic positivity, upholding social responsibility, civic duty, discipline in building a cultural environment; building culture in the Party organization and political system.

In order to build a healthy and civilized cultural and social environment, it is necessary to practice widespread democracy, to encourage and create conditions for all people to organize and participate in healthy cultural activities in the residential community. Promoting democracy, freedom and creativity needs to be in parallel with strengthening discipline, regulation and legality; ensuring freedom and individual democracy in creativity and cultural activities needs to be associated with upholding the civic responsibility and social responsibility of each person with a virtuous purpose. It is important to continue to build, perfect and strictly enforce the principle of democracy in localities in association with the implementation of the movement “All people unite to build a cultured life” in a practical way, avoiding the disease of “running after achievement” and “superficiality”. Social network management should be strengthened to ensure cybersecurity.

It is crucial to pay attention to building a cultural environment in Party organizations, state agencies and socio-political-professional organizations. The development of personnel, party members, civil servants, public employees and members in organizations, agencies, units, localities and establishments should aim at developing people with a sense of respect for the law and ethical qualities; they should wholeheartedly serve the Fatherland and the people, and are closely attached to the people. Corruption, wastefulness, bureaucracy, and manifestations of deterioration in political ideology, morality, and lifestyle should be prevented, as well as the manifestations of “self-corruption”, “self-degradation” in a part of cadres and party member, member. “We must attach great importance to building culture from within the Party and within the state apparatus, and the important content is studying and following Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, morality and style. Culture, morality and a healthy lifestyle must be expressed first of all in every Party, State, mass organization, in cadres, civil servants and public employees, in each party member and union member. The exemplary role of each cadre and party member is an important requirement in the Party’s leadership”⁹; “Renovate the organization, apparatus, content and mode of operation of the Fatherland Front and socio-political organizations under the motto of strongly orienting towards localities and residential areas, well perform the

⁹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2014). *Văn kiện hội nghị lần thứ chín Ban Chấp hành Trung ương khóa XI*. Hà Nội: Văn phòng Trung ương Đảng.

role of supervision and social criticism, protect legitimate and political rights and interests of union members and people, serve as an important bridge between the Party and the people”¹⁰; “Truly trust, respect and promote the people’s right to mastery, persistently implement the motto “People know, people discuss, people take action, people monitor, people supervise, people enjoy the benefits”.¹¹ These are the basic orientations to create new greater and more comprehensive results in building the cultural environment in Vietnam today; which contributes to improving the quality of life and happiness index of Vietnamese people and to building a prosperous, wealthy and happy Vietnam.

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Hồ Chí Minh (2011). *Toàn tập* (Ho Chi Minh. *Complete works*). Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 12.

¹⁰ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 43.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, tr. 27.

Chapter 17

THE LEADING ROLE OF THE CPV IN DEVELOPING LITERATURE DURING THE RENOVATION PERIOD: ENRICHING TRADITIONS ESTABLISHED BY HO CHI MINH

This article treats the CPV policy in the field of literature during the period of Renovation. It is noted that over the past 35 years significant positive changes have taken place in the literary sphere. Many of them are directly related to the activity of the CPV that attaches great importance to the spiritual sphere considering it to be an essential foundation of internal political stability and socio-economic development of the country. It is noted that modern Vietnamese cultural policy consists of many principles based on Ho Chi Minh's ideas. The CPV develops them inventively considering present conditions, goals, and possibilities. As culture is closely connected to ideology, it is important for the CPV to address negative occurrences in the field of literature and art, be able to stand firm against the intense influence of western culture that does not always have a good impact on creative activities in the Vietnamese society. In recent years the economic environment of the country enables Vietnam to actively promote its literature abroad.

Keywords: the CPV, Ho Chi Minh, Vietnamese literature, policy of Renovation, the 13th CPV Congress.

Introduction

The 35 year experience of Renovation policy implementation provides a wealth of information to reflect on its results. It is important to assess

comparability and synchronization of the renovation process in the field of foreign policy and economy as well as in social and spiritual spheres. The processes, taken place in the literary area, show what is generally happening in the culture sector along with spiritual life and ideology. That is why it is of great interest to study achievements and current issues in the literary field.

In the Vietnamese scientific literature this topic is treated in strict accordance with the CPV tenets stated in the party documents. These works are of purely declarative nature, they contain goals and objectives set up at the party congresses and plenums. Western scientific community mainly expresses strong criticism on the CPV leadership in general and its policies on literature and art in particular. Too much attention is paid to the issue of freedom of creation and expression in Vietnam. Both the works of Vietnamese authors of the Renovation period and the leading party and government contemporary policy in the field of literature have not yet been well examined in the Vietnamese studies in Russia. An attempt to compile and analyze Vietnamese literary life of the last 30 years was made in the only existing major work of today dedicated to the 20th century Vietnamese literature, a textbook written by T.N. Filimonova.¹ The purpose of this article is to define the nature of the CPV influence on the contemporary literature and literary life of the country. In order to do that, an attempt was made to comprehend the strides made by Vietnam in the field of literature during the Renovation period and to highlight the issues that confront the CPV and are of concern to the Vietnamese writing community. Particular emphasis is placed on the CPV policy continuity as the party creatively develops Ho Chi Minh's ideas on art and literature.

Moderation in all things, in praising and in criticism as well

From the beginning of the Renovation period the CPV has been attaching great importance to the development of literature as one of the most essential component of the national culture. Statistically it can be illustrated by the number of decrees, most of which are policy papers, adopted by the

¹ Filimonova, T.N. (2017) *Oчерk vietnamskoj literatury XX veka: Uchebnoe posobie*. M.: Jazyki Narodov Mira — TEZAURUS, p. 272.

CPV in the field of culture during the last 35 years.² It indicates that the CPV understands the importance of culture in general and literature in particular for the Vietnamese society.

The significant role of literature and art is determined by their being spiritual foundation of society and their active influence on the other aspects of national life, including economy and politics. This statement is supported by the CPV documents adopted at different periods of Renovation. It was noted, in particular, at the 13th party Congress held in 2021 that “an integrated and synchronized development of cultural sphere and environment as well as diverse, civilized, healthy cultural activities were needed for culture to really become a spiritual basis, an internal resource and a driving force of the breakthrough in social and economic growth and international integration”.³

The roots of this approach towards literature and art go back to Ho Chi Minh’s activities. Not only he had prolific literary career, writing stories, plays, op-ed articles, poems and translating belles—letters works, but he also actively developed theoretical aspects of culture in general and literature in particular.

During the period of Renovation the CPV adheres to President Ho Chi Minh’s principles of literary activity and literature management that remain relevant to this day. However, the party is not just committed to them, but it is developing them inventively, considering the peculiarities and the necessities of modern life.

One of Ho Chi Minh’s main premises is that, on the one hand, literature is needed to praise new human, new deeds and to become an example not just to us but to all future generations. And, on the other hand, it has to

² Decree of the CPV Central Committee Politburo “On the innovating and raising skills of literary, artistic and cultural management and governance to a higher level, expanding creative capacities and entering a new stage of literary, artistic, and cultural development”, 1987.

Decree of the CPV Central Committee Politburo “On the certain tasks in the field of culture, literature, and art for the forthcoming years”, 1993.

Decree of the CPV Central Committee “On forming and developing advanced Vietnamese culture imbued with national identity”, 1998.

Decree of the CPV Central Committee Politburo “On the further formation and development of literature and art during the new period”, 2008.

Decree of the CPV Central Committee “On the formation and development of Vietnamese culture and individuals in compliance with the requirements of sustainable development of the country”, 2014.

³ Tổng Bí thư, Chủ tịch nước Nguyễn Phú Trọng đọc Báo cáo của Ban Chấp hành T.Ư Đảng khóa XII về các văn kiện trình Đại hội XIII của Đảng. Retrived on May 5, 2021.

heavily criticize vices so “our society could be more healthy, pristine, and beautiful day by day”.⁴

This Ho Chi Minh’s idea becomes the basis of the Decree on “Innovating and raising skills of literary, artistic and cultural management and governance to a higher level, expanding creative capacities and entering a new stage of literary, artistic and cultural development” adopted by the Politburo of the CPV Central Committee in December 1987. This resolution was essentially the first position paper on literature of the Renovation period. The results of the historical meeting of the CPV General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh with writers and artists, held in Hanoi on 6 and 7 of October, 1987, were presented in this decree. “In the light of the new agenda for innovation Nguyen Van Linh promised the creative community that the party would ‘cut the bonds and give free rein’ to manage art- and culture-related activities and encouraged artists to take more initiative and to give a more daring and honest view on all the negative and positive existing in society...”⁵

This was the beginning of a new stage in the development of Vietnamese literature which started to move away from the severe ideological restrictions and to engage in the world literary process, bringing new topics, new forms, device, and language.

Nevertheless, the party leadership had to focus on the situation regarding literature, art, and mass media once again. During a meeting with the top media executives, held in February 1989, Nguyen Van Linh admitted that “it was necessary to actively combat the negative aspects” and stated that “in doing so, there should not be created a situation whereby there would be only the negative on the radio or in newspapers.” And most importantly “one should not put all the blame on the party and government after finding something bad”.⁶ This Nguyen Van Linh’s address is in consistent with an idea of Ho Chi Minh who repeatedly said that there had to be moderation in all things, in praising and criticizing as well. “Criticism should be sincere, honest, and true, so it doesn’t give reasons to an enemy to spread counter-propaganda”.⁷

This Nguyen Van Linh’s statement, on the one hand, can be viewed in a way as a retreat from the policy of openness and transparency, and, on the other hand, it can be taken as an expression of concern about possible risks

⁴ Hồ Chí Minh (2000). Bài nói chuyện tại đại hội văn nghệ toàn quốc lần thứ III, in: Hồ Chí Minh. *Toàn tập*, t. 10. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 646.

⁵ Filimonova, T.N. *Op. cit.*, p. 178.

⁶ Filimonova, T.N. *Op. cit.*, p. 181.

⁷ Hồ Chí Minh (1979). *Kak pisat'*, in: Ho Chi Minh. *Izbrannoe*. M.: Progress, p. 240.

of destabilization of the socio-political situation in the country. In less than no time these fears became a reality in the USSR. Some Russian politicians and experts believe that policy of openness and transparency was initiated with good intentions at its core and could bring democratization of society, but in fact it led to harsh consequences and, to a great extent, was one of the reasons why the USSR collapsed.

Diversity is a new trait of the Vietnamese literature

Nguyen Van Linh's concern did not become an obstacle to further renewal of the Vietnamese literary field. The progress made in the Renovation policy is shown in the table 1.

Table 1. Some progress of the Renovation policy in the literary field

Positive changes	Examples
Transition from socialist realism, the only sanctioned method of literary composition, to the other forms of realism — classical, critical, and magical	Bảo Ninh, Nguyễn Khải, Nguyễn Việt Hà, Lê Lyu, Dương Thứ Hương, Nguyễn Hứ Thiệp, Phạm Thị Hoài, Nguyễn Bình Phương, Tạ Duy Anh and others
Abolishing censorship of previously banned literature	Works of Nhân Văn — Giai Phẩm members, works of the New Poetry Movement members
Calling on western literature, intensive work on translating world literature into Vietnamese	Publishing the works of Haruki Murakami, Michel Houellebecq, Milorad Pavic, Dan Brown, Jorge Luis Borges, Marcel Proust, Vladimir Nabokov, Anna Akhmatova, Marina Tsvetaeva, Boris Pasternak, Lyudmila Ulitskaya; the first publication of Foreign Literature magazine (since 1996)
Exploring new topics	A reassessment of what the country has achieved since 1945 is being made; different aspects of the unification of the North and the South are being analyzed; suffering and loss of Resistance Wars are being described alongside with glorious victories of the Vietnamese people; concerns of an individual human being, his fate and private life are being addressed to alongside with national issues; spiritual life becomes more disclosed; considerable attention is paid to the post-war social challenges, negative aspects, public life contradictions;

Positive changes	Examples
	family issues and relationship between men and women are being viewed in a different light; life of Vietnamese citizens living abroad is being highlighted
Emerging of new genres	A lot of works of contemporary authors are written in mixed genres or genres that cannot be precisely identified
Increasing number of publications of autobiographies, memoirs, and diaries	<i>Midnight rising</i> by Lưu Trọng Lữ, memoir of Đặng Thái Mai, the diary of Đặng Thủy Tram, memoir of Tô Hoài, <i>In the evenings</i> , an autobiography of the Vietnamese artist Lê Vân, and others
Active development of women's literature	Y Văn, Thủy Linh, Ngô Thị Kim Cúc, Võ Thị Xuân Hà, Nguyễn Thu Trần, Thủy Anh, and others
Growing interest in issues of literary studies	Efforts to study literature not just in a context of its social functions and art, but as a way of humanity's cognition of the things in the world outside
Heated literary debates	At conferences and in the press

Diversity is one of the values that literature has acquired in renovating Vietnam of the last thirty years.

The CPV intends to continue giving high priority to literature and art. In January 2021, the then Chairperson of the National Assembly of Vietnam Nguyen Thị Kim Ngân reassured at the 10th congress of the Union of Vietnamese writers and artist Association that the party and the government were always ready to provide the best environment for the creative activity of writers and workers of culture.

Advanced literature preserving national distinctiveness

In 1998 the CPV Central Committee faced the task of forming and developing an advanced Vietnamese culture imbued with national identity. This task remains relevant to this day which can be confirmed by the documents of the 13th CPV Congress. The party wants to proficiently reconcile two different paths in the literary field: Vietnamese author have to take all the best things the world literature can offer, on the one side, and on the other, they have to earnestly promote national values in their works. These

values include “ardent patriotism, willingness to rely on your own strength, spirit of solidarity, comprehension of common historical fate through the sequence of following social structures: identity — family — community — motherland, humanity, generosity, loyalty, decency, hard working, creative attitude towards work, sensitivities in social interactions, modest life”.⁸ National distinctiveness of literature implies elaborating and using diverse devices, different literary forms and genres that are inherent in exquisite Vietnamese literary works, together with valuing the literary heritage. It was Ho Chi Minh who indicated the importance of cultural heritage recovery. He stressed that “only good traditions should be revived, and the bad once should be got rid of”.⁹

Preservation of the Vietnamese cultural heritage is one of the issues the CPV has been paying particular attention to over the last decades. In the literary field this issue is directly related to the formation of historical memory based on myths, legends, and lore. Mythological figures (above all, the Dragon King, the Fairy-mother and the Hung Kings) are deliberately fixed in the public consciousness as the progenitors of the Vietnamese nation. The first introduction to folklore for the Vietnamese people starts since early childhood in pre-school facilities, and a deep immersion in the myths and legends takes place during the school years. The story of the Dragon and the Fairy is written in detail in the “Folklore” section of the textbook on the Vietnamese language and literature for the 6th grade of secondary school. There is an excerpt in it from Ho Chi Minh’s speech to Vietnamese military personnel given in 1954: “The Hung kings were the founding-fathers of our nation, and we, all together, must protect it”.¹⁰ The decision to make the Hung Kings Festival, held to pay tribute to the kings, a national holiday celebrated on the 10th day of the third lunar month, is a mean to impact on the consciousness of grown men in Vietnam.¹¹ The historization of myths enables the party and government to solve significant political and ideological issues such as forming a national idea. “The tradition associated with the Hung kings and their supernatural origin is widely used to build the foundations of national identity and establish core values

⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1998). *Văn kiện Hội nghị lần thứ năm Ban Chấp hành Trung ương khóa VIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 56.

⁹ Hồ Chí Minh (2000). *Nói chuyện tại hội nghị cán bộ văn hóa*, in: Hồ Chí Minh. *Toàn tập*, t. 9. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị quốc gia, tr. 254.

¹⁰ Lịch sử lớp 6 (2013). Hà Nội: Nxb. Giáo dục, tr. 37.

¹¹ Grigorieva N.V. (2015) “Deti drakona i fei”: rol’ mificheskikh predkov v formirovanií nacional’noj identichnosti u detej v sovremennom V’etname. *V’etnamskie issledovaniya*, vyp. 5. IDV RAN, s. 292.

of the modern Vietnamese society”.¹² These values include Vietnamese national unity and cohesion. There is a perfectly logical transition from myths to the national idea: since there is a common ancestor, it means that everybody is related; a one big family, and therefore we have to unite and stand together. Ho Chi Minh believed that national unity was essential in order to gain victories. His statement “Unity, unity, great unity; success, success, great success” became popular. The word “unity” is among keywords of the 13th CPV Congress slogan and comes first in the party documents: “Unity — Democracy — Discipline — Creation — Development”. It can be stated that unity is one of the main reasons of Vietnamese success against COVID-19 and it is a mean to prevent socio-political crises experienced today in many countries across the globe.

International promotion of the Vietnamese literature

It is noted in the materials of the CPV Central Committee Propaganda Department that preserving national distinctiveness of literature does not mean that it has to be cut off from the rest of the world and confined to national borders, it does not imply a return of something outdated and backward. It is necessary to expand international literary relations but to be selective in embracing and drawing on advanced achievements of global cultural, at the same time it is important to spread national values all over the world with proud and in dignity.¹³

The Renovation policy involves a broad international cooperation in different fields. The Communist Party has been committed to developing relations with as many countries as possible during the last thirty-five years. To further continue this policy, a task to be actively, fully, profoundly, and efficiently integrated into the world was put forward at the 13th CPV Congress.¹⁴ It concerns the cultural field as well.

This goal does not contradict Ho Chi Minh’s ideas. He was a keen supporter of international cultural exchange, which is hardly surprising, considering the fact that he, by the twist of fate, was highly integrated into the common cultural space of the East and the West, had a deep knowledge and appreciation of culture (and literature in particular) of the USSR, France,

¹² Ibid., p. 289.

¹³ Những quan điểm cơ bản của đảng về văn hóa, văn nghệ. Retrived on May 25, 2021.

¹⁴ Tổng Bí thư, Chủ tịch nước Nguyễn Phú Trọng đọc Báo cáo... *Op.cit.*

China, and other countries. Ho Chi Minh encouraged Vietnamese writers and artists to learn from others. He noted during the Cultural workers Congress, held on the 30th of October, 1958, “We have to admit that our country when compared to our fraternal countries, for example to Korea, is not as advanced in the cultural sphere and technology <...> That is why we have to put all our efforts into learning”.¹⁵

Today Vietnam can not only learn from others but also be proud of its culture and acquaint the other countries with it. Promotion of the Vietnamese literature abroad became one of the main tasks of the CPV foreign policy during the period of Renovation. And this task is being carried out successfully. Different channels, means, traditional, and new methods offered by current conditions and opportunities are used.

Vietnamese publishing houses take an active part in the international book fairs that helps to introduce foreign readers to Vietnamese literature. Vietnam is engaged in exchange of writers’ delegation with other countries, including the former enemy — the United States of America. The relations with the USA were initiated in 1989 by the William Joiner Institute for the Study of War and Social Consequences. At that time a Vietnamese delegation of war veteran writers was invited to the conference of the above-mentioned Institute. During more than thirty years after that over a hundred Vietnamese writers, poets, and art workers have been invited to the USA by this Institution.

In the context of successful economic development it is now possible to use new efficient tools to consolidate the role of Vietnamese literature on the international stage. These means, above all, include conferences on Vietnamese literature promotion and international poetry festivals with writers, poets, literary critics, and philologists taking part and representing different countries of Asia, Europe, North and South America, and Africa. The first such conference was organized in 2002. Four conferences and three poetry festivals have taken place to this day. Two hundred literary figures from forty-six countries attended the 4th Conference on Vietnamese literature promotion held in 2019. The fact that members of the Politburo and the VCP Central Committee are always present at the opening of conferences indicates that these events are of great importance. Reception of the conference participants in the residence of the Vietnamese President is a part of the event.

During the last 30 years the number of Vietnamese literature readers has increased worldwide due to international activity of Vietnam. Hundreds of books written by Vietnamese writers were translated into different languages

¹⁵ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, tr. 255.

and published in dozens of countries. It was during this time that Ho Chi Minh's book *The Prison Diary* was first published in Latin America.¹⁶ An unprecedented interest in Vietnamese literature was taken by South Korea — more than 30 works translated from Vietnamese to Korean in the period from 1992 to 2019, including *The Prison Diary*, works of Nguyen Trai, Nguyen Du, Nguyen Van Bong, To Hoai, and others.¹⁷ Many countries issued special Vietnamese editions of literary magazines. More universities included Vietnamese literature in the list of the subjects taught.

Vietnamese belles-letters works were highly praised by the international society, which can be illustrated by different literary awards given to the Vietnamese writers during different years of the Renovation policy implementation. In particular, eighteen writers and poets have won the SEA Writer Award in the period from 1996 to the present day, which is of great importance to Vietnam since it considers ASEAN to be one of the most significant regional organizations and is one of its members. Among the SEA Write Award winners are To Huu, Huu Thinh, Do Chu, Le Van Thao, and others.

The Russian — Vietnamese cooperation in the field of literature is being re-established step by step. The main impetus for this was the decision made in 2010 by the then Russian president Dmitry Medvedev to establish the Fund for promotion of Russian literature in Vietnam and Vietnamese literature in Russia. But this cooperation has not yet reached the point of former strength and extent that was achieved at the time of the USSR. Slightly more than a dozen books of Vietnamese writers has been translated into Russian and published during the last ten years. To a large extent, success of the Vietnamese literature promotion in Russia depends on the Vietnamese activity. Interesting literary projects, programs, and grants proposed by the Vietnamese Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, the Vietnamese Association of Writers, Russian creative public organizations for the Vietnamese can help to intensify the process.

Managing negative occurrences

Deepening international cooperation in the field of literature and art, the CPV promises to pay attention to the risks of negative external influence. "It is important to maintain vigilance and stand firm against the intense pre-

¹⁶ Hữu Thịnh (2019). Diển văn khai mạc Hội nghị quốc tế quảng bá văn học Việt Nam lần thứ IV và Liên hoan thơ quốc tế lần thứ III. *Văn nghệ*, số 8, tr. 2.

¹⁷ Kyong-hwan (2019). *Phương án hoạt động việc biên dịch ra tiếng Hàn của văn học Việt Nam*. Tham luận Hội nghị quốc tế quảng bá văn học Việt Nam lần thứ IV và Liên hoan thơ quốc tế lần thứ III. Hà Nội: Hội Nhà văn Việt Nam, tr. 49—50.

ssure of any negative cultural aspects, reject any extreme views regarding personal freedom, pragmatism, and individualism”.¹⁸ Increased “cultural aggression” in Vietnam raises a question of ensuring national security in the field of culture.

Many documents, adopted at different stages of the Renovation policy implementation, prove the CPV leadership’s concern over negative aspects in the field of literature and art¹⁹. At the 13th CPV Congress, “inordinate attention paid to the West” and “worship of the USA” were said to be one of the main issues of the Vietnamese foreign policy.²⁰ There is the same tendency in the cultural field.

Freedom of creation and freedom of expression are one of the topics proposed for discussion by the liberal intellectuals. The so-called Committee on promoting ideas of an independent literary group (Ban vận động văn đoàn độc lập), organized in 2014, also brings up this matter.

Western media and some of the Vietnamese art workers consider the participation of the party and government representatives in the events of the Vietnamese creative unions to be “ideological pressure” and infringement on freedom of creation. This is exactly how the speech of the then Chairperson of the National Assembly of Vietnam Nguyen Thị Kim Ngan at the 10th congress of the Union of Vietnamese writers and artist Association was appraised.²¹

Ho Chi Minh called attention to the issue of freedom of expression and press at the time. He refuted the statement that press and culture were not of class nature in the capitalist countries and noted that workers of art and press should have a strong political stance. “Politics should be the main touchstone”.²²

¹⁸ Những quan điểm cơ bản của đảng về văn hóa, văn nghệ. Retrived on May 25, 2021.

¹⁹ A list of pertinent significant documents:

The CPV Central Committee Secretariat Report “On confronting misperceptions in the field of art and literature”, 2009.

Directive of the CPV Central Committee Secretariat, “On preventing adverse works from getting into cultural field and undermine social morality”, 2010.

Decree of the CPV Central Committee Politburo, “On protecting ideological basis of the party, fighting against hostile and misleading views, exposing them within the new constitutions”, 2018.

²⁰ From the presentation of Trần Thọ Quang, Associate Professor, Hồ Chí Minh Political Academy, PhD, at the IFES RAS Plenary Session held on May 19–20, 2021.

²¹ Cao Nguyên (2021). Chủ tịch Quốc hội nói các hội văn nghệ phải “quán triệt đường lối, chủ trương của Đảng”. *RFA*, January 18.

²² Hồ Chí Minh (2000). Bài nói tại Đại hội lần thứ hai Hội nhà báo Việt Nam, in: Hồ Chí Minh. *Toàn tập*, t. 9. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 422.

The CPV acknowledges the importance of ensuring freedom and democracy in the field of literary creation, but the freedom cannot be full and unrestricted. An examination of the party documents adopted to manage negative occurrences in the field of literature and art helps to draw conclusion that there are at least two criteria that determine limits of the freedom of creation. *Firstly*, works of writers must not undermine fundamentals of the government. *Secondly*, they must not be against the moral foundation of the society, spiritual values, and cultural traditions of the Vietnamese nation.

Culture is closely connected with politics and ideology. A certain inequality in making reforms of the Vietnamese Renovation policy must be noted. Most significant changes are mainly being made in the field of economy and foreign policy. At the same time political changes are made with caution. An examination of the 13th CPV Congress documents allows drawing a conclusion that “the CPV intends to continue looking for such a development pattern of political system that could ensure gradual process of democratization taken step by step without aggravation of social, national, and other conflicts”²³. The nature of political processes has a direct impact on the development of art and literature.

Conclusion

Since the announcement of the Renovation policy a new milestone of the Vietnamese literary development has been made. For the last 35 years some significant positive changes has taken place in the field of literature. Many achievements stem from the activities of the CPV. The party attaches great importance to the spiritual field, considering it to be not only of intrinsic value, but an important basis of internal political stability and socio-economic development of the country. The party management in the literary field is complex and comprehensive; it includes everything from developing policy papers and theoretical aspects, setting directions of cultural policy, and making institutional recommendations to controlling, appraising, encouraging writers' activity and compiling all the previous experience. Modern Vietnamese cultural policy consists of many principles based on Ho Chi Minh's ideas. The CPV develops them inventively considering present conditions, goals, and possibilities. As culture is closely connected to ideology, it is important for the CPV to address negative occurrences in the field of literature and art, be able to stand firm against the intense influence of

²³ From the presentation of Grigoriy M. Lokshin, Lead Researcher, IFES RAS, PhD, at the IFES RAS Plenary Session held on May 19–20, 2021.

western culture that does not always have a good impact on creative activities in the Vietnamese society. In recent years economic environment of the country enables Vietnam to actively promote its culture in general and literature in particular outside the country. It is now a strong tendency and one of the foreign CPV policy directions. Vietnamese literature is securing its place among the world literature now that it is an essential part of it.

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Chapter 18

THE LANGUAGE POLICY OF THE CPV IN 1945—1985

Vietnam is a multinational polylingual country, where ethnic minorities constitute significant part of the population. They played and still are playing an important role in many spheres of the life of Vietnamese society, such as land development, administration, science, culture, as well as in strengthening connections between neighboring regions.

The article discusses problems of the language policy of the CPV and the measures adopted to associate all the peoples of Vietnam with the Vietnamese language and to reserve the languages of ethnic minorities during the Anti-French Resistance War and after it, i.e., from 1945 to 1985. It evaluates the main directions of this policy resulted in the absence of ethno-linguistic conflicts in current Vietnam. The 13th Congress of the CPV noted that this policy was continued also after the given period in the interests of the unification of all minorities of the country in favor of the internal stability and prosperity of the SRV.

Keywords: poly-ethnicity of the country, language situation, polylingualism as part of national policy, the language of the titular nation, state language, bilingualism, minority languages.

Introduction

One of the most important current problems in poly-ethnic and multi-lingual countries is the problem of relationship between the language of the titular nation and other national languages of the country and the preservation of languages of indigenous population including those of ethnic minorities. Every language is a unique phenomenon of human thought, culture and history. Thus, it contributes indispensably to humanitarian treasure of mankind. Therefore, in many poly-ethnic countries all their languages, including the language of the titular nation, indigenous and ethnic lan-

languages of minorities are preserved by the State as the main component of their culture, as the national legacy belonging to mankind. But, unfortunately, not every country pursues such a policy. The negative example of the kind is, for instance, current Ukraine, where Russian population is subject to language and other discrimination.¹ The counterexample is Vietnam, where numerous languages of all the peoples and ethnic minorities are reserved by the State. There are neither language conflicts nor national ones. How does multi-national, poly-confessional, and poly-lingual Vietnam manage the situation?

A short survey of the ethno-lingual situation in Vietnam

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a multi-national and poly-lingual country. On November 1, 2021, its population is 98 904 610 persons.² Vietnam is one of the countries with high population densities (298,6 persons per 1 km²) and quickly increasing population. According to the data for 2021 of the Committee for Ethnic Minority Affairs of Vietnam the population of the country consists of 54 peoples: Viet (Kinh), Tay, Thai, Hoa, Khmer, Nung, Kho Mu, Dao, Gia Rai, Ngai, E-đe, Bana, Xo Dang, San Chay, Co Ho, Cham, San Diu, Hre, M'Nong, Ra Glay, Xtieng, Bru-Van kieu, Tho, Giay, Co Tu, Gie-trieng, Ma, Khao Mu, Co, Ta Oi, Cho Ro, Khang, Xinh Mun, Ha Nhi, Chu-ru, Lao, La Chi, La Ha, Phu La, La Hu, Lu, Lo Lo, Chut, Mang, Pa Then, Co Lao, Cong, Bo Y, Si La, Pu Peo, Brau, Muong, Ro Ma, Mong.³

Among these 54 peoples, Viet (người Việt), or Kinh (kinh) are the most numerous (85,7 % of the entire population); the rest 53 peoples are but 14,3 % of the population. The Vietnamese language is the state language of the SRV now. It belongs to the Viet group of the Austroasiatic language family, with about 86 % native speakers of the whole population of the country.⁴ Beside the Vietnamese language, there are over 100 spoken languages and dialects in the country. Such is the language situation in the SRV. Beside Vietnamese, in the spheres of business and social communication English, French, Chinese, Japanese, Korean are used, as well as langu-

¹ Putin, V. V. *Ob istoricheskoy edinstvennoy russkoy i ukrainskoy*. Retrieved on 12.07.2021.

² The Population of Vietnam / Countrymeters. Retrieved on 01.11.2021.

³ Cộng đồng 54 dân tộc Việt Nam. *Cổng thông tin điện tử Ủy ban Dân tộc*. Retrieved on 30.08.2021.

⁴ *Sovremennyy Vietnam: Spravochnik* (2015). M., s. 28.

ages of ethnic minorities. In relevance to current linguistic classification languages of the peoples of Vietnam belong to the following five language families: Austroasiatic, Austronesian, Tai—Kadai, Hmong—Mien, and Sino-Tibetan.

The speakers of these families' languages settle the territory of Vietnam unevenly. Part of them settles compactly, others are dispersed in small groups, sometimes far away from one another. Dispersed mixed nature of settlement is the main feature of the ethno-linguistic situation existing among ethnic minorities of Vietnam, especially in the North of the country.

The Viet, main part of the population, settles mostly in the deltas of Sông Hồng and Mê Kông, and along the coastline of the South China Sea. The soil of the rivers' deltas is very fertile, which allowed them to become the main rice-producing regions of the country, also, to be the region where the biggest cities of Vietnam are located.

The Vietnamese language is both the titular nation's language and the dominating autochthonous language. In various historical periods, it was the important consolidating factor in the joint struggle of the Viet and representatives of national minorities against natural disasters and foreign conquerors. Centuries-old history of the struggle against common dangers united the peoples of Vietnam, and endowed them with the feeling of solidarity, being their historical and cultural feature.

Therefore, Vietnamese is in some degree the spoken language for numerous peoples of Vietnam. At the same time, many of them speak, beside their native tongue, one or more languages of their neighbors. Therefore, the historically emerged language situation can be considered twice unique. First, in Vietnam there dispersed bilingualism and sometimes even trilingualism.⁵ Secondly, as has been said, there has never been any ethno-linguistic conflicts in its history.

The Vietnamese language situation before the Declaration of Independence of Vietnam⁶

De-facto the Vietnamese language began functioning like the state language only after the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

⁵ Guboglo, M. N. (1985) Natsional'no-v'etskoe dvuyazychie v SRV. *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya*, 4: 131.

⁶ The author is grateful to Professor Tu Thi Loan (The State Institute of Culture and Arts, Hanoi) for the information of literature on the Vietnamese language situation under the French colonial administration.

Before, during the French colonization, there was no such concept as “the Vietnamese language”. There were used the two word-combinations: either *quoc ngu* (the national language), offered as early as in the 17th century by Alexander de Rhodes⁷, or Annamese (from the French protectorate of Annam). The French colonial administration limited the sphere of functioning of the Vietnamese language. In particular, the Vietnamese language was not adopted at the top of colonial administration. As a means of education, it was used only in the primary education, and was hardly ever used in the field of scientific or technical training. The French administration methodically pursued the policy of introducing the French language into Vietnamese society. Therefore, they began with the cancellation of the Chinese *han* writing and of the Vietnamese hieroglyphic *nom* writing giving an incentive to phonemic writing *quoc ngu*. They attached a great importance to this latinized writing system, first of all, because they considered it as the intermediate stage preparing the transition for the Vietnamese to the French language, also using most letters of the Latin alphabet. In 1864 the first schools teaching only latinized writing were established in the suburbs of Saigon. The first Vietnamese newspaper “Gia Định Báo” (in *quoc ngu*) was issued in Saigon in 1865. Four years later, on February 22, 1869, Gustave Ohier, Vice-Governor of Cochinchine (Viet. *Nam Ky*), signed the decree of the obliged use of phonemic writing *quoc ngu* instead of Chinese hieroglyphic writing in the official documents in North Vietnam.⁸

In April 1878 the decree of Lafont, the governor of South Vietnam, ordered to adopt *quoc ngu* writing in Nam Ky (South Vietnam). By the early 20th century the government of colonial France enlarged the territory of the latinized writing use, having charged the School Administration to introduce teaching *quoc ngu* in Bac Ky (North Vietnam) in 1910. According to this charge, at the very beginning of the 20th century latinized writing had already been taught in Tonkin.

In the frames of Evangelization of the local population, missionaries had not only churches, but also schools and printing houses built. They opened primary schools and taught both in French and in Vietnamese. However, these changes touched only towns. The colonial administration did not attempt to teach children of ethnic minorities in Vietnam. Curricula

⁷ In the mid-17th century Alexander de Rhodes, a Catholic preacher and a member of the Society of Jesus from Avignon, finished a long work of his predecessors, European missionaries, and during his mission created the complete Vietnamese alphabet *quoc ngu* with the use of Latin letters.

⁸ Hoàng Xuân Việt (2006). *Bách thư chữ Quốc ngữ*. San Jose, CA: Hội Văn hóa Việt, tr. 374–375.

in these schools increased the colonial control, emphasizing the superiority of French values and culture. Such a “civilizing mission” of France resulted in illiteracy of over 90 % of Vietnamese population.

The French language had the official status during the colonial regime in Vietnam; and it was de-facto official language in South Vietnam till its liberation in 1975.

Since 1903 the French language has been obligatory for the Vietnamese employees in the French administration.

Notwithstanding, hieroglyphic types of Chinese *han* and Vietnamese *nom* writing systems co-existed in Vietnam up to the early 20th century. But their positions sharply decreased when the colonial administration had canceled competitive examinations for offices of state officials, traditionally taken in hieroglyphic *han* writing. Therefore, by the 1930s *quoc ngu* had already been widely used along with French in the administrative field, in culture, press, education and in everyday life. Due to lasting contacts with the French language, the Vietnamese language borrowed a lot of French words. However, this process did not result in the assimilation of the Vietnamese language by French, but only improved its vocabulary. Also, numerous Chinese words (so called hanviet lexica) have been borrowed by the Vietnamese language and is significant part of his vocabulary. And the French language, spoken by part of educated population in Vietnam up to now (especially old Vietnamese intellectuals), only broadened Vietnamese polylingualism.

After the victory of the August Revolution and the declaration of the independence of Vietnam on September 2, 1945, the Vietnamese language became the state language of the DRV, but not in legislation. As far as the writing system is concerned, *quoc ngu* is the only official writing system of the country now.

The Vietnamese language as a means of international communication and unification of the peoples of Vietnam

During its history, Vietnam is a poly-ethnic country with a specific ethnic and lingual situation which should have been taken into consideration by the CPV and the government while developing the language policy.

Since the declaration of independence of the country, the strategy of the language policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam and its government

has been the reservation and development of all its languages. From the very beginning Ho Chi Minh, President of independent Vietnam, attached the paramount importance to the unifying function of the Vietnamese language as a means of inter-ethnic communication as well as to problems of association with it languages of ethnic minorities which mostly had no writing and were illiterate. The young republic had important tasks in front of it, such as the construction of a new independent State, forced continuation of active struggle against French colonizers, implementation of democratic reforms, first of all the agrarian one, illiteracy elimination, the revival of national culture and many others.

The solution of so large-scale tasks in the poly-ethnic country, put the important question of consolidation of all the peoples into the united Vietnamese nation. The CPV saw the opportunity and successful solution of this question first of all in the rapprochement of all the peoples, in their unification on the ground of the association with the Vietnamese language as a unifying means for all the peoples and ethnic minorities and necessary reservation of national languages, including those of ethnic minorities. The Party intensely used the most efficient means of the language policy, namely: administrative sphere, educational system and mass media. The functioning of the Vietnamese language enlarged with its introduction in the fields of secondary and high education, academic communication, political and administrative spheres etc. Simultaneously, the scope of functioning of minorities' languages enlarged due to the right to use their native languages in political, economic and cultural life. The important work was carried out to create the writing systems for unlettered ethnic minorities.

It is noteworthy that soon after the declaration of the DRV, Ho Chi Minh received some representatives of ethnic minorities in Hanoi. He noted their love for the country, their contribution to the victory of the August Revolution and directed them to more active participation in the defense of independence of the young republic⁹. On December 3, 1945, in Hanoi, the Conference of representatives of national minorities of North Vietnam began its work. Ho Chi Minh took part in its opening. In his speech he emphasized the equality of all the peoples and set the task of the government of Vietnam: to give the comprehensive assistance to national minorities.¹⁰

On April 19, 1946, in Pleiku (province Gia Lai on Tay Nguyen plateau) the Congress of representatives of national minorities of South Vietnam was

⁹ Ho Chi Minh. (2016). *Biografiya*. Hanoi, s. 403.

¹⁰ Ibid.

held. Ho Chi Minh addressed its participants with the letter which said: “All the compatriots, whether they are Viets or belong to the nationalities of Tho, Muong, Mang, Gia Rai, E-de, Xo Dang, Bana and others, are Vietnam’s children, they are brothers <...> Rivers can dry up, mountains can go to ruin, but our unity is inviolable, because we have resolved to unite our strengths for the defense of liberty and independence”.¹¹

The principles of the language policy as part of the CPV national policy were reflected in the very first Constitution of the DRV, adopted at the second session of the National Assembly of the DRV on November 9, 1946. It guaranteed equal rights to all the peoples and national minorities, living in the country, the right of obligatory free primary education among them. National minorities acquired the right of education in their native tongues.¹²

The important integrating and consolidating factor of the Vietnamese language as a means of international communication was the adoption of the second Constitution at the session of the National Assembly on December 31, 1959. It defines the DRV as a united multinational State, where all its peoples are equal. Particularly, it was emphasized that the State assists unlettered ethnic minorities to create the writing, but only if the people is not too small, lives as a compact group and speak relatively common language.¹³

The complete liberation of South Vietnam on April 30, 1975, was the turning point in the life of the entire Vietnamese people. On July 2, 1976, the first session of the single National Assembly adopted the resolution to unify the country into one state, the SRV. During this period, the integrating role of the state Vietnamese language increased, as never before. The SRV Constitution 1980 guaranteed equal rights and duties to the Vietnamese citizens of all the nationalities, such as the right to speak and write native tongues, the right to reserve national customs and to develop national culture.¹⁴ However, as can be seen, neither those Constitutions of Vietnam, nor the Education Law, nor other laws and Party and state documents adopted in 1945—1985 said that the Vietnamese language is the state language of the DRV/SRV. Only the SRV Constitution adopted by the National Assembly on November 28, 2013, said (Article 5, point 3): “The state language of the SRV is Vietnamese”.¹⁵

¹¹ *Ibid.*, s. 403—404.

¹² Hiến pháp nước Việt Nam Dân chủ Cộng hoà (Quốc hội nước Việt Nam Dân chủ Cộng hoà thông qua ngày 9-11-1946.

¹³ Hiến pháp nước Cộng hoà Xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam năm 1959

¹⁴ Hiến pháp nước Cộng hoà Xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam năm 1980.

¹⁵ Hiến pháp nước cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt nam 2013.

Probably, then to attach the status of the state language to the Vietnamese language it was enough to acknowledge it as a means of inter-ethnic communication and to assign the function of uniting all the peoples living in the country to it.

The increased unifying role of Vietnamese as the titular language was connected with the necessity to develop its cultural and educational function, as well as the function of the mediator in the dissemination of knowledge among other peoples and ethnic minorities in Vietnam. Therefore, the SPV and the State paid special attention to problems of teaching the Vietnamese language and education in it for representatives of minorities.

Objectively, it was justified with the circumstance that, as has already been said, there existed bilingualism among ethnic minorities of Vietnam. But, as far as bilingualism is concerned, numerous researchers noted that here, as a means of inter-national communication was not only Vietnamese, but also numerous local languages. Such are, for instance, Tay and Nung in the North of Vietnam, the Thai language in the West. Party and administrative organs took into consideration that such language as Tay, Khmer, Muong, Nung, Meo, Dao, Gia Rai, E-de, Bana, also play an important role from the point of view of the number of speakers, but still their communicative importance concedes to the communicative function of the Vietnamese language. The most common type of bilingualism was and is the use of the Vietnamese language in public life, and the use of a native tongue in daily life. It has been noticed that the level of spoken Vietnamese of bilinguals depends on their educational level. No surprise, as the students from national minorities learned the Vietnamese language mostly at schools for grade 3. It meant that the important factor in forming bilingualism was education in secondary schools for grades 2 and 3, taught in the Vietnamese language. That is why the teaching in a native tongue was acknowledged expedient only in the primary school. In secondary and high schools, the main means of education was the Vietnamese language. As far as the native tongue and native literature are concerned, they were reserved as obligatory subject in national schools.

The Party and the State of the DRV also cared for training teachers for pedagogical colleges. Thus, in 1951 150 representatives of national minorities joined the first High pedagogical college. In 1964 there were 5854 teachers from national minorities, and in 1974 12653 ones, including 143 teachers with high education.¹⁶

¹⁶ Glebova, I. I. (1982) *V'etnamskiy yazyk kak sredstvo mezhnatsional'nogo obshcheniya v SRV. Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, 1: 162.

In 1960 a great scientific conference on problems of *quoc ngu* reform was held in Hanoi. Sixty-seven representatives of science, culture, education, journalism and publishing industry were participants. Their reports noted the urgent need to improve the existing writing system. Also, they noted its chief defects, such as the use of different letters for the same sounds, a lot of diacritical marks, difference in merged and separate writing of two-syllable words and other problems related to the unification of the orthography and the language proper.¹⁷

At the same time, the CPV and the State cared for the writing problem for ethnic minorities.

Such were, for example, decrees 153/CP (1969) and 53/CP (1980) on languages and writing of national minorities. At the same time there were adopted concrete measures for representatives of ethnic minorities, such as: the creation of writing for unlettered peoples; reform, Latinization of a number of national writings; the enlarging of the teaching national languages as course; the development of bilingual teaching “The Vietnamese language — the national language”; broadcasting in national languages; requirement to speak national language for national regions’ regulars and managers; study and investigation of national languages and writings, preparing monographs on national languages and writing etc.¹⁸

In the 1980s, in accordance with decree 53/CP in many regions of the country there were created and introduced into usage writing systems for a number of the peoples. For instance, in 1981 Gia Lai — Kon Tum province adopted the resolution on writing systems for the languages Bahnar, Xo Dang, Gia Rai; in Dac Lac province there was prepared training material on the language and writing of E-de and M’Nong. In 1983 the People’s Committee of Binh Tri Thien province officially acknowledged the writing system for the Pakoh and Bru-Van kieu languages.

Between 1945 and 1985 there were developed several dozens of Latinized writing systems for the peoples of Vietnam, a great step forward in the development of their languages. Due to it, social functions of national minorities’ languages widened, gradually there appeared their literary form and functional styles. Nevertheless, 27 ethnic minorities of Vietnam out of 53

¹⁷ Vấn đề cải tiến chữ quốc ngữ (1961), in *Tài liệu Hội nghị cải tiến chữ quốc ngữ tháng 9-1960*. Hà-Nội.

¹⁸ Nguyen Van Hiep (2020). Dinamika razvitiya yazykov malochislennykh narodov V’etnama, in *Zakonomernosti sotsiokul’turnogo razvitiya yazykov v politnicheskikh stranakh mira: Rossiya — V’etnam*. M., s. 269.

ones have not got their own writing yet.¹⁹ Joint Soviet-Vietnamese linguistic expeditions played an important role in investigation and descriptions of languages of national minorities of Vietnam.

The Russian-Vietnamese cooperation in the field of ethnic linguistics

The cooperation of Soviet and Vietnamese researchers in the field of linguistics began in the mid-1960s. Its development has become especially intense since the second half of the 1970s, when there were launched researches and documenting of the languages of ethnic minorities of Vietnam. From the Soviet side, the researches of the languages of ethnic minorities of Vietnam were initiated by V.M. Solntsev, Dr. Sc. (Filology), Professor, Head of the Department of Languages in the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAN. From the Vietnamese side, leader was Hoang Tue, Professor, Director of the Institute of Linguistics of the SRV Committee of Social Sciences.

During joint expeditions of field seasons 1979, 1981, 1984, 1986 there was collected and classified the richest material on the Ksingmul, Muong, La Ha, Hmong (Meo), Cham languages, the dialect Soc Trang of the Khmer language, Chu-Ru, Ma, Pu Peo, Poong, Ta Oi, Arem, Van Kieu, Co Tu, Pnong and Rukh. From 1986 V.M. Solntsev was head of the Institute of Linguistics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (later RAS), and the Institute continued those expeditions jointly with their Vietnamese colleagues. Those years they collected materials on the following languages: La Ha (1986), Muong (1987). Later field materials 1979—1986 were theoretically comprehended, described and represented in Russian books published according to a unified scheme, including a linguistic essay with such parts as the phonetics and phonology, lexicon, morphology, syntax, as well as thesaurus-vocabulary, grammar materials and texts. All the field materials were provided with Russian and Vietnamese translations. In 1990s, Vietnamese linguists published a number of researches of such languages as Pu Peo, Ruk, Co Tu, Bru Van Kieu etc.²⁰

¹⁹ Ly Toan Thang (2008). *Yazyki V'etnama i yazykovaya politika*, in: *Funktsionirovaniye yazykov v mnogonatsional'nom gosudarstve: Rossiya i V'etnam*. M., s. 348.

²⁰ Kraevskaya, N. M., Samarina, I. V. (2021) *Nauchnoe sotrudnichestvo v oblasti dokumentirovaniya yazykov i etnolingvistiki pri podderzhke Rossiyskogo gumanitarnogo nauchnogo fonda, Rossiyskogo fonda gumanitarnykh issledovaniy i V'etnamskoy akademii obshchestvennykh nauk*, in: *70-letie v'ietnamo-rossiyskikh otnosheniy v oblasti nauki i obrazovaniya. Materialy mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii 19 oktyabrya 2020, Hanoi*. Hanoi: Isd-vo V'etnamckogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, s. 368—390.

From 1979 to 1986 Vietnamese participants of the joint Soviet-Vietnamese expeditions came to Moscow to process the materials. Simultaneously, they improved their professional level.

After the collapse of the USSR, the cooperation in this field continued in the frameworks of bilateral relations of the RAS Institute of Linguistics, Russian State University for the Humanities (RGGU) and linguistic research institutes CSS (later VASS) of the SRV. Now one of the well-known researchers of the languages of ethnic minorities of the SRV is I.V. Samarina. Since the late 2000s she is a constant leader of many projects of RHSF-VASS and a participant of linguistic expeditions for collection materials and description of Co Lao, archaic Vietnamese languages May, Sach and Ma Lieng, relic languages Arem and Ruk, endangered languages of Nghe An and Thanh Hoa provinces. During this period from the Vietnamese side the leaders of these expeditions were Nguyen Hu Hoanh and Ta Van Thong.

In 2018 there appeared the book on the May language by K.V. Babaev and I.V. Samarina.²¹ Also, its English translation was published abroad by Brill Publisher.²² I.V. Samarina's research-work is highly appreciated by the SRV Government. She has been awarded with the Friendship Order of Vietnam. On May 23, 2019 in the Embassy of Vietnam in Moscow she was presented with the order by Nguyen Xuan Phuc, now President of the SRV.

Conclusion

Vietnam is a multinational, polycultural and polylingual state. Despite many differences, its peoples and nationalities are united in a single nation and co-exist peacefully on the same territory of the same country. It was realized due to the policy pursued by Ho Chi Minh, the Communist Party and government of the DRV (later the SRV), in 1945—1985. During that period there were laid the foundations of the language policy for the Vietnamese language as a means of inter-national communication and unity of all the ethnic groups, including ethnic minorities, on the ground of their association with the Vietnamese language. This strategy was continued after the 6th Congress of the CPV (1986), which declared the policy of comprehensive

²¹ Babaev, K.V., Samarina, I. V. (2018) *Yazyk Mai. Materialy rossiysko-v'etnamskoy lingvisticheskoy ekspeditsii*, vyp. 5. M. 576 s.

²² Babaev, K., Samarina, I. (2021). *A Grammar of May — An Austroasiatic Language of Vietnam*. Edited and translated by Paul Sidwell. Brill Publisher. 438 p.

renovation “*Doi moi*” and particularly nowadays, after the 13th Congress of the CPV, held from January 25 to February 1, 2021. However, due to dispersed dwelling in the regions with mixed population (especially in the Northern regions), typical of ethnic minorities of Vietnam, and low standards of living, up to now not every national minority has own writing. There were difficulties in the application of the existing writings of ethnic minorities to schooling, to publishing manuals, dictionaries and periodicals in those writings.

Nevertheless, making the Vietnamese language the legal language of inter-national communication in multinational and polylingual Vietnam was the only way and it was useful both to the Viet and to the 53 nationalities, including ethnic minorities. The Vietnamese language is taught in all the schools of Vietnam. It is used as a chief means of communication of all the peoples of the SRV. Nowadays, the Vietnamese language is the standardized literary language of the titular nation of the country with the status of the state language of Vietnam. It is the only official language functioning in the sphere of government, office work, legal proceedings and in every social sphere, such as education, culture, and mass media, science and technologies.

Dislike Vietnamese, the language of the dominant lingual community, ethnic minorities’ languages are not so prestigious and function less in social spheres, but they are not consigned to oblivion. They also play an important role.

In the years 1945—1985 there were created, introduced and used dozens of writings for national minorities having been the impetus for the development of their languages. Due to their own writing systems, social functions of minorities languages increased, gradually national literary languages were formed, new functional styles emerged and improved. By now, more than a half of the 53 ethnic minorities of the SRV have their own writings. These writings continue to be used. Their role increases in every sphere of social life of national minorities.

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Chapter 19

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM AND THE INTELLECTUALS IN THE AGE OF *DOI MOI*

The intelligentsia is the elite force of the society and plays an important role in the development of the country. But is this force properly perceived? And how do we promote the role of intellectuals? In the process of leading the revolution, the Communist Party of Vietnam has always been interested in building and promoting the role of the intelligentsia, so the position and role of the intelligentsia has been increasingly enhanced. Promoting the role of intellectuals, the Party has advocated improving policies on training, fostering and using the intelligentsia effectively; creating an environment for the intelligentsia to perform their functions; and perfecting mechanisms and policies for organizations of intellectuals. Therefore, the force of Vietnamese intellectuals is growing stronger, with high quality, meeting the requirements of the country's development in the *Doi moi* period.

Keywords: Communist Party of Vietnam, intelligentsia, reform guidelines, role of intellectuals

The view of the Communist Party of Vietnam on intellectuals

The concept of intellectuals

Inheriting the views of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's thought on intellectuals, since its inception, the Communist Party of Vietnam has always considered intellectuals an important part of the Vietnamese revolution. The Party's awareness of intellectuals and promoting the role of intellectuals is a process associated with the development of the country.

Coming from an intellectual family, President Ho Chi Minh, more than anyone else, understood the nature of an intellectual. In the work “Modifying the way of working” (1947), President Ho Chi Minh defined knowledge: “What is knowledge? Knowledge is knowing and understanding. In the world, there are only two kinds of knowledge: one is knowledge that a struggle gives birth to. Natural science comes out of that. The second is the understanding of national and social struggles. Those are the social sciences. Apart from those two, there are no other kinds of knowledge”.¹ In his mind, intellectuals not only have a high level of knowledge, but also have a deep understanding and must grasp the nature and laws of the objects they study. Approaching from the perspective of knowledge, Ho Chi Minh also classified intellectuals into two large groups: intellectuals in the field of natural sciences and intellectuals in the field of social sciences.

Besides, stemming from the relationship between practice and understanding in promoting the role of intellectuals, President Ho Chi Minh gave his concept of intellectuals. He asserted: “A person who finishes university can be called an intellectual. But he did not know how to plow the field, did not know how to work, did not know how to fight the enemy, and did not know how to do many other things. In short: about real work, he knows nothing. So he is only half intellectual. His knowledge is from books, not complete knowledge. If he wants to be fully intellectual, he must put that knowledge into practice”.² Thus, according to Ho Chi Minh, the minimum level of an intellectual is a university degree. But the so-called university degree needs to be verified through its effectiveness in solving real-life problems. It can be said that, for him, university is the minimum standard of intellectuals in terms of knowledge, but it is necessary to understand university standards not only in terms of degrees, but also in practical terms — solving problems in practice at the theoretical level, by the scientific method, not by pure experience.

In the condition that the country promotes industrialization and modernization associated with the development of a knowledge-based economy, absorbing and creatively applying President Ho Chi Minh's views on intellectuals, the Seventh Plenum of the Party Central Committee, Term X (August 2008) discussed intellectuals with the topic “Building the human resources of intellectuals in the period of accelerating industrialization and modernization of the country”. This is the first conference of the Party on intellectuals, demonstrating new creative thinking in line with the country's

¹ Hồ Chí Minh (2011). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 5, tr. 275.

² *Ibid.*

reality. In particular, the Party has given the definition of intellectuals: “Intellectuals are people who do mental labour, have a high level of education in a certain professional field, and have the ability to think independently, create, spread and enrich knowledge, and create spiritual and material values for society”.³ The definition of the Party is the adaptation of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh's thought. In particular, the content of the definition of intellectuals has clearly indicated the characteristics and roles of intellectuals associated with the knowledge economy and affirmed the great contribution of intellectuals to society. The definition also shows that the way to form knowledge is through training, self-training and self-study. Therefore, the definition of intellectuals becomes the basis for proposing the goals, tasks, programs and solutions of the Party and State in practice. On the other hand, this is also the basis for unifying the people's thoughts and views on the role and tasks of intellectuals in the cause of national reform.

The role of intellectuals

History has proven that intellectuals have played their important role by accompanying the Vietnamese people in the national liberation revolution as well as the socialist revolution. Intellectuals have become an important part of the revolution to contribute to the victories of the Vietnamese revolution.

The Party's initial awareness of the role of intellectuals was confirmed in the Platform of February 1930. In this document, the Party advocated building a broad national unity bloc including all classes and strata of the people. Specifically, the Party pointed out: “The Party must make every effort to contact the petite bourgeoisie, intellectuals, middle-income peasants, youth, Tan Viet and so on to pull them into the side of the proletariat. As for the rich peasants, middle-class small landowners and Annamese capitalists whose counter-revolutionary nature is not revealed, we have to take advantage of them to make them stay neutral for a while. Any group that has come out against the revolution (Constitutional Party, etc.) must be overthrown”.⁴ Therefore, in the reality of the Vietnamese revolution, grasping the spirit of the February 1930 Platform, the Party actively gathered intellectu-

³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2009). *Văn kiện Hội nghị Ban chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khóa X*. Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 459.

⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2002). *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*. Hanoi: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 2, tr. 4.

als into the great national unity bloc on the basis of workers and peasants being the main driving force.

Based on the spirit of previous congresses and in the context of the country's socio-economic crisis, the 6th Party Congress (December 1986) also focused on building and promoting the role of intellectuals as the political foundation of the great national unity bloc. The Congress determined: "It is necessary to have a correct and unified view, together with effective policies and measures to comprehensively build the working class, the collective peasantry, and the socialist intelligentsia, making the socio-political foundation of the new society increasingly firm".⁵ Thus, with the foundation of the great national unity bloc, intellectuals play an important role in contributing to the reform of the country.

The role of intellectuals continued to be clarified and fully realized by the Party at the 7th National Congress (June 1991) in the Platform for nation building during the transition to socialism. In particular, the Platform for nation building in the transitional period to socialism affirms: "In the national-democratic revolution, the role of the intelligentsia is important, in the construction of socialism, the role of the intelligentsia is even more. If the working class does not have its own group of intellectuals and the workers and peasants themselves cannot improve their knowledge, and are not gradually intellectualized, then socialism cannot be built"⁶. The issue of alliance between the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia has been determined by our Party since the 2nd Congress (February 1951). But at the 7th Congress, the Party affirmed that intellectuals are an equal subject in the alliance and one of the three elements that constitute the foundation of the new social regime. This is the inheritance of Ho Chi Minh's thought. In order to successfully build socialism, there must be a team of socialist intellectuals who wholeheartedly serve the Fatherland and work for the people.

In the context of globalization and international integration, the 9th Party Congress (April 2001) defined more clearly the role of intellectuals in the formulation of the Party's guidelines and the state's laws and policies. The Congress pointed out: "Promote the capacity of intellectuals in implementing the state's research programs and topics and building guidelines, policies and laws".⁷ This is not only a right but also an obligation of intellectuals in building socialism, especially for the elite group of intellectuals.

⁵ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*. Hanoi: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 47, tr. 778.

⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1991). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ VII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 113.

With the achievements and lessons learned after 20 years of conducting the national reforming process, the 10th Party Congress (April 2006) became more aware of the role of intellectuals according to Ho Chi Minh's thought. Not stopping at the role of building and implementing guidelines and policies, the Party also focuses on and upholds the advisory and critical role of intellectuals. Specifically, the Party pointed out “respect the advisory and critical role of associations in science and technology, social sciences, literature and art in economic, cultural and social development projects.”⁸ This continued to be confirmed by the Party at the 12th Congress (January 2016) and the 13th Congress (January 2021). Thus, the role of intellectuals is increasingly expanding along with the development of the Party's awareness and the country's reality.

Through reviewing the above viewpoints, it can be seen that the Party always upholds the role of intellectuals and considers promoting the role of intellectuals as one of the important tasks. Therefore, in the 35 years of renovation, Vietnamese intellectuals are constantly growing in quantity and quality, making many contributions in all areas of social life. However, besides that, the job of building and promoting the role of intellectuals also has certain limitations such as imbalance in professions and gender; lack of leading experts. Also, a part of intellectuals are still not so active and have not played their advisory and critical roles well. Therefore, in order to effectively promote the role of intellectuals in the innovation process, it is necessary to have practical and effective solutions for the intellectuals to become an important resource for the development of the nation.

Solutions to promote the role of intellectuals today

Improve the effectiveness of policies on training, fostering and using intellectuals

The intellectual team is considered a high-quality resource of each country. This resource is formed mainly through the development of education and training, science and technology. The 11th Congress (January 2011) of the Party has determined: “Train, foster and promote all potentials and creativity of intellectuals to create intellectual and talented resources for

⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2003). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ IX*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 126.

⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ X*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 119.

the country”.⁹ In practice, the Party's guideline has been institutionalized by the State into many specific policies for the purpose of training and fostering the group of intellectuals, which has been increasingly improved in quantity and quality. Specifically, in 2000, the Government approved Project 322 “Project on training scientific and technical staff at foreign institutions with the state budget”. In 2010, the Government expanded project 911 “Training lecturers with doctorate qualifications for universities and colleges in the period 2010—2020”. In 2019, the Government approved of Project 89 “Improving the capacity of lecturers and managers of higher education institutions to meet the requirements of fundamental and comprehensive renovation of education and training in the period 2019—2030”. The Government's projects have opened up many opportunities to study, experience and improve the capacities of intellectuals in the context of international integration.

On the basis of intellectual resources, the Party also advocates to create a truly democratic environment for intellectuals to play their role. Inheriting the spirit of previous congresses, the 9th Congress (April 2001) of the Party advocated: “Innovate the policy of training, using and treating intellectuals, respect and honor talents”.¹⁰ The renewal of policies went in the direction of relating to reality in order to ensure the interests of intellectuals. In the spirit of the 9th Congress (April 2001) and the 10th Congress (April 2006), the 7th Plenum of the 10th Party Central Committee (August 2008) also emphasized: “Create a favorable environment and conditions for the professional work of intellectuals. Appreciate intellectuals on the basis of properly assessing their quality, capacity and dedication results; have a special policy towards the country's talents”.¹¹ Through respect and promotion, intellectuals will be able to do professional work, realize their potential for creativity, give advice and discuss the country's problems.

In the context that the 4th industrial revolution is taking place strongly and affecting all countries, it shows the importance of intellectuals as a pioneering force in the field of science and technology. Therefore, the 13th Party Congress advocated to build an increasingly strong and high-quality intellectual force to meet the requirements of the country's development in the new situation. On that basis, the Congress proposed a solution: “Appre-

⁹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2011). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 41].

¹⁰ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2003). *Op. cit.*, tr. 322.

¹¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2009). *Op. cit.*, tr. 466.

ciate and adequately treat talented Vietnamese scientists and technicians with high professional qualifications at home and abroad, especially leading scientists and scientists capable of presiding over particularly important scientific and technological tasks”.¹² The Party has mentioned the implementation of practical policies for intellectuals to ensure the interests of intellectuals for their dedication and to give them benefits. In particular, these preferential policies have great significance in promoting the role of elite intellectuals.

Besides paying attention to Vietnamese intellectuals in the country, in the spirit of great national solidarity, the Party also focuses on promoting the role of overseas Vietnamese intellectuals. If at the 9th Congress, the Party's policy towards overseas Vietnamese intellectuals stopped at “focus on using and promoting the intellectual potential of overseas Vietnamese”¹³, but then at the 10th Congress, the Party determined the urgency of policies to attract and treat these talents right: “Have policies to encourage Vietnamese people and overseas Vietnamese intellectuals to return to their homeland, contribute to the construction of the country; commend those who have made many achievements to contribute to the Fatherland”¹⁴. Therefore, in practice, the Party needs to promote the role of overseas Vietnamese intellectuals in participating in democratically and publicly debating and advising on new guidelines and policies of the Party and State.

Create a good environment for intellectuals to perform their functions

For intellectuals, it is necessary that the Party and State create a democratic environment to promote their role. On that basis, the intellectuals can present their views and opinions on the country's issues and if there is no “no-go zone”, this will create more motivation for intellectuals to contribute intellectually to the country's development. Therefore, it is important to create motivation for intellectuals to further promote their creative, consultative and critical roles in the national reform process.

During the 6th National Congress (December 1986) that initiated *Doi moi*, the Party recognized the necessity of realizing creative freedom for intellectuals. The Congress affirmed: “For intellectuals, the most important

¹² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 1, tr. 167.

¹³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2003). *Op. cit.*, tr. 332.

¹⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Op. cit.* tr. 123.

thing is to ensure the right to creative freedom”¹⁵. This is an essential factor, a driving force for intellectuals to constantly research, invent and discover. Promoting the spirit of the 6th Congress, in the new context, the 10th Party Congress (April 2006) emphasized: “Encourage intellectuals and scientists to invent and create. Protect intellectual property rights, and treat intellectuals properly for their contributions to the development of the country”¹⁶. The creative achievements of the intellectuals need to be respected, protected and put into practice by the Party and State. In that spirit, the 11th Congress (January 2011) affirmed that it was necessary to synchronously form mechanisms and policies to encourage creativity for intellectuals.

In addition to ensuring creative freedom, the Party also advocates freedom of thought for intellectuals. Therefore, in view of directing the building the intelligentsia, the 7th Plenum of the Party’s 7th Central Committee (August 2008) thoroughly grasped: “Practice democracy, respect and promote freedom of thought in intellectuals’ research and creative activities for the sake of a rich people, a strong country, a just, democratic and civilized society”¹⁷. The conference emphasized the importance of creating a democratic environment and respecting the democratic rights of intellectuals in order to create a basis for intellectuals’ research and creativity in their specialized fields. This view continued to be adopted by the 11th Congress (January 2011) of the Party and concretized in the 6th Plenum of the Party Central Committee (October 2012). The conference emphasized the importance of practicing democracy, respecting and promoting freedom of thought in research, creativity, consultation and critique activities of scientists.

The 13th Party Congress takes place in the context that the country is facing many opportunities and challenges, and many new strategic issues need to be resolved. On the basis of a correct analysis of reality and the world, in order to promote the role of intellectuals, the 13th Party Congress (January 1, 2021) affirmed: “It is necessary to have a mechanism to promote democracy and freedom in creative works and to promote ethics and responsibility in scientific research. Prioritize investment in the development of infrastructure, working environment, research work and innovation of intellectuals”¹⁸. With a democratic environment, being free to create will help intellectuals effectively promote their role in the context of the fourth industrial revolution.

¹⁵ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1987). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ VI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 115.

¹⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Op. cit.*, tr. 119.

¹⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2009). *Op. cit.*, tr. 466.

¹⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 167.

Perfect mechanisms and policies for organizations of intellectuals

During his lifetime, President Ho Chi Minh was not only well aware of the role of intellectuals but also highly appreciated the importance of gathering intellectuals into organizations. Therefore, in the current period, the Communist Party of Vietnam needs to perfect mechanisms and policies for intellectuals' organizations in order to effectively promote the role of intellectuals in the fourth industrial revolution.

In Vietnam, the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) is an organization that has the role of gathering and uniting the Vietnamese scientific and technological intellectuals at home and abroad. Over 30 years of construction and development, VUSTA has become a large socio-political organization with 152 member associations, including 89 national associations and 63 provincial/city unions. Besides, VUSTA also has more than 500 scientific research, technological development and training units established under Decree 81; 101 newspapers and magazine agencies with more than 400 publications including newspapers, online newspapers, magazines, newsletters, special journals, websites and other publications. VUSTA also acts as a bridge between member associations and agencies of the Party, State, Vietnam's Fatherland Front and other organizations in order to solve common problems for intellectuals.

Recognizing the importance of associations for intellectuals, the 10th Party Congress (April 2006) emphasized: "Respect the advisory and critical role of associations in science, technology, social science, literature and arts for economic, cultural and social development projects"¹⁹. The 10th Congress (April 2006) highly appreciated the role of intellectuals in socio-economic development through consulting and debating the guidelines and policies of the Party and the State. That view continued to be adopted by the 11th Party Congress (January 2011) and concretized in the 6th Plenum of the Party Central Committee (October 2012). The conference affirmed the need to continue to strongly promote the role of the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations and socio-political organizations in consulting work and social debates in order to contribute to perfecting the Party's guidelines and the state's policies. Therefore, the Party and State need to have specific mechanisms and policies for the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations to promote their role. In the current period, in order to promote the role of intellectuals, the Party and State

¹⁹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Op. cit.*, tr. 119.

should strengthen the work of directing and promulgating legal documents and regulations to further raise awareness of the role of VUSTA in the new situation. The Party also needs to issue directive documents to stabilize the organization and ideology among the intelligentsia of the VUSTA, and these guiding documents need to be institutionalized by the National Assembly and the State through specific laws and regulations.

Conclusion

The development of countries in the 21st century requires the formation of a force of high-quality intellectuals to meet the requirements of globalization and international integration. Throughout the process of leading the Vietnamese revolution, the Party has constantly raised awareness of intellectuals and the importance of promoting the role of intellectuals. The Party has focused on training, fostering and using intellectuals effectively; building a democratic environment for intellectuals to promote their creativity and perform the function of consulting and debating. At the same time, the Party is also interested in promoting the role of intellectuals' associations as a force to gather intellectuals in society through specific policies and mechanisms. Therefore, the Party has proposed many practical solutions to build the human resources of high-quality intellectuals. Reality has proved that, with the correct views and policies of the Party, in the 35 years of *Doi moi*, Vietnamese intellectuals have constantly grown in quantity and quality, making many contributions to the development of the country.

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Chapter 20

NATIONAL DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION ALONG WITH THE GUIDELINES OF THE CPV: SOME CONNECTIONS WITH HIGHER EDUCATION IN VIETNAM TODAY

In recent times, the Fourth Industrial Revolution has been vigorously, swiftly, and comprehensively underway; this 4.0 revolution brings more opportunities but also poses many difficulties and challenges for nations, organizations, and individuals; and it is already impacting the economic and socio-political lives. The 13th National Party Congress recently emphasized the policy of digital transformation and development of the digital economy in National Congress Documents. In order to concretize the Party's guidelines and undertakings on the national development strategy in line with the actual domestic and global situation in the 4.0 technology revolution today; The State has issued many legal documents and policies to be active, positive, and ready to keep pace with this trend. Therein mentioning numbers of areas that need to be prioritized for digital transformation in Vietnam, such as in the health, education, banking and finance, agriculture, transportation, natural resources and environment sectors, etc., most notably is the appearance of digital transformation in the field of education, specifically in the university one.

Keywords: digital transformation, the Communist Party of Vietnam's guidelines (CPV's guidelines), higher education in Vietnam.

National digital transformation in line with the undertakings and guidelines of the Communist Party of Vietnam today

The Documents of the 13th National Party Congress first appeared new concepts such as “Digital transformation”, “digital economy”, and “digital society”, and soon have become the points that need to be stressed. The

connotations of these concepts are also emphasized repeatedly in the goals, perspectives on developments, and strategic breakthroughs. Notably, the Document of the 13th Congress, specifically the Draft Political Report, emphasized that¹: “It is necessary to continue to grasp thoroughly and implement consistently the policy that science and technology are a national top-priority policy, and a key engine for the development of modern forces of production, innovation of growth models, and improvement of productivity, quality, efficiency, and competitiveness of the economy. Having a strategy of science and technology development in line with the general trend of the world and the basis of local conditions, meeting the requirements of the national construction and defense in the present phase, and adapting to the Fourth Industrial Revolution”.

In response to the new reality situation, to bring the country to catch up and develop in the era of the technological revolution, the Politburo issued Resolution No.52 — NQ/TW dated September 27, 2019, on several guidelines and policies to actively take part in the fourth industrial revolution, that emphasizes the urgent need to accelerate the process of digital transformation with three main pillars are digital government, digital economy, and digital society. Accordingly, the content of the Party's line on digital transformation with its guiding viewpoints and goals that are specified as follows:

Regarding guiding viewpoints²:

Firstly, positively and actively takes part in the 4.0 Industrial Revolution 4.0 is an indispensable requirement, and a task of particular strategic importance which is both urgent and in the long-term of the whole political system and the whole society, and closely associated with the wide and deep process of international integration; at the same time having full and proper awareness of the connotations and essences of the Fourth Industrial Revolution to determinedly change ways of thinking and doing; considering it as a break-through measure with appropriate steps and routes which are an opportunity for Vietnam to constitute an achievement in the socio-economic development.

Secondly, the Fourth Industrial Revolution represents both opportunities and challenges. It is necessary to promptly seize and effectively take advantage of opportunities to improve labor productivity, as well as the effici-

¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2020). *Dự thảo báo cáo chính trị của Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khoá XII trình Đại hội 13 của Đảng*, tr. 36.

² Bộ Chính trị (2019). Nghị quyết số 52-NQ/TW ngày 27/9/2019 của Bộ Chính trị về một số chủ trương, chính sách chủ động tham gia cuộc Cách mạng công nghiệp lần thứ tư. *Báo điện tử Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam*.

ency and competitiveness of the economy and social management through researching, transferring, and vigorously applying advanced achievements of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in the full spectrum of socio-economic life, especially in a number of key industries which have potential advantages to be the engines for growth, in the spirit of catching up, advancing with and surpassing in some areas compared to those in the region and the world. Proactively prevents and responds to restrict adverse effects, assures the safety and national defense, guarantees social equality, and ensures the sustainability and stability of the country's development process.

Thirdly, the Fourth Industrial Revolution requires new thinking on economic and social management, as well as accordingly institutional building and perfecting. It is necessary to have an open and creative approach to new arisen practical problems and create all favorable conditions for innovation. Avoids all manifestations of indifference, lack of confidence, and passivity, but not subjectivity, haste, and voluntarist.

Finally, maximizes and ensures sufficient resources for the active participation in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, identifies internal resources as long-term decisions, strategies and fundamentals, and external resources as significant breakthrough to ensure the leadership of the Party and the management of the State, as well as fully promotes the strength of the whole society.

Regarding the goal:³

First, the overall objective. Effectively takes advantage of the opportunities brought by the 4.0 Industrial Revolution to speed up the process of changing the pattern of growth, restructuring the economy in association with implementing strategic breakthroughs and modernizing the country. Strongly develops the digital economy, and achieves fast and sustainable development relied on science and technology, innovation and high-quality human resources. Improves the quality of life and welfare of the people. Consolidates and strengthens national defense, and protects the ecological environment.

Second, some specific targets by 2025: Maintains the ranking on the Global Innovation Index (GII) among the top 3 ASEAN countries. Builds digital infrastructure to reach the advanced level in ASEAN. Builds the digital economy accounts for about 20 % of GDP. Basically completes the process of digital transformation in the Party, the State, Fatherland Front, and socio-political organizations. Belongs to the group of four leading ASEAN countries in e-government ranking. There are at least three smart

³ Ibid.

urban areas in the three key economic regions in the North, the South and Central Vietnam.

Third, some specific targets by 2030: Maintains the ranking on the Global Innovation Index (GII) among the top 40 countries in the world. Covers 5G mobile network the whole country that enables everyone to access the Internet at low cost. Builds the digital economy accounts for over 30 % of GDP. Completes the building of the Digital Government. Forms a number of smart urban chains in the three key economic regions in the North, the South and Central Vietnam, step by step link to smart city networks in the region and the world.

Fourth, vision towards 2045: Becomes one of the leading smart manufacturing and service centers, start-ups, and innovation centers in the leading group in Asia. Increases labor efficiency. Has enough competence to master and apply modern technology in all socio-economic and environmental sectors. It is noticeable that digital transformation is not just a technological but an institutional revolution. Institutions need to take the first step ahead and be flexibly adjusted to adopt something new, like new technologies, new products, new services, and new models. Only through innovation can Vietnam escape the middle-income trap.

Some connections with higher education in Vietnam today

Key policies

In the world today, there are many countries, such as the UK, Australia, Denmark, Estonia, etc., that have been implementing a national strategy on digital transformation. In these countries, the content of digital transformation is broad and diverse; however, they have some common key contents such as digital government (typically is online public services and open data), digital economy (notably with digital finance and e-commerce), digital society (which is the transformation in the education, health, and culture sectors), and the digital transformation in key industries (such as in agriculture, tourism, electricity, and transportation). In Vietnam, the Party and the State have defined a number of industries and areas that need to be prioritized for the process of digital transformation, with special attention to the field of education. Key policies on the reform of education have been enacted, notably are:

Firstly, the Prime Minister's Decision on Approval of the Acceleration of information and communication technology usage in managing and sup-

porting teaching-learning activities, and scientific research, contributing to the quality improvement of the national education and training in the period of 2016—2020 period and the vision towards 2025, emphasizing some main contents and overall targets, such as:⁴ Boosts up IT application to achieve the implementation of e-government, and the provision of online public services in the field education and training of state's management and administration at central and local levels. Renovates and improves learning facilities and materials, assessment methods, and scientific research, as well as the educational and training management in the national education system, contributing to the modernization and improvement of the quality of education and training. Regarding the tasks, the Prime Minister emphasized that:⁵

- 1) Deploys and puts into use the information technology system in a modern, practical, and effective manner to meet the requirements of the application of information technology in the management agencies, and educational and training institutions. Focuses on building the information technology systems for laboratories in higher education institutions. Accelerates the use of information technology in education and training as a whole. Prioritizes the hiring of information technology services.
- 2) Promotes the application of information technology to update the contents, teaching methods, learning assessment, and scientific research.
- 3) Upgrades the managers, teachers, and staffs' ability to apply advanced information technologies.
- 4) Propagandizes, disseminates, raises awareness and responsibility for the application of information technology in the field of education and training.

Secondly, in order to carry out the Government's Project 117 on improving the education quality, and applying information and technology advances in teaching activities, the Ministry of Education and Training promulgates the Plan (345 — KH — BGDDT) as follows: The main objective is to define the main tasks and solutions to accelerate information technology usage in management, teaching-learning supports, and scientific research, contributing to improving the quality of education and training. The plan also indicates the tasks that need to be vigorously and comprehensively implemented, specifically as follows: Implements a management information system for the entire education and training sector to meet the requirements of connecting, integrating, and information sharing for the information systems from central to local levels. Constructs and regularly updates an

⁴ Thủ tướng Chính phủ (2017). Phê duyệt Đề án Tăng cường ứng dụng công nghệ thông tin trong quản lý và hỗ trợ các hoạt động dạy — học, nghiên cứu khoa học góp phần nâng cao chất lượng giáo dục và đào tạo giai đoạn 2016—2020, định hướng đến năm 2025.

⁵ Ibid.

e-learning library for the education sector as a whole, like the pre-school, secondary, and continuing education. The warehouse of digital learning must include e-lectures, e-textbooks, multi-media digital learning materials, simulation software, and other learning materials. Deploys, builds, and regularly updates the online banks of questions of all subjects, online testing, and assessment software for learning students and teachers from secondary education and continuing education...⁶

Finally, Resolution 36a/NQ—CP dated October 14, 2015, of the Government on e-Government. For specific tasks in the Resolution, the Ministry of Education plays important roles, which are: Implements solutions to improve Vietnam’s human resource component index relied on e-Government assessment method of the United Nations. Develops a plan and conducts online guidance on nationwide all-level entrance examinations (especially the college or university enrollment), builds and brings the education management information system (EMIS) into implementation. Strengthens the socialization of all-level online training and the information technology usage in teaching and learning, and electronic textbooks.

The specific situation of digital transformation in higher education in recent years

Digital transformation is not a recent story, since information technology and the Internet are widely used in training and education. Although the process of digital transformation has been taken place, somewhat ambiguity remains, because there are no compelling reasons for thorough application. In the year 2020, amidst the complicated developments of the Covid-19 epidemic, along with the whole country, the whole education sector has actively taken part in the prevention and control of the epidemic with the goal that “ensures students and teachers’ health and safety”, applies simultaneously the principle “stop going to school, do not stop learning”. This situation has inaugurated and brought about a new era in Vietnam’s education sector — that is, education digital transformation. Progress in information technology and the increasing penetration of the Internet have led to initiatives in the open education system, with the emergence of online courses, open learning materials, learning, and testing application. The advent and increasing growth of both the technology and its market for these platforms show that “digital education” is inevitable and potentially be the future of education.

⁶ Bộ Giáo dục và Đào tạo (2017). *Tăng cường ứng dụng công nghệ thông tin.*

The progress of digital transformation in Vietnam's education industry is taking place rapidly and changing the face of the whole industry. In 2020, the Prime Minister signed a decision to approval of the "National digital transformation program to the year of 2025, and orientation towards to 2030", which Education is one of the sectors that need to be prioritized for the digital transformation because education is one of the social sectors that its impacts directly and daily concerns people. Successful digital transformation in education will help significantly change one's perceptions, bring efficiency, save costs for numbers of social activities, and simultaneously provides incentives for digitalization in other industries.

Over the past time, the education sector has digitized its industrial databases and attached identification numbers to 53,000 schools, 24 million students, and 1.4 million teachers' records — the database set up in the education sector helps to effectively manage and promulgate the macro-policies. Since 2018, thanks to a fully digitized database of teachers' information, the Ministry of Education and Training has analyzed numerical data, indicated the inadequacies, and therefore formulated appropriate policies on teacher management, such as policies on dealing with the teacher shortages, standards required of teachers, and annual teacher assessments. The Ministry of Education and Training recently also access the database to propose appropriate policies on teacher salaries to the Government and the National Assembly. At the same time, a repository of digital and open learning materials has been built with 7,000 electronic lectures, 200 general education textbooks, and virtual experiments. So far in Vietnam, the whole education sector has advocated and determined that the application of information technology on education is one of the nine key missions to effectively implement Resolution No. 29 of the Central Committee of the Party on basically and comprehensively renewing the sector of education and training. The Prime Minister has also planned a Project on boosting up IT applications in educational administration, which focuses on the reform in teaching and learning and carrying out scientific research⁷. A series of policies on boosting up IT applications in education have been issued. Besides, the legal framework such as regulations on IT application in management, organizations in online training, regulations on higher-educational distance training, regula-

⁷ Nghị quyết Chính phủ số 44/NQ-CP ngày 9/6/2014, ban hành chương trình hành động thực hiện Nghị quyết số 29-NQ/TW ngày 04 tháng 11 năm 2013, Hội nghị lần thứ tám Ban Chấp hành Trung ương khóa XI về đổi mới căn bản, toàn diện giáo dục và đào tạo, đáp ứng yêu cầu công nghiệp hóa, hiện đại hóa trong điều kiện kinh tế thị trường định hướng xã hội chủ nghĩa và hội nhập quốc tế.

tions on management, operation and usage of the industry-wide database system, and many other executive documents, have also been gradually completed.

Achievements

The year 2021 is waiting for an education revolution that is towards the 4.0 era in the education of Vietnam in particular and of the world in general. Obviously, Covid-19 creates an intense demand for the application of digital transformation everywhere in all industries, especially in education. By the end of 2020, Vietnam's education sector has gained certain achievements. The level of general education in Vietnam is in the top of 40 as equivalent to the OECD countries. Vietnam's higher education ranks in the top 70, vocational training is at the top of about 90 of the rank. An assessment conducted by the World Bank in 2020 showed that Vietnam's human capital index ranks 38th out of 174 economies, in which Vietnam's education component ranks 15th, equivalent to countries such as the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden.⁸

The Vietnamese Government nowadays strongly encourages and prioritizes digitalization in education. The benefits of digital transformation in the education sector in Vietnam might include, an initiative in learning, unlimited access to learning materials, improved education quality, and maximum savings on educational costs. Take for example, the application of social networking channels, particularly Facebook, to higher education activities in Vietnam today has shown positive signs such as:

First, in recent years, Facebook has become an indispensable part of the modern life of Vietnam as well as of the world. According to statistical figures⁹, as of June 2020, there were 69,280,000 users of Facebook in Vietnam, accounting for 70.1 % of the entire population. Based on such numerous users, this social network is impinging on all aspects of life, and becoming an effective communication and marketing channel.

Second, Facebook makes communication with friends, relatives, and even with foreigners that much easier. Because of this feature that the role of Facebook in the progress of digital transformation in education today is vitally important. This shows up in ways¹⁰ that teachers can create Facebook

⁸ Báo cáo quốc gia 2020 / Hội đồng quốc gia.

⁹ Hải Ninh (2020). Số liệu thống kê: Việt Nam có 69.280.000 người dùng Facebook. *Vietnamnet*, 30.11.2020.

¹⁰ Liana Daren (2019). *Top 5 cách sử dụng Facebook trong giờ học*. Dịch bởi Nguyễn Hữu Long. Retrieved on March 24, 2021.

groups for their classes to share information related to classes and subjects for students, or keep the parents engaged in their supervision of children's learning.

Third, it can be seen that most students today have their own Facebook account. Thus, if teachers know how to use it for a variety of extra teaching activities, it will certainly attract learners' participation. Moreover, this social network is also a useful platform for sharing course-appropriate materials, discussing points of view, making requests and suggestions, and providing feedback.

Fourth, Facebook offers an endless source of information and documents. Nowadays, Facebook contains a lot of practical information pages, in which the learners can find a lot of information and useful materials for learning activities. That information and materials are, for example, about vocational guidance or soft skills. It is worth noting that most Vietnamese and international newspapers nowadays have their own Facebook fan pages. Facebook's users only need to find and press the "Like" button on these pages, then they will be updated with the latest news about burning issues of the day.

Drawbacks

On the way to digital transformation, the education sector, in particular, is also facing some outstanding issues such as infrastructure, network system, equipment, services, and internet connection are still lacking, outdated, or not synchronized. Several facilities have not yet met the minimum requirements to serve the progress of digital transformation. The continued expanding and developing a repository of learning materials requires a large investment of man-power resources and financial capital in order to ensure the progress of digitalization. In particular, the construction of this digital data warehouse requires an all-level specific and synchronous implementation plan, avoiding spontaneous development that leads to the waste of time, money, and effort. There are the following limitations on using Facebook, such as:

First, being immersed in social networks and "the virtual world" makes students forget their personal goals, their will and motivation to strive. They also forget to hone their skills, or cultivate their knowledge each day.

Second, facing the risk of having depression, especially for today's young people. There are several studies showed that the more time spending on Facebook, the higher the risk of having depression. Particularly with those who already have been diagnosed with depression, are more likely to

suffer this disease when using Facebook. They will easily feel life empty and meaningless if they keep plugging their head into Facebook all the time.

Third, reducing visual acuity. When spending long hours just focusing on the phone or computer screen, student's eyes will have to work hard, that causes eyestrain. Even more dangerous is that using the phone at night when the lights are off has an increased risk of eye diseases, even leading to losing eye-sights.

Fourth, causing sleep deprivation in students. Social networks abuse will sink students at the virtual world, leading their life to be turned upside-down. In addition, the overuse of social networks also causes distraction problems. Students could not be able to concentrate on doing anything if they keep updating what-new on Facebook, and checking how many "likes" they have on their profile picture.

Finally, affecting student's learning. There are many young people addicted to Facebook that they forget to do housework and delay doing homework. Even they cannot be capable of sitting at their studies when their mind is somewhere in the virtual world of Facebook. This has a huge impact on their academic performance. The decline in academic results are an alarming situation that needs to be remedied. Moreover, social networks also lead to other drawbacks besides the learning problems such as, violating the laws, degrading morality and lifestyle, killing human creativity, etc.

Some questions and proposed measures

The explosion in educational technology has been and will create non-traditional methods of education, strongly promoting the development of education that is deeply transformative for humans. As aforementioned, the digital technology explosion along with the mass application of modern technologies in education create its duality. Besides the positive points, there are still drawbacks that require specific measures. In the case of Facebook, in order to minimize the limitations, we propose some solutions as follows:

First, in order to enhance the positivity and reduce the negative effects of social networks on the personality development and lifestyle of today's youths, first of all, families need to alert young people to the negative effect of social media, place limits on the amount of time spent on Facebook, as well as orient the children when they start using social networks. At once, parents also need to have a certain understanding of social networks and websites for business and healthy entertainment, which would give a good example for the children.

Second, schools and educational institutions need to guide how to exploit information so that students can actively take part in the learning and researching process. Also guides how to select useful information and get rid of harmful information, and educates on how to behave in a civilized manner online, how to control their behavior and words, and ensures that the online-posted information does not violate the law and affect the individuals and organization's reputation, honor, and image, that are accordance with the fine customs and standards of morality.

Third, strengthens the organization of recreational and volunteer activities to improve the spiritual life of children, contribute to a healthy environment for them to make friends, exchange, and learn the experiences from each other. Through that, students will be developed self-discipline habits and a sense of community, that helps the youths to live responsibly, away from the superficial and mindless lifestyle learned in the virtual world. When it has many interesting activities in the real world, children will stop deriving pleasure from the virtual world.

Fourth, state management agencies need to issue guidance documents for use of social networks, develop legal regulations for the service providers, encourage the healthy, useful flow and spread of information, and disseminate positive thinking and a civilized lifestyle for the community. Promotes the positives and prevents the negatives, firstly by fostering the youths' awareness. Then, the law enforcement agencies thoroughly grasp the management performance to optimize the benefits of social networks./.

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Chapter 21

THE CPV POLICY ON SOLIDARITY AND UNITING YOUTH IN THE PERIOD OF PROMOTING INDUSTRIALIZATION AND MODERNIZATION OF THE COUNTRY

During the period of accelerating industrialization and modernization of the country, the Communist Party of Vietnam has issued many guidelines and policies to unite and gather young people. Accordingly, the united front and gathering of young people were expanded with many typical and creative models. In the current period, it is necessary to have solutions to improve the effectiveness of the work of solidarity and gathering of young people under the banner of the Party. This article will analyze those basics.

Keywords: Communist Party of Vietnam, unite, gather youth, industrialization and modernization.

Promoting the strength of the great national unity is one of the valuable lessons learned from the Vietnamese revolution, the top goal and task of the Party during the process of revolutionary leadership. As a great force in the great national unity bloc, Vietnamese youth are always highly appreciated by the Communist Party of Vietnam for their role, position and trust, hoping they are the core force to build country “more decent, bigger and more beautiful”. Accordingly, the Party has issued many guidelines and policies on youth work, showing its interest in education, training and fostering youth; solve social problems, meet needs and aspirations in order to unite, gather and develop young people in all aspects.

One of the Party's viewpoints throughout the *Doi moi* period was “taking the people as the root”, considering that the revolution originates from the people, in which the youth is the most important object in the broad masses of the people. The Party asserts: “It is the youth who have the

historical mission to successfully build socialism”.¹ The Party advocates boldly assigning responsibility to young people and through social activities to train and foster them.

In the period of accelerating industrialization and modernization of the country, the Party determined the goal: to build our country into an industrial country with modern material and technical foundations, a reasonable and important economic structure, progressive production system, suitable to the development level of the productive forces, high material and spiritual life, strong national defense and security, rich people, strong country, democracy, justice and civilization. To achieve that goal, it is necessary to promote the strength of national unity, in which solidarity and youth gathering is one of the issues of strategic significance, in order to promote the role of the young generation in the role of youth, way revolutionary shock force, the future master of the country.

The Party's policy on solidarity and gathering of young people in the period of accelerating industrialization and modernization of the country

The 8th National Congress of the Party (June 1996) set a milestone for the period of accelerating industrialization and modernization of the country. In order to realize national unity, encourage all creative potentials and promote the people's mastery role, especially young people, the Party has determined: “Educating and training the young generation in politics values, ideology, culture, profession, ethics, lifestyle. Paying attention to vocational training and job creation, meeting the needs of young people for learning, creative work, cultural and artistic activities, sports, and healthy entertainment for young people etc. Create a healthy social environment, prevent prevent social evils and harmful cultural products. Taking care of the education and training of the young generation is the responsibility of the Party, the State, organizations in the political system, families, schools and the whole society”.²

The Ninth National Congress of the Party (April 2001) determined that great national unity is a strategic line, a great source of strength and motiva-

¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1987). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ VI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 116.

² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1996). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ VIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 124.

tion for the construction and defense of the Fatherland. Therefore, it is necessary to renew and perfect specific policies towards classes, classes, ethnic groups and religions, with emphasis on policies towards the young generation. The Party's policy for youth solidarity and gathering work is: "caring for education, fostering, training and developing comprehensively in politics, ideology, morality, lifestyle, culture, health, careers, create jobs, develop talents and creativity, and promote the aggressive role in the cause of national construction and defense".³ Following that policy, the 7th Central Committee Plenum, term IX (November 2002) issued a Resolution on *promoting the strength of the great unity of the entire people for the rich people, strong country, and just, civilized, democratic society*, which emphasizes some contents on solidarity and gathering youth such as: promoting political awareness education, traditional education and revolutionary morality, raising enlightenment ideals and ambitions for young people, encouraging young people to take charge in the cause of industrialization, modernization, construction and defense of the Fatherland. Actively create jobs for young people. Create conditions and opportunities for talented young people to study abroad to return to serve the country. Focus on fostering and creating cadres and vocational training for young people in the armed forces when their military service time expires. Widely attracting young people to organizations led by the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union to be the core.

The 10th National Congress of the Party (April 2006) affirmed that great solidarity is the cause of the whole nation, of the whole political system, which is led by party organizations as the core. by many means and forms. For the work of solidarity and gathering of young people, the Party advocates regular education in politics, tradition, ideals, ethics and lifestyle; creating conditions for study, work, entertainment, physical and intellectual development, contributing to the construction and defense of the Fatherland. The Party has added new issues on training young cadres, creating jobs for young people, training young people in the armed forces with jobs when their military service expires, especially "creating opportunities for talented young people to study abroad to serve the country".⁴

Faced with the new demands of the revolutionary cause, on July 17, 2008, the 7th Central Committee Plenum, term X approved Resolution No. 25 on: "*Strengthening the Party's leadership over the with youth work in the*

³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2001). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ IX*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 126.

⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ X*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 120.

period of accelerating industrialization and modernization". The resolution affirms: "Youth is placed at the center of the strategy of fostering and promoting human factors and resources. Taking care of youth development is both the goal and the driving force to ensure the stability and sustainable development of the country".⁵ The resolution clearly identifies major goals and nine groups of tasks and solutions to strengthen the Party's leadership over youth and youth work. In which, there is a new point: consolidating and consolidating the National Committee on Youth to be strong enough and assign the Committee a number of tasks and powers to advise the Government on unified state management of youth work. year. Ministries, branches, central government and People's Committees of provinces and cities have specialized sections to monitor youth work in fields and areas and according to the assignment and decentralization of the Government.

The 11th National Congress of the Party (January 2011) determined: "Taking the goal of building a peaceful, independent, unified Vietnam with territorial integrity, rich people, strong country and people. Ownership, fairness, civilization make similarities etc; uphold the national spirit, the tradition of humanity and tolerance etc in order to gather and unite people on a common front, and strengthen social consensus".⁶ For young people, the Party advocates "doing well the education of politics, ideology, tradition, ideals, morality and lifestyle; creating conditions for learning, work, entertainment, physical and intellectual development for the young generation. Encourage and encourage young people to nurture dreams, great ambitions, impulses, creativity, and mastery of modern science and technology. Forming an elite youth class in all fields, faithfully and excellently continuing the revolutionary cause of the Party and the nation, making an important contribution to the cause of accelerating industrialization, modernization, construction and defend the Socialist Vietnamese Fatherland. To widely attract young people, teenagers and children to organizations run by the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union as the core and in charge".⁷

The 12th National Congress of the Party (April 2016) affirmed: institutionalize and concretize the Party's viewpoints, lines, undertakings and policies on great national unity; complete and effectively implement mecha-

⁵ Nghị quyết số 25-NQ/TW, ngày 25/7/2008, Hội nghị lần thứ bảy Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng (khóa X) Về tăng cường sự lãnh đạo của Đảng đối với công tác thanh niên thời kỳ đẩy mạnh công nghiệp hoá, hiện đại hoá. *Báo điện tử Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam*, 25.07.2008.

⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2011). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 239—240.

⁷ *Ibid.*, tr. 242—243.

nisms and policies to promote the role of the people in deciding major issues of the country; ensure that all state power belongs to the people. In order to unite, gather and promote the role of youth, the Party advocates: “renovating the contents and methods of political education, ideology, ideals, traditions, fostering revolutionary ideals and love. country, building morality, healthy lifestyle, sense of respect and strict observance of the Constitution and laws for the young generation. Having appropriate mechanisms and policies to create a favorable environment and conditions for the young generation to study, research, work, entertain, develop intellectually, skills and physically. Encourage and encourage young people to nurture dreams, great ambitions, impulses, creativity, and mastery of modern science and technology. Promoting the role of the young generation in the cause of national construction and defense. Widely appealing to young people, teenagers and young adults Join the organizations led by the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union as the core and in charge of”.⁸

The 13th National Congress of the Party (January 20, 2021) advocates promoting the strength of national unity under the motto: all activities of the political system, cadres, party members and civil servants Officials must serve the interests of the people. Harmonious settlement of interests in society; protect the people's legitimate and legitimate rights and interests; constantly improve, raise the material and spiritual life of the people. Accordingly, in order to unite and gather young people, the Party emphasized: “Strengthen the education of the young generation on revolutionary ideals, morality, cultural lifestyle, raising patriotism, national pride, raising nurture dreams, ambitions, aspirations to rise; uphold the sense of responsibility to the country and society; building an environment with conditions for studying, working, entertaining and training for healthy, comprehensive and harmonious development in terms of intellectual, physical, and aesthetic values. Creating motivation for young people to be impulsive in learning, creative work, from karma; mastering modern scientific and technological knowledge, promoting an important role in the cause of national construction and defense”.⁹

The above policies of the Party are an important political basis for all levels of Party committees, authorities, the whole political system and the whole society to pay attention, care, unite, gather young people, create a

⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2016). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr.162.

⁹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 1, tr. 168.

source of motivation. new strength and power to promote the role, ability and great potential of the young generation in the construction and defense of the socialist Vietnamese Fatherland, meeting the requirements of the period of accelerating industrialization, modernization and international integration.

Actual situation of solidarity and youth gathering work under the leadership of the Party

Advantages and causes

After 35 years of comprehensive renovation, our country has achieved great achievements of historical significance. Each class, section, and social section all play a certain role in creating the nation's wealth, potential and position in the cause of national construction and development.

As an important part of the great national unity strategy, solidarity, gathering and promoting the role of young people in the revolutionary cause has always been of great interest to the Party, State, political system and the whole society. Party committees and members at all levels are more aware of the roles and positions of youth and youth work, boldly assigning new and difficult tasks to the youth and organizing the Youth Union. The State and authorities at all levels have paid attention to concretize guidelines on socio-economic development, education and training, labor, employment, culture and spirit etc into policies and policies. programs and projects to improve the international integration capacity of young people, support young people to establish themselves and establish a business, and create a favorable environment for young people to devote and grow up.

Under the leadership of the Party, the united front and youth gathering were expanded; The number of young people becoming union members and party members is increasing. Solidarity, youth gathering, and building Unions and associations in private enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises have been paid attention and implemented in accordance with the situation of multi-sector economic development through activities of support, care and companionship; maintaining hobby and profession clubs; strengthen solidarity, gather clubs, teams and groups of young volunteers to participate in volunteering and social security activities of the Union and Association; strengthening youth orientation through social networks. The work of solidarity and gathering of religious and ethnic youth is closely supervised, especially the work of propaganda, education and ideological orientati-

on. The work of uniting and gathering Vietnamese youth abroad has made a new development. In the years 2010—2020, there have been many typical models in Youth Union work and youth movements with many effective educational renovation methods, many creative ways in deploying revolutionary action movements, unions, etc. unite, gather and develop Vietnamese youth. Specifically: Model of the *Contest to learn about national history and culture “Proud of Vietnam”* jointly organized by the Central Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union and the Ministry of Education and Training; The campaign *“Building values as a role model for Vietnamese youth”*; Youth bulletin on radio and television systems; Journey *“I love my Motherland”*; The program *“Shining Vietnamese will”*; Model of *Rural traffic bridge construction*; Model of *Civilized street (road, alley)*; National Festival of Clubs, Teams and Volunteer Groups; Model *Lighting up the country road*; Model of the *“Creative Youth” Festival*; *Global Forum of Vietnamese Young Intellectuals*; Model *“Innovative Youth in the Army” Award*; Model *“Youth of the People’s Public Security 3 together at the grassroots”*; Model of *Commendation of the title “Model Young Teacher”*; Program *“Young Entrepreneurs Start Up excellent performance”*; Model of *Fund to support youth start-ups*; Program *“Steps for the community”*; *Vietnam Student Sports Award — VUG*; *Vietnam Youth and Student Camp in Europe*; *Vietnam — China Youth Friendship Festival*; ASEAN youth cooperation activities in the ASEAN Chairmanship Year 2020 etc. Besides, some localities have also implemented models suitable to their own characteristics and conditions in order to expand the solidarity and rallying youth.

Through the work of solidarity and gathering of young people, the Party has led to build a new generation of young people with morality, personality, knowledge, health, active thinking and bright actions. create; continuing the heroic tradition of the nation and the Party, upholding patriotism, the sense of national construction and defense; willing to sacrifice for the revolutionary cause; volunteering for community life; live responsibly with family and society; have the will to rise up in study, labor, work, establish themselves, establish a career and get rich legitimately; desire to contribute to the country.

The above results stem from many reasons, first of all because the achievements of the country's *Doi moi* have increased opportunities and conditions for the Party, State, families, schools and the whole society to pay attention. take care, educate, create a better environment for young people to study, strive, dedicate and grow up. The Youth Union and youth organizations as the core of the Youth Union are constantly growing with practical action programs, accompanying young people, creating an organized and

disciplined collective environment for fostering youth education and training. In particular, the generation of young adults growing up in the renovation period knew how to inherit and promote the good traditions of their family, homeland and country, self-reliance, national pride and ambition to overcome all difficulties and challenges, bravely assert themselves and constantly improve themselves to meet the requirements of the times.

Limitations and causes

In addition to the results achieved in the work of solidarity and gathering of young people, seriously self-criticism found that some Party committees did not pay due attention to the leadership of youth work; has not regularly and promptly urged, inspected, evaluated and learned from experience in organizing the implementation of the Party's guidelines and resolutions on youth work. State management activities on youth work are still limited. Many ministries, branches and localities have not done well their responsibilities to care for, foster and promote the role and position of youth in socio-economic development, and participate in the construction of the Party and government. The work of education, training, vocational training, job creation, prevention of social evils, cultural and sports activities etc still has many shortcomings and is slow to be overcome. Policies for Union officials, especially Youth Union officials at grassroots level, are still inadequate; The conditions and means for the Union's activities are still lacking.

Youth Union organizations in many places have been administrativeized. The content and mode of operation of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union and youth organizations are slow to adapt to the rapid fluctuations of the youth situation. A part of the Youth Union's staff, especially the grassroots Union's staff, is still inadequate in terms of capacity, professional qualifications, and has not been able to accompany the youth.

In fact, the rate of youth gathering into unions and associations is not high; the united front gathering youth is not really sustainable; the unity, gathering of young people and building Unions and associations in non-state-owned and foreign-invested enterprises, ethnic minority youth, young religious believers, etc still face many difficulties. The work of solidarity and gathering of Vietnamese youth abroad is still limited. In some areas, there are many Vietnamese young people and students who are studying, working and working but have not yet established a Union or Association. Many places have established unions and associations, but the mode of operation is still confusing, and the organizational system of representative agencies to grassroots has not yet been established.

The cause of the above limitation is the impact of objective factors such as: the negative side of globalization with difficulties in the development of the country; Changes in the social structure, lifestyle, thinking patterns and feelings of young people are complex but slow to be summarized and evaluated. On the downside of the market mechanism, the shift in labor structure makes it difficult to manage and gather and unite young people; In rural, remote and isolated areas, there is still a lack of facilities and operating funds. Enemy forces try to incite, entice and conspire to transform young people, making it difficult to propagate, educate, and orient the youth's ideals.

However, the main subjective reason is that some Party committees at all levels have not really paid attention to directing the work of solidarity and gathering of young people. Negative phenomena such as bureaucracy, corruption, illegal enrichment, harassment of people, violations of democracy etc in a part of cadres and party members have not been prevented and handled in a timely manner then affect thoughts, feelings and lifestyles of young people daily. A part of the Union's staff, especially the staff of The grassroots Union still lacks in capacity, professional qualifications have not kept up with the requirements of Youth Union work and youth movement. A part of young people lives without ideals, selfishness, pragmatism, individualism, indifference in life, lack of sense of civic responsibility, responsibility to the community.

Conclusion

Currently, in addition to opportunities, there are many challenges facing the nation's future. The Party determined “to comprehensively and synchronously promote the renovation, industrialization and modernization; firmly build and defend the Fatherland, maintain a peaceful and stable environment; striving to the middle of the twenty-first century, our country becomes a developed country, following the socialist orientation”.¹⁰ In order to improve the effectiveness of the work of solidarity and gathering of young people under the banner of the Party, it is necessary to closely follow the political, socio-economic tasks of the country in order to maximize the strength, potential and intelligence. of young people serving the revolutionary cause. Raising awareness of all levels of Party committees, authorities, political system and the whole society about the position and role of youth — the masters of the country, the future of the nation, the shock force

¹⁰ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 35–36.

in building National construction and defense, one of the factors determining the success or failure of the cause of industrialization, modernization, international integration and socialist construction. Youth must be placed at the center of the strategy of fostering and promoting the human factor; youth care and development is both a goal and a driving force to ensure the stability and sustainable development of the country.

In addition, improving the effectiveness of state management of youth, strengthening the role of the Fatherland Front, mass organizations, socio-economic organizations and families, coordinating education and fostering to promote youth development. Building a strong Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, truly a socialist school of youth, a reliable reserve team of the Party. More than ever, the Youth Union organization and the Youth Union movement need to innovate both the content and the mode of operation in the direction of diversity, abundance, flexibility, and adaptability to new conditions to truly create an educational environment for fostering and training young people. On the basis of promoting the strength of the great national unity, it is necessary to promote the efforts of each young person in study, work and life, constantly practice morality, lifestyle, and perfect personality. become a useful citizen in society, a good member of the family, rise up, establish a career, volunteer, be willing to take on difficult and arduous tasks, contribute to the cause building and defending the Fatherland.

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Nghị quyết số 25-NQ/TW, ngày 25/7/2008, Hội nghị lần thứ bảy Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng (khóa X) Về tăng cường sự lãnh đạo của Đảng đối với công tác thanh niên thời kỳ đẩy mạnh công nghiệp hoá, hiện đại hoá (Resolution No. 25-NQ/TW, dated July 25, 2008, the Seventh Plenum of the Party Central Committee (X term) on strengthening the Party's leadership in youth work in the period of public promotion, industrialization and modernization). *Báo điện tử Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam*, 25.07.2008. URL: <https://tulieu-vankien.dangcongsan.vn/van-kien-tu-lieu-ve-dang/hoi-nghi-bch-trung-uong/khoa-x/nghi-quyet-so-25-nqtw-ngay-2572008-hoi-nghi-lan-thu-bay-ban-chap-hanh-trung-uong-dang-khoa-x-ve-tang-cuong-su-lanh-dao-612>

Chapter 22

THE CPV'S CONSISTENT AND CONFIDENTIAL POLICY ON ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES THROUGH THE NATIONAL CONGRESSES OF THE *DOI MOI* ERA

In the process of leading the implementation of the national renewal process, the Communist Party of Vietnam is very concerned with solving ethnic and religious issues. Through the national congresses, the Party has always been consistent with the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh ideology on nation and religion. At the same time, on the basis of summarizing the practice, application and creative development of Marxism-Leninism, Ho Chi Minh ideology and inheriting new research results, the Party has proposed a number of views showing the develop the Party's awareness and theoretical thinking on ethnic and religious issues. The Party's innovative views on ethnicity and religion have been institutionalized, concretized and put into life, contributing to positive changes in the lives of people of all ethnicities and religions.

Keywords: consistency, cognitive development, Communist Party of Vietnam, ethnic and religious issues, National Congress of Representatives.

Vietnam is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country, with 54 ethnic groups living together, of which about 1/4 of the people are religious. Throughout history, co-newspapers of all ethnicities and religions have always united, fought back and fought against natural disasters, built and defended the Fatherland. In the process of leading the revolution, the Communist Party of Vietnam (the Party) has always determined that ethnicity and religion issues and ethnic and religious work have an important strategic position in our country's revolution. The right policy of ethnicity and religion proposed by President Ho Chi Minh and the Party has greatly contributed

to promoting the patriotic tradition and the strength of the great national unity bloc for the cause of national liberation and unification. best in the country. During the *Doi moi* period, the Party continued to be consistent with the principle of solving ethnic and religious issues according to the point of view of Marxism-Leninism, and Ho Chi Minh ideology. At the same time, through the National Congress of the Party (hereinafter referred to as the Congress), the Party has developed awareness and gradually perfected the guidelines and policies on ethnicity and religion in accordance with the national law. new conditions and circumstances of the country.

Consistency in principles of solving ethnic and religious issues through Party congresses

First, identifying ethnic and religious issues and solving ethnic and religious problems is a matter of long-term strategic position. The position and strategic significance of the issue of ethnicity and national unity have been repeatedly affirmed in the congress documents, as a matter of “with great strategic position” (the VIII National Congress), “always having strategic position” (IX Congress), “long-term strategic position” (Xth Congress), “having strategic position in the revolutionary cause” (XI, XII Congresses). Although the General Assembly Documents do not mention the position of the religious issue, the contents expressed in the General Assembly Documents clearly show the importance of this issue. In particular, the Resolution of the 7th Plenum of the IXth Central Committee clearly stated that “religious work is a strategic issue of great importance”.¹ The Party's viewpoint on the strategic position of ethnic and religious issues is in line with the reality of Vietnam, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country, and the issue of national unity is of particular importance to Vietnam. country development.

Second, be consistent with the principle of ensuring equality of all ethnic groups, solidarity, mutual assistance and mutual development. Ethnic equality is one of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism on national issues. This principle affirms that all ethnic groups have equal rights and obligations, regardless of ethnic majority or minority, large or small population. President Ho Chi Minh repeatedly emphasized the need to unite between the Kinh and ethnic minorities, between the lowlands and the highlands, in order to build a great national unity block for the sake of national liberation. In the

¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2003). *Văn kiện Hội nghị lần thứ bảy Ban Chấp hành Trung ương khóa IX*. Hà Nội: Nxb Chính trị quốc gia, tr. 45.

period of national renewal, the Party has always emphasized that solving ethnic problems, ethnic work must ensure the principles of solidarity, equality and mutual assistance among peoples. That is clearly shown through the Party Congresses: the 6th Congress affirmed, it is necessary to “develop a good and close relationship between the ethnic groups in the spirit of solidarity, equality, mutual assistance, joint mastery of the collective.”² *The Platform for building the country during the transition to socialism in Vietnam* (the 1991 Platform) approved at the VII Party Congress affirmed: “Implement the policy of equality, solidarity and mutual assistance between ethnic groups”;³ *The Platform for National Construction in the Transitional Period to Socialism in Vietnam (added and developed in 2011)* continues to affirm the principles affirmed in the 1991 and 1991 Platforms. In the previous congresses: “Implement the policy of equality, solidarity, respect and mutual assistance among ethnic groups, creating conditions for ethnic groups to develop together, closely associated with the common development of the community. Vietnamese ethnic community”.⁴ The 12th Party Congress not only affirmed the principle of equality equality, respect and solidarity among nations, but also emphasizes the task of “harmoniously settling relations between nations”.⁵ Approaching ethnic issues based on human rights and ethnic rights, the 13th National Congress emphasized the principle of “Ensuring all ethnic groups to be equal, unite, respect and help each other to develop”.⁶ Thus, through the 8 National Party Congresses during the *Doi moi* period, it can be seen that, although the congress documents have different expressions, they are generally consistent with the principle of equality, unite, support (or help) each other to develop.

Third, be consistent with the principle of guaranteeing freedom of belief and religion, and uniting religious compatriots in the great national unity bloc.

Respect for the right to freedom of belief and religion is the consistent principle of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh ideology in solving religious issues and has been thoroughly grasped by our Party throughout the

² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 47, tr. 779.

³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2007). *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 51, tr. 146.

⁴ Cương lĩnh xây dựng đất nước trong thời kỳ quá độ lên chủ nghĩa xã hội (Bổ sung, phát triển năm 2011). *Báo điện tử Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam*, 24.09.2015.

⁵ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2016). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XII*. Hà Nội: Văn phòng Trung ương Đảng xuất bản, tr. 164.

⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 1, tr. 170.

process of leading the Vietnam revolution. After the victory of the August Revolution in 1945, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was born and immediately declared the policy of “free religion, unity of religion” and that right was enshrined in the first Constitution of the new Vietnam: “Citizens have the right: Freedom of speech; Freedom to publish; Freedom of organization and assembly; Freedom of belief; Freedom to reside and move in the country and abroad”.⁷ Since then, in all the Constitutions of the State, it is affirmed to respect and protect the right to freedom of belief and religion.

During the period of national renewal, the Party continued to affirm the principle of respecting and guaranteeing the right to freedom of belief and religion, equality and solidarity among religious and non-religious compatriots in the great national unity bloc. The Party's 1991 Platform clearly states: “Consistently implement the policy of respecting and guaranteeing the right to freedom of religion”⁸, while the Political Report of the VII Congress affirmed that “Our Party and State respect the people's right to freedom of belief, practice equality, and unity among religions and between religions”.⁹ The VIII, IX, X Congresses and the 2011 Supplemental and Development Program of the Party all affirmed the consistent principle in religious policy, which is to respect and guarantee the right to freedom of belief, religion and non-belief, the people's religion according to the provisions of law and to unite the religious compatriots in the great national unity bloc. The document of the 11th Party Congress has taken a step to concretize the principle of freedom of belief when emphasizing that “Concerning and creating conditions for religious organizations to operate according to the charter and charter of religious organizations that have been approved by the Communist Party of Vietnam. Recognized by the State, in accordance with the law”.¹⁰ The document of the XIII Congress continues to affirm this principle and emphasizes the right-based approach: “Ensure that religious organizations operate in accordance with the law and their charters and charters are recognized by the State”.¹¹ Thus, in the *Doi moi* period, the principle of ensuring freedom of belief and religious solidarity continues to be the red thread throughout the congresses of the Party.

⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2000). *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 7, tr. 68.

⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2007). *Op. cit.*, t. 51, tr. 146.

⁹ *Ibid.*, tr. 109.

¹⁰ Báo cáo Chính trị của Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khoá X tại Đại hội Đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XI của Đảng. *Báo điện tử Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam*, 24/9/2015.

¹¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 171.

Fourth, focus on investing in socio-economic development, improving the material and spiritual life of ethnic and religious people.

President Ho Chi Minh affirmed that the task of the revolutionary government is to improve the lives of people of all ethnicities and religions in all aspects, because according to him, “we can fight for independence but the people keep starving and dying. If it's cold, then freedom and independence won't do anything”.¹² Thoroughly grasping his point of view, the II Congress (1951) of the Party made the request: “Improve living conditions for ethnic minorities, help them make progress in all aspects”¹³; The Third Congress (1960) affirmed that “The Party and State must constantly pay attention to improving the economic and cultural life of people of all religions”¹⁴ etc.

During the *Doi moi* period, the Party continued to be consistent with the policy of focusing on investment in socio-economic development, improving the living standards in all aspects for ethnic minorities and religious people. Regarding socio-economic development in ethnic minority areas, the Party advocates “promoting sedentary work, settlement, stabilizing production and people's lives” (Congress VI); “create all conditions for the development of nations to go up the path of civilization and progress” (Congress VII); “Eliminating hunger, reducing poverty, stabilizing and improving the lives and health of ethnic minorities, people in the highlands and border areas” (Congress VIII) “building infrastructure and social infrastructures” association, development of commodity production” (Congress IX); “Developing the economy, taking care of the material and spiritual life, eradicating hunger and reducing poverty, raising the people's intellectual level, preserving and promoting the cultural identity, voice, writing and fine traditions of the On improving the material and spiritual life for religious people, the Party affirmed that the Vietnamese State has the responsibility to “take care of economic, cultural and social development, helping religious compatriots in hunger eradication, poverty alleviation, improvement of living standards, participation in social and charity works” (Congress VIII); “Caring for economic and cultural development, improving the lives of the people” (Congress IX); “Implement socio-economic development programs, improve material and cultural life of people of all religions” (Cong-

¹² Hồ Chí Minh (2011). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 4, tr. 175.

¹³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2001). *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 13, tr. 261.

¹⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2002). *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 21, tr. 611.

ress X). Thus, it can be seen that the consistent view of the Party is to focus on taking care of socio-economic development, eradicating hunger and reducing poverty, and improving the material and spiritual life of people of all ethnicities and religions. consider it a basic task in ethnic and religious work.

Some outstanding innovative views and perceptions of the Party on ethnic and religious issues

In terms of views, renewed awareness common to both ethnic and religious issues

1) *Affirmation of solving ethnic and religious issues in order to increase resources for national development.*

In the *Doi moi* period, the Party has become more and more aware of the role of ethnic and religious issues and solving religious problems for the country's sustainable development. Accordingly, solving ethnic and religious issues is not only aimed at combating the exploitation of hostile forces, contributing to social stability, but also aiming to exploit and promote the potential, values, and strength of the society. of ethnicities and religions in socio-economic development. This shows that our Party has mastered and creatively applied Ho Chi Minh ideology on nation and religion. Because as we know, President Ho Chi Minh once emphasized, "Our country has many ethnic groups, which is a good point".¹⁵ Regarding religion, he also repeatedly affirmed the role of dignitaries, priests and followers of different religions in the revolutionary cause. On the basis of applying Ho Chi Minh ideology on ethnicity and religion, during the renovation period, the Party renewed its thinking and awareness when placing the issue of ethnicity and religion in the socio-economic development strategy. society and emphasized that solving ethnic and religious issues is to increase resources for the renewal of the country.

2) *Resolve ethnic and religious issues on the basis of the rule of law and integrate with international law.* Along with the policy of building a socialist rule-of-law state, the Party congresses in the renovation period set out orientations to solve ethnic and religious issues on the basis of the rule of law, perfecting the law on law and order. ethnicity and religion to serve as a legal framework for ethnic and religious work. Regarding ethnic issues, the VIII

¹⁵ Hồ Chí Minh. *Op. cit.*, t. 14, tr. 168.

National Congress advocated “Building the Law of the Nation”,¹⁶ as for religion, the XI and XII Congresses all emphasized the task of “Continuing to perfect policies and laws on belief and religion”. At the same time, through the congresses, the Party has become more and more aware of the rights-based approach to solving ethnic and religious issues. From this perspective, the Party affirms that people of all ethnicities and religions have the right to enjoy all the fruits of the renovation work, to be guaranteed the necessary conditions for production, life organization, high material and spiritual life; have freedom and equality in rights and obligations in all areas as prescribed by law; has the right to preserve cultural values, languages, scripts etc. Regarding the rights of ethnic groups, in addition to emphasizing ensuring that all nations are equal and united, the Congress Documents also emphasize other rights such as: the right to exploit local strengths to enrich themselves, the right to respect and preserve cultural values, languages, scripts, etc. In addition to affirming the right to freedom of belief and religion, the congresses also emphasized the equal right and the right to normal religious activities according to the law. These are basic rights enshrined in the United Nations Charter and international conventions that Vietnam has signed or acceded to. This shows that in the *Doi moi* period, the Party's views on ethnicity and religion are increasingly compatible with international law on human rights.

3) *Link ethnic policy with religion policy.* In the 1991 Platform, when it came to ethnic issues, the Party initially recognized the link between implementing ethnic policies and respecting the right to freedom of belief and religion when affirming “Respect the interests of , traditions, culture, languages, customs and beliefs of ethnic groups”.¹⁷ At the 13th National Congress, the Party set out a viewpoint to show a new awareness when affirming to link the ethnic policy with the religion policy: “Focus on perfecting and implementing well the policies on ethnicity and religion. Religion”.¹⁸ This view is completely consistent with the characteristics of Vietnam, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country, each ethnic group can have many religions and each religion can be present in many different ethnic groups, forming a interweaving ethnic and religious issues. Therefore, the resolution of ethnic and religious issues needs to be closely linked and synchronized to be effective.

¹⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2015). *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 55, tr. 404.

¹⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2007). *Op. cit.*, t. 51, tr.146.

¹⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 50.

***Outstanding innovative views and awareness on ethnic issues
and ethnic problem solving***

1) *Affirm that ethnic policy must take into account the characteristics of each region and each ethnic group.* Right from the beginning of the policy of national renewal, with the spirit of looking directly at the truth and telling the truth, the Party has demanded a full understanding of the specific differences of each region and each ethnic group in order to concretize ethnic policies accordingly, “avoid stereotyped mistakes or subjectively impose inappropriate organizational forms in the process of economic, cultural and social construction and development in different regions “ethnicity”.¹⁹ The VII National Congress emphasized that the ethnic policy must be “suitable to the conditions and characteristics of each region and each ethnic group”.²⁰ The 13th Party Congress continued to emphasize that “Focus on the specificity of each ethnic minority region in planning and organizing the implementation of ethnic policies”.²¹ This view is completely consistent with the situation of our nation, ethnic groups not only have their own characteristics in terms of culture, customs and practices, but also have disparities in living standards and socio-economic conditions. festival. Therefore, the more specific and appropriate the policy for each region and each ethnic group, the more effective it will be in implementation.

2) *Respect, preserve and promote the cultural values of ethnic minorities.* At that time, President Ho Chi Minh paid great attention to respecting, preserving and promoting the literary values, customs and practices of the ethnic groups, creating conditions for the cultures of the ethnic groups to develop harmoniously in the harmony of general development of the nation and the world. However, after the reunification of the country, in the process of socialist reform, due to subjective and hasty ideology, many Party committees and local authorities had an inappropriate attitude towards culture, customs and practices of ethnic minorities. Entering the *doi moi* period, the 6th Congress affirmed that “The strengthening of community and unity is a regular process, but community and unity are not contradictory, do not exclude diversity, uniqueness in the identity of each nation”.²² The 1991 Platform, the 2011 Supplement and Development Program and the Document of the Party Congress in the *Doi moi* period all emphasize respect for traditions, culture, language, customs, beliefs, preservation,

¹⁹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Op. cit.*, t. 47, tr. 779.

²⁰ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2007). *Op. cit.*, t. 51, tr. 108.

²¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 170.

²² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Op. cit.*, t. 47, tr. 780.

enrich and promote the fine cultural identity of ethnic minorities. At the same time, fight against the ideology of nationalism. This point of view is very important, because it creates the basis and orientation for all undertakings and policies related to ethnic minority and mountainous areas, creating conditions for preserving and promoting the culture of ethnic minorities. in the context of market economy and international integration.

3) *Promoting the positivity, self-reliance and self-reliance of ethnic minorities.* President Ho Chi Minh repeatedly affirmed that the Vietnamese people, whether majority or minority, are rich in patriotism, solidarity and self-reliance, self-reliance, and heroic struggle. During the national democratic revolution, under the leadership of the Party and President Ho Chi Minh, people of all ethnic groups has highly promoted the spirit of patriotism, creativity, self-reliance and self-reliance, actively participating in and making worthy contributions to the cause of national liberation and national reunification. After the reunification of the country, in the context of implementing the centralized and subsidized bureaucratic mechanism and prolonged in-kind support policy, the positivity and self-reliance of ethnic minorities were reduced. Recognizing that, the 7th Party Central Committee Plenum, term IX advocated, in socio-economic development of ethnic minority areas, along with increasing the attention and support of the Central Committee and the help of localities. localities throughout the country, focusing on “promoting internal strength and self-reliance of ethnic minorities”.²³ That policy continued to be affirmed by the 13th National Congress, and at the same time supplemented and developed in the right direction: “There should be a mechanism to promote the positivity, self-reliance and self-reliance of ethnic minorities to develop. socio-economic development, realize multidimensional and sustainable poverty reduction”²⁴. This point of view is the basis for solutions to overcome the low self-esteem, expectation and dependence that exist in some ethnic minorities.

4) *Switch from support policy to development investment policy.* For a long time, the implementation of the ethnic minority policy has been in favor of direct support of food or money to purchase living materials for ethnic minorities. This helps them to reduce their deprivations and difficulties in daily life, but it is difficult to make a breakthrough in socio-economic development in ethnic minority areas. Moreover, it also indirectly contributes to creating a mentality of expectation and dependence in some ethnic minorities as mentioned above. To overcome that and improve the efficiency of

²³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2003). *Op. cit.*, tr. 35.

²⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 170.

ethnic affairs, the XIII Congress set out the requirement “Mobilizing, allocating, using and managing resources for investment, development, and radical transformation. document on economy, culture and society in areas with a large number of ethnic minorities”.²⁵ This is a point of view that shows the new awareness of the Party in implementing ethnic policies, instead of implementing support and assistance policies with heavy subsidy, switching to investment for development, creating sustainable development. sustainable for ethnic minority areas.

5) *Paying attention to the issue of training, fostering and building a contingent of cadres who are ethnic minorities, focusing on building core people, reputable people, village elders.* Party congresses in the renovation period have emphasized the task of building a contingent of cadres who are ethnic minorities and a core team of reputable people, village elders and village chiefs. For example, the VIII National Congress set out the requirement to “build a political base, cadres and party members of ethnic groups in regions, at all levels, clean and strong”²⁶; The 9th Congress clearly affirmed the viewpoint “Actively implement the priority policy in training and fostering ethnic minority cadres. Motivating and promoting the role of typical and prestigious people in the nation and in the locality”²⁷; The XIII Congress emphasized the need: “To take care of building a contingent of cadres and people with typical prestige in ethnic minority areas”.²⁸ This point of view of the Party shows the profound mastery of Ho Chi Minh ideology on national affairs and is very important for consolidating and strengthening the great national unity bloc.

Outstanding new perspectives and awareness on religious issues and religious problem solving

1) *Affirming religion is the spiritual need of a part of the people.* Before the *doi moi* period, many party members believed that religion was just a “remnant” of the old social system, so according to them, religion was not a legitimate need. In order to overcome the one-sided perceptions of religion as mentioned above, during the renovation period, the Party made the affirmative view: Religion is not only a tradition but also a legitimate need of a

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2015). *Op. cit.*, t. 55, tr. 404.

²⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2016). *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 60, tr. 213.

²⁸ Communist Party of Vietnam (2021). *Op. cit.*, vol. 1. P. 170 [Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 170.

ministry. section of the people. This point of view was expressed in Resolution 24-NQ/TW dated October 6, 1990 of the Politburo (Term VI) on strengthening religious work in the new situation and continued to be affirmed in the National Assembly Documents. Party Assembly. With the affirmation that religion is the cultural, spiritual and legitimate need of a part of the people, the Party has made a breakthrough in the awareness of religion, creating the basis for the development of religious beliefs. policy innovation religion in the process of national renewal.

2) *Affirm that religion accompanies the nation during the process of building socialism in Vietnam.* Along with acknowledging that religion is the spiritual need of a part of the people, during the renovation period, the Party also affirmed that religion still exists in the long term and accompanies the nation during the process of building socialism in Vietnam. This point of view represents the creative application and development of theories of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh ideology on religion. According to the classics of Marxism-Leninism, religion is a historical phenomenon, that is, it appears in history, changes with history, and does not last forever. The form of religious consciousness will perish on its own, but it is a very long historical process, and as C. Marx notes “But that requires a certain material basis of society, or a series of certain conditions of material existence, but these are themselves the natural product of a long and painful process of development”.²⁹ President Ho Chi Minh, although he rarely mentioned religion in terms of epistemology, but from the point of view of “independent country, religion can be free”, it can be seen that he believes that religion will accompany the Vietnamese people for a long time. Inheriting and creatively developing the views of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh ideology on religion, the Resolution of the 7th Central Committee of the IX term of the Party affirms: Religion “is and will exist with the nation in the past. the process of building socialism in our country”.³⁰ This view is further affirmed by the Documents of the Party Congress, creating a basis for overcoming subjective and hasty thoughts in solving religious problems in practice.

3) *Distinguish clearly between legitimate religious needs and the use of religion for malicious purposes.* Marxism-Leninism asserts, in solving religious problems, there must be a distinction between the spiritual needs of the masses and the abuse of religion. However, in the pre-*doi moi* period, some Party committees, organizations and cadres and party members had

²⁹ Mác C. và Ăng ghen Ph. (1993). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị quốc gia, t. 23, tr. 126.

³⁰ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2003). *Op. cit.*, tr. 48.

“leftist” views on religion, viewing religion as backward, superstitious, and even a hostile, reactionary force. To overcome that false perception, the VII Congress requested to overcome all attitudes of narrowness, prejudice, discrimination and discrimination against religious compatriots; The VIII Congress affirmed the prohibition of infringing upon freedom of religion; The supplementary and developed platform in 2011 emphasizes the task of fighting and strictly handling all acts of violating freedom of belief and religion. On the other hand, the Congress Documents, when referring to religion, emphasize the need to fight against plots and acts that take advantage of religion for reactionary political purposes. Thus, the Party's point of view throughout the Party congresses is to clearly distinguish between the legitimate religious needs that need to be respected by the masses on the one hand and the abuse of religion on the other side by enemy forces that need to be condemned and fought.

4) *Focus on advocacy work and promote the active role of dignitaries, monks and followers of religions.* During the period of national and democratic revolution, the Party and President Ho Chi Minh attach great importance to the work of mobilizing dignitaries, priests and followers of religions. Heeding the call of President Ho Chi Minh, the vast majority of religious compatriots and religious monks and dignitaries actively participated in the struggle for national liberation and building a new society. In the period after the country's unification, the mobilization of religious compatriots was still focused, but because the implementation in some places was still rigid, the effectiveness was still limited. In the *doi moi* period, the Party determined that the work of mobilizing people to be religious is the core content of religious work. At the same time, through the 8 congresses, the Party is increasingly aware of the role of mobilizing the contingent of monks, dignitaries and religious positions. At the 13th National Congress, the Party clearly stated: “Mobilizing, uniting and gathering religious organizations, dignitaries and believers to live a good life”.³¹ The focus on advocacy not only for the religious masses but also for dignitaries and monks has helped improve the effectiveness of religious work.

5) *Promoting cultural values, good ethics and religious resources for national development.* This is a breakthrough point in the Party's perception of religion. Resolution 24-NQ/TW of the 6th Politburo just stated that “religious morality has many things suitable for the construction of a new society” to Directive 37-CT/TW dated July 2, 1998 of The Politburo of the VIII term raised the issue of exploiting and promoting the cultural and moral values of

³¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 170.

religion and that point of view was included in the Document of the IX Congress. At the XIII Congress, the Party continued to supplement, develop awareness when acknowledging religious resources and advocating “Promoting good cultural and ethical values and resources of religions for the cause of national development”.³² The XIII Congress of the Party raised this point of view shows that the Party clearly recognizes and appreciates the positive role and contributions of religion to the construction and development of the country.

Thus, through 8 congresses during the renovation period, the Party has always been consistent with the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, Ho Chi Minh ideology on nation and religion, and at the same time by summarizing the facts. Through practice and inheriting the results of theoretical research in the country and in the world, the Party has gradually supplemented and developed theoretical views and awareness on ethnicity and religion in accordance with the practical conditions of the public. country reform. The Party's viewpoints and policies on ethnicity and religion were supported and accepted by people of all ethnicities and religions, so they quickly came to life, creating a clear and positive change in the public sector, ethnic and religious cooperation, making an important contribution to increasing resources for the development of a prosperous and happy Vietnam.

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³² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 171.

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PART 3
THE FOREIGN POLICY
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
AND THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF VIETNAM

Chapter 23
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CPV'S
FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY
IN THE PERIOD OF IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
RENOVATION POLICY *DOI MOI*

Analyzing the evolution of foreign policy guidelines, set by the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam since the beginning of the *Doi moi* renewal policy to the present day (i.e. from 1986 to 2021), the author comes to the following conclusions. Foreign policy guidelines of the 6th CPV Congress (1986) were formulated within the orthodox tradition of the ruling communist parties, for which the main foreign policy principle was proletarian internationalism. In the post-bipolar period following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Socialist Camp, the process of de-ideologization of the SRV foreign policy begins. The party-state leadership adopts the old slogan “more friends, fewer enemies”, which emerges in the party documents as follows: “Vietnam wants to be a friend of all countries of the world community”. With the beginning of the new millennium, the core principle underlying the SRV foreign policy has become multi-vector, as reflected in the Program and Statute of the CPV, as well as in the SRV Constitution of 2013. Vietnam is keen to play a prominent role in international organizations and to maintain strategic partnerships with a large number of countries adhering to very different socio-political and ideological orientations. All

these years the SRV diplomacy has successfully served the socio-economic development of the country, the implementation of the CPV agenda for renewal of all aspects of the Vietnamese society.

Keywords: Nguyen Phu Trong, multi-vector foreign policy, *Doi moi* renewal policy, Communist Party of Vietnam, Constitution of the SRV.

Within the class approach

In Vietnamese and national scientific and publicist literature it can be considered as an entrenched statement, that the policy of comprehensive renewal *Doi moi* originates from the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, which was held in Hanoi on December 15–18, 1986. It is also generally accepted that at the Congress the idea of updating has been articulated in the very first approximation, in the most general form. As the General Secretary of the CPV Central Committee Nguyen Phu Trong acknowledged, “the 6th Congress outlined in general”.¹

As for foreign policy issues, the 6th CPV Congress interpreted them in line with the common then orthodox Marxist-Leninist class approach to world politics. The world was viewed from the perspective of the competition between two systems or camps — socialism and imperialism. The Vietnamese revolution was presented in close connection with the “common struggle of progressive mankind against imperialism and other reactionary forces”. In the world revolutionary process, the Vietnamese Communists distinguished then three streams — the countries of the socialist community, the national liberation movement, the communist and labor movement in the capitalist countries. The SRV foreign policy was based on the principles of proletarian internationalism.

It is with this awareness that the SRV international relations were considered in the Political Report of the CPV Central Committee to the Congress, which was read by the General Secretary Truong Chinh. The party and the country Leader defined the objectives of the CPV and the State in the area of foreign policy for the subsequent years as follows: “Fight for the peacekeeping in Indochina, actively help maintain peace in Southeast Asia and throughout the world, strengthen special ties between the three countries of Indochina, enhance relations of friendship and comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, take advantage of favorable international conditions for the socialism building

¹ Nguyen Phu Trong (2008). Comprehensive generalization of the accumulated experience for further accelerating the renewal, in: *Vietnamese Renewal after 20 Years of Doi moi*. Hanoi: The Gioi Publishing House, p. 37.

and defending the homeland, while actively contributing to the common struggle of the peoples of the world for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.”²

In the same orthodox tradition of communist parties' documents, a detailed description of the SRV relations with various countries and world revolutionary movement groups was given in the political report of the Central Committee. First of all, it concerned the cooperation with the Soviet Union, which was considered the “cornerstone of foreign policy” of the CPV and the SRV. Furthermore, it described Vietnam's “special relations” with Laos and Cambodia. It then considered relations with the countries members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Non-Aligned Movement (and its members Cuba and India), the struggling peoples of Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Algeria, South Yemen, the Sahrawi Republic, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, El Salvador and Nicaragua.

The report supported the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and other Asian countries (MPR, India, North Korea, Afghanistan), aimed at creating a secure and stable environment in Asia. It was also expressed the willingness by the Vietnamese side to negotiate with China in order to normalize bilateral relations and improve relations with the US “in the best interest of peace and stability in Southeast Asia”.³

The resolution on the 6th Congress outcomes also contained commitment to the development of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community, strengthening the solidarity of the international communist and labor movement, and supporting the struggle of peoples for liberation and national independence.⁴

Despite its apparent conservative views on world politics, the 6th Congress triggered changes in approaches not only to economic machinery, property relations, but also to foreign policy. As in other areas, important reform decisions were already taken in 1988—1989. In May 1988, the Politburo of the CPV Central Committee adopted Resolution No.13 concerning the tasks of foreign policy in the new situation. It stated that the strategic objective was “the maintenance of peace, the use of favorable external conditions and time to concentrate all efforts for the gradual stabilization and providing a basis for economic development in the next 25—30 years, socia-

² VI s"ezd Kommunisticheskoy partii V'etnama. M.: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, (1988)s. 81.

³ Ibid., p. 81—88.

⁴ Ibid., p. 198.

lism building and the preservation of the Motherland independence, making an active contribution to common struggle for peace, national independence and socialism.⁵ The same Resolution introduced a slogan into Vietnamese foreign policy practice, which was based on popular wisdom and became a guide to action: “more friends, fewer enemies”. Australian scholar Carlyle Thayer believes that Resolution No.13 was an indication that CPV eliminated the concept of “Two Worlds” in favor of the idea of “interdependence of the world”.⁶ This is difficult to accept, the analysis of the documents shows that at that time such a turn had not yet taken place.

In March 1989, at the 6th Plenum of the CPV Central Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SRV was instructed to adjust its activities to serve the needs of the national economy, combining political diplomacy with economic diplomacy.⁷

It is important to note that by that time, in December 1987, the Law on Foreign Investments had already been adopted, foreign capital flowed into the Vietnamese economy, and joint ventures with foreigners were being established.

An ordinary 7th CPV Congress, intended to consolidate the course of comprehensive renewal, met in Hanoi in June 1991. In hindsight, it appears that it was a difficult time — the destructive processes were taking place in the socialist community, although the USSR still existed, Vietnamese diplomacy made special efforts to normalize relations with China and establish ties with ASEAN and Western countries. Overall, the Vietnamese leadership kept hope alive for enabling environment to forward march of humankind towards a communist future. This was reflected in the Congress proceedings.

The 7th CPV Congress had a special role to play also because it adopted a new party program entitled “The nation-building program during transition to socialism”. It was a document intended to guide the communists and all Vietnamese citizens for the coming decades. The program, as well as all the documents of the Congress, confirmed the CPV determination to push forward the renewal policy. New guidelines have been introduced in the spheres of foreign policy: to diversify international relations and to develop equal and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries, regardless of their socio-political regimes, on the basis of the principles of peaceful coe-

⁵ Quoted from: Vietnamese Renewal after 20 Years of *Doi moi*. Hanoi: The Gioi Publishing House, p. 317.

⁶ Vietnam’s foreign policy under *Doi moi*. Edited by Le Hong Hiep & Anton Tsvetov. Singapore: ISEAS, p. 26.

⁷ Vietnamese Renewal after 20 Years of *Doi moi*. Op.cit., p. 317.

xistence. The slogan “more friends, fewer enemies” was then transformed into a statement made from the rostrum of the Congress: “Vietnam is willing to become a friend of all countries in the world community”. It can be considered that since then, that was the beginning of the process of de-ideologizing the foreign policy.

In the Central Committee report, which was made by the General Secretary of the CPV Central Committee Nguyen Van Linh, the tasks of the SRV foreign policy were defined as follows: “Maintain the peace, expand relations of friendship and cooperation, create external environment conducive to the construction of socialism and the protection of the homeland, and at the same time make an active contribution to the struggle of people the world over for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress.”⁸

The ideology of the Congress documents continued to be based on the Marxist-Leninist worldview and maintained the class approach. The CPV theorists then demonstrated new views on the situation in the world and the course of world development. The Party program noted that many socialist countries evidenced a profound crisis. It was also pointed out that capitalism still retained its potential for development. The main contradiction of capitalism was interpreted in a new way — “between the growing public nature of production and the private capitalist ownership regime”, which is getting deeper every day. As for the contradictions between socialism and capitalism, they, according to the authors of the Program, “have become very acute”.⁹

The Vietnamese communists, however, remained optimistic, referring to historical experience, they wrote: “Humanity will eventually come to socialism — it’s a rule of development”.¹⁰

Also noteworthy are the other innovations in the documents of the Congress: while maintaining the list of foreign policy partners of the SRV adopted at the last Congress, an indication of the need for interaction with the UN and international financial institutions appeared. Encouraging was the conclusion reached by the General Secretary of the CPV Central Committee Nguyen Van Linh, that successes in international politics created a favorable external environment for the cause of “renewal”.¹¹

⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2007). Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 51, tr. 117–118.

⁹ Ibid., tr.136.

¹⁰ Ibid., tr.137.

¹¹ Ibid., tr. 76.

At the beginning of post-bipolar world history

In the five years following the 7th CPV Congress, international relations of Vietnam and world politics have undergone tremendous changes. In 1991 USSR dissolved, and Vietnam has lost a major donor and a political-military ally; in the same year, Vietnam normalized relationships with neighboring China, in 1995 Vietnam acceded to the ASEAN and established diplomatic relations with the United States.

These changes were taken into account in the preparation of the new Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1992. As opposed to the previous Constitution adopted in 1980, where its body determined that the country's foreign policy priorities are "fraternal friendship, military solidarity and comprehensive cooperation" with the USSR, Laos, Cambodia and other countries of the socialist community, as well as the struggle against "American imperialism" and "Chinese hegemonism", in the Constitution of 1992 there were no references to the USA and China, and the goals of Vietnamese diplomacy were defined in Article 14 as follows: "The Socialist Republic of Vietnam pursues a policy of peace, friendship, enhancing exchanges and cooperation with all countries of the world, regardless of the differences in their socio-political background, on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit; strengthens friendly solidarity and cooperative relations with all socialist countries and neighboring states; actively supports and contributes to the common struggle of the peoples of the Earth for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress".¹²

At the 8th CPV Congress, held in the summer of 1996, a new in-depth analysis of the situation on the world stage and Vietnam's international relations was presented. In the report of the Central Committee, which was read out by the General Secretary Do Muoi, the challenging issues included: the collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, the continuation of national and class battles, the dissemination of the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution, disparities in wealth between countries, fierce competition in the economy and trade, the consequences of globalization. It also claimed that humanity was in a transition from capitalism to socialism.¹³

¹² Hiến pháp Việt Nam (từ năm 1946 đến năm 1992) và các luật về tổ chức bộ máy nhà nước (2002). Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr.112.

¹³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1996). Văn kiện đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ VIII. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr.76—77.

The issues of war and peace were interpreted as follows: “The threat of a devastating world war has receded, but armed conflicts, local wars, conflicts on national, racial and religious grounds, an arms race, interference in internal affairs, coups, terrorist acts continue to occur in many places.”¹⁴

The main trends of that time included the following: “peace, stability and cooperation for development become a genuine demand of the peoples and states of the world”; all states — great and small — are included in the processes of regionalization and economic integration; the desire of peoples for independence, autonomy, self-reliance, opposition to pressure and interference from outside has increased; “countries with different socio-political backgrounds both cooperate and struggle in peaceful coexistence”.¹⁵

The party leadership, presenting at the Congress its vision of the peculiarities of the international situation and trends in world politics, assumed that these factors would influence both positively and negatively all aspects of the life of the Vietnamese nation, and diplomats should also take this into account.

The party defined the country's foreign policy objectives for the coming period in a different way from the 1992 Constitution: “To consolidate a peaceful environment and create external conditions more conducive to enhancing the country's socio-economic development, industrialization and modernization, to serve the construction and defense of the Motherland and to contribute actively to the common struggle of the peoples of the world for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress.”¹⁶ The differences between the Party Congress proceedings and the Basic Law of the country then into force reflected the fact that, in the four years from 1992 to 1996, dramatic changes had taken place in the world arena, which the ruling party in Vietnam could not stay away and ignore.

In 1996 earlier statements on Vietnamese diplomacy were confirmed: it should continue to pursue a line of independent, diversified and multi-vector foreign policy, in keeping with the thesis “Vietnam entertains the wish to be a friend with all countries in the world community that are fighting for peace, independence and development”.¹⁷

The list of Vietnam's foreign policy partners in the Central Committee's report outwardly resembled the one as at the previous congresses. Elements of the socialist internationalism approach remained, though they were exp-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, tr. 76.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, tr.77—78.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, tr. 120.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

ressed less. The report did not indicate specific countries, likewise it changed ordering of priorities: the neighbors and ASEAN countries, as well as the Non-Aligned Movement dominated and took thus the first place; UN, francophone union, international economic organizations were at the second place and were further followed by the communist and workers' parties.

The innovation was a call to expand ties with non-communist parties, or as they were cautiously called “ruling and others”.¹⁸ Therefore, it can be considered not fortuitous that the governing parties of Malaysia and Singapore attended the 8th CPV Congress.

Also the need to develop ties through public diplomacy was expressed for the first time from the floor of the Congress.¹⁹

In general, the highlighting foreign policy sphere in the proceeding of the 8th CPV Congress was generally optimistic.

It was noted that the SRV ties with other countries have expanded “as never before”, “the opportunities to maintain independence and autonomy and to integrate into the global community have increased”.²⁰ Placing an emphasis on interdependence of the foreign policy with the “renewal” policy has intensified.

The course toward multi-vector interaction

The 9th CPV Congress (April 2001) has largely repeated the main assessments of world development and the objectives of Vietnamese diplomacy. The only notable innovation was the adjustment of the statement “Vietnam is willing to become a friend of all countries of the world community” to “Vietnam is ready to be a friend and **reliable partner** (emphasis added. — *P. Ts.*) of all countries of the world community, advocating for peace, independence and development”.²¹ These two words were a significant addition. The new version not only reflected the desire of Vietnamese leaders to develop relationships with all countries of the world, but also in certain extent peculiarly invited foreigners for guaranteed cooperation with Vietnam.

This statement, which can be considered as a credo of multi-vector policy, was further amended at the 10th CPV Congress (April, 2006). To the

¹⁸ Ibid., tr 121.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., tr.78.

²¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2001). Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ IX. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 42.

readiness to be a friend and reliable partner of all countries of the world, “the willingness to actively engage in the process of regional and international cooperation” has been added.²²

The materials of the 10th Congress of the CPV have been enriched by generalizations and theoretical content. The fact is that it met 20 years after the country's transition to a “renewal” policy, and it was natural to expect a summary of the results at this forum. The outcomes of the “renewal” policy were rated in positive terms. Among other things, it was alleged that the position of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the international arena was growing steadily.²³ Peace, cooperation and development were identified as global and regional megatrends.²⁴

The foreign policy objectives of the SRV were defined in the same way as at the previous congress, but the guidance to strengthen international integration run through the pages devoted to Vietnam's foreign relations like golden threads. The goal was to “make a breakthrough” in this sphere.²⁵ At the same time, the concept of integration went beyond the boundaries of the economic sphere, encompassing other areas: culture, science, education, etc.

It also draws attention to the fact that the concern about the need to ensure the “leading role” of the CPV in the country's international affairs was expressed at the Congress.²⁶ The task of strengthening ties with the Communist parties also remained.

In general, the 10th Congress confirmed the course of pursuing a policy of openness, establishing broad and deep ties with all foreign actors on the principles of respect for national independence and non-interference in internal affairs.

The 11th Congress of the CPV (January 2011) went down in history as a congress, providing with an update on the Party Program and Statute. The CPV Program reaffirmed a line of independent foreign policy of peace, friendship and cooperation,²⁷ set targets for actively strengthening international relationships, enhancing the role of Vietnam in world politics.²⁸ The course towards a multi-vector and diversified foreign policy was reiterated.

²² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2018). Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 65, tr. 209.

²³ Ibid., tr. 139.

²⁴ Ibid., tr. 141.

²⁵ Ibid., tr. 278.

²⁶ Ibid., tr. 214.

²⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2011). Văn kiện đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XI. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 72.

²⁸ Ibid., tr. 84.

Given the importance of these party documents as a basis for ideology and practice of all Vietnamese communists, including diplomats, it should be assumed that the intended goals will be carried out over a rather long period; they are to be considered on a strategic level.

The course towards a multi-vector and diversified foreign policy was also enshrined in the main law of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In its article 12, the new Constitution, which came into force on the January 1, 2014, directed citizens towards multilateral cooperation and integration into international processes. The State itself was supposed to appear at the international scene as follows: “The SRV is a friend, reliable partner and responsible participant of the international community, contributing to the cause of peace, national independence, democracy and social progress throughout the world in the interest of the nation and the State.”²⁹

The second decade of the XXI century was filled with the vigorous activity of Vietnamese international experts in the implementation of the multi-vector course. On the one hand, this was evident in the in the establishment of strategic partnerships with various states. By mid-2021, the number of strategic partners of the SRV reached three dozen, among them there were all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

At the same time, the party leadership continued to emphasize multilateralism. In August 2018, the CPV Central Committee Secretariat issued a directive outlining the way forward for multilateral diplomacy until 2030.³⁰ In particular, it highlighted effective use of the opportunities of free trade zones. Between the 12th and 13th CPV Congresses, Vietnam joined the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership — the organizations where the lead role is played by countries of liberal capitalism like Japan, and there is no place for Russia. It appears that the increased focus on developing Vietnam’s ties in a multilateral format, with more active participation in international organizations, was due, inter alia, to the desire of Hanoi leaders to avoid suspicion of affiliation with any one superpower. This became particularly important in the tenth years of the present century, when relations between PCR — US and US — Russia had become tense.

This line will be continued in the future. This was evidenced by the proceedings of the 13th CPV Congress, which took place at the end of January

²⁹ Hiến pháp nước cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam (2014). Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr.25.

³⁰ Pham Binh Minh. Lifting Foreign Affairs in 2019 to a New Level (2019). *Vietnam Investment Review*, February 6.

2021. The list of tasks of Vietnamese diplomacy addresses the strategic issues of protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, resisting old and new (COVID-19, cyberattacks) challenges and threats, pursuing a diversification and multi-vector policy, active participation in international integration for further socio-economic development of the country. This Congress paid more attention than before to Vietnam's participation in multilateral institutions, in particular, such as ASEAN, UN, APEC.³¹ It can be expected that in the near future the representatives of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will take global initiatives in these institutions.

Conclusion

Thus, over the years of implementation of the “*Doi moi*” renewal policy, Vietnamese diplomacy has made a transition from socialist internationalism, membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, practically allied relations with the Soviet Union and the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization through de-ideologizing its external relations to a multi-vector, strategic partnership with a large number of states and active integration into international economic and political institutions. All these years, the diplomacy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has successfully served the socio-economic development of the country, the implementation of the CPV course to renew all aspects of the life of Vietnamese society.

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³¹ Báo cáo chính trị của Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng khoá XII tại Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII của Đảng. Retrieved on June 15, 2021.

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Chapter 24

PROMOTING THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CPV — OUTSTANDING ACHIEVEMENTS SINCE 1986 TO THIS DAY

After 35 years of implementing the *Doi moi* (reform) process from 1986 until now, Vietnam has increasingly integrated into the international community and has attained great achievements of historical significance, especially in the field of economic sector. It is the result of the state's process of consistently implementing the Party's guidelines and orientations, with a proactive spirit, actively promoting international integration, diversification and multilateralization of foreign relations; maintaining independence and putting national interests first. These achievements have created great spiritual strength and solidified the Vietnamese people's belief in the leadership of the Communist Party and the performance of the state's leading and governing role in the country's current international integration process.

Keywords: State's role, international integration, outstanding achievements, leadership of the Communist Party.

In the context of globalization, Vietnam's international integration is inevitable and reasonable, following the trend of the current times. With the goal of promoting internal resources, making the most of external resources, shortening the development process, and gradually implementing the cause of national reform successfully, the State of Vietnam, under the leadership of the Communist Party, has effectively promoted the role of management and administration and led the international integration process of Vietnam. This work has reaped many achievements, contributing to enhancing the country's position in the international arena. These outstanding achieve-

ments are the result of the state's process of realizing the international integration policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam from 1986 to present.

The international integration policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam in *Đổi mới*

Vietnam's international integration started with the cause of *Đổi mới*, initiated by the VI Party Congress (1986). This was a period when the global situation was volatile with complicated developments, especially with the recession in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which had a negative impact on the Vietnamese revolution. On the basis of analyzing the domestic and foreign context, with the motto of looking directly at the truth, pointing out the deep causes of the socio-economic crisis at that time, the Communist Party of Vietnam set out a policy and major policies, creating an important turning point in thinking and acting, and officially brought Vietnam into the period of reform. The Party asserted: "In order to combine national strength with the trends of the times, our country must participate in the international division of labor; (...) at the same time take advantage of expanding economic and scientific — technical relations with third world countries, industrialized countries, international organizations and foreign private sector on the principle of equality and mutually benefits".¹ This is an important theoretical premise for the State and people of Vietnam to take the first steps firmly and effectively in the process of international integration.

Entering the 90s of the twentieth century, the world situation changed along with the disintegration of the system of socialist countries in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; The VII National Party Congress (1991) defined the principle of Vietnam's international integration as "diversifying and multilateralizing economic relations with all countries and all economic organizations on the principle of respect for independence, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit".²

At the VIII National Congress (1996), for the first time, the term "Integration" was officially mentioned in the Party's Document, which was: "Build an open economy, integrate with the region and the world..."³, continue to implement the foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, openness, multilateralization and diversification of foreign relations; proactively

¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2019). *Văn kiện Đại hội Đảng thời kỳ Đổi mới (phần 1)*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị quốc gia Sự thật, tr.79—80.

² *Ibid.*, tr. 471.

³ *Ibid.*, tr. 690.

prepare necessary conditions of personnel, legislation and especially of products that Vietnam can compete internationally to integrate into regional and international markets.

In international integration, international economic integration is both the center, the basis and the driving force, promoting other integration fields of society. Deeply aware of the importance of this process for the overall development of the country, at the IX Congress of the Party (2001), the Politburo issued Resolution No. 07/NQ-TW: “On international economic integration”. The resolution clearly states: Actively integrate into the international economy to expand the market, take advantage of more capital, technology and management knowledge to promote industrialization and modernization of the country in the direction of socialism. Try to achieve a prosperous population, a strong country, a just, democratic and civilized society...

At the X Congress, the integration guideline by the Party was developed from “Active” to a higher level, which was “Actively and proactively integrating into the international economy, and at the same time expanding international cooperation in other fields”⁴.

At the XI National Congress of Deputies, the Party's thinking and awareness of integration had a new development, that was, from “international economic integration” in the previous congresses, it was changed to “International integration”. The Party has asserted a determination to “Actively and proactively integrate into the world”⁵. Affirming and strengthening this spirit, on April 10, 2013, the 11th Politburo issued Resolution No. 22 / NQ-TW “On international integration”. By promulgating Resolution No. 22/NQ-TW, the Party's awareness of international integration has developed more deeply and comprehensively. Vietnam will participate in integration in all areas of social life, in which economic integration is the focus; integration in other fields must facilitate economic integration and actively contribute to economic development, strengthening national defense, ensuring national security, preserving and promoting national cultural identity.

At the XII National Congress (2016), the Communist Party of Vietnam continued to emphasize: “Improve the effectiveness of international integration, fully implement international commitments and free trade agreements in the new era in a master plan with a reasonable roadmap; which is

⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2019). *Văn kiện Đại hội Đảng thời kỳ Đổi mới (phần 2)*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị quốc gia Sự thật, tr. 123.

⁵ Ibid., tr. 434.

consistent with the interests of the country. Promote and deepen relations with partners, especially strategic partners and major countries that play an important role in the development and security of the country, and put the established relationship framework into substantive implementation”⁶.

In 2021, the Communist Party of Vietnam successfully organized the XIII Party Congress in the context of a complicated international situation. As strategic competition between major countries increases, the COVID-19 pandemic is still a worrying threat in Vietnam as well as in many other countries. On the basis of deep awareness of the domestic and foreign context, the XIII National Congress of the Party continued to affirm: “Combine the strength of the nation with the trend of the times, proactively take initiative in comprehensive and extensive international integration; Vietnam is a friend, a reliable partner and an active and responsible member of the international community”⁷.

Thus, a summary of the past 35 years shows that Vietnam's foreign policy and international integration policy was initiated from the VI Congress (1986) and has been regularly supplemented and developed through the VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII congresses in accordance with the requirements and tasks of the Vietnam as well as with the constant movement and change in the world. Subsequent congresses always inherit, supplement and develop the perceptions and decisions of previous congresses. This is considered an important theoretical basis, a guideline to guide all activities of Vietnam in the process of international integration. The realization of the Communist Party's policy of international integration since 1986 has helped the State and people of Vietnam reap great achievements, contributing to promoting the country's development and raising Vietnam's position to a new height.

Outstanding achievements of the State of Vietnam in the process of international economic integration from 1986 to present

First, the State implemented reform of administrative procedures, supplemented and completed the legal frameworks to improve the efficiency of international integration.

⁶ *Ibid.*, tr. 589.

⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 162.

Faced with the increasing requirements of the international integration process and for the sake of comprehensive renovation, the state's functional agencies have reviewed the system of legal documents, annulled thousands of outdated and duplicate documents, iterated and promulgated new documents with much progress, in line with Vietnam's international integration process. The Prime Minister has issued decisions guiding and directing the simplification of administrative procedures in order to ensure the consistency, synchronization, simplicity, publicity and transparency of administrative procedures, and created favorable conditions for individuals, organizations and enterprises at home and abroad. Typical examples are Decision No. 30/QĐ-TTg, issued on January 10, 2007 (referred to as Project 30) and Decision No. 896/QĐ-TTg, issued on June 8, 2013, (referred to as Project 896). As of 2021, 57/57 (100 %) of Project 896's tasks have been completed, and the implementation process has achieved many important results⁸, contributing to general socio-economic development of the country.

At the same time, in recent years, the State has focused on institutionalizing the Party's guidelines, improving the quality of legal documents to suit the new situation and meet higher levels of requirements of the international integration process. Specifically, procedures for business registration, import and export, and issuance of certificates of urban land use rights are simplified; there was fundamental reform in customs procedures, appraisal and issuance of foreign investment licenses, and exemption from inappropriate fees and charges. A series of laws such as the Commercial Law, the Enterprise Law, and the Investment Law have been gradually adjusted, supplemented and revised over the years 1996, 1999, 2005, 2014, 2020, contributing to eliminating discrimination between domestic investment and foreign investment and eliminating inequality between economic sectors, especially between the state economic sector, the private economic sector and the foreign-invested sector.

After more than 30 years of opening up to attract foreign investment, the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Vietnam has continuously increased. In 2010, realized investment capital reached USD 11 billion, by 2015 it reached USD 14.5 billion, and by 2016 it reached USD 15.8 billion. By the end of 2017, Vietnam attracted over 25,000 foreign direct investment projects with a total registered investment of more than USD 333 billion. Up to now, 129 countries/territories have invested in Vietnam. Particularly in 2019, FDI capital into Vietnam reached USD 38.95 billion, an increase

⁸ Lê Sơn (2021). Đề án 896: Xuyên suốt tiêu chí 'đúng, đủ, sạch, sống'. *Báo điện tử Chính phủ nước Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam*, April 22.

of 7.2 % compared to 2018; making Vietnam one of the attractive countries for foreign investors.⁹

The results of the promulgation of legal documents of the State have brought certain successes in attracting foreign investment, creating more jobs for the economy, and increasing incomes for all classes of the population, contributing to boosting Vietnam's import and export activities in the integration process.

Second, the State negotiates, signs and implements international and regional economic-commercial agreements and contracts in the process of international integration.

Regarding bilateral cooperation, as of 2020, “Vietnam has established diplomatic relations with 189 out of 193 UN member states; establishing a stable and long-term relationship with 30 strategic and comprehensive partners, creating a solid foundation for Vietnam and other countries to raise cooperation levels for the benefit of each country and for peace, cooperation and development in the region and in the world”.¹⁰ Particularly in 2020, Vietnam has joined 3 major trade agreements, opening up an unprecedented large market, including the Vietnam — European Union Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) and the UK-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (UKVFTA), bringing the total number of free trade agreements that Vietnam participates in to 15. Currently, Vietnam has economic, trade and investment cooperation relations with more than 230 countries and territories, including FTAs with 60 economies, opening up potential export markets, contributing to increasing trade turnover from USD 2.9 billion (in 1986) to over USD 500 billion (in 2019).¹¹

Regarding multilateral and regional cooperation: Vietnam has had positive relationships with international monetary and financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Vietnam's international integration process has been accelerated and taken to a higher level by joining regional and world economic and trade organizations such as ASEAN, AFTA, ASEM, APEC, WTO, and TPP. Most notably, in 2020, in the context that the

⁹ Vũ Thị Yến (2021). Thực trạng thu hút vốn đầu tư trực tiếp nước ngoài vào Việt Nam giai đoạn 2010—2020. *Tạp chí Công thương điện tử*, April 15.

¹⁰ Thái Văn Long (2021). Đối ngoại đa phương trong phát huy lợi thế địa chính trị Việt Nam theo tinh thần Đại hội XIII của Đảng. *Tạp chí Lý luận chính trị*, 6: 59.

¹¹ Thuý Minh (2021). Đối ngoại Việt Nam năm 2020: Tự tin vững bước trên con đường phát triển. *Tạp chí Cộng sản điện tử*, February 12.

world was facing difficulties due to the outbreak of the Covid-19 epidemic which affected the global economy, the joining and signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) still went smoothly, marking an important milestone in Vietnam's economic integration process.

The outstanding achievements of the state's role in negotiating and signing bilateral and multilateral economic-commercial agreements and contracts have contributed to conveying Vietnam's message to international friends about its proactive and positive spirit in the process of promoting international integration.

Third, the State has handled well the relationship between independence and international integration, contributing to enhancing Vietnam's position in the region and the world.

Independence, autonomy and international integration have an interactive and dialectical relationship with each other. Independence and self-reliance are the basis, creating endogenous strength to improve the efficiency of international cooperation. Similarly, deep international integration will allow to make good use of all external opportunities and to increase the internal strength of the country, thereby creating more power and strength for the country to maintain its independence. Over the past 35 years, under the good leadership of the Communist Party, the State of Vietnam has effectively resolved the relationship between independence and international integration, creating a positive resonance among international friends.

Besides focusing on the economic field, Vietnam attaches great importance to strengthening cultural strength, defense and security; proactively and successfully handles situations and is not passive or unprepared. Political, economic, cultural, and social security and the safety and order of the country are maintained. Foreign affairs and international integration are promoted, constantly expand and deepen. Vietnam also resolutely and persistently protects independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and national interests; maintains a peaceful and stable environment for the development of the country, and at the same time makes active and responsible contributions to peace, cooperation and development of the region and the world. These efforts have been advocated and highly regarded by the international community; the reliability and position of the Party and State, and the position and power of the country are constantly being improved in the international arena¹².

¹² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, tr. 22—23.

In the context of the world economy's recession, the GDP growth rate of many countries declined, but Vietnam's economy still achieved a good growth rate. Gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020 increased by 2.91 %. Although this was the lowest increase in the period 2011—2020, this was a great success for Vietnam with the growth rate among the highest in the world, given the context of complicated developments of the Covid-19 epidemic which negatively affected all socio-economic fields. Vietnam has now been removed from the group of the least developed countries by the United Nations and has become a middle-income country.

Up to now, Vietnam has signed more than 100 bilateral agreements and treaties with cultural content. In-depth socio-cultural integration has attracted international friends to come to Vietnam more and more. Defense — security cooperation with major countries and countries in the region has been gradually expanded; Vietnam has official defense relations with nearly 70 countries, has military attache offices in more than 30 countries and more than 40 countries have military attache offices in Vietnam.¹³ Vietnam has been assigned many international tasks at the same time and has completed them successfully, namely: Chairman of ASEAN 2020, Chairman of the 41st Inter-Parliamentary Council of Southeast Asian Nations (AIPA), non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the 2020—2021 term. These are clear demonstrations of the state's achievements in effectively resolving the relationship between independence and international integration.

It can be seen that the success of international integration has contributed to strengthening synergy, creating a vital material and spiritual premise for maintaining and ensuring the country's independence and self-reliance in all fields, especially in politics, economy, defense, security and foreign affairs. At the same time, Vietnam's independence and autonomy has increasingly contributed to affirming the country's position in the region and in the world.

Fourth, the State has developed a strategy for cultural diplomacy, which creates good foundation for Vietnamese culture to integrate globally

Vietnam has the goals of actively integrating into the world in terms of culture, promoting Vietnamese cultural values to the world, absorbing the cultural quintessence of global humanity and creating a comprehensive development for the Vietnamese culture to contribute to enhance the country's international position and prestige. To fulfil these goals, the Prime Minister signed Decision No. 208/2011/QĐ-TTg approving the “Strategy for cultu-

¹³ Hội đồng lý luận trung ương (2019). *Quan hệ giữa độc lập, tự chủ và hội nhập quốc tế*.

ral diplomacy until 2020” (issued on February 14, 2011) and Decision No. 210/QĐ-TTg approving the “External cultural relations strategy to 2020 and vision to 2030” (issued on February 8, 2015).

Implementing the Party's guidelines on cultural integration and the state's cultural diplomacy strategies, Vietnam has strengthened its good cooperation relationship with UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) in all areas of competence. Most notably, Vietnam and UNESCO signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation between the two sides for the 2016–2020 period on the basis of summarizing the MOU for the 2010–2015 period. Vietnam continues to promote its active role in UNESCO through holding a number of important positions at UNESCO's specialized committees, such as Vice President of the Memory of the World Program for Asia and the Pacific (MOWCAP) for the term 2014–2018; Vice Chairman of International Oceanographic Commission for the Western Pacific (IOC/WESTPAC) for the term 2012–2015 and Secretary General of the World Union of UNESCO Associations for the term 2011–2015¹⁴.

After a lot of effort, up to now, Vietnam is proud to be the leading country in the ASEAN region with a total of 21 world heritages recognized by UNESCO. This is Vietnam's responsible contribution to enriching, protecting and promoting humanity's cultural treasures. At the same time, UNESCO's international titles for Vietnam are also an effective way to help international friends better understand the country, people, traditions and history of Vietnam.

The present world is facing profound, rapid and unpredictable changes. Peace, cooperation and development are still the aspirations of the peoples of the world, but humanity is also facing many difficulties and challenges, especially the world economic recession and strategic competition between great powers, and the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. This fact is having a multi-dimensional impact on Vietnam. In this context, the role of the State becomes even more important. Therefore, in order to continue promoting the role of the Communist Party of Vietnam in realizing the international integration policy as clearly stated at the 13th Party Congress (2021), the State needs to focus on a number of fundamental contents as follows:

First, to further strengthen the proactive international integration, not only in the economic field but also in the political, cultural, social, defense and security fields.

¹⁴ Lý Thị Hải Yến, Trần Thị Hương (2020). *Ngoại giao văn hóa Việt Nam: Một thập niên nhìn lại*. Tạp chí Cộng sản, 947: 103.

Second, to improve the state's macro-forecasting capacity in response to changes in the world, thereby properly identifying opportunities and challenges of international integration.

Third, to focus on developing human resources to meet the increasing requirements of the international integration process.

Fourth, to continue to supplement and perfect the current legal system, minimizing risks from the “common rules of the game” that international integration brings.

Fifth, to focus on summarizing practices and drawing on experiences, contributing to a good advisory function for the Party to plan policies and guidelines for integration in the coming years.

Vietnam's thirty-five-year journey of reform and international integration from 1986 to now has been a challenging and difficult process. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the State's achievements have historical significance, creating a premise and motivation for Vietnam to enter the period of deep international integration, stronger and more comprehensive development now and in the future.

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Chapter 25

INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION AS A KEY FOREIGN ORIENTATION OF THE CPV (2016—2021): ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS

The thought of expanding foreign relations, integration with the region and the world of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has been clearly shown in the diplomatic documents of Vietnam's government and documents of the National Congress of CPV. The process of Vietnam's international integration has taken place in many areas and in many different levels, from bilateral, sub-regional, regional, inter-regional to global. The paper focuses on assessing the achievements that Vietnam has achieved on the integration process, both in bilateral and in multilateral cooperation. Vietnam has taken advantage of a favorable international environment to concentrate on socio-economic development, maintaining peaceful environment, stabilizing national security, improving the position of the country in the international arena. Besides, Vietnam's international integration process still faces many difficulties. Finally, the paper also raises the forthcoming prospects for Vietnam's international integration in the direction of the 13th National Congress of the CPV.

Keywords: Integration, region, international, the CPV, relations and cooperation.

Some basic views on international integration of the Party and State of Vietnam

The basic objective of international integration defined by the CPV is to consolidate a peaceful environment, make the most of favorable international conditions for rapid and sustainable development of the country, improve people's living standards, maintain independence, sovereignty,

unity, territorial integrity and firmly defend the socialist Vietnamese Fatherland. The principles of Vietnam's international integration are: respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs; not use force or threaten to use force; resolve disagreements and disputes through peaceful negotiation; mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit.¹

Entering the new century, the 9th Party Congress (2001) affirmed that “Consistently implement the foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, expansion, multilateralization and diversification of international relations, willing to be friends and reliable partners of countries in the world, striving for peace, independence and development”.² The 10th Congress also affirmed “Actively integrate into the international economy, and at the same time expand international cooperation in other fields. Vietnam is a friend and reliable partner of countries in the international community to participate actively in the process of international and regional cooperation”.³ The 11th Party Congress in 2011 marked a new development in the policy of international integration with the view “Multilateralization and diversification of relations, proactive international integration; raising the position of country, for the sake of the nation, for a rich and strong socialist Vietnam; a friend, a reliable partner, and a responsible member of the international community”.⁴

Continuing the orientation of international integration stated in the 11th National Party Congress, the 12th Party Congress (2016) set out the policy “Diversification and multilateralization in foreign relations; proactive integration on the basis of both cooperation and struggle, external activities aim to maintain a peaceful and stable environment, make the most of external resources to develop the country, improve people's living standards ... ; raise the country's position and prestige, contributing to the cause of peace and national independence democracy and progress in the world”⁵.

¹ Ban Tuyên giáo Trung ương (2017). *Hội nhập quốc tế*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 47–48.

² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2001). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ IX*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 119.

³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ X*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 112.

⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2011). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 235–236.

⁵ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2016). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 153.

Thus, through different historical periods, the CPV has set forth guidelines for international integration flexibly on the basis of inheritance and adjustment and supplementation to suit the new situation. International integration is both objective and subjective, bringing both opportunities and challenges for Vietnam when participating in international life.

Results of Vietnam's international integration in the period 2016—2021

Achievements

Over the past time, Vietnam has achieved many great achievements in the process of integrating into international relations, contributing to socio-economic development, maintaining a peaceful environment, stabilizing national security, improving position of the country in the international arena.

The document of the 13th Party Congress commented that “The network of strategic partnerships and comprehensive partnerships has been consolidated and expanded; relations with other countries have gradually deepened”⁶. Vietnam has taken advantage of the favorable international environment to focus on socio-economic development. Through specific diplomatic activities, especially focusing on strengthening cooperation with key partners, Vietnam has taken advantage of resources for socio-economic development. In addition to establishing diplomatic relations with 185 countries, Vietnam promotes economic, trade and investment relations with 224 markets on all continents, participating in more than 500 bilateral and multilateral agreements in the world, attracting a large amount of foreign direct investments.⁷

- *In bilateral cooperation:*

*Vietnam has consolidated and developed comprehensive cooperative friendship with such neighboring countries as Laos, Cambodia and China, promoting mechanisms for negotiating and exchanging with neighboring countries on territorial borders, basically completing border delimitation with them.*⁸

⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 1, tr. 60—61.

⁷ Học viện Chính trị Quốc gia Hồ Chí Minh (2019). *Giáo trình quan hệ quốc tế*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Lý luận Chính trị, tr. 226.

⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 2, tr. 60.

With Laos, in general, Vietnam implements a policy of friendship and solidarity with Laos, considering it “an invaluable asset of the two peoples to be passed on to future generations, a law of development, a decisive factor in the development of Laos, which is determined to win the cause of national construction and defense of each country”.⁹ The two countries agreed to upgrade the relationship of “traditional friendship” to “great friendship” on the occasion of the official friendship visit to Laos by General Secretary and President Nguyen Phu Trong in February 2019, which is considered an important historical milestone, creating a breakthrough in cooperation between the two countries in the coming time.¹⁰

With Cambodia, the relationship between the two countries is constantly developing and achieving many achievements. Leaders of the two countries affirmed their determination to work together to foster the good traditional friendship and solidarity between the two countries. Two-way trade turnover has surpassed 5 billion USD in 2019.¹¹ Vietnam and Cambodia have implemented border demarcation and marker planting work on land since the beginning of 1986. As of December 2018, the two sides have completed about 84 % of the work of demarcation and marker planting.¹²

With China, on the basis of the comprehensive strategic partnership, Vietnam and China have determined to develop the relationship between the two countries according to the motto set out earlier: “friendly neighbors, comprehensive cooperation, long-term stability, looking to the future” (1999) and the spirit of “good neighbors, good friends, good comrades, good partners” (2005). Up to now, Vietnam and China have established nearly 60 exchange and cooperation mechanisms from central to local levels. Vietnam maintains its position as China’s largest trading partner in ASEAN countries, with bilateral trade turnover in 2020, reaching USD 192.2 billion, increased by 18.7 %. China was the 3rd largest FDI investor in Vietnam in 2020¹³.

⁹ Phạm Quang Minh (2015). Giáo trình quan hệ quốc tế ở khu vực châu Á — Thái Bình Dương. *Tạp chí VNU*, tr. 208.

¹⁰ Vũ Quang Vinh (2020). Quan hệ hữu nghị, đoàn kết đặc biệt và hợp tác toàn diện Việt Nam — Lào: Những chặng đường lịch sử (Vu Quang Vinh. Friendship, special solidarity and comprehensive cooperation between Vietnam and Laos: Historical journeys). *Tạp chí Cộng sản*, December 13.

¹¹ Quan hệ Việt Nam — Campuchia: Vàng đã qua thử lửa. *Báo Quốc tế*, January 6. 1

¹² Quan hệ Việt Nam — Campuchia tiếp tục phát triển tốt đẹp (2019). *Báo điện tử Đảng cộng sản*, October 4.

¹³ Kỷ niệm 71 năm thiết lập quan hệ ngoại giao Việt Nam — Trung Quốc (2021). *Nhân Dân*, March 26.

Actively improve relations with major countries and regional integration organizations

For the US, the relationship with this world's superpower is very important to Vietnam's security, stability and economic development requirements, helping Vietnam improve its relations with other partners and create more favorable conditions for Vietnam to deal with current challenges¹⁴. On the basis of a comprehensive partnership, the total two-way import and export turnover between Vietnam and the US in 2019 reached USD 75.6 billion. The US is Vietnam's largest export market and 3rd largest trading partner. Vietnam is also the 27th largest export market and the 16th largest trading partner of the US¹⁵. In the first 10 months of 2020, the bilateral trade turnover between Vietnam and the US reached 73.9 billion USD. By September 2020, the US ranked 11th out of 138 countries and territories with FDI in Vietnam with 1,063 projects and a total registered capital of USD 9.4 billion.¹⁶ The US has also actively supported Vietnam to overcome the consequences of the war, supported Vietnam in combating climate change, and many health and medical programs in Vietnam.

With Russia, over the years, Vietnam has consistently considered the Russian Federation a top priority in its foreign policy. The outstanding feature of Vietnam — Russia political relations is high reliability with diverse forms of cooperation. Security and defense cooperation is promoted. Russia is Vietnam's leading partner in this field. In economic cooperation, since the Free Trade Agreement between Vietnam and the EAEU (VN — EAEU FTA) came into effect, the growth of trade turnover between Vietnam and Russia has made strong progress with an increase in about 30 %/year on average¹⁷. Two-way trade turnover increased from USD 2.5 billion in 2014 to USD 4.5 billion in 2019. Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, two-way turnover between Vietnam and Russia still grew by nearly 10 % in the first 9 months of the year.¹⁸ Science — technology cooperation

¹⁴ Viện Kinh tế và Chính trị thế giới. Kỳ yếu Hội thảo “Tình hình chính trị và an ninh thế giới hai thập kỷ đầu của thế kỷ 21: thực trạng, xu hướng và hàm ý chính sách đối với Việt Nam”. Hà Nội. Tr. 100.

¹⁵ 25 năm quan hệ Việt Nam — Hoa Kỳ: Từ cự thù tới đối tác toàn diện (2020). *Thanh Niên*, July 10. 1

¹⁶ Quan hệ thương mại Việt Nam — Hoa Kỳ đạt tốc độ phát triển ấn tượng (2020). *Vneconomy*, November 18.

¹⁷ Thúc đẩy giao thương hướng tới năm chéo Việt — Nga (2019). *Công Thương*, March 14.

¹⁸ Thúc đẩy quan hệ thương mại Việt — Nga sớm đạt 10 tỷ USD (2020). *Báo điện tử Đảng cộng sản*, November 12.

continues to be maintained. The two countries have carried out nearly 60 research and technology transfer projects. Currently, Russia continues to support Vietnam in human resource training. Russia is one of the largest scholarship providers for Vietnam.

For the EU, Vietnam has a cooperative relationship in all fields and is one of the EU partners with the most comprehensive relationship in the region. An important event that marks the latest historical milestone in the bilateral relationship is the signing, ratification and official entry into force of the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA) from August 1, 2020. The EU has always been one of the top three trading partners (after China and the US) and one of the two most important export markets (after the US) of Vietnam. From 2000 to 2019, the total export turnover of goods between Vietnam and the EU increased 17 times, from USD 4.1 billion (in 2000) to USD 56.45 billion (in 2019). The EU is one of the five largest foreign direct investors in Vietnam. In 2019, the EU had 2,375 projects (an increase of 182 projects compared to 2018) from 27/28 EU countries still valid in Vietnam with a total registered investment capital of USD 25.49 billion (up 1.19 billion).¹⁹ The EU is Vietnam's largest supplier of development aid. The European Commission committed to providing aids to Vietnam in the period 2014–2020.²⁰

- *In multilateral cooperation:*

In recent years, Vietnam has signed and implemented many new-generation free trade agreements, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), EVFTA, and VN — EAEU FTA, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) etc. Vietnam actively promotes its role at the United Nations, APEC, ASEAN and related forums and mechanisms like being elected as non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the term 2020–2021 with almost absolute votes²¹.

At the regional scale, Vietnam has affirmed its active and important nuclear role in ASEAN, actively working with ASEAN to build and promote tools and mechanisms for political-security cooperation in the region, contributing to building trust, promoting dialogue, for peace, security, stability and cooperation for development. For example, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), Declaration of Conduct of the

¹⁹ Bùi Hồng Hạnh (2020). Quan hệ Việt Nam — Liên minh châu Âu: Từ hiệp định khung về hợp tác đến hiệp định thương mại tự do. *Tạp chí Cộng sản*, October 3.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 60–61.

parties in the East Sea (DOC), towards the development of a Code of Conduct in the East Sea (COC), etc. In addition, Vietnam has also stepped up and participated in more and more substantive and effective organizations in organizations and forums for inter-regional and regional cooperation such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Cooperation (ASEM), The Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), the World Economic Forum (WEF), the Mekong Sub-regional cooperation mechanisms, etc.

Assessing the results of international integration, the 13th Party Congress pointed out “international integration continues to be expanded and deepened, creating a framework for stable and sustainable relations with partners, participating in the development of principles and standards in regional and global multilateral institutions; properly and effectively handling relations with neighboring countries, major countries, and strategic partners, comprehensive strategic partners, and other partners”.²² Thus, the great achievements of Vietnam in international integration are the results of the consistent implementation of the foreign policy of openness, diversification, multilateralization, and deeper integration with the region and the world, thereby creating favorable conditions for Vietnam to participate effectively in the international labor division system, making use of all resources to serve development goals.²³

Challenges

Besides great achievements, Vietnam’s international integration process still has certain difficulties:

In some fields of foreign relations and international integration, at specific times, “it did not keep up with the developments of the situation, not fully anticipated the adverse impacts. Not exploited well and effectively brought into play the interwoven benefits relationships with important partners”.²⁴ “International integration has not been uniformly implemented, and the overall efficiency is not high. The capacity of international integration is slow to improve”²⁵. Some relationships have been established but are still limited in depth, have not made qualitative leaps, have not built relationship frameworks or have not yet concretized signed agreements.

²² Ibid., tr. 69.

²³ Ban Tuyên giáo Trung ương (2017). *Op. cit.*, tr. 45.

²⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 88.

²⁵ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 2, tr. 77.

The relationship between economy, politics, security and foreign affairs in some specific cases has not been closely linked together. The progress of legal and institutional preparation is still far from the requirements of integration and the changes of world situation. The work of external information and propaganda is not sensitive, the form is not lively, the coordination mechanism between sectors and levels is not synchronized, and the efficiency is not high. The work of training, fostering and building cadres in charge of foreign affairs and international integration is still not of high quality; basic research, strategic forecasting in foreign affairs and international integration is still limited, not meeting the requirements, sometimes lacking initiative, coordination, and unified administration.

Some orientations for international integration of Vietnam in the coming time in the spirit of the 13th Congress of the CPV

There should be some orientations for international integration of Vietnam as follows:

Continue to actively promote foreign affairs, make the most of the opportunities brought by the integration process, especially the signed free trade agreements, focusing on improving integration capacity, international trade, and investment dispute settlement; closely link foreign affairs with national defense and security and serving socio-economic development; promote relations with partners, especially important partners; enhance the interweaving of interests, handle flexibly, creatively and effectively relations with other powers.²⁶

Persevere, steadfastly follow the foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, multilateralization and diversification of relations, improve the ability to adapt dynamically and flexibly to harmonize national interests with common interests²⁷; improve the efficiency of foreign affairs, step up and raise the level of multilateral diplomacy, closely combine with bilateral diplomacy, well perform international responsibilities, especially within ASEAN, the United Nations, and other international cooperation frameworks in Asia-Pacific; improve the level and quality of international integration to expand the market, take advantage of capital, technology, knowledge and management skills, improve the competitiveness of the economy, businesses and products; actively contribute to the process of renewing the

²⁶ Ibid., tr. 153.

²⁷ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 282.

growth model, restructuring the economy, accelerating industrialization and modernization of the country, narrowing the development gap compared with more developed countries in region and around the world; strictly implement international commitments and signed trade agreements; take advantage of a favorable international environment to improve integration capacity and benefit from integration.²⁸

Continue to renew international cooperation on law in a proactive way, making effective use of international rules and laws and participating in activities of the regional and international community; proactively propose initiatives and cooperation mechanisms on the principle of mutual benefit, for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress in the world, in order to create qualitative changes in cooperation activities on law.²⁹

Build economic diplomacy for development, taking people, localities and businesses as the center to serve and protect the legitimate interests of the State, businesses and Vietnamese people in economic disputes³⁰; further promote cultural diplomacy, make practical contributions to strongly promote the national image and strengthen the country's synergy.³¹

Maximize the national position and external resources to serve the development of the country; improve integration capacity, effectively implement international commitments, free trade agreements, integrate with socio-economic development plans and programs.

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²⁸ Ibid., tr. 283—284.

²⁹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 2, tr. 154.

³⁰ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 284.

³¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 2, tr. 155.

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Chapter 26

THE COMBINATION OF THE COUNTRY FORCE AND THAT OF THE EPOQUE IN THE CPV'S RESPONSE TO NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES (COVID-19 PANDEMIC CASE ANALYSIS)

Based on the viewpoint and guideline of the Communist Party of Vietnam on solving and responding to non-traditional security issues (through the case of the Covid-19 pandemic), the book chapter analyzes and evaluates the current status of the role of the Communist Party of Vietnam in solving non-traditional security issues on the basis of combining national strength and the strength of the times. Based on updated official data and the results of surveys/in-depth interviews with scientists in the field of politics and social sciences in Vietnam, the author draws some experiences and policy recommendations for Vietnam in dealing with non-traditional security issues in the coming time.

Keywords: Communist Party of Vietnam, national strength, the strength of the times, non-traditional security, Covid-19.

Views and policies of the Communist Party of Vietnam

Viewpoints on non-traditional security

The issue of non-traditional security has emerged as a challenge that threatens the survival of all nations in the world. Being aware of that, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has had a clear orientation on non-traditional security issues. At the XI Congress (2011), the CPV affirmed:

“...the threats to non-traditional security are high-tech crimes in the fields of finance — currency, electronics — telecommunications, biology, and environment, and these continue to increase”.¹ At the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 2016, the CPV clearly stated non-traditional security issues: “The international community must deal more and more decisively with traditional and non-traditional security challenges, especially cyber security and new forms of war”.² The XIII Congress affirmed “challenges on climate change, environmental degradation, resource depletion, and cross-border use of water resources, especially the Mekong River, natural disasters, epidemics and non-traditional security challenges are all increasing, posing urgent requirements on strengthening cooperation in handling, posing many unprecedented problems and challenges for rapid and sustainable development”.³

Thus, according to the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), the problem of non-traditional security is the challenges of climate change, environmental degradation, resource depletion, cross-border water use, epidemics, cyberwar, transnational organized crime, terrorism. Among those problems, the epidemic is a non-traditional security challenge mentioned quite clearly. In 2020, epidemics became an urgent and serious issue due to the serious consequences of the Sar-Cov 2 virus, and now humanity has another disaster called the Covid-19 pandemic. Commenting on the epidemic, the XIII Congress said that in 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic had a strong impact on our country, causing a lot of socio-economic damage and affecting the development of the country.⁴

Perspectives on combining national strength with the strength of the times

The thought of combining national strength and the strength of the times in Vietnam was formed in the nation’s history of nation building and defense, and later raised to the theoretical level by President Ho Chi Minh and inherited by the Communist Party of Vietnam. At the 8th Plenum of the

¹ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2011). *Văn kiện Đại hội đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia.

² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2016). *Văn kiện Đại hội Đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XII*. Hà Nội: Văn phòng Trung ương Đảng, tr. 72.

³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Văn kiện Đại hội Đại biểu toàn quốc lần thứ XIII*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 2, tr. 90.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 78.

Central Committee (session IX), the Party determined: “to make every effort to promote internal resources, and at the same time make the most of and exploit all external advantages”. Resolution 28-NQ/TW, term XI clearly states that one of the guiding viewpoints must be mastered: “Maximizing the strength of the nation in combination with the strength of the times. Strong promotion of internal resources is the decisive factor; at the same time we should make the most of all external advantages”⁵ to effectively achieve the goals of national defense as well as national development.

At the XII National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the Communist Party of Vietnam continued to make the point of “maximizing domestic resources, while actively integrating into the world, effectively mobilizing and using external resources”⁶ and affirmed the lesson of “combining the promotion of national strength with the strength of the times to firmly build and defend the socialist Vietnamese Fatherland”.⁷ Raising a clear view on the combination of national and epochal power during the 12th National Congress has shown the importance and consistent thinking of the Party on this issue.

At the XIII Congress, the CPV defined more specifically and explicitly: Combining the strength of the nation with the strength of the times; uphold the will to be independent, self-reliant, proactively and actively integrate in the international community and improve the efficiency of international cooperation, make the most of internal resources, take advantage of external resources, in which endogenous resources, especially human resources are the most important”.⁸ In addition, the Party affirmed, “Maximizing the synergy of the whole nation, the whole political system combined with the strength of the times, making the most of the consensus and support of the international community to firmly defend the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Fatherland, protect the Party, State, people, socialist regime, the national culture and national interests; maintaining a peaceful environment, political stability, national security, human security; Responding promptly and effectively to threats to security and safety, especially the task of search and rescue, as well as prevention against natural disasters and epidemics”.⁹

⁵ Nguyễn Ngọc Hồi. *Kết hợp sức mạnh dân tộc với sức mạnh thời đại trong Chiến lược bảo vệ tổ quốc*. Retrieved on 10.06.2021.

⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2016). *Op. cit.*, tr. 21.

⁷ *Ibid.*, tr.70.

⁸ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 110—111.

⁹ *Ibid.*, tr. 155—156.

In summary, along with the complicated evolution of non-traditional security challenges in Vietnam, the CPV soon recognized the transnationality of the issue, thereby issuing the right policy on combining national strength and the strength of the current times to respond to non-traditional security challenges, including the Covid-19 pandemic. This is an important basis for the Party's leadership in practice.

Practices in responding to non-traditional security challenges

When the non-traditional security challenge began to appear in Vietnam from simple to complex forms, the Party quickly set out a way to lead the State to gather and make use of domestic resources, specifically:

Firstly, the Party led the State in planning and implementing many policies and plans to control or solve the issues. For example, the outbreak of the Covid-19 epidemic in early 2020 was a great challenge. For the first time, the CPV in particular and the world in general had to fight with a completely new form of unrecognizable enemy — the Sars-Cov 2 virus. In 100 days from January 2020 (the first patient in Vietnam), Vietnam recorded more than 250 infections while the world had 3,561,887 cases and 248,084 deaths.¹⁰

Right from the first case, the Communist Party of Vietnam, specifically the Politburo, clearly identified the special and complicated nature of the epidemic and directed the Government to come up with response policies, the first was Official Dispatch No. 121 of Prime Minister on January 23, 2020. After that, a series of guiding documents were issued: Directive No. 05/CT-TTg dated January 28, 2020, Official Letter No. 79-CV/TW dated January 29/01/2020, Decision No. 170/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister dated January 30, 2020 on establishing the National Steering Committee for epidemic prevention and control, Directive 06/CT-TTg dated January 31, 2020, Official Letter No. 716/VPCP-KGVX dated 02/02/2020, Official Letter No. 164/TTg-KGVX dated 03/02/2020, Directive No. 11/CT-TTg, Directive No. 13/CT-TTg, Directive No. 15/CT-TTg of the Prime Minister, Decision No. 437/QD-TTg dated March 30, 2020, and Directive No. 16/CT-TTg dated March 31, 2020.

Secondly, the Party led the State to establish and upgrade the institution of state management agencies on non-traditional security issues to the

¹⁰ “Cuộc chiến” chống dịch COVID-19 tại Việt Nam: 100 ngày nhìn lại. *Thông tấn xã Việt Nam*, 15.06.2021.

ministerial level¹¹ to facilitate administrative handling in solving the problem of non-traditional security in the best way. For example, in the prevention of the Covid-19 epidemic, the Party led the establishment of the National Steering Committee for the prevention and control of the Covid-19 epidemic, headed by the Deputy Prime Minister — Mr. Vu Duc Dam, who directly directed and operated with the view of “fighting the epidemic like fighting the enemy” and the motto — 4 things on the spot: “Direction on the spot, forces on the spot, measures on the spot, supplies and logistics on the spot”.

Thirdly, the Party actively led the mass communication work, raising the awareness of officials and people about the current situation and consequences of security issues in an effective and creative way. In the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic, from loudspeakers in residential areas, newspapers, bulletins of Vietnamese television stations to many electronic newspapers such as <https://dantri.com.vn/>, <https://vnexpress.net/>, or <https://nhandan.vn/>, information and propaganda on prevention and control of Covid-19 were updated on a regular basis. At the same time, many websites have been established to provide official information on the Covid-19 situation such as <https://ncovi.vnpt.vn/> (National Steering Committee for Covid-19 Prevention), and <https://ncov.moh.gov.vn/chi-dao-dh> (News page of the Ministry of Health). In addition, social networks have also been used effectively such as facebook, youtube, or zalo. As a result, the majority of Vietnamese people are aware of the epidemic situation and comply with the state's instructions on epidemic prevention and control such as implementing 5K (5 Don'ts), social distancing, strictly complying with medical declaration and quarantine. More specifically, since then, each citizen has become a soldier for mass communication with famous compositions such as songs like Jealous Covy; Join hands to prevent and fight Corona; Vietnam! Beat covid! or the Hand washing dance.

Fourthly, the Party led the political system to participate in the prevention and combat of non-traditional security issues with great responsibility. In the fight against Covid-19, besides the medical staff, the Party mobilized the army, police, militia and self-defense forces, and socio-political organizations to participate in the fight against the epidemic. More than ever, forces in the political system have joined hands to contribute to ensuring medical tracing, zoning and stamping out the epidemic, as well as stabili-

¹¹ Interview with Prof. Dr. Hoang Khac Nam, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University on June 14, 2021.

zing society and ensuring the production or consumption of agricultural products for farmers in quarantine areas.

Fifthly, the Party's leadership promoted the people's strength and strengthened the spirit of national unity to solve the non-traditional security issue, especially in the fight against Covid-19 with the slogan "Everyone fights the epidemic". This has demonstrated the intelligence and flexibility of the Party's leadership method. The reality of the fight against Covid-19 has shown the national spirit of Vietnam. Along with supporting the Steering Committee in medical tracing, the people are very supportive of each other. Many charity activities appeared for the first time in Vietnam as well as in the world by the Vietnamese people, such as sewing and distributing free masks; creating a booth with "0 Vietnam dong" goods; free rice ATMs and free food distribution stalls. Especially, in 2021, with the complicated development of the epidemic and as soon as a country can produce a vaccine, the Party has led the Government to launch a vaccine fund for Covid-19 prevention and control and received positive response from the people. Businesses, overseas Vietnamese, officials, party members and people have contributed to the Fund in the spirit of sharing and joining hands to fight against Covid-19. As of June 13, 2021, the Fund Management Board announced that it has mobilized more than 4800 billion VND.¹²

In addition to promoting internal strength and national solidarity, the CPV is highly aware of the transnational nature of issues of non-traditional security. The Party has led the State to promote international cooperation activities to take advantage of the resources of the current times in preventing and combating non-traditional security challenges, such as: i) strengthening international cooperation to share information and experience on both bilateral and multilateral levels. Regarding bilateral cooperation, Vietnam continuously promotes the sharing of information and experiences with countries such as Chile, Thailand, Laos, Australia, India, Britain, Japan, China, and the United States. Regarding multilateral cooperation, Vietnam actively participates in meetings and conferences such as ASEAN + 3 with Agenda No. 4: "Exchanging solutions to respond to the COVID-19 epidemic" or Forum on future health trends 2020 organized by Singapore. ii) Vietnam increases international cooperation to make the most of resources. In the fight against Covid-19, Vietnam has been supporting and donating masks and medical equipment to many countries, which is acknowledged by the international community. Vietnam also received bi-

¹² Quỹ vaccine phòng Covid-19 đã tiếp nhận 4.851 tỷ đồng. *Thông tấn xã Việt Nam*, 14.06.2021.

lateral support from countries such as: 40 remote body temperature monitors from Korea, 2 batches of drugs to support Covid-19 treatment from Russia and Ukraine, 100 ventilators and \$9.5 million in aid to respond to the Covid-19 epidemic from the US. In 2020, 115 foreign nongovernmental organizations provided cash, medical supplies, necessities, education and training with the worth of more than 6.5 million USD for Vietnam in response to the pandemic¹³.

In addition, for non-traditional security problems, defensive measures are only temporary; attacking combined with defense and finding the root cause is decisive. In the fight against Covid-19, the CPV is aware of the fundamental role of vaccines. From the very beginning, the Party advocated that Vietnam must research and produce vaccines, but producing a vaccine is not easy. In 2021, in the face of the strong outbreak and spread of the new virus strain, the Party directed the “Vaccine Strategy” and the “5k + vaccine” (5 Don’ts combined with vaccine) formula while the new domestic vaccine production was in the trial phase. This forced Vietnam to consider buying and attaining vaccine production technology through international cooperation. Up to now, the Ministry of Health has successfully negotiated 38.9 million doses of the COVID-19 vaccine. It is expected that in 2021, Vietnam will have more than 120 million doses of Covid-19 vaccine¹⁴; Vietnam has negotiated to have other vaccine sources from Russia, the US, the UK, and Japan. Along with buying vaccines, the Party set the goal that: Vietnam must produce its own vaccine, reflected in the message of Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh: We must mobilize all resources, all capabilities, and access in any form, by all means to buy the most vaccines with the fastest speed; at the same time, we promote research, technology transfer and domestic vaccine production¹⁵. So far, Vietnam is trying to negotiate technology transfer for vaccine production with Russia, the US, Japan and the UK and has received consent to consider technology transfer from Russia.

The leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam in practice has combined national strength and the strength of the times in responding to the non-traditional security challenge and this has been shown in the above case analysis of the Covid-19 pandemic. This has brought about certain positive effects. In the early stages of fighting the epidemic, Vietnam emerged

¹³ Thu Phương (2021). Các tổ chức phi chính phủ nước ngoài hỗ trợ tích cực cho Việt Nam. *VietnamPlus*, June 14.

¹⁴ Bộ Y tế. *Chi tiết hơn 120 triệu liều vắc xin COVID-19 sẽ có ở Việt Nam trong năm 2021*. Retrieved on June 15, 2021.

¹⁵ Bộ Y tế. *Tạo mọi điều kiện sản xuất bằng được vắc xin phòng chống COVID-19 để chủ động lo cho người dân*. Retrieved on June 15, 2021.

as a spotlight in the world's epidemic prevention and control. Entering the first half of 2021, Vietnam is still recognized as a fairly successful country with about 11,000 infections out of more than 95 million people in the population.

Some experiences

Experience in perception and thinking: Awareness about using a combination of national strength and the strength of the times needs to be strengthened to solve the problem of non-traditional security. In the document of the 13th Party Congress, the Communist Party of Vietnam mentioned the phrase “combining national strength and the strength of the times” five times on page 57, 110, 111—112, 155, and 162, showing the deep awareness of Party on this issue. The 13th National Congress stated: “Thanks to the great unity of the whole nation, the superiority of the socialist regime, the synchronous and active participation of the whole political system, the right leadership of the Party and the unanimous support of the people, we have gradually controlled the Covid-19 pandemic successfully; gradually restored production, business and socio-economic activities and stabilized people’s life, which contributed to strengthening people's trust in the Party, State and the socialist regime and affirmed the bravery, will and good traditions of our people and our nation”¹⁶. The Congress also affirmed: Focus on controlling the Covid-19 pandemic, doing mass vaccination of the community with Covid-19 vaccine; recovering and developing society and economy¹⁷ — this is the strength of the times.

Besides fostering and developing thinking about combination the strength of the nation and the strength of the times in solving non-traditional security challenges — the mindset that needs to be developed is the mindset of core values. Following through the process of conceptualization, the Communist Party of Vietnam has always clearly determined: national strength is the foundation, the decisive factor, and the strength of the times is important. The fight against Covid-19 has proven that the core value mindset is reasonable. When the Covid-19 pandemic appeared, while the whole world was confused, the CPV applied a perfect combination, first of all through choosing measures based on internal strength, communication and solidarity of the people to minimize the damage caused by Covid-19 pandemic. However, in the complicated development of the epidemic in

¹⁶ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2021). *Op. cit.*, t. 1, tr. 78.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, tr. 200.

2021, in addition to continuing to promote national strength, Vietnam has increased learning from international experiences in herd immunity, in which the “Vaccine Strategy” has important meaning.¹⁸

It is necessary to continue to think of putting the national interest first in the process of combining the strength of the nation and the strength of the times to solve non-traditional security challenges. In the fight against Covid-19, the Party has always relied on the main foundation of ensuring the national interests of the nation. In a situation that threatens the people's survival, the Party is ready to introduce measures to ensure the safety of the Vietnamese people, and at the same time cooperate with other countries to implement vaccination to achieve community immunity on the basis that the national interest is not infringed.

Experience in action: The Party leads decisively and skillfully in the implementation of combining national strength and the strengths of the times. With limited resources, the CPV has creatively used national strength, with the secret of its success being the government's role in mobilizing the people's strength. However, in some localities, some cadres are sometimes negligent and careless, leading to great consequences forcing the whole system to struggle to deal with it. In that situation, the Communist Party of Vietnam took the lead in dealing with the consequences while take some measures of deterrence such as dismissal or even prosecution of those irresponsible officers.

In addition, current non-traditional security challenges are transnational, with global challenges such as epidemics and environmental pollution. Covid-19 pandemic alone is a global health crisis. Therefore, the most effective anti-epidemic measure is to coordinate with countries with good economic conditions and resources that have gone ahead of Vietnam to have the capacity to deal with the root of the problem. With Covid-19 pandemic, the solution is vaccination — the most important tool to overcome the problem.¹⁹ Moreover, Vietnam has always placed the fight against Covid-19 in the regional and international framework by strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation with countries and international organizations.²⁰

Experience in perfecting institutions when combining national strength and the strength of the times power: As analyzed, many of the current non-traditional security challenges are global, forcing Vietnam to have a

¹⁸ Interview with Prof. Dr. Duong Van Quang, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, on June 14, 2021.

¹⁹ Interview with Prof. Tran Thi Vinh, Hanoi National University of Education, on June 14, 2021

²⁰ Interview with Prof. Dr. Duong Van Quang. Op. cit.

central strategic solution. Therefore, institutionalizing strategic solutions is necessary. For example, in the fight against Covid-19 pandemic, the Party gradually led the establishment of a vaccine production institution with the first steps of creating incentive mechanisms, which creates internal strength²¹ for Vietnam to obtain vaccines for herd immunity. However, in the long term, Vietnam needs to add two more important elements to perfect the institution: laws related to vaccine production and how to organize the management and establishment of such institutions.²²

Conclusion

In the past years, according to the common assessment of many experts and the international community, Vietnam has initially successfully combined the strength of the nation and the strength of the times in solving the non-traditional security challenge²³, especially in the fight against Covid-19 pandemic. However, in order to have more lasting, convincing and effective victories, Vietnam should:

Firstly, continue to promote the strength of the nation such as strengthening solutions on culture and thinking — gradually fixing the Asian mindset of “dealing with the situation as it comes” among many Vietnamese people²⁴; strengthen mass communication on the awareness of Vietnamese people and businesses²⁵; further promote the achievements with the motto and principles of zoning, stamping out the epidemic, and 5K (Five Don’ts); and perfect the vaccine production institutions.

Secondly, improve the efficiency of international cooperation by promulgating policies to encourage international cooperation with partners such as international organizations, transnational corporations, countries with highly developed science and technology, developed countries; develop, uphold and promote multilateralism²⁶; and actively participate in joint international efforts to enhance Vietnam's position in the international arena.

²¹ Interview with Prof. Dr. Duong Xuan Ngoc, Academy of Journalism and Communication, on June 15, 2021.

²² Ibid.

²³ Interview with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Phan Van Ran, Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics, on June 14, 2021 and Assoc. Prof. Vo Kim Cuong, Institute of History on June 21, 2021.

²⁴ Interview with Prof. Dr. Duong Xuan Ngoc. *Op. cit.*

²⁵ Interview with Prof. Dr. Hoang Khac Nam. *Op. cit.*

²⁶ Interview with Prof. Dr. Pham Quang Minh, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University, on June 17, 2021.

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Bộ Y tế. *Tạo mọi điều kiện sản xuất bằng được vắc xin phòng chống COVID-19 để chủ động lo cho người dân* (Ministry of Health. *Create all favourable conditions for production of a vaccine against COVID-19 to actively take care of the people*). Retrieved on June 15, 2021 from URL: <https://ncov.moh.gov.vn/web/guest/-/6847912-238>

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Chapter 27

INTERNATIONAL UNITY IN THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE RESISTANCE WAR AGAINST THE US (1954—1975)

After the Geneva Agreement (July 20, 1954) on restoring peace in Vietnam and Indochina countries was signed, it was thought that the Vietnamese people would enjoy a peaceful life, embarking on economic recovery, overcoming the consequences left by the war. However, after the French colonialists withdrew their troops back home, the US gradually replaced and waged a war to invade Vietnam. During this time, Vietnam had to heal the wounds of war and build the socialism system in the North, while having to prepare to deal with the American invasion plot in the South. Therefore, the solidarity and help of the international community as well as the peace-loving people in the world were one of the key factors that determine the victory of Vietnam in the resistance war against the US.

Keywords: Vietnam, Soviet Union, China, USA.

The Vietnamese people's heroic war of resistance against the US to save the country has ended successfully for nearly half a century, which is a great victory not only for the Vietnamese people but also for the whole of peace-loving people all over the world. One of the factors contributing to the victory of the resistance war against the US and national salvation of the Vietnamese people is the solidarity and support of people from all over the world. The Vietnamese people clearly understand that: "Our victories cannot be separated from the great help of the Soviet Union, China, and other fraternal socialist countries, and the active support of the people around the world".¹

¹ Hồ Chí Minh (1996). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 10, tr. 638.

The spirit of solidarity by Laos and Cambodia

Realizing the plot to replace the French colonialists, in 1954 right after the Geneva Agreement was signed, the US invaded three countries Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, in order to implement the new global strategy of the US. With this strategy, the US considered Vietnam a strategic area, tried to sabotage the implementation of the Geneva Agreement, gradually invaded South Vietnam, with the intention of turning South Vietnam into a new type of colony of America. In Laos, the US used Lao reactionary forces to attack the revolutionary forces, prevent the establishment of a coalition government with the plot to seize the Government of the Kingdom of Laos, and prevent the revolutionary movement in Indochina and Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, in Cambodia, the US lobbied the government, tried to threaten to destroy the neutrality of the Sihanouk government, and pulled Cambodia into the US orbit in order to isolate the Vietnamese revolution and the Lao revolution.

Stemming from practical requirements, the Communist Party of Vietnam clearly determined that in order to defeat the US at this time, it must simultaneously deal with two basic issues: solidarity and alliance. In particular, the most important issue was to gather and unite all forces, to call for all forces in the country to unite and ally with neighboring countries, as well as to enlist consensus and support from the international community. In order to do that, on the one hand, we must enlist and persevere in the solidarity and alliance with the people of Laos and Cambodia; on the other hand, depending on the object, the forces, space and time, we would select the format, content, task and missions to achieve solidarity and alliance accordingly.

In July 1954, at the 6th Plenum of the 2nd Central Committee, President Ho Chi Minh identified the US imperialists as the main and direct enemy of the Indochinese people: “After the Dien Bien Phu campaign, the plots and schemes The US intervention plan also changed to prolong the Indochina war, internationalize the Indochina war, sabotage the Geneva Conference, seek to oust France to occupy the three countries of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, turn the people into slaves of the US and caused more tension in the world. That is: the US is not only the enemy of the people of the world, but the US is turning itself into the main and direct enemy of the people of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos”.²

² Hồ Chí Minh (2002). *Toàn tập*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 7, tr. 314.

Recognizing the risk of war spreading to the whole of Indochina, as well as the role and importance of Laos and Cambodia, we soon proactively contacted and discussed with the two friends in the spirit of liberation and protection. National defense is the work of the people of each country, but the support, solidarity and mutual assistance against the common enemy must be considered as an urgent need of the three peoples. Immersed in President Ho's view that "helping a friend is helping oneself", the armed forces of the three countries signed a contract to fight, divided the combat tasks among the three battlefields, inflicting fatal blows on the American troops and their henchmen. The governments of the three countries closely coordinated with each other in politics, diplomacy, cooperation and mutual assistance in many fields, focusing on key strategic issues such as: building of revolutionary armed forces, timely aid, coordinated combat on the battlefields, opening of campaigns, and exchange of experiences.

At the end of 1960, Vietnamese volunteers coordinated with the Laotian armed forces to launch a campaign in the Plain of Jars, Xiang Khouang; in 1971, they opened the campaign on Road No. 9 in southern Laos. These campaigns, together with a series of joint battles of the Vietnam-Laos coalition, had gradually bankrupted the "Special War" strategy of the US in Laos, at the same time created favorable opportunities for the resistance war of the people of Vietnam — Laos — Cambodia to make new progress. In the Cambodian battlefield, the combat coordination between Vietnamese volunteers and the Cambodian Armed Forces defeated 100,000 US troops and the Saigon government when they attacked Cambodia in April 1970. This event opened up a new situation for the Cambodian revolution, and at the same time created a strategic position beneficial to the army of Vietnam and people in the South. In addition, we have created all conditions to organize solidarity conferences of the three peoples in the form of the "People's Conference of the Three Indochinese countries" in 1970 in order to gather and unite all patriotic and political forces of the three countries, take advantage of the world's public support for the resistance wars of the three nations, and make the American empire and its henchmen divided and isolated. The spirit of solidarity of the three countries of Vietnam — Laos — Cambodia had contributed to creating a synergy to defeat the US imperialists and liberate the three countries from the invasion of the US imperialists and their henchmen at around the same time: Vietnam and Cambodia won in April 1975, Laos won in December 1975.

It can be said that the solidarity of the three peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia on the path of fighting for independence and freedom had created favorable conditions for the three countries and complemented each

other's strength. Solidarity, coordination and assistance were shown in the political, military and diplomatic fields, the ultimate goal was for all three countries to gain independence and the people to enjoy freedom. The 4th National Congress of the Party (1976) assessed: "Our victory is also the victory of the unshakable fighting solidarity of the people of Vietnam, Laos and Vietnam, of a special relationship that has a long history and has been tested in the flames of revolution against the common enemy of the three peoples".³

Support and assistance by the Soviet Union

During this period, the global situation had many changes, especially the increasingly serious disagreement between the two socialist countries, the Soviet Union and China. The disagreement between these two countries had a profound effect on the support and assistance of the Soviet Union to Vietnam, especially military assistance. However, thanks to the joint efforts of the leaders of the two countries, especially the Vietnamese side, the relationship between Vietnam and the Soviet Union had gradually been firmly built and developed more and more comprehensively. This development is reflected in the signing of bilateral treaties, agreements and decrees.

In July 1955, during the official visit of President Ho Chi Minh, the Government of the Soviet Union signed with the Government of Vietnam a number of agreements on loans and grants. According to the agreement signed between the governments of the two countries, on July 18, 1955, the Soviet Union provided non-refundable aid worth 400 million rubles to Vietnam to improve people's living standards, restore the economy, build factories to carry out the 3-year plan from 1955 to 1957. In addition, the Soviet Government also lent Vietnam a long-term credit of 160 million rubles⁴. During the period from 1958 to 1960, when Vietnam implemented the plan of 3 economic renovations and cultural development, the Soviet Union continued to help us economically and technically. According to the agreement signed between the two governments on March 7, 1959, the Soviet Union provided Vietnam with a long-term loan of 100 million rubles with preferential conditions. On June 14, 1960, the governments of the two countries continued to sign an agreement, under which the Soviet Union lent Vietnam 350 million rubles to buy equipment, machinery and build factori-

³ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2006). *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập*. Hanoi: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, t. 37, tr. 475.

⁴ Tạp chí Lịch sử quân sự (2000). Số 7+8, tr. 20.

es. Also during this time, the Soviet Union also helped Vietnam train professional cadres and sent experts in many fields to help our people. From 1955 to 1960, the Soviet Union sent 1,400 experts to work in Vietnam, in economic, cultural, educational, medical establishments. In the early 60s of the twentieth century, nearly 8,000 students and 10,000 Vietnamese trainees went to the Soviet Union to study and do research.⁵

When Vietnam implemented the first 5-year plan (1961–1965), the Soviet Government signed with the Vietnamese Government many agreements on economic, as well as scientific, technical assistance. Accordingly, the Soviet Union supported Vietnam with 460 million rubles, which included long-term credit loans and grants, supported Vietnam with technical equipment, materials to build factories, and many other civil works. By the end of 1964, the Soviet Union had helped Vietnam renovate and build 90 factories and civil works, including 43 industrial projects, 46 state-owned farms and a number of universities and hospitals. Among the industrial projects supported by the Soviet Union with 100 % of capital, materials and techniques, the most notable were 7 thermal power plants, with a total capacity of 71,300 kW and 8 transmission lines that were 130 km long. Many other mining projects and food processing enterprises such as tin mines in Tinh Tuc, Cao Bang; apatite mine in Lao Cai; canned fish factory in Hai Phong were also supported and invested by the Soviet Union during this time.⁶

In the field of diplomacy, in 1960, The Soviet Union strongly condemned and criticized the US reinforcement of advisers and means of wars into Vietnam, blatantly violating the 1954 Geneva Agreement on the restoration of peace in the three countries of the Indochinese peninsula. The Party and Government of the Soviet Union repeatedly affirmed their unchanged stance, which was resolutely opposing the US invasion of Vietnam and supporting our people in the resistance war against the US imperialists. In the years 1961–1964, the Soviet Foreign Ministry repeatedly reminded the British Government — the co-chair of the Geneva Conference on the restoration of peace in the three countries on the Indochinese peninsula. In it, the Soviet Union pointed out the US government's gross violation of Vietnam's sovereignty and emphasized the need to take necessary measures to stop the US intervention in Vietnam.

⁵ Phan Ngọc Liên (2005). *Hậu phương lớn, tiền tuyến lớn trong kháng chiến chống Mỹ cứu nước 1954–1975*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Từ điển Bách khoa, tr. 724.

⁶ Trường Đại học Khoa học Xã hội và Nhân văn — Khoa Lịch sử (2011). *Một chặng đường nghiên cứu Lịch sử 200 — 2011*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Thế giới, tr. 711.

During the years when the United States expanded the war to escalate the destruction of the North and wage a local war in the South, the relationship between the Soviet Union and Vietnam became increasingly close. Faced with that situation, the Soviet government strongly condemned America's escalation of the war and affirmed that it would not turn a blind eye to the fate of a fraternal socialist country, and at the same time publicly aided Vietnam in many aspects. The Declaration of September 18, 1964 stated: "The US interference in the internal affairs of the Vietnamese people can lead to many serious consequences. The United States must bear full responsibility for the consequences".⁷ From 1965 to 1975, the Soviet Government signed with the Government of Vietnam 12 Agreements, including 7 agreements on the Soviet Union's commitment to "additional assistance", "non-refundable aid to Vietnam". It can be said that the help of the Soviet people came from the heart, from the friendship and solidarity of the two peoples. During this period, millions of people took to the streets to rally and protest against the unjust war of the US and express brotherly solidarity with the Vietnamese people. In 1965, the Communist Youth Union of the Soviet Union donated 800,000 rubles to the Vietnamese people, and the Soviet Women's Committee sent 800,000 rubles.⁸

In about 20 years (1955—1974), the total value of technical materials and equipment that the Soviet Union helped Vietnam to build and develop, mainly by way of aid and loans, was 2,176,051,000 rubles. With these materials and equipment, the Soviet Union built 135 industrial enterprises and civil works in Vietnam, including 46 works for the electricity industry; 5 works for the mining industry; 19 works for mechanical engineering, metallurgy; 41 works for the transport industry; 1 project for the chemical industry; 3 projects for the construction materials industry and 20 projects for agriculture.⁹

In addition to assisting Vietnam in economic, scientific and technical terms, the Soviet Union also provided Vietnam with modern weapons and military technical means to fight against the US imperialists. During the period of resistance against the US, to save the country, the Soviet government provided aid to the Vietnamese people with a total of 316 aircrafts; 52 naval warships; 687 tanks of all kinds; 601 armored vehicles; 1,332 cannon trailers; 100 construction motorbikes; 12 sets of pontoon bridges; 1,357

⁷ Phan Ngọc Liên. Op. cit., tr. 725—726.

⁸ Declaration of Vietnam — Soviet Union of April 17, 1965. Document on Vietnam-Soviet relations 1973. P. 19—20.

⁹ Đặng Phong (2005). *Lịch sử kinh tế Việt Nam 1945—2000*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Khoa học Xã hội, t. 2: 1955—1975, tr. 483.

rocket launchers; 10,169 rocket rounds; 23 SA 75M missiles; 8,686 VT 50V missile rounds; 2 S125 missile regiments; 439,198 infantry guns; 5,630 anti-tank guns; 1,076 mortars; 1,877 rocket cannons; 789 ground cannons; and 480 K681 missile rounds¹⁰. This was the great and timely support and assistance of the Government and people of the Soviet Union for Vietnam in the resistance war against the US. Thanks to that great support and help, our army and people gradually could become more active in the battlefield, and at the same time went towards conducting the general offensive and spring uprising in 1975 with complete victory. The whole nation became united once again.

Support and assistance by China

After the Geneva Agreement was signed, China, as a signatory to the agreement, strongly condemned the US intervention in South Vietnam. In addition, China also actively supported and helped the Vietnamese people in terms of human, material and financial resources in order to restore and develop Vietnam's economy after the North was completely liberated. On July 7, 1955, on the occasion of President Ho Chi Minh's visit to China, the two countries issued a joint statement, in which the Chinese side stated: "In order to help Vietnam heal the wounds of war, recover and develop the economy, based on the requirements of the Vietnamese Government, China will send experts to help Vietnam, and at the same time provides 800 million yuan in non-refundable aid, in addition to providing provide a large amount of food and daily necessities"¹¹. In addition, the Governments of the two countries also signed protocols, stating that China will send experts in the fields of industry, agriculture, post, and transportation to help us in technical skills.

When the US imperialists expanded their war of aggression in Vietnam, China repeatedly voiced its opposition to the US's invasion of Vietnam and consistently affirmed its support for our people's just struggle. The Chinese leader repeatedly affirmed: "The 700 million Chinese people are the solid supportive force of the Vietnamese people, and China's vast land and territory is the reliable supportive base of the Vietnamese people".¹² In May

¹⁰ Đại học Khoa học Xã hội và Nhân văn — Khoa Lịch sử. *Op.cit.*, tr. 714—715.

¹¹ Đinh Tiến Hiếu (2014). *Quan hệ Việt Nam — Trung Quốc giai đoạn 1950—1975*. Luận án tiến sĩ (bản tiếng Trung). Tr. 119.

¹² Compilation by the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002). *Chronicle of diplomatic events of the People's Republic of China* (Chinese version). Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House, vol. 3, p. 185.

1963, President Luu Thieu Ky and Foreign Minister Tran Nghi led the Chinese delegation to pay an official visit to Vietnam. During this visit, the delegation had a meeting with President Ho Chi Minh, and at the same time stated: “We are standing in the same boat, combating several battles, you can trust China as your support”.¹³

Then, the US launched a war to destroy North Vietnam, starting with the “Gulf of Tonkin” incident (August 4, 1964) that used fighter aircrafts to bombard the North. At the beginning of March 1965, the US imperialists sent troops to land in Da Nang, and at the same time sent ground troops directly to the battlefield in South Vietnam. Faced with that situation, the Chinese Government strongly condemned the aggressive act of the US, as well as affirmed its solidarity and high responsibility towards the Vietnamese people: “The Chinese people have steadfastly maintained our unchanging stance, we will use all abilities and measures to help the people of Vietnam and Indochina, oppose and fight to the end against the aggression of the US imperialists”.¹⁴ As the war expanded and became more and more fierce, the Chinese Government and people showed more determination to help and support Vietnam to overthrow the US imperialists. Chairman Mao Zedong pointed out: “Anything that the Vietnamese people ask us to help, if we can do it, we will definitely fulfill it. What we have, we can help, what Vietnam has not asked for, we can suggest and propose such as: mosquito nets, rain gear, medicine, first aid bags, dry food ...”. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai also pointed out: “Helping the people is our top mission, as regards the things that the Vietnamese people ask for help, we will do them actively, diligently and seriously”.¹⁵

In order to ensure the final victory for the Vietnamese people's resistance against the US to save the country, the Government and people of China had given great aid and assistance to Vietnam. The main support were infantry weapons, military equipment, foodstuffs, medicines, means of transport, military vehicles, artillery and artillery shells. During this period, China provided Vietnam with weapons, equipment and materials with a total value of up to 4 billion yuan. This mainly included: 1,770,000 guns; 30,000 cannons; 810 tanks and armored vehicles; 165 aircrafts; 117 boats;

¹³ Song Shu Editorial Board (1988). *Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy* (Chinese version). Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House, p. 159.

¹⁴ *Synthesis of documents on Indochina issues* (1965) (Chinese version). Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House, vol. 5, p. 301.

¹⁵ Document Research Lab of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (1997). *Military Collection of Zhou Enlai* (Chinese version). Beijing: People's Publishing House, vol. 4, p. 551.

15,000 cars; 3 sets of surface-to-air ballistic missiles; 180 ballistic missiles; 260 sets of radars; 30,200 radio electromechanical sets; 40,900 sets of electromechanical lines; 4,834 sets of motorized machinery; 15 sets of pontoon bridges; 1,400,000,000 bullets of all kinds; 1,660,000 rounds of artillery shells; 190,000 mines and mines; 15,000 tons of explosives; chemical prevention tools; reconnaissance equipment and a large number of military equipment and supplies.¹⁶

In addition, China also undertook the transit of goods, weapons and ammunition that other countries gave to Vietnam. Some of China's seaports became places to receive weapons and ammunition to deliver to Vietnam. In addition, during this period, China also sent many experts, soldiers and citizens to help us build and repair roads, oil pipelines, military works, scan for mines, remove mines, as well as help with logistics for the army. From September 6, 1965 to August 8, 1973, the Chinese government sent a total of 320,000 volunteer soldiers to help Vietnam in construction and repair of roads, military works, demining of landmines and UXO. The number of Chinese volunteer troops in Vietnam reached 170,000.¹⁷ These Chinese volunteer soldiers worked together with the Vietnamese people to successfully complete a noble international task.

In addition to the coordination of Laos and Cambodia, as well as the enthusiastic help of the people of the Soviet Union and China, during this period, Vietnam also received a lot of attention and help from the peace-loving people in the world. Among the countries supporting and helping Vietnam fight the US, we cannot forget to mention Cuba. In December 1961, Cuba was the first country to recognize the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and on July 25, 1962, Cuba proposed to set up a permanent office of the Front in Havana. This was the first representative agency of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam abroad. President Fidel Castro declared a famous saying expressing the deep affection of the Cuban people for Vietnam: "For Vietnam, Cuba is ready to give its own blood". After that speech, many young Cubans sent letters to the representative agency of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam asking to volunteer to fight in Vietnam¹⁸. Along with that, the people took to the streets to participate in demonstrations of

¹⁶ Han Hoai Tri, Tan Tinh Tieu (1989). *Military work of the Chinese army in contemporary times* (Chinese version). Beijing: Social Science Publishing House, p. 581.

¹⁷ Dinh Tien Hieu. *Op. cit.*, p. 143.

¹⁸ Nguyễn Thị Bình (2001). *Mặt trận Dân tộc giải phóng — Chính phủ cách mạng lâm thời tại Hội nghị Pari về Việt Nam*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị quốc gia. Tr. 78.

peace-loving people all over the world and even in the United States, to protest the American war of aggression in Vietnam. It was the American peace-loving people's movement that shook the foundation of the US imperialists, making an important contribution to the defeat of the US in the war of aggression in Vietnam.

Conclusion

It can be said that during the years of resistance war against the US for national salvation, Vietnam persevered and consistently maintained its views and principles of solidarity, as well as enlisted the help and support of people from all over the world. During the period of resistance war against the US for national salvation, Vietnam received a lot of encouragement, support and help from neighboring countries, countries of the Socialist bloc and the international peace-loving community. It was these factors that became the material and spiritual strength to help the Vietnamese people reach the final victory on April 30, 1975. The victory of the Ho Chi Minh campaign was a great turning point in our nation's history, the whole nation became united again, bringing the country into a new era — the era of independence, freedom and socialism. At the same time, this victory is also a common victory of the people who love peace and progress around the world.

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Chapter 28

THE CPV'S POLICY IN IN CONDITIONS OF THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE CPSU AND THE CCP IN 1960—1964

The article presents an analysis of the domestic and foreign policy of the WPV (CPV) in the period 1960—1964 in a climate of growing confrontation between its two main allies — the CPSU and the CCP. The course of the struggle of the WPV for the implementation of two main provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords on holding of the nationwide elections and the reunification of the country is shown, the reasons for the WPV' transition to the deployment of armed struggle in the South of Vietnam are analyzed.

Further, the author focuses on the almost divergent positions of Beijing and Moscow in the matter of the armed struggle launched by the WPV against the USA military intervention in the South in 1960. Beijing sought to promote Mao Zedong's slogan “a rifle gives birth to power”, which in those years was supported by a significant part of the WPV members, and the CPSU basically stood up for the principle of peaceful coexistence and did not approve of the WPV's course towards armed struggle. Notably, both the CPSU and the CCP persistently tried to bring the WPV to each side.

The article draws attention to the fact that differences gradually began to grow within the WPV itself, which was reflected in the decisions of the 9th Plenum of the WPV Central Committee (1963). The Plenum condemned “modern revisionism, opportunism and dogmatism”, and this marked the beginning of the deterioration of Soviet Vietnamese relations.

The article shows that the “air war” unleashed by the USA in August 1964 against North Vietnam created a fundamentally new situation, which required of the WPV leadership to radically change its strategic line. Important changes in the “Vietnamese question” also occurred in the policy of the CPSU after the removal of N.S. Khrushchev from the post of its lea-

der (10.14.1964). As a result, the positions of the two sides began to converge rapidly.

Keywords: WPV (CPV), CPSU, CCP, unity, disagreements, interference of the USA, Second Resistance War, NFLSV (Vietcong).

Introduction

Five years 1960—1964 — one of the most difficult stages in the activities and history of the CPV. On the one hand, the party has been working the problem of reviving the North of the country, bringing it out of the post-war devastation, on the other hand, it fought for the implementation of two important provisions of the Geneva Accords: holding nationwide elections in both parts of the country and its reunification.

These two vital tasks were opposed by the US policy. Washington regarded the Geneva Accords as a “catastrophe”, since an analysis of the situation in South Vietnam made by American experts showed that if free nationwide elections were held in both parts of the country, the Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh would inevitably win. At the same time, the belief that whoever controls Vietnam controls the entire region of Southeast Asia became dominant in the US administration. By the beginning of the 1960s, the United States, with this consideration in mind, firmly took a course towards perpetuation of the partition of Vietnam and turning South Vietnam into a colony of a new type, into a stronghold of American imperialism in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the US-backed government of Ngo Dinh Diem in power in Saigon refused to abide by the Geneva Accords and aborted the nationwide elections. Mass repressions against communists and participants in the Resistance War began in the South.

The new situation that has developed in Vietnam after the signing of the Geneva Accords required the CPV to develop new approaches, use new forms and methods of struggle for the implementation of its main provisions. In solving this problem, the leadership of the CPV faced certain problems within the party itself, caused, in particular, by the fact that there were many people in its ranks who relied only on military methods and underestimated the importance of political and diplomatic forms of struggle. Such sentiments were especially strong among the southerners — participants in the First Resistance War. Many Vietnamese, especially the partisans in the South, which is quite understandable, were in those years under the influence of the theory of “people's war” preached by Mao Zedong and the slogan “a rifle gives birth to power.” Ultimately, the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam came to the conclusion that in the context of the growing

aggressive US policy aimed at perpetuation of the partition of Vietnam, political and diplomatic measures alone, within the framework provided for by the Geneva Accords, were no longer enough.

The North is a reliable rear, the South is the front of struggle

On January 14–16, 1959, the 15th Plenum of the Central Committee of the WPV took place in Hanoi with the participation of representatives of the party organizations of South and Central Vietnam. At the initiative of Le Duan, who was recalled to Hanoi in 1957 and who headed the party organization of the South, the CC Plenum decided to support the urgent appeals of the southerners for help and to start a “full-scale guerrilla war” in the South.¹ The retrained participants of the First Resistance War, party cadres, military specialists began to return to the South — then it was called in the North *đi B* (direction B). Deliveries of various types of weapons began, initially through the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and after the military successes of the Patriotic Front of Laos, through Lao territory. The construction of the legendary Ho Chi Minh Trail began — a network of roads laid in the dense jungle, bypassing the DMZ through Laos and further south, which in some places also entered the territory of Cambodia.

On September 5–10, 1960, the III Congress of the WPV was held in Hanoi — “Congress of the builders of socialism in the North and the struggle for the peaceful reunification of the country.” It was noted at the congress that since the Second Party Congress (1951) profound changes had taken place in the political and socio-economic situation of the country. The country won independence. The party, which had been working underground for many years, became the ruling one. The political report pointed out that after the restoration of peace in 1954, the Vietnamese revolution entered a new stage: a period of transition to socialism began in the North, and a “national, people's democratic revolution” continued to unfold in the South. The resolution of the congress formulated two strategic tasks of the Vietnamese revolution for the forthcoming stage: “realization of the socialist revolution in the North and the liberation of the South from domination of the American imperialists, the unification of the country.”²

¹ 50 năm hoạt động của Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam (1979). Hà Nội: Nhà xuất bản Sự thật. Tr. 152–153.

² III s'ezd Partii trudjashhihsja V'etnama (1961). M.: Politizdat. S. 277.

The congress adopted the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy of the DRV (1961—1965). The Agreement signed on December 23, 1960 between the governments of the USSR and the DRV on the provision of economic and technical assistance by the Soviet Union to the DRV in the implementation of the first 5-year plan for the development of its national economy largely facilitated its successful implementation. In accordance with the Agreement, the Soviet Union, in particular, undertook to provide technical assistance in construction of 43 new industrial enterprises and other facilities, including 8 thermal and hydroelectric power plants.³

The congress strengthened and expanded the composition of the Central Committee of the party. Ho Chi Minh was elected chairman of the Central Committee, Le Duan — the first secretary of the Central Committee. The Central Committee included many leaders of the liberation movement in the South, partisans, underground fighters. The overwhelming majority of them entered the highest governing body of the party under fictitious names, pseudonyms. This was required by the situation of terror unleashed by the Saigon authorities. Their real names were named only in 1976 at the 6th Congress of the CPV, after the final victory and state reunification of the country. The author of the article recalls that every familiar to the delegates name pronounced at the congress received a standing ovation.

As is commonly known, Ho Chi Minh was an active advocate of the strategy of a united national front in the anti-colonial struggle. In 1941, on his initiative, the Viet Minh Front was created, which subsequently operated under the auspices of the party and under the flags and slogans of which the August Revolution won in 1945. The WPV followed the same path in South Vietnam in the 1960s. In accordance with the course outlined by the III Congress, on December 20, 1960, in one of the villages of Tây Ninh province (90 kilometers from Saigon), a Congress of representatives of patriotic organizations was held, which proclaimed the creation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSV). The Appeal and the Program of Action of the Front of 10 points were adopted. These documents emphasized the determination of the population of the South to expel the American interventionists, to create an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Vietnam, developing towards national reunification, as envisaged by the Geneva Accords. The practical implementation of this Program of Action

³ Novakova, O.V., Tsvetov, P.Ju. (1995) *Istorija V'etnama*. Chast' 2. M.: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta. S. 227—228.

paved the way for the elimination of the puppet pro-American regime in Saigon and creation of a national unity government.⁴

On February 15, 1961, partisan units and paramilitary forces in the South, which had retained their combat effectiveness since the time of struggle against the French colonialists, united into an army, which later received the official name — the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF).

The formation of the NLFSV and the success of the patriotic forces on the battlefield threatened the US position in Indochina and forced them to reconsider their policy. A 'Special War' strategy was developed, the essence of which was to fight the patriotic forces using the Saigon army, armed with American weapons and placed under the leadership of American advisers.

In January 1961, the Politburo of the WPV Central Committee took a decision on *The directions and urgent tasks of the revolution in the South*, which stated that “the period of temporary stabilization of the American-Diệm regime has passed and a period of continuous crisis and its serious degradation has begun.”⁵

On February 16, 1962, the 1st congress of the NLFSV was held. The congress promulgated the following “Urgent Programs for Saving the Homeland”:

- the USA must stop the war of aggression in South Vietnam;
- “strategic villages” must be completely liquidated;
- it is necessary to create a government of national reconciliation in South Vietnam;
- a peaceful, neutral line of diplomatic struggle should be pursued.⁶

The participants of the congress elected the Central Committee of the Front, headed by the well-known Saigon lawyer Nguyen Hue Tho, who spent 11 years in prison for his patriotic activities.

The growing military and political successes of the patriots further intensified the crisis of the Saigon regime. In May 1963, the so-called “Buddhist crisis” broke out, which shook the regime of Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem to its foundations. Ultimately, the US decided to remove Ngo Dinh Diem, and a military junta came to power in Saigon. In the next two years, military coups took place in Saigon every 2–3 months. Herewith, despite all the efforts of the United States, by the end of 1964 — beginning of 1965, the “Special War” strategy had completely failed. During this period, the

⁴ Đại cương lịch sử Việt Nam, tập III (1945—2006) (2010). Hà Nội: Nhà xuất bản Giáo dục Việt Nam. Tr. 171—172.

⁵ Ibid. Tr. 183.

⁶ Ibid. Tr. 184—185.

NLFV managed to significantly expand the territories under its control, strengthen its influence and enter the international arena through a network of its official representative offices in the USSR, the PRC, countries of people's democracy and in some non-aligned countries of Asia.

In an attempt to save the Saigon regime from complete collapse and keep South Vietnam under its control, the US government set out to unleash an air war against North Vietnam. In July 1964, the United States sent to the Gulf of Tonkin ships of the 7th Fleet, which invaded the territorial waters of the DRV, provoking armed conflict. On August 5, 1964, coastal regions of the DRV were subjected to shelling and bombardment. On August 7, President L. Johnson passed through the US Congress the so-called Tonkin Resolution "On the maintenance of peace and security in Southeast Asia", which gave him the right to unlimited use of American armed forces in this region.

After the very first aggressive actions against North Vietnam, the WPV and the DRV government began a major political and organizational activity to mobilize all segments of the country's people to repulse the enemy. The fighting slogans of the Resistance War against the aggression of American imperialism were the words from Ho Chi Minh's address to the people on July 17, 1966: "The war may last another 5, 10, 20 years or longer. Hanoi, Haiphong and other cities, and enterprises may be destroyed, but the Vietnamese people will not be intimidated. **Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom!** (Emphasis added by me. — E.K.). Once victory is won, our people will rebuild our country and endow it with bigger and more beautiful constructions."⁷

The air war unleashed by the US aggressive circles against North Vietnam radically changed the nature of the Second Resistance War of the Vietnamese people. Southeast Asia has again become one of the most hotbeds of tension on the planet. The new situation required a radical change in the entire strategic line and tactical actions of the WPV leadership. Important changes in the "Vietnamese question" were also emerged in the policy of the Soviet Union, especially after the decision to dismiss N.S. Khrushchev from the post of head of the CPSU was taken by the CC Plenum of the CPSU on October 14, 1964.

Hanoi very positively appraised these decisions. As early as October 20, 1964, a telegram signed by Ho Chi Minh and Le Duan was received in Moscow in address to L.I. Brezhnev on the occasion of his election to the

⁷ Hồ Chí Minh (1970). *Vì độc lập, vì chủ nghĩa xã hội*. Hà Nội: Nhà xuất bản chính trị quốc gia. Tr. 282.

post of First Secretary of the CPSU CC.⁸ The Prime Minister Pham Van Dong arrived in Moscow to celebrate another anniversary of the October Revolution. On November 9, his talks with the Soviet leadership took place in the Kremlin. The meeting was of great importance for determining the future vector of the Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The parties agreed to “remove from the agenda” all mutual ideological claims, stop polemics, and focus on practical issues to repel US aggression against the DRV.

Immediately after this meeting, the new Soviet leadership took a number of steps to create an environment conducive to strengthening Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. Contacts with the leadership of the DRV became much livelier, and Soviet diplomacy began to act more proactively and assertively. On November 27, 1964, the Soviet telegraph agency TASS came with a new statement, which, along with a strong condemnation of the continued US air raids on the territory of the DRV, but in contrast to the statement of August 5, included the following warning: “those who harbor adventurous plans in the Indochinese peninsula, must understand that the Soviet Union cannot be indifferent to the fate of the fraternal socialist country and is ready to provide it with the necessary assistance.”⁹

Going to expand hostilities in Vietnam, the administration of L. Johnson carefully studied possible options for the reaction of the Chinese leadership to the impending escalation of the war. The Americans were encouraged by the inaction of Mao Zedong and his group during the events in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964. The prospect of reaching a “tacit understanding” with the PRC on the issue of expanding US intervention in the events in Vietnam was being observed. Finally, accurate data about the position of the PRC leadership came from Beijing. On January 20, 1965, the American press published a very extensive interview given by Mao Zedong to the American journalist E. Snow. To a direct question from a journalist whether the South Vietnamese guerrillas “win victory by their own efforts alone,” the Chinese leader answered in the affirmative. Referring to the Sino-US relations, Mao Zedong said that he did not believe that this relationship could lead to war. “There would be no war. That could occur only if American troops came to China...”. “What of the possibilities of a war arising over Vietnam?” — E. Snow continued to ask. “China’s armies would not go beyond her borders to fight. That was clear enough. Only if the United States attacked China would the Chinese fight,” Mao Zedong stated categorically.¹⁰

⁸ “Pravda”, 20.10.1964.

⁹ “Pravda”, 27.11.1964.

¹⁰ New Republic, 20.01.1965.

Washington perceived this recognition of Mao Zedong as a signal of Beijing's readiness to expand US-Chinese contacts on an anti-Soviet basis and its consent to the escalation of Pentagon's military operations in Vietnam, including acts of aggression against the sovereign State — the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

In the “CPSU — CPV — CPC triangle”

The Second Resistance War began in very unfavorable political conditions for the WPV. The fact is that the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s were marked by the beginning and subsequent aggravation of disagreements between the two main allies of the CPV — the CPSU and the Communist Party of China. The first signs of these disagreements appeared after the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956), which debunked the personality cult of I. V. Stalin and proclaimed a course towards “peaceful coexistence” in the foreign policy of the USSR. As is known, the leadership of the CPC, and especially Mao Zedong, reacted extremely negatively to the debunking of Stalin's personality cult by the congress, which, in fact, was the start of the ideological struggle between the CPC and the CPSU. In addition, Mao Zedong was extremely annoyed by Khrushchev's desire to act as the leader of the international communist movement, in which role he saw himself.

A different position regarding the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU was taken by Ho Chi Minh and the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Back in July 1956, Soviet Ambassador M.V. Zimyanin reported to Moscow on how the decision of the CPSU Central Committee “On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences” was perceived in Vietnam. In this dispatch, he cited the words of Ho Chi Minh that “the leading core of the party considers this decision as a fair and good decision.”¹¹

Subsequently, in an article published in *Pravda* newspaper, Ho Chi Minh wrote: “It is crystal clear that once victorious, socialism can never tolerate the personality cult and its harmful consequences. The energetic measures taken by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to do away with the personality cult, and its consequence, set a brilliant example of unprecedented political boldness ... The unshakable authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is growing and strengthening

¹¹ Novaja i novejšaja istorija (1998). M., № 3, s. 132.

even more. Taking a Leninist position in matters of criticism and self-criticism, the CPSU Central Committee showed that it cares much less about “what the reactionaries will say” than about the need to correct mistakes and educate the party of the working class and the masses.”¹²

At the same time, the theoretical controversy between the CPC and the CPSU, which soon took on the character of an open ideological and political confrontation between the two parties, placed the leadership of the CPV in a hard-to-solve dilemma. The Soviet-Chinese ideological differences, which were given publicity and later developed into a deterioration in interstate relations and into confrontation between the two great socialist powers — the main allies of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, naturally, could not but have a negative impact on the character of relationship between the USSR and the DRV. The fact is that each of the opposing sides — the Soviet and the Chinese — sought to induce Hanoi to take an unequivocal support for only one side. However, Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese leaders in official negotiations invariably emphasized the need to preserve the unity of the international communist movement.

A search for and maintenance of the most practical and rational positions in relations with the CPSU and the CPC has always been a “headache” for the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam. The famous sinologist M.S. Kapitsa wrote in his memoirs: “In August 1954, Pham Van Dong, on the way from Geneva, met in Moscow with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR G.M. Malenkov. After listening to the request for help, Malenkov in general reacted positively to this and then began to argue in a way that the emergence of a large number of countries of people's democracy requires great efforts and funds, the Soviet Union alone is not up to it, therefore it would be advisable to divide the functions between the USSR and China. The Soviet Union would take care of strengthening socialism in Europe, and China in Southeast Asia. Pham Van Dong took this idea stiffly ... Very soon, in Moscow Ho Chi Minh expressed firm objections to Chinese “guardianship” and demanded that the CPSU and no one else supervised affairs of Vietnam and all of Southeast Asia.”¹³

Members of the WPV could not stay away from the Soviet-Chinese controversy either. Differences began to grow among them also, although Ho Chi Minh constantly warned the party against symptoms of factiona-

¹² Ho Shi Min (1990). *Izbrannoe. Vospominanija o Ho Shi Mine*. M.: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoj literatury. S. 147.

¹³ Kapica M.S. *Na raznyh paraleljah. Zapiski diplomata*. M.: Kniga i biznes. S. 269.

lism, and the CPV, in its long history, happily avoided them. Impressive in this regard is the recording of a conversation between N. Godunov, Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in the DRV, and the President of the DRV dated June 22, 1960, during which Ho Chi Minh asked to hand over a letter to N.S. Khrushchev on issues that were at the center of the controversy between the CPSU and the CPC. "At present time," he said, "this difference in points of view can lead to serious consequences, especially since the discussion is already being conducted openly in pages of the party press ... Such differences are only to the advantage of the imperialists ... I believe that in our common interests it is necessary to prevent an open duel that will bring nothing but harm ... The CPSU CC and the CPC CC should together discuss the existing controversial issues during a joint meeting and come to a common agreement. In our Party, Ho Chi Minh noted, the baffled questions have arisen already in connection with these differences, but we are trying to prevent them from being raised and urge WPV members to wait and not make any hasty conclusions."¹⁴

In that phase of history, periodic conferences of communist and workers' parties served as an important form of collective analysis of topical problems of world development. They stimulated the creative activity of all the social and political institutions of the socialist countries. The conclusions drawn by these meetings served as a guideline in determining the essence of complex and controversial problems of the world development.

A special place in this process was taken by the International Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties, held in Moscow in November 1960. Early in the period of preparation for the Meeting, the WPV supported the draft documents submitted by the CPSU. Ho Chi Minh in his speech at the Conference persistently urged: "In order to defeat a common enemy, we must be closely united. Unity is our invincible strength. At the center of this unity, he stressed, is the Soviet Union."¹⁵ The leadership of the WPV, given the seriousness of the situation, again suggested that "the fraternal parties immediately stop mutual attacks on the radio and in the press" and "avoid actions that could increase discord."¹⁶

In the summer of 1962, Ho Chi Minh, concerned about the growing Sino-Soviet controversy and their possible dangerous consequences for the

¹⁴ Novaja i novejšaja istorija, 1998, № 3, s.136.

¹⁵ Internacional'noe sotrudnichestvo KPSS i KPV: istorija i sovremennost' (1987). M.: Politizdat. S. 294.

¹⁶ Ibid., s. 296.

CPV, again made an attempt to smooth out the contradictions in relations between the CPSU and the CPC. To this end, he flies to Beijing, where he holds talks behind closed doors with the CPC leaders. Then, at the invitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU, he flies to Moscow on a special plane provided to him by the Soviet side.¹⁷

The visit was informal and closed-door. And, consequently, nothing was reported about him in the press. In Moscow, the president of the DRV, as well as his personal secretary Wu Ki and Dr. Bao, who accompanied him, were placed not in a hotel, but in a state mansion on the Lenin Hills, away from prying eyes. Negotiations were held in the Kremlin, which, however, did not change the positions of the parties on controversial issues.

After the talks, Ho Chi Minh went on familiarization trip to ten union republics, visited 19 cities, including Kyiv, Tbilisi, Yerevan, Baku, Alma-Ata. He spent several days in Sochi, at K.E. Voroshilov's dacha "Bocharov Ruchei" (Bocharov Creek). Ho Chi Minh planted a tree in memory of his stay in the all-Union health resort in the local arboretum on the Alley of Friendship. It turned out to be comrade Ho Chi Minh's last visit to the Soviet Union.¹⁸

Meanwhile, the intensity of the Soviet-Chinese controversy continued to grow. And each of the parties required of the Vietnamese leadership a straight answer to the question: whose side was it on? In January 1963, a high-ranking Soviet delegation headed by Yu.V. Andropov visited the DRV. In official negotiations with him, Ho Chi Minh and Chairman of the National Assembly of the DRV Truong Tinh, as before, emphasized the special interest of the Vietnamese people in maintaining the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement, as a guarantee of solving the main national task — the liberation of the South and the unification of the country. It became obvious that the Vietnamese leadership at that time was not ready to unambiguously and openly condemn Beijing's actions. After the completion of the official part of the negotiations, the first secretary of the WPV Central Committee Le Duan, in tête-à-tête conversation with Yu.V. Andropov, only in presence of an interpreter, said confidentially and with some bitterness: "Don't take this the wrong way, but we cannot do without China now!"¹⁹ And it was, as events later showed, not a matter of "revisionism" or "revolutionism" of either of the two allies of the DRV. It was well understood in Hanoi that if the Chinese authorities cut off commu-

¹⁷ Rossijane o Ho Shi Mine. Vospominanija (2010). M. S. 86.

¹⁸ Ognetov I.A. (2007) *Na v'etnamskom napravlenii*. M.: Gumanitarij. S. 125—128.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, s. 148.

nication between Vietnam and the Soviet Union, the Vietnamese people would become lifeless and their cherished dream of achieving the reunification of the country would remain only a dream. And this was the main concern of the WPV leadership.

In connection with the growing day by day disagreements within the WPV itself, the question of its foreign policy line was included in the agenda of the 9th plenum of the Central Committee (December 1963). The Plenum condemned “modern revisionism, opportunism and dogmatism”. At the same time, “revisionism” meant, apparently, the views of N.S. Khrushchev on issues of peaceful coexistence. As a result of this decision of the plenum of the WPV CC, Soviet-Vietnamese relations began to noticeably worsen. The Vietnamese leadership even decided to recall from the USSR the DRV’s students who studied social disciplines, apparently believing that they were being brainwashed there.²⁰ The decisions of the 9th plenum raised many questions among the leadership of the CPSU. A discussion between Moscow and Hanoi on topics that were at that time in the focus of attention of the international communist movement became more intense, and some mutual misunderstanding arose in the Soviet-Vietnamese relations.

The Serious frictions in the “CPSU — WPV — CCP triangle” complicated the solution of the national liberation struggle tasks of the Vietnamese people, and demanded from the leadership of the WPV a high tactical flexibility and balance in relations with its two main allies, while maintaining integrity and firmness in regard to the implementation of the main strategic task — liberation of the South and unification of the country. The CPV leadership, displaying tactical flexibility, did not allow itself to be drawn into public controversy. In the context of a long and difficult struggle against the aggression of such a powerful enemy as the United States, it was vital, in the famous words of Ho Chi Minh, to pursue a policy of “the more friends, the fewer enemies”.²¹

In March 1964, in the face of major changes in the international and domestic situation, President Ho Chi Minh, based on the Constitution of the DRV, convened a Special Political Conference. In his speech at the conference, he emphasized: “After 10 years of restoration and transformation, the North of our country has taken a gigantic step forward, has not yet seen in the history of the nation. The country, society, people have been

²⁰ Ibid., s. 153.

²¹ Người Nga nói về Hồ Chí Minh (2010). Nhà xuất bản chính trị — hành chính. Hà Nội. Tr. 103.

renewed.” He appealed to the citizens of the country: “All of us must work hard enough for two to pay tribute to the native compatriots of the South.”²²

Having headed for the Second Resistance War, the leadership of the WPV naturally sought to keep their complicated relationship with the CCP out of the public eye. And only after the events of 1979, when Chinese troops invaded the territory of Vietnam in order, as Deng Xiaoping said, to “punish Vietnam,” in Hanoi the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry in the shortest possible time prepared and published a study “The Truth about Vietnamese-Chinese Relations over the Past 30 Years” was, in which many unknown pages of Vietnamese–Chinese relations were revealed.

Thus, the study told that at the negotiations in 1963 the Maoists persistently “tried to convince the CPV of the need to accept their point of view, namely, to deny the existence of the socialist camp.” In the same 1963, the Chinese leaders put forward the so-called Program of the general line for the world communist movement with 25 points and proposed to convene a conference of 11 communist parties “in an attempt to usurp the leadership of the world revolution” and create a “new communist international” controlled by Beijing. They sought Vietnamese support for these plans, as they “hoped to use the prestige and role of Vietnam in the world communist and national liberation movement.”²³

The publication of the SRV's MFA stated that the Vietnamese side reaffirmed its determination to stand on the positions of defending the socialist system and did not approve the idea of convening a conference of 11 parties. “Thanks to the firm position of the Vietnamese side, the 25-point program was not applied and nothing came of the plans to create some “new communist international.”²⁴

Perhaps the broadest exchange of views on relations in the “USSR—DRV—PRC triangle” took place in Moscow in February–March 1964 between the CPSU delegation headed by the second person in the party, M.A. Suslov and a WPV delegation led by the second person in the party, Le Duan. The author of this article was an interpreter at this meeting and remembers well that the negotiations took place in the “familiar manner”: Suslov accused the WPV of slipping more and more into the position of Beijing, while Le Duan categorically denied this. The fact that the contem-

²² Đại cương lịch sử Việt Nam, tập III (1945–2006) (2010). Hà Nội: Nhà xuất bản Giáo dục. Tr. 179.

²³ Pravda o v'etnamo-kitajskih otnoshenijah za poslednie 30 let (1979). Ministerstvo inostrannyh del Socialisticheskoy Respubliki V'etnam. S. 39–40.

²⁴ Ibid., s. 40.

porary head of the CPSU, N.S. Khrushchev, was an active champion of the concept of peaceful coexistence, was increasingly mixed with the negative factors in the relationship between the two parties, and the armed struggle in South Vietnam launched by the WPV leadership displeased him, as it blows this concept of his.

As a result of the negotiations, both sides confirmed that, on the basis of the principles put forward at the international meetings of the communist and workers' parties in 1957 and 1960, the CPSU and the WPV will continue to work to unite the socialist countries and the international communist and workers' movement. The parties were unanimous that now the center of the struggle was the task of ensuring the unity of all anti-imperialist forces.²⁵ In those historical conditions, such a conclusion was an important achievement. Above all, there was no alienation between the two parties; on the contrary, as a result of the discussion, the parties began to understand each other better. The downward spiral into aggravation of relations was halted. And soon the objective development of events inspired a powerful positive stream into relations between the two parties and countries.

Conclusion

The air war unleashed by the United States in August 1964 against North Vietnam radically changed the nature of the Second Resistance War of the Vietnamese people. The new situation required of the WPV leadership a radical change in the entire strategic line and tactical actions. Important positive changes in the “Vietnamese question” were also outlined in the policy of the Soviet Union after the change of CPSU’ leadership.

Summarizing the results of the WPV’s skillful tactics of political maneuvering within the framework of the “USSR — DRV—PRC triangle”, one cannot but admit that it has borne fruit. On the one hand, Beijing, although it renounced the unity of action of the socialist countries in the defense of the DRV, nevertheless did not block the delivery of Soviet aid through Chinese territory. On the other hand, to prevent the escalation of US military operations against the DRV and to demonstrate firm political support for the position of the Vietnamese leadership, Moscow took a decision to send a delegation headed by Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.N. Kosygin, which included Yu.V. Andropov, whose authority and influence in the Soviet leadership was growing rapidly. Previously, the Soviet

²⁵ *Internacional'noe sotrudnichestvo KPSS i KPv: istorija i sovremennost'* (1987). M.: Politizdat, 1987. S. 296—297.

prime minister had never visited the DRV, although Ho Chi Minh, in a conversation with Khrushchev, invited him to visit the DRV back in 1961. But he evaded answering in his usual impulsive manner.²⁶

Upon returning to Moscow, A.N. Kosygin urgently submitted detailed proposals to the Politburo of the CPSU CC on the maximum increase in military and economic assistance to the DRV. Priority attention was paid to the delivery of modern air defense systems in the shortest possible time. The proposals were unanimously accepted. Thus, as a result of this visit, the necessary prerequisites were created for a significant expansion of political, military-technical and economic cooperation between the USSR and the DRV, which became one of the most important factors in Vietnam's further success in the fight against US aggression. The visit of A.N. Kosygin to Hanoi marked a qualitatively new stage in the development of Soviet-Vietnamese relations, they increasingly acquired a confidential, essentially allied character.

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²⁶ SSSR/Rossija — V'etnam. Druzhiba, proverennaja vremenem (1958—2008) (2008). M.: Kuna. S. 59.

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Chapter 29

CURRENT VIETNAM — RUSSIA RELATIONS

More than 70 years ago, on January 30, 1950, the Soviet Union became the second country in the world to recognize and officially establish diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (after China). Since then, the people of Vietnam and the Soviet Union, although geographically distant, are very close in spirit and passionate patriotism and have always accompanied and overcome countless difficulties and challenges together. This has formed a special traditional friendship between the two peoples and laid the foundation for the current comprehensive strategic partnership. In the new context with strong mobilization of international and domestic factors, the relationship between Vietnam and Russia still has many areas and aspects for the two sides to expand and develop. It is the responsibility of the current generation of the two countries to continue to cultivate and develop this important friendship, a traditional and comprehensive strategic partnership.

Keywords: Vietnam — Russia relations; comprehensive strategic partner.

Major achievements in Vietnam — Russia relations over the years

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the political upheavals of the Soviet Union in the 1980s presented historical challenges to relations between the two countries. After a period of hiatus, with the determination and efforts of the leaders and people of the two countries, the Vietnam — Russia relations soon returned to a good trajectory, with strong strides, worthy continuation of the tradition of good relations between the two nations. In order to create a new legal framework for the relationship between Vietnam and Russia, in 1994, the two countries signed the Treaty

on the Basic Principles of Friendship Relations, which affirmed that the friendship between the two countries was built on the principles of respect for independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit based on international law. This is the premise for the establishment of a strategic partnership between the two countries in 2001, making Russia the first country in the world to have a strategic partnership framework with Vietnam, creating a foundation for Vietnam — Russia cooperation in the twenty-first century. Next, with the desire to deepen the Vietnam-Russia relationship more deeply and effectively, the two countries decided to upgrade the relationship to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership, which is a very high level in Vietnam's foreign policy (this level is only below Special Relations) in 2012, marking a new development in the relationship between the two countries. Looking back at the Vietnam — Russia relationship in the past period, some basic points can be seen as follows:

About political relations

Vietnam — Russia is considered to have very high reliability at all levels and this trust is constantly being strengthened. High-level delegation exchanges take place regularly, creating a strong impetus for the development of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. The two sides maintain many coordination and dialogue mechanisms such as the annual Diplomatic-Defense-Security Strategic Dialogue at the level of Permanent Deputy Foreign Ministers, and Defense Strategy Dialogue at Deputy Defense Minister level. In addition, the two sides conducted regular political consultations at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers and at Department levels within the framework of cooperation between the two Foreign Ministries. The two sides share similar views on many international and regional issues, closely coordinate and support each other at international forums such as the United Nations, APEC, ASEM, ARF, EAS, ADMM+, and Shang-rila Dialogue. Russia basically supports Vietnam's stance on settling disputes in the East Sea by peaceful means, without using force or threatening to use force, on the basis of international law and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC). Russia also supports the early development of a Code of Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (COC). The coordination between the National Assembly, the Government, ministries, branches, local government agencies, political parties and social organizations has also been deployed to a great extent.

About economic relations

In terms of trade, Vietnam — Russia trade turnover in 2020 reached US\$4.85 billion, an 8 % increase compared to 2019. The main export items of Vietnam to Russia include: telephones, electronics, textiles, footwear, agricultural produce, seafood of all kinds. The main imported items include: defense equipment, coal, wheat, iron and steel, fertilizer, automobiles, machinery and equipment of all kinds. In 2015, Vietnam became the first country to sign a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Russia is a key and founding member, which represents a special priority in cooperation between the two countries.

In terms of investment, by the end of 2020, Russia ranked 25th among countries and territories investing in Vietnam with 137 projects and a total registered capital of about 943 million USD. Russia's investment mainly focuses on the fields of mining, oil and gas, processing and manufacturing industries. Vietnam has more than 20 investment projects in Russia with a total capital of nearly 3 billion USD; main projects are Rusvietpetro Oil and Gas Joint Venture, Hanoi — Moscow Cultural and Commercial Center and TH Group's dairy and agricultural project with a capital of 2 billion USD (this is one of Vietnam's largest international projects). In addition, there are more than 200 small and medium enterprises with 100 % Vietnamese capital that are operating in manufacturing and doing business quite effectively in Russia. In the field of investment, energy is a traditional, strategic cooperation field and a bright spot that has been really effective, bringing significant revenue to the national budgets of Vietnam and Russia for many years. In addition to continuing cooperation within the framework of the Vietsovetpetro Joint Venture until 2030, major Russian oil and gas groups such as Gazprom and Rosneft are implementing many projects on Vietnam's continental shelf, including offshore areas. In Russia, the Rusvietpetro Petroleum Joint Venture is implementing a project to exploit oil and gas in the Nenets Autonomous Region, which has been exploited with high efficiency since 2010 until now. In addition, Vietgazprom, Gazpromviet joint ventures are expanding cooperation in the field of oil and gas in both countries.

About culture, tourism

Cultural exchange activities are held regularly, contributing to enhancing understanding and friendship between the people of Vietnam and Russia. The two sides organize annually and alternately Cultural Days in

Vietnam and Russia. More and more Vietnamese and Russian people are interested in learning about each country's culture. Particularly in Vietnam, the wave of finding out about Russian culture and traditional Soviet culture has been strongly promoted over the years.

Russia is continuously one of the top 10 markets that has the highest growth for tourism in Vietnam. If in 2012, Vietnam only welcomed 176,000 Russian tourists, in 2020 this number has increased to over 650,000 visitors, making Russia the largest European tourist market of Vietnam. Russia is also a large and interesting market for Vietnamese tourists. In 2020, there are 11.7 thousand Vietnamese tourists to Russia, the highest among Southeast Asian countries.

About education and training

Previously, the Soviet Union helped Vietnam train nearly 40,000 officers and experts in many different specializations. Currently, Russia continues to be the most important supporting country for Vietnam in human resource training with a large number of full scholarships for undergraduate and graduate levels. In 2020, Russia granted Vietnam nearly 1,000 scholarships. This number will remain the same throughout the period until 2025. In recent years, the Ministry of Education and Training and Vietnamese higher education institutions have always been ready to receive and train Russian students under the framework of the Agreement signed. Up to now, more than 250 Russian students and teachers have come to learn Vietnamese in Vietnam, of which, about 35 students study the entire university degree and 5 students study graduate programs under the cooperation scholarship between higher education institutions or cooperation programs between the two countries. In addition, the number of Vietnamese international students studying in the Russian Federation is increasing day by day. In recent years, the number has always maintained at more than 5,000 self-funded students studying in Russia per year. The quality of human resource training of the Soviet Union and Russia for Vietnam is considered the most reliable and stable over the past six decades since the first Vietnamese students arrived in the Soviet Union in the 1950s.

About security — defense

Vietnam and Russia has maintained the Intergovernmental Committee on Military Technical Cooperation at the level of Deputy Minister of Defense. Russia is Vietnam's leading important partner in the field of milita-

ry technology. Defense cooperation between Vietnam and Russia is also a rare model in global defense cooperation. The two sides conducted the Deputy Ministerial Defense Strategic Dialogue, most recently held in December 2019. Cooperation in security fields continues to be highly valued, contributing to maintaining peace, stability and development in the region and the world.

About science and technology

Not only training scientific staff, Russia has supported Vietnam to carry out nearly 60 major research and technology transfer projects. Bilateral cooperation in the field of science and technology has developed quite dynamically, becoming one of the pillars of the Vietnam — Russia relationship. The outstanding highlight of the effective cooperation between Vietnam and Russia in this field is the Vietnam-Russia Tropical Center — a multi-disciplinary science and technology research facility on the tropics. The center is deployed in the direction of combining basic research and applied research, meeting the interests of both countries and serving the socio-economic development tasks of Vietnam. This is a significant contribution to the consolidation and development of the traditional friendship and comprehensive strategic partnership between Vietnam and Russia. The two countries are also promoting the establishment of a Nuclear Science and Technology Center in Vietnam with an investment capital of 350 million USD. This is a big project and a new symbol of in-depth cooperation between Vietnam and Russia.

About the relationship between localities

The relationship between localities of the two countries continued to be maintained and strengthened through the exchange of delegations and the signing of many cooperation agreements. Many localities of the two countries have established cooperative relations with each other, especially between Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and Moscow, Saint Petersburg.

The summary above is living proof for the dynamics of the Vietnam — Russia relations. That basic result is also the premise to make the Vietnam-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership deeper and more effective, for the common interests of the two peoples in the coming time. Looking back over the past 70 years, especially in recent years, surely both Vietnam and Russia are proud of their achievements. The results are, to some extent, the result of the determination and efforts of the leaders and

people of the two countries. Both Vietnam and Russia have grounds to believe that the Vietnam-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership will continue to be consolidated and developed, overcoming all challenges and difficulties, being worthy of the traditional close friendship between the two peoples, in line with the aspirations of the two peoples, contributing to peace, cooperation and prosperity in the region and in the world.

Current shortcomings in Vietnam — Russia relations

Firstly, the perception and assessment of the extent, role, position and influence of Russia in the world by the authorities, especially the Vietnamese foreign policy makers, is not adequate. In the past periods, Vietnam, with its strategic preoccupation with other issues, could not devote all its efforts to promoting relations with Russia to realize its position of a “comprehensive strategic partner”. Russia's partnership status has not been accurately assessed, especially in terms of development prospects, so Vietnam has not yet focused on the need to increase cooperation with Russia.

Secondly, bilateral economic cooperation is still modest. Vietnamese businesses are strongly attracted to the Chinese, American and European markets. Vietnam's policy-making agencies with Russia always think of a big obstacle that is difficult to overcome when promoting Vietnamese businesses to the Russian market to invest and exchange goods — China. That is an error in our mindset. After Vietnam's Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union took effect in October 2016, trade turnover still grew at a limited rate, the results achieved were very low and unsatisfactory, which is not commensurate with the good political relations, great potential, economic scale and desires of the two sides. The two markets include nearly 250 million people, but only 4.85 billion USD in trade (in 2020) is too low a figure compared to potential. This leads to some opinions that the Vietnam — Russia relations are not at all “strategic”. In addition, the promotion of business investment of Russian enterprises in Vietnam is in fact highly focused on the oil and gas sector. Many other important economic sectors have not yet been exploited. Russia is a large country with an economic scale at least 6.5 times that of Vietnam, but Vietnam is a country that invests in Russia at least 3 times more than the amount Russia invests in Vietnam. It is a paradox that shows that Russia's potential and strengths have not been fully exploited in the cooperation with Vietnam.

Thirdly, the relationship between Vietnam and the Russian Federation takes place in a rather favorable geo-strategic context with the Look East policy of the Russian Federation (since 2010). Vietnam is considered as one

of the key elements of Russia in the Look East policy that Russia is pursuing. President Putin affirmed that “Developing multifaceted relations with Vietnam is one of the priorities in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in Asia”. Although Russia always highly appreciates Vietnam's role and position in the Asia-Pacific region and Southeast Asia and considers Vietnam one of its particularly important partners, and the two countries have established strategic partnership 20 years ago as well as a comprehensive strategic partnership 9 years ago; the development of relations between Vietnam and Russia is not commensurate with the spirit of “strategic partnership”, especially “comprehensive strategic partnership”. Vietnam seems to have only a role of a bridge with ASEAN in order to improve Russia's position and balance its interests in Southeast Asia as well as offset a certain weakening in Russia's economic relations with Western Europe after the Ukraine crisis. On the basis of Russia's long-standing traditional relations, the position and power of Russia and the geopolitical and geo-economic advantages of Vietnam, Vietnam and the Russian Federation should have stepped up cooperation in multilateral institutions in the region. This could create intertwined interests, regional and inter-regional connections, and create breakthroughs in cooperation that both sides can benefit from in the short and long term.

Fourthly, many issues related to the Vietnamese community have not been satisfactorily resolved to ensure the daily life, economic and social benefits of the expatriate community throughout Russia, especially in big cities. Vietnamese alumni who studied in Russia and came back to Vietnam have been promoted to a limited extent in the recent period. Not many central and local agencies and units are interested and willing to train these alumni into a key team to continue the political tradition of Vietnam for many years, instead, they mainly promote alumni trained in Europe and America.

Fifthly, the friendship between Russia and Vietnam is one of a kind, having overcome many challenges throughout the historical events of the twentieth century and the rapid changes in the world and in the relations between the two countries. In addition, there's one thing that hasn't changed in the relationship between the two countries, it is the attitude of respect, sincerity and mutual assistance that has become a tradition. This is a positive point for Russia and Vietnam to have an authentic cooperation, and the two partners never betray each other. This issue may have been recognized, but has not been fully promoted in the Vietnam — Russia relations to turn it into a fulcrum and great resource.

Some recommendations

First, in the context that the world and the region continue to have many complicated developments, potential risks and challenges in both traditional and non-traditional matters, it is necessary to fully realize that strengthening relations the comprehensive strategic partnership between Vietnam and Russia is of great significance to the implementation of Vietnam's foreign policy and international integration. The comprehensive strategic relationship with Russia also has comprehensive strategic significance for the defense of Vietnam's independence, sovereignty and socio-economic development, as well as contributing to the maintenance of peace, stability and development in the region and in the world. On that basis, Vietnam and Russia must continue to preserve and promote the good friendship between the two peoples. In particular, the Vietnamese senior leaders must have political determination to further strengthen the Vietnam — Russia relationship, which needs to be concretized by many guidelines and cooperation agreements in various fields. Vietnam needs to consider Russia as an important and top priority partner in its foreign policy, working closely together at regional and international forums. In particular, Vietnam must actively rethink the cooperation game with Russia, showing our respect for Russia in the most sincere and substantive way. Appreciating Russia is not because of the past, but because of the actual needs of the process of developing and defending the Fatherland now and in the coming years. Vietnam's consistent view is that it always considers Russia as one of Vietnam's most important and reliable partners and wishes to further consolidate and promote the comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia, but this view must be implemented in practice and should not just stop at words and policies. Also, maintaining top-level visits is a particularly important channel.

Second, in terms of economic cooperation, it is necessary to further improve the efficiency of the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement between Vietnam and the Eurasian Economic Union, to continue to remove non-tariff barriers in bilateral trade, as well as create the most favorable conditions for investment cooperation, especially in areas that have performed well and are promising such as energy, infrastructure and agriculture. Vietnam must comprehensively study the Russian market to further promote the exchange of goods in the groups of industries where we have advantages (self-manufacturing or being production sites of foreign enterprises) in the following areas: Agriculture, apparel, leather tanning, electronics, and mobile phones. In fact, the space for trade cooperation between Vietnam and Russia is still very large; the Russian market is in a state of

“monopoly” by China, but there are still many “loopholes” that can be entered. Vietnam needs to actively work with Russian agencies to promote simplification of procedures, remove technical barriers, and uniformly apply safety standards for food, according to international standards to open up new opportunities for agricultural, aquatic, forestry and pharmaceutical products to enter each other's markets. This will contribute to increasing bilateral trade turnover. It is necessary to improve and diversify cooperation in the field of finance-credit, facilitate the expansion of the use of local currencies of the two countries in bilateral payments and the wider participation of the Vietnam Joint Venture Bank — Russia in order to serve major cooperation projects between the two countries. Vietnam and Russia need to interact effectively and jointly handle relationships with other actors (especially China) to expand cooperation in new oil and gas exploration and production projects on the Vietnamese continental shelf and in the Russian territory. This should be done in line with international law as many projects by both sides, or with other parties participating in the past time, have had difficulties due to China's involvement in the East Sea. In the immediate future, cooperation should be focused on expanding the oil and gas exploration and production area on Vietnam's continental shelf, in accordance with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982). Vietnam needs to promote the determined plan of Gazprom Group to participate in the construction of a gas power plant in Quang Tri province and the plan of NOVATECH Company to implement a joint project to build a liquefied natural gas port and a gas power plant in Binh Thuan province. In addition, Vietnam needs to promote and encourage Russian businesses to invest in projects in new industrial fields (artificial intelligence, robotics), hi-tech agriculture, information and telecommunications, or construction of traffic infrastructure in provinces and cities of Vietnam. In addition, Russian enterprises should be promoted to cooperate in the electricity industry (wind, solar power); the advantages of Russian companies should be promoted when participating in projects to modernize energy facilities that were previously built with the help of the Soviet Union. At the same time, it is necessary to promote the investment and production by Russian enterprises in Vietnam in the field of motor transport vehicles.

Third, the field of national security and defense is a field of cooperation with a long tradition between the two countries, which is considered to be stable, solid, increasingly in-depth, practical and highly effective. Vietnam has always considered and will need to consider Russia as a leading important strategic partner in this field. Vietnam needs to consider

the defense cooperation relationship with Russia as a fundamental and leading partner, which continues to be a pillar and a priority direction for development for peace, stability, cooperation and development on the basis of traditional friendship and comprehensive strategic partnership between Vietnam and Russia. One of the new qualitative results in military-technical cooperation that needs to be further promoted is the fact that Vietnam is deploying the production of advanced military technical equipment with the participation of Russian companies. Military trade relations between the two countries have in fact been strongly promoted, contributing to enhancing Vietnam's defense power, and in the coming time, in the context of constantly changing global situations, Vietnam needs to create favorable conditions and promote the procurement of equipment for a number of Russian enterprises and defense units belonging to the group of traditional partners in times of difficulty (the impact of the Covid-19 epidemic, sanctions against the Russian Federation by the US, and the highly competitive market for weapons and defense equipment). As soon as the epidemic stabilizes, Vietnam needs to actively promote Russia to fulfill its commitment to continue to expand the training of soldiers and senior military officers for Vietnam at Russian military schools. In particular, Vietnam should pay attention to promoting its position as a rare country in East Asia or Asia that has high political trust with Russia — a key factor for effective defense cooperation. In defense cooperation, it is necessary to calculate carefully to avoid the impact of Chinese factors on cooperation content, especially in the procurement of weapons and defense equipment, training support, and head towards joint exercises of the army of Vietnam and Russia.

Fourth, cooperation should be promoted further in humanities, education-training, science and technology. In particular, the promotion of human resource training in Russia should be considered as a priority for the process of developing a network of new science, technology and basic sciences in Vietnam (instead of the fact that we are focusing investment in the direction of Europe and America with a lot of risks, high costs, lack of political and security reliability). It can be calculated that from now until 2025, there should be an increase of at least 50 % of the number of cadres sent to study at university and graduate school in Russia (compared to the plan of state budget scholarships). In fact, the cost of training a doctorate in the US, Europe and Australia is 2.5 to 3 times higher than training in Russia, and in some fields it costs dozens of times more. Personnel trained in the US, Europe and Australia are very difficult to integrate into the public sector and often work in foreign private sector. They find it difficult to adapt to the

working environment in state enterprises or public administration because of their lifestyle and their mindset, which has been shaped in the learning process. Meanwhile, personnel trained in Russia can adapt faster, can ensure political security, and can be trusted for a long time. Particularly in the cooperation in training high-quality human resources, Vietnam needs to strengthen joint training programs between Russian and Vietnamese higher education institutions, in which priority is given to fields where Russia has strengths and Vietnam has demand such as energy, information technology, law, transportation, economy — management, agriculture, marine research, fisheries, and environment. In addition, student exchange should be promoted through the higher education institutions of the two countries, and at the same time the range of recognition of each other's credits and diplomas should be expanded. Next, exchange of lecturers should be done through the effective use of the scholarship program in the Agreement signed between the two Governments. Lastly, excellent international research groups should be formed with the participation of lecturers and scientists from the two countries, including the co-instruction of PhD students, cooperation in research and scientific publication. It is necessary to actively connect with businesses to promote innovation and entrepreneurship among students.

Cooperation in the field of medicine (medical training, medical examination and treatment technology transfer, research cooperation, medical equipment production cooperation, treatment cooperation) with Russia should be a new direction for Vietnamese medicine. This is also an area of cooperation that needs to be deepened to clearly reflect the comprehensive strategic partnership. The context of the Covid-19 pandemic proves the great capacity and long-held tradition of Russian medicine. Russia is a pioneer in developing a Covid-19 vaccine in the world with a typical product called Sputnik V. Therefore, medical cooperation with Russia should be promoted as soon as possible. In the immediate future, medical cooperation should be directed towards Russia giving priority to Vietnam in the distribution of Russian vaccines.

In addition to the established scientific and technological cooperation, in the new task group, it is necessary to actively coordinate with the Russian side to promote cooperation in the field of using outer space for peaceful purposes, first of all in working together in the use and development of the global satellite navigation system GLONASS by Russia.

Fifthly, it is important to skillfully persuade Russia to participate more deeply in East Asia and Indo-Pacific affairs to contribute to creating more balance in regional affairs, which is also in line with the aspirations of

Russia to leverage its position in the region. The fact that Russia considers Vietnam one of its most important partners in the Asia-Pacific region should be utilized, as Russia has always emphasized. Promoting the “central” role in practice, with Russia's consistent priority in the Asia-Pacific region for Vietnam is to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership with Vietnam. This view is not influenced by the fluctuations of the situation, has been repeatedly affirmed by the Russian leadership and noted in a special section in the most recent Foreign Affairs Doctrine of the Russian Federation. In it, Putin repeatedly emphasized: The Vietnam — Russia relationship is a close, loyal and profound friendship, which has experienced many ups and downs of history since the difficult years of the war to protect the country till the time of building a prosperous country. Therefore, cooperation between the two countries in the international arena, within the framework of the United Nations and especially at regional dialogue forums such as EAS, APEC, ASEM, ARF, ADMM+ should be promoted more effectively and more substantively. Vietnam should be able to utilize this relation and promote Russia's interests (in terms of shipping, oil and gas exploitation) so that Russia has views and actions to support Vietnam's settlement of the East Sea issue. Of course, this is not a simple task.

Finally, what constitutes the long-term attachment of the Vietnam — Russia friendship is the similarity of the strong character, the resilient courage, the ability to overcome harsh challenges and not to surrender to great power, especially the similarity in both nations' interests. The friendship between the two peoples was built during the tough years of struggle for Vietnam's independence and sovereignty, tested through the fluctuations, ups and downs of the world and regional contexts as well as of the two countries. Therefore, between the leaders and people of the two countries, political trust has been built at a high level, and political trust will pave the way for other relations and areas of cooperation in the future. Therefore, it is necessary to consider this as a foundation, a valuable asset, to pay attention to this relationship, to continue educating and communicating about this friendship and mutual trust, and to show precisely the extent of the comprehensive strategic partnership between Vietnam and Russia in reality. Vietnam's leaders, including foreign policy makers and implementers, need to be fully aware of the rare tradition of attachment, and the high political trust of the two countries as a real asset that cannot be achieved only in a short time. It follows that we should sincerely and devotedly cultivate and develop the relationship, and overcome all challenges and difficulties to build a new position in relations with Russia, which will be worthy of the long-standing friendship tradition between the two countries and two

peoples. Among the important things that need to be done in the immediate future and long term is the building of a team of experts with deep understanding of Russia and operational personnel who directly communicate with Russia (of the foreign affairs sector and of other agencies directly related to this relationship). This should be focused on and implemented seriously. If we cannot fix the absence of a policy consultation team with Russia, or the absence of skilled foreign affairs cadres who can transform the relations with Russia, it will be difficult to satisfactorily foster the development of Vietnam — Russia relations to the right level and to meet new requirements.

Chapter 30

THE CPV AND SOVIET LITERATURE AS THE FACTOR OF ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF CREATIVE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP (1945—1954)¹

After the victory of the August Revolution (1945) the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under the leadership of the Communist Party of Indochina began to construct new life, new society and new culture. During the Anti-French Resistance War (1946—1954) literature and art played an important role in the process of forming ideology of the new formation person. The general conception of a new revolutionary culture in Vietnam was formulated by the Party theorist Truong Chinh in his works “Theses on Vietnam Culture” and “The Marxism and Vietnamese Culture”, its three typical features being as follows: *national, scientific and popular*.

The knowledge of Soviet culture and, first of all, of Soviet literature (increased, when the diplomatic relations between the DRV and the USSR had been established) was a powerful impetus for the development of creative interaction between the two countries.

Keywords: Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of Vietnam, culture, revolution, Soviet literature, literary translation.

Introduction

After the victory of the August Revolution (1945) the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under the leadership of the Communist Party of Indoc-

¹ The author would like to express his gratitude for the assistance in the preparation of the article to his Vietnamese colleagues: Thuy Toan, poet and translator; Lai Nguyen An, literary critic; Tran Thi Phuong Phuong and Vo Van Nhon, lecturers of the philological faculty of Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City.

hina began to construct new life, new society and new culture. In November 1946, the Cultural Workers Congress was held in Hanoi, having proclaimed their main task to be political education of masses fostering the sense of patriotism and the ideas of national independence, the development of their revolutionary awareness. In December 1946, the Anti-French Resistance War broke, and the whole country self-sacrificing heroically defended its independence and the revolutionary achievements. The grounds of a new revolutionary culture of Vietnam were created in the conditions of the backwardness of the broad masses (the population being thoroughly illiterate), elitism of science, literature and art. In October 1945, Ho Chi Minh, head of the state, said: "Now we have won the independence. Our task is to improve the cultural level of the people as soon as possible, and we must carry it out immediately".² He signed the decree to organize the movement to eliminate illiteracy and simultaneously established a special department in the Ministry of Education to lead the movement.

The theory of a new, revolutionary culture began developing before the August Revolution. Its general conception was formulated in the works by Truong Chinh, an outstanding Party theorist ("Theses on Vietnam Culture" ("*Đề cương Văn hóa Việt Nam*", 1943) and "The Marxism and Vietnamese Culture" ("*Chủ nghĩa Mác và vấn đề văn hóa Việt Nam*", 1948), having determined its three typical features: *national, scientific, and popular*. These documents mentioned that Vietnam culture should get free of overlappings of the colonial times and first of all reject formalism. Vietnam culture must be really national, meet interests of broad masses, direct, teach, improve their level.

"Theses on Vietnam Culture" virtually determined the policy of the Communist Party of Indochina in cultural sphere and formulated the following concrete tasks:

- to action at the three fronts, i.e., economic, political and cultural ones;
- to implement not only the political revolution, but also the cultural one;
- the advanced party must lead the advanced culture; only in this case it will be able to influence the community and its propaganda can be efficient.

² Ho Chi Minh (1959). Ob'yavim voynu negramotnosti, in: Ho Chi Minh. *Izbrznnnye stat'i i rechi*. M., p. 184.

Thus, culture and the cultural revolution were declared to be integral part of the future struggle of the Vietnamese people for national liberation.³

According to the slogan “To revolutionize the ideology, to link our activity with the life of the people”, patriotic actors of literature and art left as soldiers for the front, having got engaged in propaganda and agitation work. They desired to describe the heroic time, the deeds of their compatriots in their works.

The experience and cultural policy of the Soviet Union was very important for the Communist Party of Vietnam during the formation and implementation of the policy in the field of popular education and for the improvement of the cultural level of the people. The important role belonged to Soviet culture and particularly to Soviet literature, which was objectively the most demanded by intellectuals and ordinary readers in Vietnam in the conditions of the war-time. The process of acquaintance with Russian classics and Soviet writers “was conditioned by the internal need of the reading milieu and could occur both in the literary form and in the non-literary one”.⁴ In the years of anti-colonial Resistance in Vietnam, translations of Russian and Soviet literature were “a very productive and powerful means of perception foreign literature, one of the effective measures to enrich national literature, because very often new artistic forms, tendencies, ideas, genres, images of foreign literature penetrate into it through translations”.⁵

Different aspects of the problem are represented with documents, research-works, memoirs and publications in mass media.⁶ In Russian Oriental studies the cultural construction in Vietnam in 1945–1954 has not been

³ From February 25 to 28, 1943, the CC Plenum of the Communist Party of Indochina was held, which discussed problems of the extension of the united national front and acceleration of preparing the armed revolt. After the Plenum, another session was held, where Truong Chinh, the Secretary General of the Party, presented his “Theses on Vietnam Culture” (Đề cương về văn hoá Việt Nam). See: Trường Chinh (2007). *Tiểu sử*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 117. Retrieved on April 12, 2021. They were published on November 10, 1945, in “Tien phong” (“Vanguard”) newspaper. Quoted after: Suu tập trọn bộ Tiên phong (1996). Hà Nội, t. 1, tr. 32.

⁴ Gaprindashvili, N.N. (1993) *Osobennosti vospriyatiya inonatsional'noy literatury i sredi (opyt istoriko-sravnitel' nogo issledovaniya)*. Diss. Dr. Sc. (Philology). Tbilisi, p. 12.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ban Tư tưởng văn hóa Trung Ương (2000). *Sơ thảo lược sử công tác tư tưởng của Đảng Cộng Sản Việt Nam, 1930–2000*. Hà Nội; Ban Nghiên cứu Lịch sử Đảng Trung ương (1978, 1979). *Văn kiện Đảng 1945–1954*, t. 2, quyển 1, 2. Hà Nội; Trần Thanh Giang (2013). Sự phát triển các lĩnh vực văn hoá trong thời kỳ kháng chiến chống thực dân Pháp (1945–1954). *Nghiên cứu văn hóa*, số 3, tr. 60–67; Văn hóa và thông tin thời kỳ kháng chiến chống thực dân Pháp (1945–1954) etc.

specially investigated. The only research-work by G.V. Shmeleva “The Studies in the Cultural Construction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam” (Moscow, 1976) touched the given historical period but partially.⁷

A special attention should be paid to a great collection of documents, held in a private Museum of Russian Literature, established in 2015 by Hoang Thuy Toan, a famous Vietnamese poet and translator. His collection of books and publications, including many artifacts, allows to highlight the process of the distribution of Russian and Soviet literature in Vietnam, to assess the importance of creative contacts of writers of the both countries and to introduce new facts, events and names into scientific parlance.

The first translations of Russian and Soviet literature in Vietnam

The first attempts to translate works of Russian and Soviet literature were made in Vietnam as early as in the 1930s. They were stories, essays or fragments of novels by M. Gorky, F. Dostoyevsky, L. Tolstoy, whose works attracted public attention. They were published in periodicals in translation from French. The active acquaintance of the population of this far-east country with Russian and Soviet literature began in the second half of the 1940s coinciding with the time of Anti-French Resistance War of the Vietnamese people against French colonizers.

The bibliography of National Library of Vietnam evidences that the first work of Russian literature, published in the DRV, was “The Strange Reader” (“*Người đọc giả kỳ dị*”)*⁸, a story by Maxim Gorky (Dai Hoc Publishing House, 1945).

In 1946, some works of three well-known authors of Russian and Soviet literature were published in Vietnam. The absolute leader among them was Maxim Gorky. His story “The Torments” (“*Dấn vất*”)* was published by Thang Tam Publishing House, and his famous novel “Mother” (“*Người*

⁷ See also: Nguyen Khanh Toan (1960). Uspekhi kul’turnogo stroitel’stva v Demokraticheskoy Respublike V’ietnam, in: *Demokraticeskaya Respublika V’etnam: 1945–1960*. M., p. 177–199.

⁸ Perhaps, this is “The Reader” (1898), a story by Maxim Gorky. The title being changed in the translation may be considered as one of the measures of *localization* of the literary product in order to be understood and adopted in a new country. Here and somewhere else it is difficult to identify the original Russian text by its Vietnamese title, because a translator and a publishing house often gave new titles to the works in translation. In this article such variants of the translation are accompanied with the *asteriks* (*). Moreover, this Gorky’s story was translated from French, and the French translation could, in its turn, have the title unlike the original one.

mẹ”) was published by three publishing houses (Phu nu, Lao dong and Van Hoc). At the same time Dai Hoc publishing house published “The Death of a Government Clerk” (“*Cái chết của một anh công chức*”) by A.P. Chekhov.

The genre of Soviet story of the Great Patriotic War was represented with a well-known “Hatred Science” (“*Khoa học căm thù*”) by Mikhail Sholokhov (Hien Nam thu xa publishing house, Hung Yen). It was translated from English by Hoc Phi, a famous writer and dramatists.⁹ In the following years he and other Vietnamese writers, poets, journalists intensely translated works of Russian and Soviet literature.

That year, another work by Mikhail Sholokhov, “And Quiet Flows the Don”, was known to Vietnamese readers. Traditionally, it is considered that the book appeared in Van Hoc publishing house in 1959–1961 in Nguyen Thuy Ung’s translation, but the first chapters of the novel were published on May 4, 1946 “Cuu quoc” newspaper (N 231) entitled “On the banks of the Quiet Don” (“*Trên sông Đông êm đềm*”). The publication of the book in newspaper issues lasted almost to the end of the year. There were 130 issues in total (213–361), from May 4 to September 30, 1946.¹⁰ The translator’s name was Hong Ha, but after long searches it occurred to be the pen-name of the writer Nhu Phong.¹¹ In the 1930s he took an active part in the youth democratic movement, was a journalist, published his stories in Hanoi newspapers. After the August Revolution he collaborated with numerous newspapers and magazines and in 1965–1980 headed Van Hoc publishing house.

In 1947, only the books of social and political content were translated into Vietnamese, issued by Les Editions Sociales (Paris) which published Marxist literature: “Dialectical and Historical Materialism” by Stalin, philosophical works by G.V. Plekhanov, publicism by Alexei Tolstoy etc.¹²

To extend agitation and propaganda, in 1948 there was established Van nghe (Literature and art) publishing house and “Van nghe” magazine in Viet Bac, the region in the North of Vietnam, bordering with China. In the years of the Anti-French Resistance War, the government, state and other institutions of the DRV located there. A special role in the dissemination of new knowledge belonged to “Van nghe” magazine, which gave a detailed infor-

⁹ Tạ Hoàng Minh (2014). *Tiếp nhận M. Sôlôkhốp ở Việt Nam*. Tóm tắt luận án tiến sĩ ngữ văn. Trường đại học Sư phạm Hà Nội, tr. 12. Retrieved on May 12, 2021.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Thủy Toàn (2010). Người Việt Nam đầu tiên dịch Sông Đông êm đềm là ai? *Văn nghệ*, số 129.

¹² Vũ Hạnh, Nguyễn Ngọc Phan (2008). *Văn học thời kỳ 1945–1975 ở Thành Phố Hồ Chí Minh*. 100 câu hỏi về Gia Định-Sài Gòn-TPHCM. Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh: Nxb. Văn hóa Sài Gòn, tr. 49.

mation on the events of cultural life in the USSR, published the translations of Soviet authors' works.¹³ In 1948—1954, it was the official organ of The Alliance of Arts and Literature Associations of Vietnam.

On the occasion of the opening of the Medical institute a group of fourteen students translated “The Russian Widow” (“*Người quả phụ Nga*”)*, a story by Valentine Katayev. Perhaps, it was “The Wife”, the story he wrote in 1945 and dedicated it to the writer Evgeny Petrov, his brother who perished in a plane crash in 1942. The story tells about an evacuee-woman, who leaves for the frontline to find the grave of her perished husband.

In 1948—1949, in military zones in South Vietnam in the *cai luong* theatre “The man with a burned face” (“*Người mặt cháy*”), staged by the actor and dramatist Nam Chau, was popular. It was the adaptation of “The Noble Love” (“*Mối tình cao thượng*”) story. Its authors, patriots, Bao Dinh Giang and Bich Lam “vietnamized” “The Russian Character”, a famous story by Alexei Tolstoy.¹⁴ After numerous performances in military sub-units the play was premiered in a professional theatre at the end of 1955. The distinguished features of the Russian character, such as fortitude, steadfastness, love for Motherland, readiness to give one's life for it, were appreciated by the Vietnamese who struggled for independence of their country¹⁵. It is noteworthy that the story was very popular among the Vietnamese. For the first time, it was published in “The Russian Region”* collection issued in French.

Also, in 1948, for the first time in Vietnam, an amateur theatre staged a Soviet play. It was “The Russian Matter” (“*Vấn đề Nga*”), the political drama by Konstantin Simonov translated from English by Hoang Xuan Nhi.¹⁶ It was staged by research-fellows of the Cultural institute jointly with the students of a high school in November 1948. The performance took place outdoors, in U Minh Forest in the south Vietnam. Hoang Xuan Nhi wrote: “About a hundred spectators came to see the play by the Soviet

¹³ Here and further on the information on publications in “Van nghe” magazine was borrowed from: *Sưu tập Văn nghệ 1948—1954 (1998—2006)*, tập 1—7. Hà Nội: Nxb. Hội Nhà văn.

¹⁴ Lê Văn Nghĩa (2018). Trăm năm sân khấu cải lương: những vở cải lương không thể quên. *Sài Gòn Giải Phóng Online*, November 11. URL: <http://www.sggp.org.vn/tram-nam-san-khau-cai-luong-nhung-vo-cai-luong-khong-the-quen-558293.html>

¹⁵ Nguyễn Thành Long (1985). *Những bước thu nghiệm của một lớp người Việt chúng tôi. Cách mạng — Kháng chiến và đời sống (1945—1954)*, in: Hồi ức — kỷ niệm. Hà Nội, t. 1, tr. 316.

¹⁶ Vũ Hồng Loan (2005). *Văn học Việt Nam tiếp nhận văn học Xôviết*. Luận án tiến sĩ ngữ văn. Trường đại học sư phạm thành phố Hồ Chí Minh, tr. 25.

author. They were cadres, soldiers, population of the neighboring villages, mostly illiterate ones”.¹⁷

Probably, the poem “Wait for Me” by Konstantin Simonov had the most unusual history. Translated by the poet To Huu and published in April 1948 in “Van nghe” magazine as “Wait for me, and I’ll be back” (“*Đợi anh về*”), it became the independent work and disseminated quickly through the country, having acquired the unprecedented popularity.

To Huu described the work at this translation in his memoirs “Thoughts of That Time” (“*Nhớ lại một thời*”).¹⁸ That time he was attached to a sub-unit at the north-west of Vietnam. One evening, when all the soldiers were preparing for the battle, one of them exclaimed: “Oh, Heavens, how I am longing for my wife!” and he asked To Huu: “If you have a poem of your beloved wife, recite it, please”. And he recited his poem “It Is Raining” (“*Mưa roi*”).¹⁹ The soldiers liked it very much. Their reaction and feelings inspired the poet, and he thought of a small poetry collection of seven Russian poets in French translation in his bag. He liked one of them very much. It was “Wait for Me” by Konstantin Simonov. To Huu read it once again. The translation was very good, though it was not clear, if it is close to the Russian original. But the matter was quite sufficient for the poet, and he began to translate. The poet wrote in his memoirs: “I have never translated poems before. But at that moment I made up my mind and I even did not think that I would manage so soon. Perhaps, because I dwelled then with soldiers, and it was easy for me to get into their feelings, their thoughts of home and especially of the beloved ones”. The poem by Simonov, so dear for Soviet soldiers at the front, at last found a new life in the other part of the world. Vietnamese soldiers had sheets of paper with a copy of the poem, translated by To Huu in their bags. It became a prayer for those women who were waiting for their husbands. Later, in South Vietnam the well-known composer Van Chung put the poem to music. In 1960–1970s this song had a success sung by Elvis Phuong, a popular Saigon singer.²⁰

Konstantin Simonov sincerely supported the Vietnamese people in their struggle against foreign aggressors. Having visited Vietnam, he devoted two poetry collections to this country: “Vietnam, the Winter of the Seventies”

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Phạm Thành Chung. “*Đợi anh về*”- *cây đàn muôn điệu*. Retrieved on July 24, 2021.

¹⁹ This poem was put to music by composer Tran Hoan and became a very popular song.

²⁰ Tân nhạc vn — thơ phổ nhạc — “*Đợi anh về*” — Konstantin Mikhailovich Simonov & Văn Chung. Retrieved on March 12, 2021.

(1971) and “One’s Grief Is Everyone’s Grief” (1972). The latter contains Simonov’s poetic letter «To Comrade To Huu, who has translated “Wait for Me”»:

I know, here my verses live
 In your wonderful translation.
 And they will live, while wives are waiting
 For those who are in campaign.

The history continued. For many years, the poem by To Huu was part of literature compulsory programme in Vietnamese schools. In November 2017, in Hanoi there took place a solemn presentation of the book “Wait for Me, and I’ll Be Back” (“*Đợi anh về*”), a collection of Soviet poetry on the Great Patriotic War. It was prepared by translators Nguyen Huy Hoang and Nguyen Van Minh and was timed to the 100th anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

In 1949 Van nghe publishing house edited the book “Misha” by Boris Polevoy (“*Mi-sa*”, translated by Vu Ngoc Phan)*, — a collection of stories of the Great Patriotic War.

In June 1949, “Van nghe” magazine published an adapted text of L. Subotsky’s essay “The Weapons for the Victory” (“*Võ khí để chiến đấu*”)*, prepared by the writer Nguyen Huy Tuong under the pseudonym Thao Truong. The essay analysed the works of Soviet writers (A. Tolstoy, I. Ehrenburg, M. Sholokhov, M. Aliger, V. Grossman, K. Simonov etc.) of the war against fascist aggressors. It was emphasized that their works boosted the morale of the troops at the frontline and patriotic enthusiasm of all the Soviet people.

In 1950 the publications of the works of Soviet literature in Vietnam increased. So did the interest of professionals and ordinary readers, mostly due to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Vietnam followed with the extension of bilateral contacts in all the spheres.

There appeared “The Third Summer” (“*Mùa hè thứ ba*”)* by Konstantin Simonov in the translation of the well-know journalist Phan Quang. At the same time Van nghe publishing house published the essays by famous Soviet writer and journalist Ilya Ehrenburg “The Time Supports Us” (“*Thời gian ủng hộ chúng ta*”)* translated by the journalist Thép Moi.

During the war years Vietnamese readers got acquainted with the works of Soviet writer Konstantin Paustovsky. Later his works were translated and published in Vietnam many times. In 1950 there appeared two books: “The Lace-Maker” (“*Cô gái làm ren*”) and “Stories about Russian Children” (“*Truyện nhi đồng Nga*”)* in Thanh nien publishing house”.

The Van nghe publishing house published “The Iron Flood” (“*Suối thép*”), a novel by Alexander Serafimovich, which was translated from Chinese by famous writer and dramatist Ngo Tat To back in 1946.

“Van nghe” magazine (April, 1950, N 22) published K. Simonov’s poems “Do you remember, Alesha, the roads of Smolensk...” (“*A-lê-sa nhớ chãng*”, translated by To Huu), the review of Ilya Ehrenburg’s essays “Along the Roads of Europe” (“*Trên những nẻo đường châu Âu*”)* by the writer Nguyen Tuan, the review of Valentine Katayev’s novel “Time, Forward!” (“*Thời gian tiến lên!*”) (in Chinese) by the writer Phan Khoi. The magazine also informed that Van nghe publishing house had prepared two books by Maxim Gorky: “How I Learned to Write” (“*Tôi đã học viết như thế nào*”) and “The Theory of Literature” (“*Vài đoạn lý luận văn học*”).

Several issues of this magazine published materials on theatre life and contemporary drama in the Soviet Union. In May 1950 (N 23) there was published the review of theatre life in the Soviet Union by Doan Phu Tu, a literary man, written after the article of famous French writer and art critic Léon Moussinac (from the book “*Connaissance de l’URSS*”, Paris, 1946) with the information of new Soviet plays. In September the magazine published reviews of contemporary theatre criticism in the USSR.

At the same time in partisan regions in South Vietnam there appeared “The Great Patriotic War” (“*Vệ quốc đại*”), a collection of stories about the recently finished war. It was prepared by a patriot and Buddhist, venerable Thien Tieu, known under pseudonym of Xich Lien.²¹ He participated in the revolutionary movement in Vietnam, was a prisoner of Con Dao. During the Anti-French Resistance War, he worked at the Political Department of the 8th military zone. At that time, he began to translate books and various materials to study and propagandize the experience of the USSR, China and other socialist countries. He regularly received the press and books from France. Later he decided to translate the works of Soviet writers from Russian into Vietnamese. Soon there appeared “The Great Patriotic War” in three volumes (the total circulation of 10,000 copies). Among the authors there were Andrei Platonov, Boris Lavrenev, Vasily Grossman, Petr Pavlenko, Veniamin Kaverin etc. In total Xich Lien translated more than 30 works by Soviet authors (“They Fought for their Country” by M. Sholokhov, “The Frontline” by A. Korneychuk etc.). Twenty of them were published by the Political Department of the 8th Military zone.²²

In 1951 Van nghe publishing house issued “Underground RC Acts” (“*Tình ủy bí mật*”) by Aleksey Fedorov, a well-known actor of partisan mo-

²¹ Xich Lien means the Red Lotus. The translator’s official name is Nguyen Van Tai.

²² Thủy Toàn (2011). Câu chuyện về dịch giả Xích Liên — Sư Thiện Chiếu — Chiến sĩ cộng sản Nguyễn Văn Tài (1989—1974), in: Thủy Toàn. *Những con ngựa thồ...: văn học dịch — dịch văn học*. Hà Nội, tr. 81.

vement in the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War (the 1st vol., 1951, 2d vol., 1952). The name of the translator was Nguyen Du Kich (Nguyen the Partisan). In October, 1951 “Van nghe” magazine informed that the translator decided to give his fee for the book by A. Fedorov to the soldiers of the best sub-unit in Phu Vang District (Thua Thien Province). Other sub-units got copies of the book.

Many years later it became known that the translator was Ho Chi Minh, the first President of the People’s Democratic Vietnam. In winter 1950 during his sojourn in Moscow, he desired to get a book by a Soviet author about partisans to use their military experience in Vietnam. This book was “Underground RC Acts” by Alexei Fedorov about the partisan movement in the Ukraine (Chernigov region) during the Great Patriotic War (in French translation). On May 1, 1953 “Literaturnaya Gazeta” published “The Parcel from Vietnam” notice in its holiday issue. This was the novel by A. Fedorov in the Vietnamese translation.

According to National Library of Vietnam data, in 1951 Van nghe publishing house edited two books by Boris Polevoy: “We Are Soviet People” novel (“*Người Xôviết chúng tôi*”) and the collection of stories “Soviet Pioneers, the Participants of the Great Patriotic War” (“*Thiếu nhi Liên Xô chiến đấu*”, translated by Xuan Sanh)*, and the story “Just Love” (“*Chỉ vì yêu*”) by Wanda Wasilewska. Its second edition appeared three years later. At the same time there were published “Some Remarks on Literature and Art” (“*Vài quan điểm văn học nghệ thuật*”)* by A.A. Zhdanov, a Soviet Party figure, and “Socialist Realism” (“*Hiện thực xã hội chủ nghĩa*”)* by writer Aleksey Tolstoy.

In 1951 the department of the Vietnamese Writers’ Association of the 5th Military Zone published the collection “New Literature of Central and Eastern Europe” with the poetical satire “Mister Twister” [“*Chuyến Tư tiên sinh*” (*Mister Twister*)] by Samuil Marshak translated by Nguyen Dinh. Later there appeared its separate edition.

Saigon Dong Phang publishing house issued the novel “Surrounded by three Armies” (“*Giữa chõn ba quân*”) by Thiên Giang, the adaptation of “The Captain’s Daughter” by Alexander Pushkin.

In September 1951 “Van nghe” magazine (N 30) published “The Open Letter of Ijya Ehrenburg to Writers of the West” (translated by poet Xuan Dieu). The same issue contained the essay “Meeting Soviet Writers” by journalist and translator Thép Moi. Staying several days in Moscow after his participation in the International Conference of Journalists in Helsinki, the Vietnamese delegation met Soviet writers Alexander Fadeyev and Samuil Marshak. So began the first creative contacts of the two countries’ men of

letters. At another meeting in Moscow writer Nguyen Dinh Thi spoke about a Vietnamese youth, who returned to North Vietnam from Europe. He brought two books in French: “Virgin Soil Upturned” by Mikhail Sholokhov and the issue of “Soviet Literature” magazine with “Greetings from the Front” by Valentin Ovechkin. “Soldiers queued for them. Everybody desired to read them. The first reader was a bookbinder. He was charged to bind the book”.

It was the early 1950. Brutal fights broke out again in the North. The People’s Army left the regions of these events for a time. The bookbinder kept the books. Hoai Thanh, the Secretary of the Standing Committee of the Vietnamese Writers’ Association penetrated to the occupied territory, found the bookbinder and came back with the books.

Fifteen days later, the aggressors were suppressed. Soon the Congress of Representatives of Liberated Peoples was held in the province. Hoai Thanh brought the two books there. It was clear that it was impossible to satisfy all the readers. The books were taken apart and circulated in many handwritten copies”.²³

This story evidences the great interest of the Vietnamese in Soviet literature.

In 1952 there appeared “The West Wind” (“*Gió Tây*”) anthology, consisted of 37 poems by 32 authors from 20 countries. Russian literature was represented by two poets of the 19th century: Michael Lermontov with “The Beggar” (“*Ke an xin*”) poem and Yuliya Zhadovskaya with “The Precious Stone” (“*Chau ngọc*”)* poem. They were translated from French by Le Van Hoe, well educated and religious person. Also, he was the author of the anthology, with the circulation of 1500 copies.

The same year there was staged “The Run for Liberty” (“*Chuyện xe tự do*”)* by Yu. Lenitsky, a Soviet dramatist, translated from French. It was shown to participants of the Conference of retraining of the workers of literature and art. Such famous men of letters like Nguyen Tuan, The Lu, Truc Quynh took part in its production.²⁴

In 1953 Vietnam for the first time knew the poetry by Vladimir Mayakovsky. “Six Poems by Mayakovsky” (“*Sáu bài thơ Mai-a-kop-xki*”, Van

²³ Bazarov, N. (1951) *Istoriya dvukh knig. Literaturnaya gazeta*, October 13. That was the Vietnamese delegation, that after the 3d International Youth Festival in East Berlin stayed in Moscow for some days. Among its participants there were writer Nguyen Dinh Thi, composer le Huu Phuoc, artist Nguyen Do Cung and poet Nong Quoc Chan. They met a group of Moscow artists, writers and composers.

²⁴ Vu Hong Loan. *Op.cit.*, tr. 25.

nghe publishing house) were issued translated from Chinese by Hoang Trung Hong.

In February 1953 Van nghe magazine (N 39) published the names of those who received the prize in the field of literature and art of Vietnam in 1951—1952: poet The Lu for the translation of “The Moscow Character” (“*Tinh cách Mác Tư Khoa*”), a play by Anatoly Sofronov, and Nguyen Quoc Hung for the translation of “The White Birch Tree” (“*Cây phong bạch*”), a novel by Michael Bubenov.

Thien Giang, a writer from the South of Vietnam, referred in his work to Russian literature again. That time he wrote the novel “To Kill Father” (“*Giết cha*”) after “The Brothers Karamazov”, the famous novel by Fyodor Dostoevsky. Since June 6, 1953 it had been publishing in the popular newspaper “Nhan loai”.

Van nghe publishing house edited “The Birth of the Epic” (“*Một bản anh hùng ca ra đời*”)* by Boris Polevoy translated from French by Vu Ngoc Phan.

In 1954, the last year of the Resistance War, Vietnamese readers met again the works by Boris Polevoy. Van nghe publishing house issued the second edition of his essays “We Are Soviet People”.

Vietnamese readers showed great interest in “The Days and Nights of Stalingrad” (“*Ngày và đêm Xtalingrat*”)*, Quan doi Nhan dan publishing house), a novel by Konstantin Simonov, and “The Russian Character” (“*Anh thương binh về làng*”, Van nghe publishing house) by Aleksei Tolstoy. Also, the book “Far from Moscow” (“*Xa Mác-tư-khoa*”) by Vasily Azhaev was published.

Some practical books were translated from Russian. Phu nu publishing house issued “Klava: How to Be Mother” (“*Colava. Làm mẹ?. Bút ký*”)*, the book of essays for women.

And here is the story of “The Director’s Notices” (“*Bút ký của một hiệu trưởng*”) by Ivan Novikov. Its author is the director of a secondary school. His notices are a sincere and fascinating story of the life of Soviet schoolchildren, of problems and tasks of the Soviet school. The book was translated into many languages, French and Chinese among them. Pham Dinh Diem, an employee of Hanoi Library, read the book and thought it would be interesting and useful for Vietnamese teachers and students. He translated it from French and then checked it against the Chinese translation. In 1954 the book was edited by Giao duc publishing house.

The great event in the literary life of Vietnam was the publication of “How the Steel Was Tempered”, a novel by Nikolay Ostrovsky translated by

Thep Moi. Like in the Soviet Union, it was “the handbook” for many generations of Vietnamese young boys and girls. Ngo

In April 1954 “Van nghe” magazine (N 50) published the article “From the Poetry Experience” (“*Kinh nghiệm làm thơ*”)* by Mirzo Tursunzoda, a Tadzhik poet, in May 1954 (N 51) — the discussion of Boris Polevoy’s letter, addressed to the translator Vu Ngoc Phan.

From 1954 publishing of Russian and Soviet literature in Vietnam increased, the works became the integral part of spiritual life of Vietnamese people.

Conclusion

In spring 1954, the historical victory in the battle of Dien Bien Phu crowned the end of long heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people for their liberty and independence. Giving assessment to the event, Nguyen Khanh Toan, a famous Vietnamese historian and public leader, pointed to the following important factor: “The struggle on the cultural front during the Resistance War assisted to this victory”.²⁵ An important component of the victory was the elimination of illiteracy in the country. By December 1946, i.e., on the eve of the Resistance War, 2 million of the Vietnamese had learned to read and write. Under French colonial regime less than 10 % of the population were literate. The revolutionary government fulfilled that task during a year, while it took the colonizers nearly hundred years.²⁶ By mid-1954, when the Resistance War ended, 10 mln people (about half the population of the country) in liberated area were literate.²⁷

The Governmental measure in the field of culture and education were as important: the introduction of schooling free of charge. School doors opened widely before the children of the working people. All educational institutions provided mother tongue education (*quoc ngu*). The literacy campaign was followed with the interest in reading, and in literature. During the Resistance War Russian and Soviet literature began to disseminate through translations from French, Chinese, and English. It is noteworthy, that there were different forms of perception and dissemination of literary works: oral stories²⁸, collective readings, copying the texts, transposition of stories into

²⁵ Nguyen Khanh Toan. *Op.cit.*, tr. 9.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, tr. 187.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, tr.189.

²⁸ In 1952 Nguyen Thanh Long prepared “The Stories about Soviet Novels” (“*Kể lại một số tiểu thuyết Xô-viết*”), which contained short exposition of famous literary works. The book was published in one of publishing houses in South Vietnam. See: Nguyen Thanh Long. *Op.cit.*, tr. 317.

plays, adapted translations, creation of independent literary works using the Russian originals etc.

Obviously, every type of literary cultural interaction of different verbal communities, is realized through or with the participation of translation, “one of the most ancient type of interculturality and at the same time one of the necessary conditions for intercultural communication”.²⁹ It was then, in the harsh years of the Resistance War, that the Vietnamese began to get acquaintance with Russian and Soviet literature, which helped them to know the life of Soviet people, to learn of their victory in the Great Patriotic war. Those years meant the beginning of the interaction of the two cultures, when Vietnamese readers got acquainted with facts and ideas of another culture developing respect to it and widening their range of interests. In this process translators became mediators between the cultures. Not occasionally Alexander Pushkin used to call translators “posthorses of the enlightenment”.

The first translations of Russian and Soviet literature into Vietnamese were made by professional men of letters, journalists, students, teachers, culture employees and even the President of the country. Usually they translated through French, Chinese, and English translations, as in Vietnam there were no Russian-speaking people³⁰, they appeared at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s.

Nearly all the works by Soviet authors are devoted to the war, to the struggle of Soviet people against fascist Germany. The Vietnamese liked this war prose and poetry, which reflected the heroism of Soviet people at the frontline and in the rear. That literature inspired optimism and showed the prospect of the peaceful future. The Soviet people won, and it meant that the Vietnamese would stand their ground in the Anti-French Resistance War.

Soviet literature showed new artistic and esthetic methods (such as socialist realism) of socialist art to Vietnamese men of letters and readers.

²⁹ Mikoyan, A.S. (2011) Rol' perevoda vo vzaimopoznani i vzaimobogashchenii kul'tur. *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta*, ser. 22. The Theory of Translation, no. 4, p. 20.

³⁰ In December 1945, Hanoi University opened the Socio-political department, where the Russian language was taught by O.V. Pletner, Orientalist, a graduate of Saint-Petersburg University. One of his students was Nguyen Thuy Ung, later a famous translator. He learned but six months, therefore he continued to learn Russian himself. In 1950 he was sent to learn in one of Chinese military schools. There in 1952, on the order of the school-head he translated “Ten Steel Blows” by Stalin. It seems to have been the first translation from Russian into Vietnamese. — The author's private interview with Nguyen Thuy Ung. Hanoi, November 2004.

It contributed to the departure of Vietnamese writers from simplistic views of the artistic tasks, revealed in the Chinese official thought.³¹

During the Resistance War the Vietnamese discovered the Soviet Union and its literature for themselves. Literary personages and events became part of their life. Moreover, it is considered that before the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the DRV in 1950 Russian and Soviet literature in Vietnamese translations was an important link between our countries and peoples. Later there appeared other kinds of Soviet art (cinema, paintings, music, theatre). The development of bilateral relations between writers widened, and soon they grew into the creative interaction between Soviet and Vietnamese writers and artists.

Thus, Russian and Soviet literature in Vietnamese translations is considered to participate directly and indirectly in the general process of cultural construction in the DRV during the Anti-French Resistance War.

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³¹ These postulates were mostly formulated by Mao Zedong in his “Yan’an Theses” in May 1942. See also: Ngô Viết Hoàn (2021). Tư tưởng văn nghệ Diên An và tình hình tiếp nhận tại Việt Nam giai đoạn 1940—1960. *Nghiên cứu Văn học*, tháng 3, số 3 (589), tr. 119—131.

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Chapter 31

THE VIETNAMESE WORKERS' PARTY AND YUGOSLAV MODEL OF SOCIALISM

This article treats the issue of the VWP's attitude towards the Yugoslav model of socialism during 1948–1965. The author used material of Russian and Serbian archives as well as official documents related to the VWP leadership activities. It is noted in the article that the VWP leaders were neutral towards the stance of Josip Tito and his associates on the issue of establishment their own form of political system in Yugoslavia until the outbreak of the conflict between the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1948. It was after visiting Moscow in 1950 and meeting Stalin that Ho Chi Minh started to criticize Yugoslavia. It was dictated by Stalin's attitude towards Tito, which Ho Chi Minh had to take into account in the course of his work during the First Indochina War. Ho Chi Minh continued to criticize Tito's policy and considering him to be a revisionist within the international revolutionary movement even after Stalin's death and improvement of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. The ties between the VWP and the LCY became stronger after the 20th CPSU Congress where Stalin's cult of personality and his policy towards Yugoslavia were disapproved of. Ho Chi Minh visited Yugoslavia in 1957, but after the SPCU criticism of Tito in 1958 he turned against the Yugoslav socialism model once again.

Keywords: Vietnamese Workers' Party, League of Communist of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav model of socialism, Tito, Ho Chi Minh.

Introduction

The 13th Congress of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam, held in late January and early February of 2021 in Hanoi, became a good reason to look at the results of a quite successful development of the country in different fields and to review party's historical experience of building relations-

hips with other ruling communist parties when the bipolar world still existed. This article only treats the attitude of the Vietnamese communist leadership towards the way the socialist system was developing in Yugoslavia during the mid-1950s and the first half of the 1960s.

And beyond that, the contacts between countries — among them the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia¹ — that after the Second World War declared their intention to take path of socialism² are an important aspect of international relations and foreign policy of contemporary history.

In the period from 1948 to 1953 all the ties between the nations of people's democracy and Yugoslavia were broken on the personal initiative of Joseph Stalin who openly confronted the Yugoslav president Josip Tito and accused him of betraying the cause of socialism. This attitude towards Yugoslavia that existed right until the death of Stalin went against the beliefs of his successors who firstly started to re-establish inner-state relations and then interparty ties between the USSR and Yugoslavia.³ In June 1955, Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan went to Belgrade to “reconcile” with his Yugoslav partners. Hanoi happened to be in a quite difficult situation. Having relied in 1950 on the unwavering endorsement of Stalin's policy, it now had to somehow explain to the party activists and people of the country why the attitude towards Yugoslavia and its leader had changed significantly.

Improving relations with Belgrade

At the 20th CPSU Congress, held in February 1956, the General Secretary of the Vietnamese Workers' Party Truong Chinh led the party delegation. Upon his return to Hanoi, Khrushchev's “secret speech” was the topic of discussion at the specially convened plenary session; after listening to Truong Chinh's report about things happened at the 20th CPSU Congress the plenary members were at a loss. They sent a letter “On certain concerns related to the line of policy for the development of Vietnamese revolution” to Moscow and asked to send a soviet leader to Hanoi for further clarification.⁴

¹ In the Soviet political phraseology of the mid 1940s — early 1950s — People's Democracies

² Since 1963 — Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

³ For more details, see.: Edemskiy, A.B. (2008). *Ot konflikta k normalizatsii. Sovetsko-Yugoslavskiyе otnoшeniya v 1953—1956 gg.* M.

⁴ GA RF, F. R-5446, In. 98s., File 704, sh. 6—7.

Anti-Yugoslav propaganda coming from Stalin ran through entire politico-ideological activity of the Vietnamese Workers' Party and it was difficult to switch position quickly. An issue of the establishment of formal ties between the DRV and the FPRY was raised upon the behalf of North Vietnam during the visit of the Soviet Union Communist party's Politburo member, one of Khrushchev's supporters, Anastas Mikoyan that he paid to Hanoi in April 1956 to provide clarifications on decisions made at the 20th CPSU Congress.⁵

During one of the plenum of the VWP Central Committee Politburo, that Mikoyan not just attended to but also took an active part in, Ho Chi Minh informed that Yugoslav ambassador in the People's Republic of China commented that DRV ambassador's appeal to establish diplomatic relations with the FPRY "should be postponed." It might be a respond to DRV leadership's refusal to make such a decision in early 1950.

The soviet visitor told Vietnamese partners about a significant improvement of the relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. As a result, Mikoyan and Vietnamese Workers' Party leadership agreed that during the next meeting in Beijing DRV's ambassador in the People's Republic of China should ask his Yugoslavian colleague about the reasons why FPRY administration had postponed the issue of establishing diplomatic relations. In addition, North Vietnamese ambassador would also ask him to tell Josip Tito that Ho Chi Minh had requested that the Yugoslav leader spoke well of Vietnam⁶ during his working visit to Paris and Delhi.

Upon his return to Moscow Mikoyan informed Veljko Micunovic, new Yugoslavian ambassador in the USSR, about the discussion held in Hanoi and said that the decisions made at the 20th CPSU Congress were "unanimously endorsed" by the DRV leadership ("Vietnamese comrades").⁷

Some implicit signs indicate that Ho Chi Minh and his entourage did not like at all the fact that relations between Moscow and Belgrade was getting better as well as a peaceful attitude towards South Vietnam that Mikoyan showed during his last visit.

The decisions made at the 20th CPSU Congress considerably helped to establish formal relations between the two states — North Vietnam and Yugoslavia — but they did not guarantee establishment of interparty ties. Soviet leadership was interested in strengthening comprehensive cooperati-

⁵ For more details on the Mikoyan's visit to Hanoi, see.: Selivanov, I.N. (2021). *Эпоха XX сjezda. Mezhdunarodnaya deyatelnost A.I. Mikoyana v 1956g.* SPb., p. 261—276.

⁶ GA RF, F. R-5446, In. 98s., File 704, sh. 115.

⁷ *Ibid.*, sh.178.

on with other socialist states. To do that, on October 30, 1956, a special Declaration by the Soviet Government on possible different ways of building socialism was adopted.

But the burdensome past had a significant impact on the attitude towards Yugoslavia among socialist countries which soon led to another round of confrontation between Moscow and Belgrade. In a given situation the DRV took a stance that was mainly dictated by the interests of its leaders wishing to unite Vietnam under their rule by all means. This task was considered to be of high priority and could hardly be accomplished without help of Moscow and Beijing.

Knowing that after Stalin's death Ho Chi Minh had a mainly negative attitude towards what was happening in Yugoslavia, Moscow made occasional "confidential gestures" to show that they were ready to "confer" with him about the issue of such a delicate nature for all communist states. On January 3, 1957, a USSR embassy official in Hanoi gave Ho Chi Minh the text of the letter written by the CPSU Central Committee to the Central Committee of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia and asked him on behalf of the Soviet administration to read it and assess its content. Such a move could only mean that they trusted him in Moscow and they were ready to receive advice and recommendations. This is something that could never happen during the government of Stalin. It was during that conversation that Ho Chi Minh gave his opinion on the assessment of Stalin's activity, saying that it had 70 % of the positive and only 30 % of the negative.⁸

At the same time the Chinese Communist leadership made attempts to find a common ground with Tito and his comrades. In January 1957, Chinese parliamentary delegation, led by the head of the Beijing Municipal Committee (the mayor of Beijing) Peng Zhen, was in Yugoslavia. He had three receptions given by Tito himself and the Vice President of the Presidium of the Federal Assembly Mosa Pijade. The delegation was given a trip around the country; this visit was widely covered by the media.⁹

The DRV always coordinated its foreign policy with its "Great Neighbour", so this event should become an important signal to start rapprochement with Yugoslavia. They probably did not know it in Hanoi that during

⁸ See.: Bukharkin, I.V. (1998). Kremly i Ho Chi Minh. 1945—1969. *Novaya yi Noveishaya Istoriya*, no. 3, p. 132. Apparently, it refers to the CC LCY letter that was decided to be written at the CPSU CC Presidium meeting on the 3d of December, 1956; See: Preziidium CK KPSS (2015). 1954—1964. *Postanovleniya*, t. 2. M., p. 510.

⁹ *Borba*, 1957, January 18, 19, 20, 29, 30, 31, February 2; *Politika*, 1957, January 21, 29, 30, February 2.

these Peng Zhen's meetings with Yugoslav leaders they had been constantly criticizing the USSR and the leadership of the country.¹⁰

For the rest of the world this visit was just another important manifestation of the rapprochement of Yugoslavia with one of the main socialist countries. Thus, it became clear to Ho Chi Minh that he could now visit Yugoslavia without fear of being accused by Chinese leaders of "connivance to revisionists".

Hopes of Ho Chi Minh and his associates that the Kremlin would return to the policy it had had during the days of Stalin were mostly lost after members of the anti-party group Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov were deposed of their position in government in June, 1957. In the period from June to August, 1957, Ho Chi Minh as a newly elected president took an extensive tour of Asian and European socialist countries, including Yugoslavia. He came to Belgrade on the 5th of August where he was given a warm welcome. It is worth noting that the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung had gone on the similar tour around socialist countries a year before, but "revisionist" Yugoslavia, unlike "Marxist" Albania, was not among the places to visit.

In the Archives of Yugoslavia, there are funds named "Office of the President" that contain certain folder of documents dedicated to organization and conducting meeting of Tito, Kardelj, and other Yugoslav leaders with Ho Chi Minh. This folder provides an opportunity to have a detailed examination of those bilateral relations from Yugoslav perspective. It becomes clear that Tito had high hopes for positive attitude of the respected communist leader towards Yugoslav realities and a "special" path of the "socialist construction".

Hồ Chí Minh's visit was widely covered in Yugoslav national newspapers, he, as a revolutionary figure, was written about in a supplement for *Borba* ("Struggle").¹¹

Tito said during his speech at the mass meeting on occasion of North Vietnamese delegation arrival that Hồ Chí Minh's visits had brought them closer so that he "felt like one of his neighbours".¹² According to him, their nature and the way they fight for their goals are the things that relate the Yugoslavs with the Vietnamese. He noted, however, that there are certain

¹⁰ Boi s "tenyu" Stalina (2016). M., p. 550. See also: Selivanov, I.N (2019). Beseda chlena Politburo Tsentralnogo Komiteta Kompartii Kitaya Pen Chzhenya s K.E. Voroshi-lovym o situatsii v Yugoslavii, aprel 1957. *Slavic Studies*, no. 5, p. 58—65.

¹¹ See.: *Borba*, 1957, August 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. *Politika*, 1957, August 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

¹² AJ — 837. KPR— I-5-b/122-1.

differences due to “specific conditions” in which the two countries had to exist, but bilateral cooperation was a contribution to the cause of socialism of their countries.¹³

Ho Chi Minh was more diplomatic and careful in his response and said that he hoped that his meetings with Tito would result in further strengthening ties between the two states and that Yugoslavia felt like home to him¹⁴.

Corresponding information about the dialogues had in Belgrade was received both through TASS and from Soviet embassy in Belgrade. For Ho Chi Minh with his inherent diplomacy, it most likely was only wishful thinking, as it was for Tito. It can be assumed that by the moment Ho Chi Minh had had false hope that Yugoslavia could join “socialist camp”.

The Yugoslav administration organized an unparalleled grandiose tour around the Yugoslav republic for Ho Chi Minh as a part of the reception. He particularly visited Croatia, there, on Brijuni islands, he continued talks with Tito in informal settings. It is hard to tell how ascetic Ho Chi Minh who was used to having a frugal lifestyle perceived the luxury Tito had on Brijuni.

At the end of the visit a specially produced book was given to Ho Chi Minh as a gift; it was written in French about the places of Yugoslavia that he had visited and was of a good printing quality.¹⁵ Tito’s generous gesture was clearly made so that the eminent visitor would have good memories of Yugoslavia and the achievements of the Yugoslav people made in the path of building their own model of socialism.

Returning to Hanoi, the DRV president decided to make a diplomatic move that was supposed to be accepted both by Yugoslavia and the USSR, which had earlier been concerned about strengthening ties between Hanoi and Belgrade. On the 14th of October, 1957, a telegram to Tito was sent to Belgrade by Ho Chi Minh. The DRV leader on behalf of “the nation and the Vietnamese government” invited his Yugoslav colleague and his wife to visit the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in January 1958. He did not address to Tito as a “comrade” in this telegram but called him the “president” instead, just as he called himself “Ho Chi Minh” without mentioning any official titles. Yet he used a very common diplomatic expression “if the time would be convenient for you”.

The DRV president said that this visit “would strengthen the bond between the Yugoslav and Vietnamese nations, contribute to the unity of socialist countries and consolidation of peace throughout the world”.

¹³ Ibid. See also: RGASPI. F. 495, In. 201, F. 1/2 (Dossier), Sh. 90—91.

¹⁴ AJ — 837. KPR— 1-5-b/122-1; RGASPI. F. 495, In. 201, F. 1, P. 2, Sh. 240.

¹⁵ Ibid.

He concluded the invitation the way he always did when writing to the leaders of the allied nations: “With most fraternal greetings”.¹⁶ It should be noted that development of interparty ties between the VWP and the LCY was not mentioned in that document.

Interparty relations of this kind might well have been established during communist and labor parties meetings that were held in Moscow on occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, but it did not happen. It was probably taken note of in Hanoi that the LCY had send a delegation led by Edward Kardelj, but he had not signed the main documents made on the basis of their outcomes.

Ho Chi Minh himself visited Moscow in person and approved all the documents on behalf of the VWP. Considering his further assessment of the Yugoslav leaders’ policy, it was likely that the Vietnamese president disapproved of the conduct of the Yugoslav delegation at the meetings in Moscow, suspecting the LCY leadership in their unwillingness to show the rest of the world cohesion and unity against “global imperialism” and “forces of reaction”.

Tito, continuing his policy of balancing between the West and the East, did not have time and opportunity to (or did not want to) visit Hanoi. It is possible that he was afraid of negative reaction from the USA that at that time strived to support a vastly unpopular regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in southern Vietnam.

This fact could hardly become a reason of discontent in Moscow, but it could be taken painfully in the DRV that was waiting for a cause to criticize Yugoslavia again, and the cause was found very soon.

New wave of disputes

In April 1958 the 7th LCY Congress was held and a new party program was adopted there. Ten years after, this event became a reason why the dispute between the USSR and Yugoslavia arose anew. Moscow and its allies voiced harsh criticism of the Yugoslav leadership, accusing it of revisionism.

Fierce diatribes against Yugoslavia launched by other socialist countries and “fraternal parties” resulted in a series of theoretical articles that were soon compiled in Moscow into a special subject collection¹⁷. In our view, it

¹⁶ A photocopy of this invitation is in the Archives of Yugoslavia (AJ — 837. KPR. I-5-b/99-5), see.: Ličnosti i potpisi (Ličnosti i potpisi: autografi poznatih ličnosti na dokumentima Arhiva Jugoslavije) (2014). Beograd, p. 154.

¹⁷ Protiv sovremennogo revisionisma (1958). Sbornik statej, opublikovannyh v gazetah i zhurnalah kommunisticheskikh i rabochih partij. M.

was related to the fact that after the 20th CPSU Congress Kremlin aimed to pin on Yugoslavia a label of “revisionists” that since the time of Lenin had been considered by members of the international communist movement even more offensive than, for example, “dogmatist”.

Hanoi did not ignore the “Yugoslav issue” as well and followed the example of its socialist neighbor. A big article “Cohesion and common beliefs are essential for the Socialist Camp” was published under the name of Chi Lãng in the May 1958 issue of a VWP official organ and main theoretical magazine “Hoc Tap”. Considering the content of this article it can be said that Hanoi believed Yugoslavia to be a socialist country yet with one reservation to it — there were still politicians in Yugoslavia with “views and statements fundamentally incompatible with the teaching of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism” who did not contribute to strengthening the unity of the Socialist Camp, but “supported imperialists”.¹⁸

The North Vietnamese author conveyed official VWP Central Committee policy and upbraid the Yugoslav leaders who almost always seem to support a motion to prevent war and maintain peace, but at the same time accused the USSR and its allies in playing power politics and dividing into military and political blocs¹⁹.

Since the draft of the LCY Program concerned an issue of dividing “zones of interest and zones of influence” between the USSR and Western countries with Vietnam given as an example by the drafters of the Program, the author of the article reproached the Yugoslav leaders of having little understanding of the situation that Indochina was in after the 1954 Geneva Conference when the process of peaceful unification that had been voted for in general election was sabotaged by American imperialists that came to the south of Vietnam instead of the French. Moreover, in the north of the country people were building socialism and the main purpose of it was to establish the basis for making Vietnam a unified state.²⁰

The statements of “the Yugoslav comrades”, the author emphasized, did nothing but discredit the achievements of Vietnamese people during the last ten years.²¹

As it was stated further in the article, “To reject unity and international cooperation, to put emphasis on national peculiarities, to deny general patterns of the socialist revolution and construction of socialism is to take path

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 216–217.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 222.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 222–223.

²¹ Ibid., p. 233.

of bourgeois nationalism, 'national communism' rather than proletarian internationalism".²²

There was a major forthright conclusion at the end: "History appointed the USSR to be the centerpiece of unity and lead the Socialist Camp, and that is what the USSR is doing with honor".²³

It seems to us that Ho Chi Minh took criticism of Moscow and Beijing towards Yugoslavia as a blueprint for action, so he brought communication with Yugoslavia to a halt.

Needless to say, the previous invitation for Tito to visit Hanoi was no longer relevant to the DRV leadership. Ho Chi Minh chose to enhance relations with Moscow, especially since there had been no criticism towards Stalin and his ways of governance while there had been some towards Yugoslavia during the 20th CPSU Congress, at which he had led the VWP delegation.

Reversals of Soviet policy

With the PRC, things were not going as well as Ho Chi Minh expected in the context of Vietnam's reunification. Mao Zedong and his associates did not want Vietnam to unite because it could become a geopolitical rival in the South-East Asia region, that is why in Beijing they were paying lip service to the idea of Vietnam unification meanwhile doing anything to obstruct Hanoi's taking steps in that direction. In the midst of disputes with the PRC North Korean leaders disclosed a number of earlier sensitive documents of this period and used excerpts from them as a proof that the PRC "had been duplicitous" and it had "betrayed" interests of the Vietnamese people.²⁴

Ho Chi Minh in order to endorse the CPSU stance on the Yugoslav issue in February 1960 during a conversation with the Soviet ambassador Leonid Sokolov concurred with Kremlin's criticism of Yugoslavia. In the beginning of the meeting with the Vietnamese President the Soviet diplomat gave him to read the transcript of conversation between Khrushchev and Vucmanovic-Tempo who was in Moscow to clarify the positions of the LCY on important international issues.

After reading it, Ho Chi Minh gave quite frank comments. He tend to explained the mere holding of such a meeting by the Yugoslav leaders'

²² Ibid., p. 234.

²³ Ibid., p. 235.

²⁴ See.: Pravda o v'etnamo-kitajskih otnosheniyah za poslednie 30 let (1979). Ministerstvo inostrannyh del Socialisticheskoy Respubliki V'etnam. Hanoi. S. 34–49.

angling for a way out of that unenviable situation they happened to be in because of their “unconstructive” stance on issues of building the socialism.

Ho Chi Minh highly commended Khrushchev’s commitment to easing international tensions and accused the leadership of Yugoslavia of trying to “sit on the fence” and getting the support of the USA that aimed at sowing dissension within “the Socialist Camp”. He considered Yugoslavia to be the mean to do that. Ho Chi Minh said that Tito and his associates certainly understood it and that was why in fact they sought rapprochement with the USSR and its other allied countries, but they still did not want to abandon their “revisionist” policy of building “specific” model of socialism that had been earlier exposed by Khrushchev.

Ho Chi Minh associated himself with the Soviet position towards Yugoslavia and cited his conversation with Tito on Brijuni islands in 1957 as an example of wrongfulness of the Yugoslav leaders’ beliefs. According to him Tito was trying to convince him in his rightness, but could not do it. Yet Ho Chi Minh did not tell it to him because he did not want to ruin “amicable” spirit of the conversation. As Tito might have taken his silence for approval of his position and told Khrushchev about it, the North Vietnamese president decided two years later during the conversation with the Soviet ambassador to take precautions and express his “true” opinion of Yugoslavia that was “completely identical” to the Soviet one.

Then Hồ Chí Minh, faithful to his favorite strategy, decided to stand up for Mao Zedong and his associates as Yugoslavia was heaping abuse upon them trying to sow dissension between the CPSU and the CCP that was not acceptable in relations within the “Socialist Camp”²⁵. It demonstrates another Hồ Chí Minh’s trait: his inclination to always mediate disputes between the leaders of the socialist states and be “a moral authority”, someone who can do things that were not permitted to anyone else either in Moscow or in Beijing.

In the latter part of August 1961, Ho Chi Minh on his own initiative, as he claimed it to be, made a visit to Pitsunda where Khrushchev was vacationing and preparing a report for the 22nd CPSU Congress. He wanted to “reconcile” the CPCU and the Labor Party of Albania that had been in dispute since the 1960 November Moscow meeting of communist and labor parties.

The Soviet and the Vietnamese leaders had two conversations; the Yugoslav issue was brought up in their course. During the first meeting Khrushchev said that all the actions of Albanian leaders were recently aimed

²⁵ AVP. F. 079, In. 15, F. 12, P. 2. Sh. 25—26. See.: Bukharkin, I.V. Op.cit., p. 135.

at withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and that they were practically following in Tito's footsteps.

He further stated that they were going to reconsider their relationship with Albania soon. "We are going to trade with them on the same conditions as we do it with capitalist countries. We already have such relations with Yugoslavia. We have signed trade agreements and we are trading in accordance with them. We sell weapons and other goods to them. They asked for concessions and we denied this request. We told them: take it or leave it. Yugoslavia is paying us with good products. It suits us."²⁶

Khrushchev elaborated upon it two days later. According to him, Chinese leaders call the CPSU leaders "revisionists". "They attacked Yugoslavia, but by doing that they meant to hit the USSR. We told our Chinese comrades that they should not give too much attention to Yugoslavia. It would pay them too much honor. The CPSU criticize Yugoslavia but do it moderately, because it is not our chief enemy. Imperialism is. Does Yugoslavia threaten our principles? No, of course not. Do not inflate the worth of the Yugoslav revisionist. We criticize the Yugoslavs and follow our own path. It enrages the Yugoslav leaders. When we paid less attention to Yugoslavia, it started to be given less help from America. Now Chinese leaders are trying to make it look like all harm and danger for the communist movement comes from Yugoslavia. That is not right."²⁷

Considering the fact that Yugoslavia was the main regional aggravator, Ho Chi Minh started to edge towards rapprochement with Tirana and continued to dissociate himself from Belgrade. At that moment this state of things quite suited Moscow.²⁸

In October 1961, the 22nd CPSU Congress was held; the Yugoslav issue was discussed from the perspective of the CPSU leaders. It was noted in the summary report at the Congress that activity of the Yugoslav leaders disrupted unity of the international communist movement, they had "national narrow-mindedness", they had gone astray and this road had led them to the morass of revisionism. To the Moscow 1975 Declaration they responded with "revisionist anti-Lenin program".

Khrushchev pledged that the CPSU would continue to criticize revisionist concepts of the Yugoslav leaders.²⁹

²⁶ Journal of Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, 1998, no. 2, p. 80.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 87.

²⁸ For more details, see.: Selivanov, I.N. (2017) Moscow — Hanoi — Tirana Relations in the Context of the Split in the "Socialist Camp". *Sojourn*, no. 2, p. 479—514.

²⁹ Dvadcat' vtoroj s'ezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (1962). Ste-nograficheskij otchet, s. 35.

Then Khrushchev mentioned Yugoslavia in the report about the CPSU Program. He reassured: “We were fighting and will continue fighting against revisionist beliefs of the LCY leadership, but at the same time we always stood and keep standing for comprehensive development and strengthening of relations with Yugoslavia at a state level. The USSR and Yugoslavia have quite similar stance on the struggle for peace.”³⁰

As a result, “Yugoslav revisionism” was mentioned in the very text of the CPSU Program which was at least very odd for the document of this kind. It can be explained by notorious “subjectivism” and “voluntarism” that later became the reason why Khrushchev was deposed from his position as a leader of the CPSU and the USSR.

The decisions made at the Soviet Communists Congress were generally met with a negative response in Hanoi. It especially concerned the further disapproval of Stalin’s policy and removal of his body from the Mausoleum. Moreover, Ho Chi Minh could not but be offended by the fact that his insistent requests to reconcile with Albania were unheeded by Khrushchev.³¹

Despite the criticism towards “Yugoslav revisionism” the decisions made at the 22nd CPSU Congress were mainly received positively in Yugoslavia because of disapproval of Stalin and Albanian leadership. What is more, according to the recently published preparatory documents made for Khrushchev’s reports, Albanian issue had not been addressed before Hồ Chí Minh’s visit that later gave rise to a thorough and acute development of this issue by the impulsive Soviet leader.³²

In December 1962, Tito visited the USSR once again and that was a clear manifestation of defusing tension between the two countries.³³

According to the recently published record, of the conversation between Khrushchev and Vucmanovic-Tempo, which took place in Moscow on the 3d April, 1963, the Soviet leader answered a question of the Yugoslav visitor about the attitude of Indonesian, Vietnamese, and North Korean communist parties towards the CPSU policy the following way: “Vietnam... It is very difficult there. I am very sorry for comrade Ho Chi

³⁰ Ibid., p. 227. Of the documents of the Moscow conferences in 1957, the Yugoslav delegation signed only the Peace Manifesto.

³¹ See.: Boi s “tenyu” Stalina. Op. cit., p. 30—33.

³² Ibid., p. 626.

³³ See.: Edemskiy, A.B. (2016). Znachenije sobytij 1961/62 dlya sovetsko-yugoslavs-kogo sblizheniya pervoi poloviny 1960 godov, in: *Vmeste v stoletii konfliktov. Rossiya yi Serbia in XX veke*. M., p. 300—322.

Minh, he is having a hard time. He endorses the CPSU line, but he has to act with regard to the CCP CC policy.”³⁴

On the summer of 1963, Khrushchev “reconciled” with Yugoslav leaders once again during his visit to Belgrade that was strongly criticized in Albania. First an editorial reflecting this issue was published in newspaper *Zeri i Popullit* (“*Voice of the People*”), and after that it was issued as a separate publication with a specific headline “Khrushchev kneels before Tito”. Albanian leaders obviously feared that Khrushchev and Tito could arrange for the joint occupation of this “rebellious” country.

During the conversation with Tito held on August 26, 1963, the Soviet leader, looking at the situation surrounding Vietnam and North Korea, said: “We have to empathize with Kim Il-sung and Ho Chi Minh— there are many Chinese in their parties, the pro-Chinese influence is really strong.”³⁵

The visit was made at the same time the interparty relations between the USSR and China escalated and, as a result, the VWP leadership supported their colleagues and allies in Albania and China. Sometime later, the CPSU was indirectly accused in the 1963 December VWP CC Plenum documents of carrying the ideas of “modern revisionism”.

At that time Ho Chi Minh was one of the few who advocated maintaining amicable relations with the USSR. Significant number of his associates was pro-Chinese, mainly because of the heated ideological dispute between the USSR and China.

The General Secretary of the VWP Central Committee Lê Duẩn visited Moscow in February 1964 where he had an impartial conversation in the CPSU Central Committee with the chief ideologue of the Party Mikhail Suslov. The Vietnamese leadership believed that, after aligning himself with Tito, Khrushchev approved of “revisionist policy” that had been quite recently criticized in Moscow. Reminiscences of that dispute were reflected in Khrushchev’s memoirs in which he calls Lê Duẩn an “anti-soviet person” while Ho Chi Minh is considered to be a “communist saint”.³⁶

Tito and Ho Chi Minh

Khrushchev’s removal from office put an end to the dispute between the CPSU and the VWP over the Yugoslav issue. They pretended in

³⁴ Југославија—СССР. Сусрети и разговори на највишем нивоу руководилица Југославије и СССР (2014). Vol. 1. Beograd, p. 522.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 557.

³⁶ Khrushchev, N.S.(1999). *Ludi. Gody. Vlast*, vol. 3. M., s. 114.

Moscow that they did not notice the markedly warm relations of Hanoi with Tirana and Beijing, and Hanoi in its turn did not accuse Moscow of rapprochement with the “Yugoslav revisionists”, especially since the USSR supported them in the beginning of 1965 when the Second Indochina War broke out in the DRV territory.

In the 1960s, when the second split within the international communist movement occurred some western columnists stated drawing analogy between Yugoslavia and North Vietnam, between Tito and Ho Chi Minh. In this regard there is a distinctive characteristic of the two leaders given by Richard West: both of them were partisans, “great leaders of the mass”, they were respected not just among the communist and they did not seek “servile obeisance”.³⁷

Analogies between Tito and Ho Chi Minh became very popular among liberal Americans who were against the war in Vietnam. Famous American writer Barbara W. Tuchman recalled in one of her journalistic works (*The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam*) that the US State Department could make Ho Chi Minh “a Tito for Indochina” during 1945—1946. In that region, according to her, this choice would have required imagination, which was “never a long suit” with western governments, they were not ready “to take the risk of supporting a Communist when communism was still seen a solid block”. “Tito was then its only splinter, and the possibility of another deviation was not envisaged”.

Conclusion

To sum up, it can be said that the VWP stance on “the Yugoslav model of socialism” primarily depended on the CPSU and the CCP attitude towards this issue. Relations between the two countries normalized after the SPCU had stopped the attacks on “the Yugoslav revisionism” that happened at the same time with the outbreak of a new conflict in Indochina where Titoist Yugoslavia supported the DRV and criticized the USA. In addition to it, a gradual rapprochement between the SFRY and the PRC began.

Now that international political environment has drastically changed and Vietnam is still looking for its way of building socialism, it seems worthwhile for the present generation of Vietnamese political scientists and economists to study the Yugoslav attempts to construct socialism, paying particular attention to finding positive aspects for the future implementation.

³⁷ West, Richard (1997). *Josip Broz Tito. Power Force*, Ch. 14.

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Chapter 32

VIETNAM'S COMBINATION OF NATIONAL FORCE AND THE FORCE OF THE EPOQUE: A CASE STUDY OF VIETNAM — ASEAN RELATIONS

Coming out from decades of war with devastation, poverty, economic stagnation, trade embargo, and diplomatic isolation, from mid-1980s to early 1990s, Vietnam made a revolutionary change in its diplomacy direction. This shift marked a turning point of Vietnam diplomacy and has been bringing many achievements to the national construction and defense. In particular, the direction of 'combining national strength and strength of the times', the fabric of the policy has been holding its merit even after more than 30 years. 'Combining national strength and that of the times' did not only clarify the relations between international and domestic factors, but it also solved the urgent problems that Vietnam was coping with in the course of the post-war decade, helping Vietnam gradually improve its international status and become an active and constructive member of the international community. The following research will use the relations between Vietnam and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a case study to understand this strategic direction. It will elaborate on the content of the direction and analyze how the direction has reflected the relations between Vietnam and ASEAN in terms of benefits that the country has gained from joining ASEAN and the contributions that Vietnam has been making to ASEAN.

Keywords: Vietnam's diplomacy direction, Communist Party of Vietnam, ASEAN.

Introduction

In 1986, Vietnam undertook a strategic shift in foreign direction. For the first time in history, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) identified the top foreign policy objective was to "*combine the strength of the nation*

with that of the era/times; make full use of favorable international conditions to build socialism and defend the nation; and proactively create a stable environment to focus on economic development..."¹ At the end of that year, the direction of "*combining the strength of the nation with that of the times*" became one of the four lessons and the only foreign policy experience highlighted in the *Political report of the Fifth Central Committee to the Party's Sixth National Congress*.²

According to this direction, *national strength* is defined as internal strength of a nation state. It is the sum of all endogenous resources available within the country such as natural resources, economic capacity, defense capacity, human resources, culture, values, history, and so on. Meanwhile, the *strength of the times*, which is understood as the exogenous resources originating from major global trends such as peace, cooperation and development, scientific and technological revolution, knowledge-based economy, globalization, regionalization, democratization, and institutionalization, etc.

In terms of foreign affairs, the direction presented several implications: (1) The development of one country is inseparable from the development mainstream of the world; (2) Cooperation, not confrontation, is the key to ensure security. This perception paved the way for Vietnam's strategy of "making friends with all countries in the world" several years later; (3) Expanding relations with different countries regardless of their ideology and political systems is crucial to Vietnam's development. This is the cognitive basis for the policy of "multilateralization and diversification" adopted in the following years. Obviously, these implications marked a sea change in Vietnam's foreign direction. This lesson was further affirmed in the document titled, *Platform for National Construction in the Period of Transition to Socialism* (1991), the supplement and amendment of this Platform in 2011, the documents of the National Congress in subsequent years, and deployed in many aspects of the country's activities.

While the accession of Vietnam to ASEAN is a typical case study exemplifying how Vietnam handles relations nationally and internationally, nationality, and era, the relations between Vietnam and ASEAN prove the effectiveness and impact of the above foreign policy lesson. The following research will examine how the direction of combining the strength of the

¹ Phan Doãn Nam (2006). *Ngoại giao Việt Nam sau 20 năm đổi mới. Tạp chí Cộng sản*, 14, tr. 26–30.

² Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1987). *Văn kiện Đại hội Đảng toàn quốc lần thứ VI*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 99.

nation and that of the era influence on Vietnam's decision to become a member of ASEAN and the country's contribution to the development of ASEAN.

Vietnam's accession to ASEAN: Infusing the strength of era into national strength

Born in 1967, ASEAN was regarded as perhaps the last chance for the nations of Southeast Asia to achieve some kind of unity after efforts made to establish regional grouping had been ill-fated. However, due to differences in ideological prism and the involvements of some ASEAN states in the US war efforts in Vietnam, Vietnam decided to decline the invitation to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Bangkok in 1973. The relations between Vietnam and ASEAN during these years were characterized by stagnation, tension, and even confrontation for a decade after Vietnam had sent its troops into Cambodia in 1979.

The Sixth National Party Congress in 1986 made a shift in foreign policy and this pushed Vietnam into ASEAN's orbit. Hanoi proactively opened dialogue with ASEAN states for a settlement of Cambodia's problem, which was evident with the Jakarta Informal Meeting 1 and 2 (JIM 1 and JIM 2). In 1989, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach expressed Hanoi's desire to join ASEAN.³ In the Seventh National Party Congress (1991), CPV officially proclaimed that "*Vietnam wants to develop the relation of friendship with Southeast Asian nations and strive for a Southeast Asia of peace, friendship, and cooperation*".⁴ Subsequently, in 1991, Vietnam acceded the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, (TAC), and was granted observer status of ASEAN. Two years later during General Secretary Do Muoi's visit to Singapore and Thailand, Do announced a four-point policy concerning Vietnam-ASEAN relations. The policy highlighted "*Vietnam will increase multifaceted cooperation with individual neighboring countries as well as with ASEAN as regional organization*".⁵ It ended with a very important message that "*Vietnam is ready to join ASEAN at an appropriate time*".⁶ In response to Vietnam's eagerness to be a full-fledge member,

³ Nguyen Vu Tung (2021). 1978 to 1985: Coexistence between Two Opposing Groups, in: Nguyen Vu Tung (2021). *Flying Blind: Vietnam's decision to join ASEAN*. ISEAS, Singapore, p. 40–75.

⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (1994). Văn kiện Đại hội Đảng toàn quốc lần thứ VII. Hà Nội: Nxb. Chính trị Quốc gia, tr. 90.

⁵ Nguyen Vu Tung (2021). *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

⁶ *Ibid.*

ASEAN invited Vietnam to join and became the founding member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In July 1995, with Vietnam's efforts and ASEAN's goodwill, Vietnam officially became ASEAN's seventh member.

The lesson of 'combining the strength of the nation and that of the times' can be adopted to shed light to understand the underlying reason for Vietnam to change its attitude and policy towards ASEAN.

In terms of security and politics, eventual membership in ASEAN was expected to allow Vietnam to solve its three main problems at that time. *First*, the accession to ASEAN would remove the trade embargo and the diplomatic isolation that Vietnam had suffered since 1979. After the Cold War ended, an embargo was in place while Vietnam received no support from the recently collapsed Soviet Union and very limited aid from other socialist countries. This situation put Vietnam in a very difficult economic and political situation internally and externally. In particular, the embargo and isolation cut Vietnam off from many advanced postindustrial economies which had been preventing the country from obtaining external inputs for the country's economy reconstruction and development. Vietnam's accession to ASEAN was believed as one of the first steps to gradually draw Vietnam out of its isolation and embargo given that ASEAN was viewed as one of the "*most successful experiments in regionalism in the developing world*".⁷ In return, ASEAN's changed posture towards Vietnam's would result in the détente of countries and international organizations that had previously advocated ASEAN to go against Vietnam.

Second, Vietnam's accession to ASEAN would provide useful leverage for Vietnam in managing its relations with major powers, especially China and the US. Despite the end of the Cold War, great power politics was still the main factor looming large in the region and threatening Vietnam's security. They were, however, also potential partners to Vietnam's integration and development. Therefore, normalizing and improving relations with major countries breaks free the isolation status, opens up opportunities for Vietnam to integrate into the world in the short term, and preserves security in the long term. Given the complex relations between Vietnam and major powers, membership of ASEAN was likely to advance the political relationship of Vietnam with these countries. ASEAN's positive relations with all major powers and its vast array of cooperation mechanisms with these countries would be a diplomatic bonus to Vietnam.

⁷ Acharya, A. (1993). Trật tự khu vực mới ở Đông Nam Á: ASEAN trong thời kỳ hậu chiến tranh lạnh. *Tờ Adelphi*, số 279. tr. 3.

Third, in a long haul, Vietnam's admission to ASEAN potentially brings about peace and security not only to Vietnam, but also to the whole region. As a country which had undergone many wars in modern times, Vietnam was fully aware of the probability that Southeast Asia might become a hotbed of strategic rivalry between great powers. Therefore, a unity of all Southeast Asian countries in ASEAN is pivotal since it would greatly reduce the risk of security threats coming from competition for influence between powers and especially the interference of great powers into the region. Besides, being a member of ASEAN meets the needs of Vietnam, a peaceful, stable, and cooperative environment, which is conducive to the country's reconstruction and development after years of wars and crisis. Moreover, this accession also helps Vietnam take advantage of ASEAN's activities in international forums to construct a region of less confrontation, more cooperation, and détente as it had been after the end of the Cold War.

In terms of economy, ASEAN's membership was likely to provide Vietnam with favorable conditions that link the Vietnamese economy with trends of development and cooperation in the world. Since the 1970s, scientific and technological revolution had taken place worldwide, creating a leap in production. Internationalization and globalization erased borders, opened up markets, expanded trade, drew investments, and attracted modern technology and management skills between countries. In addition, the model of economic integration, inspired by the success of the European Union diffused to many regions in the world. Indeed, many Asian countries, including ASEAN-6⁸, benefited from these major trends. Fully aware of the development mainstream of the world, Vietnam considered rapprochement with ASEAN the key task of foreign policy. It had prepared for the accession since 1986. It was therefore no coincidence that in the same year, Vietnam set forth a Three Economic Program, one of which was aimed at promoting trade and investment relations. Also in 1986, Vietnam issued the decision on the development of a multi-sectoral economy, creating more room for private and foreign sectors in addition to the existing state-owned sector. In 1987, Vietnam passed the Law on Foreign Investment. These were all outward movements which were in line with the revised foreign policy and the direction of combining the strength of the nation and that of the times.

Economic cooperation with ASEAN countries was expected to help Vietnam gradually overcome the socio-economic crises at home from being

⁸ ASEAN-6 referring to the group of five founding members of ASEAN (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei).

a war-torn country since 1979, and also from the trade embargo imposed by the US with almost no aid from outsiders. Worse still, the failure of Vietnam's central planning economic model, especially the wage-price reform in 1985, resulted in serious economic conditions. Against this backdrop, only ASEAN countries had economic relations with Vietnam. Despite small scale, with growing momentum, Vietnam's economic relations with ASEAN countries would make a significant contribution to Vietnam's economic recovery. For Vietnam, ASEAN was also a good start before joining in wider arrangements in the world. ASEAN-6 countries, which shared similar starting points and conditions like Vietnam, had succeeded in international economic cooperation. Enhancing economic relations with these countries would provide Vietnam with development experiences. At that time, these economies were at a medium level of development; Vietnam's economic cooperation with those countries would also limit the risk of being oppressed and disproportionated dependent.

As a newly emerging economic block, which was possessing good partnerships with many developed countries, ASEAN provided Vietnam with a platform to socialize into international communities, especially, to forge new relations or enhance relations with developed countries. It would be more difficult for Vietnam to approach these countries on a bilateral basis than on multilateral mechanisms already formed by ASEAN. As a matter of fact, Vietnam's economic cooperation with developed countries was established thanks to regional mechanisms such as ASEAN+1 and ASEAN +3.

In the long term, joining ASEAN laid the ground for the Vietnamese economy to gradually integrate into the rest of the region and the world. In 1992, the organization established its own free trade area called the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Participating in AFTA had been an appropriate first step for Vietnam, a country that had never experienced international integration before it engaged in larger frameworks with the participation of developed countries. Vietnam's experience with ASEAN became a motivation for the country to continue its integration path, which was illustrated by the proposal of a policy of international integration at the Eighth National Party Congress in 1996 and its participation in Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation in 1998.

It is discernible that Vietnam's accession to ASEAN in 1995 was an important turning point in the country's foreign policy. This participation was expected to help Vietnam take advantage of external opportunities and resources to solve its problems and start its development process. For Vietnam, this is a sound diplomatic decision, which is in line with the main trends of the world, the situation and characteristics of the region, and the country.

The direction has also brought about obvious effects. This is a good use of the power of the times to develop the national strength of Vietnam in the first half of the 1990s.

Vietnam in ASEAN: The dialectical combination between national strength and strength of time

After Vietnam had joined ASEAN, the foreign direction in combination of national strength and strength of times has evolved in two dimensions. On the one hand, Vietnam has been taking advantage of the strength of the times from participating in ASEAN. On the other hand, Vietnam has actively contributed to ASEAN with its own national strength. This is a dialectical combination; Vietnam's contribution to ASEAN makes it stronger, whereas a well-developed ASEAN contributes more international strength to Vietnam. Vietnam's significant addition to ASEAN is reflected as follow:

First, Vietnam's accession to ASEAN in 1995 was itself a contribution to the development of ASEAN in three aspects: the expansion, cohesion, and collective strength of the Association. ASEAN's acceptance of Vietnam's membership is a testament to "*the tolerance of this regional organization towards countries with different political regimes, ideologies, levels of economic and social development in the region*".⁹ The benefits of Vietnam gained from ASEAN became the impetus for other countries such as Myanmar (1997) and the other two Indochinese countries such as Laos (1997) and Cambodia (1999). As a result, ASEAN became the fully legitimate representative organization for Southeast Asia as it was originally expected.¹⁰

For ASEAN cohesion, Vietnam's accession to ASEAN accelerated the reunification of Southeast Asian states in a common regional institution. ASEAN including Vietnam has changed its identity, opening expectations for a common mechanism that brings togetherness among countries in the region. This event has been recognized by Vietnam as "*in terms of geopolitics, Vietnam is the factor connecting groups within ASEAN and ending the di-*

⁹ Nguyễn Thu Mỹ (2006). Những đóng góp đối với sự phát triển của ASEAN kể từ khi gia nhập, in: Phạm Đức Thành và Trần Khánh. *Việt Nam trong ASEAN: Nhìn lại và hướng tới*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Khoa học Xã hội, tr. 36.

¹⁰ In 1996, when the initial idea of ASEAN was drafted, the then Malaysia's foreign Prime minister, Mr. Abdul Rahman went on record with the statement "*Our goal is a regional association comprising Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. We have no other option.*" [Urlyapov 2010:109.

vision of Southeast Asia (...) Vietnam's participation South to ASEAN created cohesion for the region".¹¹

The addition of Vietnam to ASEAN contributed to its collective strength as the group which consists of inherently small and medium-sized countries. Southeast Asia is no longer divided. Its unification helps to enhance the position and voice of ASEAN. The Indonesian Foreign Minister once commented on Vietnam becoming an official member of ASEAN in 1995:

“Vietnam will certainly increase our collective vitality and strength. Vietnam's strategic location, Vietnam's skilled workforce, and the country's rich natural resources will be a complement and will deepen the meaning of ASEAN's unity and cooperation.”¹²

Second, besides actively participating in ASEAN activities, Vietnam has been taking a number of initiatives in promoting its development. Over the past 26 years, Vietnam has successfully hosted many important ASEAN events and meetings, such as the 6th ASEAN Summit (1998), the 8th ASEAN Regional Forum (2001), ASEAN Plus Three Foreign Ministers Meetings, Meetings after the Foreign Ministers Meeting between ASEAN and Dialogue Countries (PMC + 10), meetings with each Dialogue Countries (PMC + 1), and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) Ministerial Meeting (July 2001). Vietnam was the Chairman of the 34th ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) (July 2000 to July 2001) and the rotating Chair of ASEAN twice, in 2010 and 2020.

Vietnam has championed numerous important initiatives, such as the Hanoi Plan of Action (1998) and the Hanoi Declaration on Narrowing Development Gap for Closer Integration (2001). These ideas and proposals provided collective direction for ASEAN countries to overcome the economic crisis in 1997—1998, narrow the development gap between sub-regions, which then created the premise for the establishment of ASEAN Community. One thing should not be missed is that the original idea of ASEAN Community consisted of only two pillars: political-security and economy. It was Vietnam that proposed socio-cultural pillars and initiatives on social welfare, education, and health in the process of implementing commitments to build the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). The addition of the social-cultural piece in the master plan of the Community delivered a more comprehensive, people-oriented, and sustainable format of

¹¹ Assessment from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the occasion of 20th anniversary of Vietnam's membership in ASEAN. Read [Lê Việt Duyên 2015].

¹² Nguyễn Thu Mỹ (2006). Op. cit., tr. 56.

ASEAN Community. In the relations between ASEAN and its external partners, Vietnam was the initiator of expanding East Asia Summit's membership (by promoting the admission of Russia and the United States to the East Asia Summit), promoting and organizing the first ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) in 2010.

Third, Vietnam has made considerable efforts to enhance the ASEAN's position in relations with outside partners. In addition to hosting the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM 5) in 2004 and launching the initiatives to expand the EAS and ADMM+, which were mentioned above, Vietnam has successfully assumed the role of coordinating ASEAN's relations with other partners. Specifically, Vietnam has been coordinating ASEAN relations with China (period 2009–2012), with the European Union (EU, period 2012–2015), with India (period 2015–2018) and is currently facilitating the relations of ASEAN – Japan (period 2018–2021).

Fourth, Vietnam has also been making remarkable contributions in specific areas. In the economic field, by mid-2020, Vietnam was one of the three countries which had the highest rate of implementation rate of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) measures (94 %).¹³ As for the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), Vietnam completed the reduction schedule in 2018 with the tariff elimination rate for the whole ASEAN states reaching more than 98.6 %.¹⁴ In terms of political and security, Vietnam has been taking credit for its efforts in internationalizing the South China Sea (SCS) issue and finding a peaceful solution based on international law, especially its steering and defending ASEAN's redlines in diplomatic negotiations on the Code of Conduct. Ralf Emmers and Le Thu Huong (2020) argued that Vietnam can be considered as a leading country in the field of security in the region, particularly in South China Sea issues.¹⁵

Compared to Vietnam's policy towards Southeast Asia and ASEAN before 1986, it is obvious that Vietnam has been turning itself into a far more active and constructive actor in foreign affairs. This is not simply the responsibility and obligation that Vietnam needs to meet as a member of ASEAN. It is in fact that the contribution of Vietnam to ASEAN brings about benefit to Vietnam's national strength in return. Consequently, main-

¹³ Vụ Chính sách thương mại đa biên (2020). Cộng đồng kinh tế ASEAN – Cơ hội và thách thức với Việt Nam. Retrieved on August 23, 2021.

¹⁴ ASEAN, thị trường tiềm năng cho hàng Việt Nam. *Báo Điện tử Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam*. Retrieved on July 20, 2021.

¹⁵ Emmers, R.& Huong Le Thu (2020.) Vietnam and the search for security leadership in ASEAN. *Asian Security*.

taining and developing ASEAN is crucial to Vietnam's policy. This is the reason why despite inherent weakness of ASEAN, Vietnam has always remained steadfast in ASEAN's policy. The regional organization has always been considered as one of the top priorities of Vietnam foreign policy, which has been frequently emphasized in Vietnam's foreign directions presented at congresses of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

Economically, ASEAN is a particularly important market of Vietnam. This is also the first market for Vietnamese products—in other words, a reagent for the competitiveness of Vietnamese products before they access wider markets.¹⁶ Data from the General Department of Vietnam Customs in 2019 showed that the total trade turnover of commodity between Vietnam and ASEAN reached \$57 billion USD, 10 times higher than that of 1995 and accounting for 11 % of the total export turnover of the whole country.¹⁷ For years, ASEAN has been the fourth largest export market of Vietnam after the US, EU, and China. In addition to the ASEAN market, on the basis of FTAs signed between ASEAN and its partners, Vietnam is increasingly expanding its economic relations with major economies, which are also trade partners of ASEAN.

From the political and diplomatic front, becoming a member of ASEAN helps Vietnam take steps to normalize its diplomatic relations with major countries in the world, approach regional and international institutions, and integrate into the international community. In 1995, Vietnam normalized diplomatic relations with the US. After that, Vietnam joined the ASEM in 1996 and APEC in 1998. After many years of negotiations, Vietnam officially became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2007. By 2020, Vietnam has been a member of more than 70 regional and international multilateral organizations and signed many multilateral economic agreements.¹⁸

In terms of defense and security, since 2006, defense and security activities between ASEAN, its member states, and partners have been enhanced in many specific fields with more substantive activities. Besides ARF, ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meetings (ADMM) became the venue where traditional and non-traditional security issues have been discussed. Many cooperation initiatives within the framework of ADMM such as ASEAN

¹⁶ ASEAN, thị trường tiềm năng cho hàng Việt Nam. Op. cit.

¹⁷ Tổng cục Hải quan (2020). Thống kê xuất khẩu theo quốc gia / vùng lãnh thổ xuất khẩu chính đến tháng 12 năm 2019. Retrieved on August 23, 2021.

¹⁸ Liên hiệp các tổ chức hữu nghị Việt Nam (2020). Việt Nam — thành viên tích cực, có trách nhiệm tại các diễn đàn đa phương. Retrieved on July 22, 2021.

Peacekeeping Centres Network (APCN); ASEAN Defense Industry Collaboration (ADIC); ASEAN Defense Interaction Program (ADIP); ASEAN Logistics Support Framework (LSF); The ASEAN Centre of Military Medicine (ACMM) were deployed to promote trust and enhance the coordination of countries to solve common security issues. In addition, within the mechanisms of ADMM+ and its dialogue partners, many activities related to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, military medicine, counterterrorism, humanitarian security, and cyber security are also conducted. Vietnam is able to take advantage of ASEAN's security mechanisms and relationships to manage conflicts in the South China Sea dispute. Through ASEAN, the South China Sea issue has been internationalized, which is illustrated by the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC) between ASEAN and China in 2002. Since 2016, when the Philippines changed its strategy on the South China Sea issue, Vietnam became the most active country in promoting the process of negotiating COC.

Thanks to the the support of ASEAN, Vietnam's international position in international forums has been enhanced. As a representative of the region, Vietnam was twice elected to the position of a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council with a high number of votes in 2008 and 2020. Also in 2020, according to the Asia Power Index issued by the Lowy Institute (Australia), Vietnam was listed in the group of Asian middle power and ranked at 12th over 26 countries. It is clearly that compared to 1995, Vietnam made an enormous leap in national power/strength, which was attributed to the combination of national strength and that of time through accession to ASEAN.

Conclusion

The policy of “*combining the strength of the nation and the strength of the times*” in 1986 was a strategic shift in Vietnam's foreign policy. This adjustment paved the way for breakthrough changes in Vietnam's diplomacy, making an important contribution to bringing Vietnam out of difficulties after decades of war. The direction on combining strength is formed based on the transformation in perception of the worldview and foreign ideology of the CPV.

Joining ASEAN is one of the first steps in realizing this policy. This step was in line with the general trend of détente and cooperation in the post-Cold War era and the mainstream of regionalization in Southeast Asia. Choosing ASEAN as the first multilateral regional institution for its integra-

tion was a rational decision. It was suitable to Vietnam's conditions and the situation in Southeast Asia. The integration process of Vietnam into ASEAN is favorable since it meets the needs of both sides.

From the Vietnamese side, the policy of “*combining national strength and the strength of the times*” is a vital mantra that governs both its accession and participation in ASEAN. Within the 26 years of joining ASEAN, Vietnam's combination of national strength and that of the era has been characterized by a two-way interaction. The accession helps Vietnam secure the country against external and internal threats, obtain the external inputs which are necessary to achieve economic prosperity and growth, and play an active role in international forums and global governance structures. In return, Vietnam's active participation in this organization has contributed to the strength of ASEAN and the peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

Given remarkable achievements Vietnam has gained in the relations with ASEAN, there is no doubt that Vietnam-ASEAN relations will continue to develop and Vietnam's direction of “*combining national strength and that of the times*” will continue to be the monolith in Vietnam's foreign policy in years to come.

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Chapter 33

HEIGHTENING VIETNAM'S POSITION IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH JAPAN (2012—2021)

Vietnam and Japan have a long history of bilateral relations, but diplomatic relationship was only officially established in 1973. Vietnam wants Japan to be an important partner, and is simultaneously keen on holding an advancing position in the bilateral relationship. As a country located in Southeast Asia, Vietnam's endogenous capabilities comes from its important geopolitical and geo-economic position. Besides, Vietnam also takes advantage of the global trend of cooperation and integration to become an important partner of countries in the region and the world. For Japan, Vietnam is considered as an increasingly important partner due to its great economic, security, political and diplomatic benefits. In spite of fluctuations in the past, the relationship between Vietnam and Japan has made remarkable progress in the period 2012—2021. Therefore, it can be said that Vietnam is making use of geopolitical and geo-economic values as well as opportunities of times to bring practical benefits to Japan. Since then, Vietnam's position in relations with Japan has been increasingly consolidated, strengthened and heightened.

Keywords: position, Vietnam, Japan, extensive strategic partnership.

Introduction

Japan is one of Vietnam's most important international partners. After a relatively passive period in the international arena and dependence on the alliance with the United States, since 2012, Japan has always consciously and gradually expanded its influence in the international arena. Under Prime Ministers namely Abe Shinzo and Suga Yoshihide, Vietnam is gradually becoming an important partner of Japan. Vietnam's position and role in diplomatic relations with Japan is increasingly changing in a positive direction for

Vietnam. In 2009, Vietnam and Japan officially established a strategic partnership. In 2014, bilateral relations were raised to a new height when the two countries agreed to upgrade “strategic partnership” to “extensive strategic partnership”. This article argues that, due to its position and interests, along with the policy of combining national capabilities and the opportunities of the times, Vietnam is becoming an increasingly important partner of Japan in the region. Although “strategic partner” is a relatively vague concept, compared with the relationship levels that Japan has with other important partners, it can be seen that Japan gives Vietnam a relatively high unique position due to the country’s strategic, diplomatic and economic benefits.

Factors affecting Vietnam’s position in the international arena

In order to heighten Vietnam’s position in the international arena, Vietnam has actively taken advantages of its national capabilities and opportunities of times. In other words, the combination of Vietnam geopolitical and geo-economic position, renewal of foreign policy, and opportunities of times enhance Vietnam’s either global or regional voice and image.

First, Vietnam’s geopolitical and geo-economic position is an extremely important factor, affirming Vietnam’s importance to major powers in the region and in the world. The major powers all want to exploit Vietnam’s geopolitical and geo-economic position. Vietnam has a relatively important geographical position because it is located on the junction between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, next to the South China Sea in which there are many important resources and transportation routes, and due to its economic potentials, which are enough to attract other countries to do business. But there is one more point that makes Vietnam’s sensitive geographical position — it is adjacent to China. It was the French’s efforts to break into China from the south that was an important reason for the colonialist invasion of Vietnam in 1858 — the beginning of the colonial period of nearly 100 years. It was also in order to prevent the influence of communism and the People’s Republic of China after the unification in 1949 that from 1950, the US tried to jump into Vietnam leading to a bloody war — the most severe and prolonged suffering — in the world since 1945 that the Vietnamese people have to endure. Vietnam’s history has been repeatedly “distorted” by the intervention of major countries, of which geo-political position is a cause.¹

¹ Hoàng Khắc Nam (2012). Một số yếu tố địa chính trị của Việt Nam: Nhận thức và thực tiễn. Tạp chí Nghiên cứu châu Âu, số? 148 (1), tr. 74.

In the context of increasing international and regional economic cooperation and integration, Vietnam is paying more and more attention to improving its geo-economic position. Compared to the geo-political position, which is more dependent on external factors, especially big countries, the geo-economic position is something that Vietnam can actively create and enhance when turning Vietnam to an important segment in the regional as well as global economic value chains. Sometimes, the economic benefits are large enough to increase the geopolitical role.² Vietnam is located at the life-line of the regional economy, where there are strong and dynamic economies considered as the growth engines of the region and the world. As a bridge between the maritime economic zones and the continental economies of Southeast Asia and Asia, Vietnam has favorable conditions to strengthen connectivity, promote cooperation and development in the region. *Firstly*, with the advantage of a “front” overlooking the South China Sea, Vietnam plays a key role in providing logistics services for either regional or external countries. *Secondly*, Vietnam is located on the Trans-Asia road in the project to build a highway, connecting the countries of Eurasia and Asia by initiated by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific initiated. Vietnam is also remained in the main axis of the East-West Economic Corridor connecting the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, which creates great potential in the socio-economic development of the countries of the Mekong sub-region and the Mekong River Delta. Thanks to those advantages, Vietnam has potentials to become a great power in the future³, and the country increasingly attracts attention and investment of many countries worldwide.

Second, Vietnam's foreign policy has changed in a positive and proactive direction, thereby giving appropriate foreign strategies and actions, helping to better protect its interests and further enhance its international status. Accordingly, Vietnam wanted to expand relations with other countries to maintain a peaceful and friendly environment. The seventh National Congress of the Communist Party (1991) stated the Vietnam's foreign policy of openness that “wants to make friend with all countries in the world community, striving for peace, independence and development”.⁴ The eighth National Congress of the Communist Party (1996) successively proposed and developed an independent, open, diversified, and multilateral

² Ibid., p. 74–75.

³ Hamada, Kazuyuki. (2020). *Cường quốc trong tương lai: Vẽ lại bản đồ thế giới năm 2030*. Hà Nội: Nxb. Thế giới, tr. 74.

⁴ Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, 1991.

foreign policy with the motto “Vietnam wants to be a friend of all countries in the international community, striving for peace, independence and development”.⁵ It can be seen that, compared to a somewhat timid attitude when only “making friend with all countries” in 1991, Vietnam has positioned itself with a higher and more proactive position in international relations when stating “to be a friend of all countries”. The motto “making friend with all countries” in the world may be appropriate at the time when Vietnam was starting to integrate with the regional and the world, or the integration was at early stage. However, when Vietnam integrates more deeply, it is also necessary to reorient the foreign relations in a profound way, or develop an overall diplomatic strategy not just focusing on economic realm, with a vision and orientation for each specific period of time.

Third, global trend of international integration, to some extents, forces Vietnam to gradually gel with the international community. After years being embargoed, Vietnam recognized international integration as a urgent demand, and therefore, the country had to accelerate its regional and global integration process to take advantage of external resources, actively and assertively participate in regional integration mechanisms and institutions led by ASEAN as well as multilateral forums and institutions to raise its voice. Clearly, Vietnam’s position has also been enhanced with the motto of combining national capabilities with the opportunity of the times, taking full advantage of favorable international conditions, especially global achievements and development trends. In particular, in the past few years, Vietnam has effectively implemented free trade agreements (FTA)⁶, and international agreements and commitments to expand the markets, attract external resources for the renewal of growth model, restructure the economy, promote industrialization and modernization of the country on the basis of science-technology and innovation, and high-quality human resources, etc.

Vietnam’s position in bilateral relationship with Japan

Vietnam’s position in relations with Japan is enhanced by the benefits that Vietnam can bring. Accordingly, for Japan, in each field, Vietnam’s rising position can be determined as follows:

First, economically, Vietnam is able to meet Japan’s economic development needs in the new period. Japan is a country with great industrial capacity. Right from the 1980s, the Japan entered the ripe stage of an industrialized economy. The Japanese economy, therefore, moved from a mature in-

⁶ To date, Vietnam has signed 15 FTAs, and is negotiating 2 other FTAs.

dustrial state to a knowledge economy. On one hand, Japan must invest in researching new technologies to build new industries. On the other hand, Japanese companies must speed up the process of transferring technology and management skills through direct investment in industries that require a lot of labor and raw materials. That is an opportunity to increase and attract investment capital as well as create or develop industries such as iron, steel, automobiles, cement, chemicals for developing countries and in the process of industrialization and modernization like Vietnam. Vietnam gradually becomes a place for technology transfer from Japan.

Thanks to a number of advantages, such as a large population, a relatively skilled workforce, experienced technicians, and especially stable politics and security, Vietnam often attracts foreign investments. Japan therefore also identifies Vietnam as a destination for its foreign investment. In 2013, the two countries approved “Vietnam’s industrialization strategy within the framework of Vietnam-Japan cooperation through 2020 with a vision toward 2030”.⁶ With that framework, Japan promises to invest in six key industries in Vietnam, including electronics, food processing, shipbuilding, agricultural machinery, environment and energy, and vehicle accessories. Japan has also pledged to support Vietnam in implementing large-scale infrastructure projects such as Lang — Hoa Lac Hi-tech Park, Ninh Thuan Nuclear Power Plant, North-South Expressway, Nghi Son Oil Refinery, etc. Moreover, Vietnam is assessed as an effective user of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in economic restructuring activities, improving infrastructure, combating environmental pollution and infectious diseases, and poverty reduction. Vietnam’s impressive results in socio-economic development thanks to Japan’s ODA in recent years have encouraged Japan to increase ODA for Vietnam. Thus, Vietnam is the largest recipient of ODA, and also the most important ODA partner of Japan.⁷

Although not the largest trading partner of Japan, Vietnam is still an important one. The Japanese government always pays attention to opening the market and creating favorable conditions for Vietnamese agricultural products to enter Japanese market, especially focusing on the four sub-sectors of seafood processing, rice, coffee, and vegetables. If Vietnam is able to improve the quality of those products, surely Vietnam’s market share will increase

⁶ Chính phủ nước Cộng hoà Xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam (2013). *Chiến lược công nghiệp hóa của Việt Nam trong khuôn khổ hợp tác Việt Nam - Nhật Bản hướng đến năm 2020, tầm nhìn 2030*. Retrieved on August 18, 2021.

⁷ Cơ quan hợp tác quốc tế Nhật Bản (2013). *Quan hệ đối tác Việt Nam - Nhật Bản từ quá khứ đến tương lai*. Retrieved on August 17, 2021.

rapidly. Cooperation in the field of agriculture, therefore, will be a priority in economic relations between the two countries in the coming time. During Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide's visit to Vietnam in October 2020, Japan took positive measures to help Vietnam fight the COVID-19 pandemic and overcome the consequences of floods in the central region, while emphasizing cooperation between the two countries to overcome challenges caused by the disruption of global production and supply chains due to the pandemic.⁸

Second, in terms of security and defense, cooperation is a new point in the Vietnam-Japan strategic partnership. For many years, security and defense were considered sensitive areas in bilateral relations, as Japan kept its pacifist restraint, and Vietnam was concerned about negative reactions from China. Things began to change in 2009, when China took a series of assertive and aggressive actions in territorial disputes with its neighbors, such as establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, and intensifying the construction of artificial islands and violating Vietnam's sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the South Sea. That makes Japan and Vietnam share a common interest, which are the abilities to maintain the status quo in the dispute with China, and the right to freedom of navigation, freedom of navigation, security and safety in the sea. The good cooperation between Japan and Vietnam is naturally the result of the two countries sharing security interests and concerns. China's overheated rise in general and naval power in particular as well as China's drastic moves in maritime disputes with Japan and Vietnam have threatened the status quo of the disputed area. That is something that Vietnam and Japan have always strongly opposed.

From the Japanese point of view, Vietnam is likely to be the most important strategic partner in the near future. For Japan, Vietnam not only has a large market base and an important resource supply for Japan's trade, investment and production activities, but also is an importantly capable player to maintain the balance of power in the region. More importantly, there are undoubtedly problems in the relationship between Vietnam and China, that are difficult to be resolved. Those beneficial factors have put Vietnam on the list of partners that need to be prioritized in the Japan's southward foreign policy.

For Japan, they are concerned not only about sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands but also the safety of shipping lanes, including those through the South China Sea which are even more crucial to Japan's energy security as 80 % of the country's oil imports are transported through that

⁸ Đỗ Nga (2020). Thủ tướng Suga thăm Việt Nam: Chuyến thăm thành công trên nhiều phương diện. *Thế giới & Việt Nam*.

sea.⁹ Maintaining maritime security, therefore, is one of Japan's top interests when it comes to strengthening relations with ASEAN countries, including Vietnam. Japan has provided the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam with maritime patrol boats.¹⁰ Japan's support for Vietnam in the modernization and capacity building of maritime law enforcement agency has become a priority in the defense relationship between the two countries. The assistance from Japan is very important and is a significant complement to Vietnam's efforts to strengthen its national defense.

Japan's preference for Vietnam is not limited to maritime security but also a range of other traditional and non-traditional security areas. Japan also recognizes Vietnam's role in relations with North Korea, because Vietnam to some extent can play a role in the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, which is a major security concern for Japan.¹¹ In particular, Japan is very sympathetic to the fight against the negative impacts of climate change, when Vietnam is among most heavily affected countries by climate change and sea level rise. Japan has provided ODA worth 10 billion Yen in the Support Program to Respond to Climate Change that the two countries signed. This program has made a positive contribution to sustainable economic development and climate change mitigation. Japanese partners also shared useful experiences for Vietnam in reconstruction after natural disasters¹².

Third, politically and diplomatically, due to Vietnam's strategic role and position in the region today, cooperation with Vietnam helps Japan improve its prestige and limit China's influence in the region. Since the 1997 Asian financial and monetary crisis, Japan has had to not only recover its economy, but also carry out a comprehensive reform, in order to create a new Japan that is either economically strong or politically important in the region as well as in the international arena.

Japan had been the world's second strongest economic power for many years before drowning into the state of economic recession. Its position and role in the world economy and politics has been challenged in the face of China's strong rise. Southeast Asia has become a strategic location for both

⁹ Koda, Yoji. (2016). Japan's Perceptions of and Interests in the South China Sea. *Asia Policy*, 21: 32.

¹⁰ Teo, V. (2020). Japan's Weapons Transfers to Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Challenges. *Perspective of ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute*, 70: 4-5.

¹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2013). *Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Visit to Viet Nam (Overview)*. Retrieved on August 21, 2021.

¹² Bích Ngọc (2018). Chuyên gia Nhật giúp Việt Nam nghiên cứu ứng phó biến đổi khí hậu. *VnExpress*, September 10.

China and Japan to assert their roles. There is no serious issue between Japan and Southeast Asian countries today. In the new context, when the major powers all have strategies to take advantage of Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN, considering the group of Southeast Asian countries as a necessary springboard to promote cooperation in the region, Japan therefore needs adjustments to be made.

Vietnam, the country with the second largest population in Southeast Asia, has big growth potentials. In addition, Japan's need to increase cooperation with Vietnam also comes from the desire to accelerate the process of creating a market economy in Vietnam, thereby gradually reducing the dependence of the Vietnamese economy on Chinese economy. The common concern of Vietnam and Japan is not only towards China's military modernization and territorial ambitions in the East China Sea and South China Sea, but also the strategic implications of too much dependence on the Chinese economy, or even the risk of turning from economic dependence to political dependence and military pressure. It should be noted that China is the largest trading partner of either Vietnam or Japan, and also causes Vietnam and Japan to suffer huge trade deficits. "Japan and Vietnam should avoid a heavy dependence on China that would narrow both countries' freedom of action."¹³ That is not only the wish of Japan but also in the global strategic consideration of the United States — Japan's closest military ally. In fact, both the United States and Japan are concerned about China, especially in recent years, when the Chinese economy has grown steadily. Therefore, promoting cooperation with Vietnam, on the one hand, creates an opportunity for Japan to increase relations with other Southeast Asian countries. On the other hands, it also helps Japan deal with China's spillover influence in the region.

In addition, given Vietnam's growing position in ASEAN, and considered as an important player in regional politics, Japan's attention to Vietnam is not unreasonable. Japan and Vietnam have cooperated effectively in international as well as regional forums such as East Asia Summit, ASEAN + 3 Summit. Moreover, looking at the list of important partners of Vietnam and Japan, it is easy to see that the two countries have many common partners, mainly in the Asia-Pacific. The opportunity for Vietnam and Japan to cooperate beyond the bilateral framework is entirely possible. Japan also wants to win the support of regional countries region for the post of permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. In this regard, Vietnam, with its rising status in Southeast Asia, has attracted the attention

¹³ Ogasawara, Takayuki. (2011). The Prospects for a Strategic Partnership between Japan and Vietnam. *AJISS-Commentary*, 124.

of Japan as a potential actor in East Asian politics. It should be noted that Vietnam is among few ASEAN countries that has supported Japan's bid to win the seat of a permanent member of the Security Council in the first place despite great diplomatic pressure from China. When Japan first floated the idea of winning a permanent membership of the Security Council, it was only supported by Vietnam and Singapore as other countries in ASEAN were under pressure from China¹⁴.

Because of Japan's strategic benefits that found in Vietnam, it can be affirmed that Japan is prioritizing Vietnam as one of the most important partners. Japan was the first country in the Group of 7 that established a strategic partnership with Vietnam. Vietnam's advancing position can be clearly seen in the statements of the Japanese Prime Ministers. In 2013, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo said that Japan and Vietnam had common interests in the Asia-Pacific region, mutually supported each other in the economic field, and at the same time Vietnam was one of the countries with a strategic partnership with Japan.¹⁵ For Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide, during his first foreign trip after taking office as Prime Minister, he also emphasized that Vietnam was an important partner of Japan, playing an important role when Japan conducted its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy.¹⁶

In addition, Vietnam's important position in Japan's foreign relations can be shown in a table revealing level of relationship between Japan and a number of its crucial partners. Notably, the "extensive strategic" partnership for peace and prosperity in Asia that the two countries established is the highest among Japan's relationship level with its Southeast Asian partners.

Table 1. Level of diplomatic relations between Japan and some important partners

Level	Partner	Highest Treaty or Agreement or Declaration	Year
<i>Ally</i>	The United States of America	Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan	1951
		Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan	1960

¹⁴ Wallace, Corey J. (2013). Japan's strategic pivot south: diversifying the dual hedge. *International Relations of the Asia Pacific*, 13(3): 479–517.

¹⁵ Tân Thủ tướng Nhật Bản Shinzo Abe trả lời phỏng vấn Tuổi Trẻ. *Tuổi Trẻ online*, 16.01.2013.

¹⁶ Nga Đỗ. *Op. cit.*

Level	Partner	Highest Treaty or Agreement or Declaration	Year
<i>Comprehensive strategic partnership</i>	Australia	Comprehensive Strategic, Security and Economic Partnership	2008
<i>Special Strategic and Global Partnership</i>	India	Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World	2015
<i>Extensive strategic partnership</i>	Vietnam	Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia	2014
<i>Strengthened Strategic Partnership</i>	Philippines	Strengthened Strategic Partnership for the Shared Principles and Goals of Peace, Security and Growth in the Region and Beyond.	2015
<i>Strategic Partnership</i>	European Union	Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement	2018
	Cambodia	Strategic Partnership	2013
	Thailand	Strategic Partnership based on the Enduring Bonds of Friendship	2012
	ASEAN	ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Prosperity Together	2011
	People's Republic of China	Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests	2008
	Indonesia	Strategic Partnership for Peaceful and Prosperous Future	2006
<i>Partnership</i>	Republic of Korea	A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century	1998

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. URL: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/>

Conclusion

In short, thanks to the historical background of a long-term relationship and common interests, the extensive strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japan is increasingly consolidated. On the Japanese side, it sees great strategic benefits in Vietnam. As a result, Vietnam's position in foreign rela-

tions with Japan is heightened. In terms of economy, Vietnam is a large market, rich in trade and investment potential. Vietnam also has an important position in ASEAN, so it is an extremely important partner of Japan at forums and cooperation mechanisms led by ASEAN. Vietnam is also important to Japan because the country is related to the US and China in terms of strategy and security, especially sharing concerns with Japan about China's rise. Japan sees in Vietnam the political and economic interests to build an extensive strategic partnership, and towards a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Therefore, not only becoming more important to Japan, Vietnam is in a relatively high position in the levels of partnerships that Japan establishes with its partners. It can be said that the strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japan has become clear in all aspects. An well-coordinated strategic relationship will be the foundation for the two countries to jointly develop their economies, such as Industry 4.0's applications which Japan has advantages, strengthen track-two and cultural diplomacy as well as the solidarity between the two peoples, and security and political cohesion for common interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

Vietnam's increasing position in foreign relations with Japan is clearly not only due to Vietnam's objective values and the interests in that Japan finds, but also to Vietnam's efforts in promoting and facilitating the development of relations between the two countries. That is a policy based on the combination of national capabilities and the opportunities offered by the times. The national capabilities of Vietnam make Japan pay attention and prioritize cooperation with Vietnam. On the contrary, the development of the Vietnam-Japan hybrid relationship enhances the strength and position of Vietnam in the region and in the international arena.

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Conclusion Chapter

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM IS THE INSPIRER AND ORGANIZER OF THE VICTORY OF THE AUGUST REVOLUTION

Dear readers!

You have acquainted with the most important milestones of the glorious historical path of the Communist Party of Vietnam, which will soon turn 100 years old. And this whole long way is an uninterrupted chain of outstanding, historic achievements of the Party, the recognized vanguard of the Vietnamese people. Established by Ho Chi Minh in 1930, the CPV from the very first days of its activity to the present time constantly and convincingly demonstrates that it is a party of living revolutionary creativity, a party of bold, non-standard decisions, a party of national unity and solidarity.

The creation of the Communist Party of Indochina (as the CPV used to be called) was a turning point in the history of Vietnam and the Vietnamese national liberation movement. Since that day, the struggle of the Vietnamese people against the colonialists for national liberation has assumed decisive forms. In October 1930, in two provinces of Central Vietnam — Nghe An and Ha Tinh, mass protests of the peasantry against the colonial order began, which were led by the newly created communist party. In 116 villages of both provinces, Soviets were created following the example of Russia — the first organs of people's revolutionary power in Vietnam. The Ngetian Soviets, as they were called by the people, for almost a year, were islands of freedom and independence in colonial Indo-China, until they were liquidated by the colonialists. As Ho Chi Minh said 30 years later, the Nghetinh Soviets forged forces for the victory of the August Revolution.

In May 1941, the 8th plenum of the Central Committee of the ICP, took decision to change the strategy of struggle. The resolution of the plenum stated that at this stage the task of the revolution in Indochina was

to drive out the French colonialists and Japanese occupiers and win independence. To this end, it was decided to create the League for the Independence of Vietnam — the Viet Minh Front, in order to rally the various classes, nationalities, religions, political parties, individual patriots and win independence of Vietnam.

Of all the political forces in Vietnam at that time, only the Viet Minh Front, created by the communists, was able to mobilize and organize the masses of people with its “liberation committees” created in many provinces of the country. In August 1945, the nationwide uprising that began in Hanoi under the banners and slogans of the Viet Minh rolled irresistibly to the south, and in just 12 days the revolution won throughout the country. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed on September 2, 1945.

Undoubtedly, the defeat of militaristic Japan, with the tremendous contribution of the Soviet Union to this, became the main condition for the victory of the August Revolution. But this victory was won by the Viet Minh Front largely due to the skillful use of the ICP under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh favorable external and internal conditions. The August Revolution was launched at a time when the Japanese troops, although they did not capitulate, were paralyzed, and the Allies had not yet landed. The anti-communist forces in Vietnam were confused and weak. But no “luck” would have helped if the ICP had not accurately calculated the situation and determined the decisive moment for a general uprising in the current revolutionary situation.

For the first time in the history of revolutions of the peoples of colonial and semi-colonial countries, a party barely 15 years old led a national democratic revolution in the country and led it to success. The victory of the August Revolution, which led to the formation of the first people's democratic state in Southeast Asia, opened a new historical stage for the Vietnamese people. Being national and people's democratic in nature, the August Revolution and the proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on September 2, 1945 became the victorious end of the almost century-long struggle of the Vietnamese people against colonialism, marking the beginning of collapse of the colonial system in Southeast Asia. The August Revolution rightfully entered the history of the world national liberation movement as one of the brightest examples of the revolutionary creativity of the masses, led by the Communist Party.

At the same time, the August Revolution did not completely liberate Vietnam from French colonial rule. France did not want to accept the loss of Indochina, and in December 1946 the first Indochina War began, known in Vietnam as the Resistance War. In the extremely difficult situation that

had arisen, the ICP again showed political wisdom — as early as November 1945, it went underground, although it continued to lead both the Viet Minh and the state bodies of the young republic. Understanding well that the colonialists have undeniable military superiority at the initial stage of the intervention, the ICP countered the enemy's plan of lightning war with the strategy of a protracted all-people's Resistance War with the widespread use of guerrilla methods of struggle.

International changes favorable to the DRV soon followed. In 1949 the People's Republic of China was proclaimed, and in January 1950 the USSR, the PRC and other socialist countries declared their recognition of the DRV. In February 1951, the 2nd Congress of the ICP was held, at which a decision was made to transform its Vietnamese part into the Workers' Party of Vietnam (WPV). In 1950—1951 the armed forces of the DRV conducted an extensive military campaign in the north-west of the country in order to break through the blockade, which made it possible to provide outside assistance to the struggling Vietnam. In March 1954, the decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu began, which ended on May 7 with the complete surrender of the French expeditionary force. Under these conditions, France was forced to agree to the proposal of the Soviet Union, agreed with the DRV, to consider at an international meeting in Geneva the question of ending the war in Indochina.

The outcome of the Geneva Conference, although a compromise — a temporary division of Vietnam into two parts along the 17th parallel and the holding of general elections within two years to reunify the country, was an important respite for the WPV. Decade 1954—1964 became one of the most difficult stages in its activities and history. On the one hand, the party solved the problem of reviving the North of the country, bringing it out of the post-war devastation, on the other hand, it fought for the implementation of the two most important provisions of the Geneva Accords: holding of general elections in both parts of the country and its reunification.

These two vital tasks were opposed by the USA. Washington regarded the Geneva Accords as a “catastrophe”, since an analysis of the situation in South Vietnam made by American experts showed that if free general elections were held, the Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh would inevitably win them. And in the US administration, the belief became dominant that whoever controls Vietnam controls the entire region of Southeast Asia. By the beginning of the 1960s, with this in mind the USA firmly took a course to perpetuate the partition of Vietnam and turn its southern part into a stronghold of US imperialism in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the US-backed government of Ngo Dinh Diem in power in Saigon refused to abide by the Geneva

Accords and disrupted the general election. Mass repressions against communists and participants in the War of Resistance began in the South.

In the circumstances, the leadership of the WPV came to the conclusion that under the growing aggressive US policy aimed at perpetuating the division of Vietnam, political and diplomatic measures alone, within the framework provided for by the Geneva Accords, are no longer enough. On September 5–10, 1960, the 3rd Congress of the WPV was held in Hanoi — “the Congress of the builders of socialism in the North and the struggle for the peaceful reunification of the country.” At the Congress, it was noted that since the 2nd Congress, cardinal changes had taken place in the political and socio-economic situation of the country. The country won independence, the party, which had been working underground for many years, became the ruling one. The resolution of the congress stated that after the restoration of peace in 1954, a fundamentally new stage had begun in the development of the Vietnamese revolution, therefore two strategic tasks of the Vietnamese revolution were formulated: the implementation of the socialist revolution in the North and the liberation of the South from the domination of American imperialists, the unification of the country.

In accordance with the course outlined by the 3rd Congress of the WPV, on December 20, 1960, in one of the villages of Tey Ninh province, 90 kilometers from Saigon, a Congress of representatives of patriotic organizations was held, which proclaimed the creation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF). Shortly after its formation the NLF came up with a detailed 10-point Action Program. This document emphasized the determination of the population of the South to expel the American interventionists, to create an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Vietnam, developing towards national reunification, as was envisaged by the Geneva Accords.

Southerners who had undergone retraining began to return to the South — the PTV’ cadres and military specialists. They were to create the backbone of the future political and armed resistance forces. The supply of weapons was also organized, at first through the demilitarized zone (DMZ), and after the military successes of the Patriotic Front of Laos through Lao territory. The construction of the legendary “Ho Chi Minh trail” began — an extensive system of roads laid in the dense jungle, bypassing the DMZ through Laos and further south, which in some places also entered the territory of Cambodia.

Despite all the efforts of the United States, which provided ever-increasing military-political assistance and support to the Saigon regime, the NLF by the end of 1964 — the beginning of 1965 managed to significantly expand the territories under its control, strengthen its influence in them, and even

enter the international arena through a network of its official representatives in the USSR, the PRC, the countries of people's democracy and in some non-aligned countries of Asia.

In an effort to save the Saigon regime from complete collapse and keep South Vietnam under its control, the US government set out to unleash an air war against North Vietnam. On August 7, 1964, President L. Johnson passed through the US Congress the so-called "Tonkin Resolution", which gave him the authorization for the unrestricted use of American military forces in the region.

After the very first aggressive actions against North Vietnam, the WPV launched a broad political and organizational activity to mobilize all segments of the country's population to repulse the enemy. The fighting slogans of the Second Resistance War were the words from Ho Chi Minh's address to the people on July 17, 1966: "The war may last another 5, 10, 20 years or longer. Hanoi, Haiphong and other cities and enterprises may be destroyed, but the Vietnamese people will not be intimidated! Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom. Once victory is won, our people will rebuild our country and endow it with bigger and more beautiful constructions."¹ Southeast Asia has become one of the most "hot spots" on the planet again. The new situation demanded from the WPV a fundamental change in the strategic line and tactical actions. On the one hand, with the help of the Soviet Union, a powerful air defense system was created in the North, which American generals qualified as never known in the history of wars. On the other hand, the military-political pressure on the United States and its minions in the South was radically increased.

In July 1967, the 14th Plenum of the WPV CC took a decision to begin preparations for a broad counteroffensive in the South in order to bring the victorious end of the war closer through a major and successful operation. After all, this is how the First Resistance War against the French colonialists ended after their crushing defeat in the operation at Dien Bien Phu that went down in history. On the night of January 31, 1968, in the Tet holiday (Lunar New Year festival), units of the PAVN liberated the ancient capital of Hue with an unexpected blow. At the same time, strikes were carried out in almost 100 cities and large settlements throughout South Vietnam. Numerous bases, warehouses, airfields, command posts, including the US Embassy in Saigon, were assaulted. The 1968 offensive greatly undermined the morale of both the US administration and US troops and marked an important turning point in the course of the war.

¹ Hồ Chí Minh. Vì độc lập, vì chủ nghĩa xã hội. Hà Nội, 1970, tr. 282.

In the course of a continuous struggle against imperialist aggression (1965—1973), the WPV achieved a flexible, effective combination of armed, political and diplomatic forms of struggle. This ultimately forced the United States to negotiate with the DRV and the NLF, and in January 1973 to sign the Paris Agreement on peace and the withdrawal of the American troops from Vietnam, as a result the liberation of South Vietnam and the reunification of the country became possible two years later. At the 4th Congress of the WPV (1976), which was named “the Congress of the Victors”, historic decisions were made: the united country was named the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), and the WPT — the Communist Party of Vietnam, which it has always been in essence.

And, finally, the last achievement of the Communist Party of Vietnam, perhaps no less significant than the victories in the two Resistance Wars — the “doi moi” policy, a new strategic course for the development of a single country, which was timely adopted in 1986 and the successfully implemented. As you know, by the mid-1980s, the world socialism, especially the main pillar of Vietnam — the Soviet Union, entered the stage of an insurmountable crisis, which could not but affect Vietnam. Under these complex conditions, the Communist Party of Vietnam once again rose to the occasion and at the fateful 6th Congress found courage to admit its mistakes and a need to shape a new strategic course for the development of the country, which was called a policy of renewal.

At the same time, the CPV, in contrast to the then leadership of the CPSU, took a fundamentally different formula as a basis for the renovation reforms: economic reforms must precede political ones, while the latter must be carried out on a basis of economic achievements and improvement in the material well-being of the population. As a result, the following main components of the “doi moi” policy were formulated:

- implementation of radical structural economic reforms in order to break the administrative-command model of socialism and drop barriers for free enterprise and the formation of market relations in the economy;
- building “market-oriented socialism” while maintaining the traditional political mechanism as a whole and on the basis of the political stability of society provided by the CPV;
- an open, multi-vector foreign policy aimed at accelerating the integration of the country both economically and politically into the world community.

The fact that the name “the renewal policy” turned out to be visionary became clear by the end of the first 10 years of the new course implementation. If in the 70s and 80s of the last century, according to the UN,

Vietnam was one of the 25 most backward and poorest countries in the world, but by the mid-90s it broke into the group of world leaders in terms of economic growth. The country, whose population had lived on the edge of starvation for many decades, surprisingly quickly solved the problem of food shortages and became one of the world's largest rice exporters. Impressive economic achievements, coupled with an open foreign policy, contributed to a fundamental change in the international image of Vietnam. From a backward country with a hypertrophied military potential, Vietnam has turned into a solid, trustworthy and reliable partner in the eyes of the world community.

From the very beginning of the “doi moi” policy, the CPV formulated several fundamental principles of political reform, which are still firmly adhered to today, namely:

- strengthening the leadership role and political positions of the CPV as the main driving force and guarantor of reforms;
- gradual democratization of social and political life under the control of the party on the basis of the principle “democracy must be guided”;
- resolute rejection of the principles of multi-party system and political pluralism.

Undoubtedly, the weightiest political master card of the CPV should be recognized the fact that the new strategic course of development proposed by it was a very effective means for quickly leading the country out of the socio-economic crisis and stimulating the processes of national modernization while maintaining political stability and social peace. That is why the “doi moi” policy has found the broadest support not only of the CPV members, but of the entire Vietnamese people. Having witnessed the collapse of the European model of socialism, which caused the disintegration of entire states and bloody conflicts, the Vietnamese people, whose two generations in the middle of the 20th century went through several protracted and cruel wars, strongly spoke out in favor of the option proposed by the CPV for the gradual reform of socialism without dramatic upheavals and the flip and flop policy.

Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong, one of its main ideologists of the CPV quite reasonably stated the position of the party on this issue: “We cannot allow the concepts of “democracy” and “human rights” to be used to undermine the political system, violate the established order or lead to interference in internal affairs of the country ... We believe that in Vietnam there are no objective conditions for the recognition of political pluralism and opposition multi-party system, this is not allowed by the political situa-

tion, the economic level, the social situation, the cultural level of the population and the laws of the country ...”.²

The CPV, being the guiding force in the development of Vietnamese society, within the framework of the process of “controlled democratization”, is gradually abandoning many characteristics of the “state party”. The party manages the economy only at the macro level, defining at plenums and congresses a long-term strategy for the country’s economic development. The political and legislative role of the National Assembly is increasing year by year, openness and greater freedom of expression are expanding in the media.

The renewal policy not only saved Vietnam from falling into the abyss of an unpredictable crisis, but also ensured its fairly rapid economic rise. So, in 2020, Vietnam entered the list of the 40 largest economies in the world and ranks the 4th place in terms of size of the economy among the ASEAN countries. Vietnam is also one of the 10 fastest growing economies. From year to year, the role and authority of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in regional and international organizations is growing.

Today, the CPV sets before its cadre workers and party members the task of developing Vietnam as a “prosperous and happy country”, which should become a “developed state of socialist orientation” by the middle of the 21st century. Adopted at its 13th Congress (2021), the 10-year strategy for socio-economic development for the period up to 2030 provides for the transformation of Vietnam into a developing country with a modern industry and a high average income level of the population, a country that successfully develops partnerships with all the great powers and the main world political and economic centers.

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